Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
May 24, 2019
Document Release Date: 
May 30, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 29, 1952
Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 d02016344 , J. U.E1 Nire SECJJTfINFORMATION 29 March 1952 3.5(c) Copy No.4 (4 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLAGn. PECLASS:FIED CLM5.3. CP, 70: NEXT AUTH: DATE.risr!1 3.5(c) Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP SECRET 3.5(c) SEC INFORMATION Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2016344 Approved for Release: 2019/65/08 CO2016344 T1ZD SErCRET 3.5(c) SUMMARY USSR I. Soviet Ambassador to Sweden encourages Nordic Alliance (page 3). FAR EAST 2. 3. North Korean Mr Force increases activity at Sariwon (page 4). NEAR EAST - AFRICA 4. Iranian Prime Minister reportedly will remain in office (page 5). 5. Greek Government agrees with Turkey on NATO command (page 5). WESTERN EUROPE 6. French weigh possibilities of new Berlin blockade (page 6). 7. French Cabinet seen safe until June (page 7). LA TIN AMERICA 8. Possible military coup in Colombia (page 7). * * * * -2 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) TOP ET Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2016344 3.5(c) 1� Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2016344 '19P CRET USSR 1. Soviet Ambassador to Sweden encourages Nordic Alliance: On 17 March the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden reportedly expressed the opinion to Prime Minister Erlander that Sweden and the USSR should cooperate to their mutual advantage. at the Nordic Alliance would become a reality and that Sweden would attempt to persuade Finland to join such a pact. Prime Minister Erlander indicated that his country had no wish to interfere in Finnish affairs. Comment: This report, if true, represents the first direct Soviet approach regarding a Nordic Alliance, and lends credence to previously reported rumors of Soviet interest in the subject. The primary objective of this maneuver is to prevent the further westward orientation of Sweden and the fulfillment of Norway's and Denmark's commitments in NATO. Previous tentative suggestions along this line have found no support in Scandinavian capitals. FAR EAST 2. Chinese Communist division in Korea receives gas masks: TOP ET Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2016344 Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2016344 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) I It is possible that the arrival of this equipment is linked with the recent expansion of Communist charges of American use of biological war- fare in Korea to include use of chemical warfare. Gas masks are not believed to be standard equipment in either the Chinese Communist or North Korean army. The small size of this issue in relation to the 7,000 to 8,000 men in the 7th Artillery Division may indicate an initial delivery. 3. North Korean Air Force increases activity at Sariwon: United Nations aerial reconnaissance on 24 March disclosed that two airfields in the Sariwon area, 35 miles south of Pyongyang, had been repaired and that their runways were operationaL Comment: 3.3(h)(2) The enemy's unwillingness, thus far, to provide adequate jet fighter coverage this far south would seem to rule out Sariwon's utility as an operational Communist airfield. It is possi- ble, however, that the Communists are seeking to establish operational air installations within North Korea either in anticipation of a cease- fire or in preparation for a renewed offensive. - 4 - 3.3(h)(2) TOP RET Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2016344 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2016344 P RET 3.5(c) NEAR EAST - AFRICA 4. Iranian Prime Minister reportedly will remain in office: Prime Minister Mossadeq apparently has decided not to resign when the new Majlis meets, according to Minister of Court Ala. Mossadeq, in conversation with Ala, spoke as though he intended to remain in office indefinitely, and indicated that he will abandon efforts to revive Iran's oil industry and concentrate on balancing the national budget without the oil income. The Shah has left Tehran for a ten-day rest. According to Ala, the Shah had been counting on Mossadeq's voluntary resignation. Comment: Mossadeq recently told a special Iranian Senate committee that he intended to concentrate on the Iranian budget and would in particular attempt to collect taxes from those merchants and landlords who had so far evaded payment. Meanwhile, Iran's financial situation is steadily growing worse, and the funds available to the government for the month ending 21 March barely covered government salaries and wage commit- ments. 5. Greek Government agrees with Turkey on NATO command: The Greek Government has informed the Turkish Foreign Office that it will continue o act in concert with Turkey on NATO problems. pecifically, it assured Turkey that it will not gree to an Italian commander for Greek troops as long as Turkey is unwilling to accept him for Turkish troops. The Greek Government is considering suggest- ing that an Italian commander be appointed for a new western sector of Admiral Carney's land command and an American to command an eastern sector, which will include Greece and Turkey. - 5 - 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2016344 Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2016344 3.3 WESTERN EUROPE 6. French weigh possibilities of new Berlin blockade: the Russians are planning a blockade o Berlin, possibly extended this time to include the air corridors to the city. French Foreign Office officials, while not unduly disquieted is a possibility of some sort �Ub�k�bud5fl$tU1Tnk it would be extended to air communication, believe that there Comment: While a blockade now could serve as pressure on the West to agree to a four-power conference on the whole German question, such a move appears unlikely at this time. Although the USSR can now by-pass the Western sectors of Berlin by rail, the canal by-pass will not be completed before fall. Combined, these two projects are designed to reduce vulnerability to Allied retaliation. A blockade now might also destroy the appeal of the current Soviet campaign for unification and a peace treaty. 6 3.5(c) (h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) TOP ET Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2016344 3.5(c) nApproved for Release: 2019/0E708 CO2016344 I11SECRET 3.5(c) 7. French Cabinet seen safe until June: 3.3(h)(2) French Premier Pinay has been so successful in obtaining public support for his "stability- without-sacrifices" program that his budget proposals will probably be approved by the As- sembly early in April, in the opinion of the American Embassy in Paris. He would then be assured tenure until June, because of public pressure that he should be given time to apply his program. Most of the deputies expected to vote for his budgetary program have serious doubts, however, that it is practical enough to avert a collapse later in the year, should his "confidence" policy fail. The Embassy considers that, in this event, pressure for cutting French commitments in Indochina would rise. Comment: Most competent observers have been pessimistic on Pinay's chances of success. While the French public's unprecedentedly active interest in the recent government crisis may temporarily avert a parliamentary showdown over partisan issues, there is no evidence that his "climate of confidence" is a satisfactory substitute for financial reform. LA TIN AMERICA 8. Possible military coup in Colombia: President Gomez and President-designate Urdaneta both fear that extreme rightists in Colombia may attempt a military coup, \ Increased dissatisfaction with government policy in coping with guerrilla activities has reportedly led a group of high army officers, headed by Com- mander of the Army Colonel Mariano ()spina o p an a revolt. The government now plans to purge the armed forces of officers whose loyalty to the present regime is doubtful. - 7 - 3.3(h)(2 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) TOP Anoroved for Release: 2019/05/08 CO2016344 Approved for Release: 2019/0-5./08 CO2016344 Te..,EfECRET 3.5(c) Comment: Despite heavy governmental expenditures for anti-guerrilla action, insurgent strength has increased in personnel, organization and arms, and has seriously lowered the prestige of the present administration. The government's counter- measures can be expected to avert any immediate threat, but political instability will continue because of increased army dissatisfaction with failure to suppress guerrilla activities. Some individual Communists have been reported cooperating with guerrilla bands, which in general, support the Liberal Party. To date there has been no indication that the Communist Party has adopted cooperation as a policy. 8 3.5(c; Approved for Release: 2019/05/08 002016344