CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/06/09
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02018022
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
August 20, 2019
Document Release Date:
August 30, 2019
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Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 9, 1954
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15689422].pdf | 377.18 KB |
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l's�P410'
9 Sune 1954
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO __,
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
L I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE 1-10 IC
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 4/60 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
F
3.3(h)(2)4.
3.5(c)
orio
CORD
PLEA,3L �L,AN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
/
/
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1'J1' LKL1
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Comment on Molotov's 8 June speech at Geneva (page 3).
2. Briggs fears early South Korean withdrawal from Geneva talks
(page 4).
3,
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Navarre foresees destruction of Vietnamese units in southern
delta (page 5).
5. Viet Minh document assesses French delta situation (page 6).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. British ask ARAMCO to leave disputed Trucial Coast area (page 6).
7. Syrian extremist (page 7).
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Bloc conference in June to discuss East-West trade (page 7).
9. Moscow apologizes for mistreatment of Yugoslav diplomats (page 8).
WESTERN EUROPE
10. De Gasperi sees fall of government in event of unsatisfactory Trieste
solution (page 9).
11. Comment on linden's call for reassessment of Scandinavian posi-
tion (page 9).
LATIN AMERICA
12.
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GENERAL
1. Comment on Molotov's 8 June speech at Geneva
Judging by preliminary press reports,
Molotov' s 8 June speech at Geneva has
again made it clear that the Communists
have no intention of reaching an early
cease-fire agreement or abandoning
their maximum demands on Indochina at
this time. The speech states publicly
the hard line which the Communists have been taking in private
in three weeks of restricted 'sessions on Indochina.
The only new proposal is that the Indo-
china sessions of the conference discuss political and military
problems on alternate days, and that representatives of the two
commands discuss political questions just as they have been dis-
cussing military matters. The Communists have insisted all along
that "at least some" political problems must be connected with a
truce.
Molotov suggested specifically that the
talks consider the "true independence" of Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia, "free" elections in these states, and withdrawal of
foreign troops. This is a restatement of the Viet Minh proposal of
10 May.
The Communists now appear more than
ever convinced that they will continue to achieve military successes
in Indochina and that these successes plus political developments in
Paris will eventually force the French government either to move
toward the Communist position at Geneva or to give way to a new
government which would be more amenable. Molotov's unyielding
attitude is likely to have the immediate effect, however, of strength-
ening French Premier Laniel's position by helping him to convince
the National Assembly that he is making every effort to obtain an
acceptable settlement but is being balked by the Communists. It is
also likely to result in increased pressure on the French government
for an appeal to_lcheUNandter military assistance from the
US and Britain.
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2. Briggs fears early South Korean withdrawal from Geneva talks:
President Rhee's feeling that the Geneva
discussions are futile may prompt him to
terminate further South Korean participa-
tion in the conference by the end of this
week, Ambassador Briggs warned on 7 june.
3.
Briggs said Rhee may do so to get the 15
June Asian anti-Communist conference at Chinhae, a project very
close to his heart, "off with a bang."
� Comment: Briggs has reported several
times recently that Rhee will become extremely difficult to deal with
once the United States concedes the failure of the Geneva conference
to unify Korea.
The proposed Chinhae conference is a
gathering of 23 unofficial delegates from South Korea, Viet Nam,
the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Thailand, Nationalist China and Hong
Kong which Rhee originally scheduled for 26 April. It will be pri-
marily a propaganda forum seeking to influence American support
for South Korean foreign policy objectives.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Navarre foresees destruction of Vietnamese units in southern delta:
� In a conversation on 4 June with the
American charg�n Saigon, General
Navarre was scornful of the morale of
the Vietnamese army and predicted its
forces in south Tonkin would be "fleeced like sheep" by the Viet
Minh. Navarre later admitted that some Vietnamese units had fought
gallantly in recent engagements and could perform creditably under
proper leadership.
The charg�ad the distinct impression
Navarre would feel an "inward, sardonic satisfaction" if the Viet-
namese units in south Tonkin were "chewed to bits" by the Viet Minh.
Comment On previous occasions, Navarre
expressed in the strongest terms his contempt for the Vietnamese army
and his doubt of the existence of any patriotic spirit around which a
national army could be built. Navarre's attitude explains in large part
the failure of the French to instill confidence and a sense of responsi-
bility in the Vietnamese army.
Navarre's emphasis at this time on the
weakness of the Vietnamese army is probably an attempt to excuse
his failures.
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5. Viet Minh document assesses French delta situation:
A captured Viet Minh document dated
31 May gives a remarkably accurate
estimate of French plans in the Tonkin
delta and issues instructions for Viet
Minh commanders pending commitment
of thff battle corps,
The document estimates that the French
will abandon many fortifications, put Vietnamese army units in a
static role, and establish mobile forces in a reduced area. Command-
ers are told to continue present harassing activities, take over evac-
uated. areas promptly, am make final assaults on posts only when sure
of success. Subversion of Vietnamese troops and the prevention of
Vietnamese army recruitment are to be important objectives.
Comment: In the past, Viet Minh intelli-
gence has frequently been well informed on French tactics.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. British ask ARAMCO to leave disputed Trucial Coast area:
Ambassador Wadsworth in Jidda reports
that on 5 June a British aircraft dropped
a message to the ARAMCO exploratory
party in the disputed Trucial Coast area
asking it to return immediately to Saudi Arabia as it was trespassing
in British-controlled Abu Dhabi,
R. L. Keyes, president of ARAMCO, re-
plied to Britain's Persian Gulf political resident that the party would
be dispersed soon, but only in accordance with seasonal program-
ming and without prejudice either to Saudi rights and claims or to
ARAMCO's concession. Keyes also told the British he had instructed
the party to continue to the coast. He anticipated that the party would
be out of the disputed area by the evening of 8 June.
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Comment: ARAMCO probably feels it
must take this position in order not to give the Saudi government
� any pretext to award the company's concession rights in the dis-
puted territory to the British in return for political control. Saudi
officials have already cited lack of American support in this dis-
pute as the reason for their threat to terminate Point IV activities
in Saudi Arabia.
7. Syrian extremist
Comment: The situation in Syria is
deteriorating markedly. The coalition caretaker cabinet has not
yet agreed on a date for the elections and is bitterly opposed by
strong army factions. Rumors of the government's resignation and
possible coups are circulating.
Hawrani--reportedly with one fifth of the
army's officers behind him--appears to be the most serious of many
threats to the regime. A government dominated by extreme nationalist
Hawrani would probably adopt a non-co-operative policy in its deal-
ings with the West.
EASTERN EUROPE
Bloc conference in June to discuss East-West trade:
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The meeting, which is "to be an answer
to the recent Paris conference on relaxation of East-West trade
controls," may be the quarterly session of the bloc's Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).
Comment: A 17 May circular message
from the Czech Foreign Trade Ministry to its representatives in
Orbit countries urgently emphasized the need for a trade conference
to be held in Moscow about 1 June. Information requested by the
ministry suggests that the bloc may be planning to launch a co-ordi-
nated effort to increase trade with the West in order to take advantage
of the expected relaxation in Western trade controls.
A leading role played by China, not known
to be a member of CEMA, would suggest consideration of a systematic
bloc program for procuring industrial goods for China.
9. Moscow apologizes for mistreatment of Yugoslav diplomats:
On 4 June the Soviet government, accepted
responsibility and apologized for the dis-
courteous treatment of Yugoslav diplomats
in Moscow and gave assurance that in the
future the Yugoslav embassy would receive all privileges customarily
accorded the diplomatic corps.
Ambassador Bohlen comments that he can
recall no instance in the recent past of "so complete an admission of
error" by the Soviet government, even though the incidents involved
unusually flagrant discrimination.
Comment: This reply to the Yugoslav
government's recent protest marave been intended to demonstrate
Soviet good faith in "normalizing" relations in response to various
Yugoslav expressions of doubt on this score. For the past six months,
Soviet efforts in this direction have diminished. A general revival of
trade by the rest of the Orbit and re-establishment of full Czech,
Polish, and Rumanian diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia are moves
which Moscow can encourage if it wishes to pursue vigorously the
"normalization" campaign.
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WESTERN EUROPE
10. De Gasperi sees fall of government in event of unsatisfactory Trieste
solution:
Former premier De Gasperi told Ambassador
Luce on 6 June that if a Trieste settlement is
reached which is not satisfactory to the Italian
public and parliament, the government will
a an new e ec ons may be required this autumn. Because of the
strong public feeling aroused by the Balkan pact, Italians now ask whether
the West considers the Balkans more important than Italy.
The alternative to new elections, De Gasperi
said, would be "a neutralist Italy which will not take sides in the world
struggle against Communism."
Comment: De Gasperi's pessimism over
alleged American favoritism to Yugoslavia reflects a new depth of
disillusionment in one of the most consistently pro-American Italian
leaders. His statements also show the extent to which Italy has become
preoccupied with the Trieste question to the exclusion of other considera-
tions.
11. Comment on Unden's call for reassessment of Scandinavian position:
Swedish foreign minister Unden's speech on
6 June deplores the adherence of Norway and
Denmark to NATO and urges these countries
to follow a "cautious and moderate" policy.
Unden's counsel, on the eve of his departure for an unofficial visit to
Moscow, is consistent with a 28 May statement by another Swedish offi-
cial that the foreign minister was deeply perturbed by the possibility
that the American "policy of massive retaliation might import otherwise
local wars from Asia into. . Europ,e "
While expressing his awareness that Sweden's
fate is inextricably linked with that of its Scandinavian neighbors, Unden
may also be attempting to impress the Soviet Union with the importance
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which Sweden attaches to neutrality and to its role as a possible
East-West arbiter. Norway and Denmark have previously ex-
pressed strong reservations about extending commitments under
the North Atlantic pact,
LATIN AMERICA
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