CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/05/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02020560
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: May 11, 1952

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SECURIT.1FORMATION
11 May 1952
Copy No. 53
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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DATED:
0: TS
AUTH: HR 70
DATE.
REViEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOPS
RET
SECURE FORMATION
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S131' trl AR Y
FAR EAST
1. Russians make large shipments to Chinese and Korean Communists
(page 3).
2, North Koreans intercept UN communications (page 3).
3. Peiping sketches line for Asian "peace conference" (page 4).
4. Chinese Communists dismiss high officials (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
5. Ceylon opens credit for Soviet rubber deal (page 5).
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
6. Iranian Parliament rejects credentials of opposition and government
leaders (page 6).
7 King Farouk rejects British proposal on Sudan (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
Indications seen that East Germans are tightening security (page 7:).
. Netherlands will not present obstacles to signing of Defense Com-
munity treaty (page 8).
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TOSEC
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AST
1. Russians make large shipment o Chinese and Korean Con munists:
Recent Russian messages reveal letters of
credit covering Chinese purchases of four
million rubles (one million dollars at the
official rate of exchange) worth of spare parts
or motor e ic es and tractors, almost 200,000 rubles for medical sup-
plies, and over 350,000 rubles for explosives. The delivery date for these
items is believed to be no later than 21 June.
The US Air Force comments that a build-up
pattern strikingly similar to that which preceded the outbreak of hostilities
in 1950 is provided by this transaction coupled with recently reported
letters of credit amounting to 13 million rubles covering Soviet shipments
of petroleum products to the North Koreans, and deliveries in late May
or early June of approximately 2,000 motor vehicles.
Comment: A steady build-up of supplies during
the period of the truce negotiations has provided the Communists with
sufficient materiel to launch a major offensive against the UN forces. A
continuing flow of deliveries from the Soviet Union is foreshadowed by a
Sino-Soviet trade protocol which was signed in mid-April and which provided,
according to TASS, for "a considerable expansion of goods exchange in
the coming year as against the 1951 level."
ibk
2. North Koreans intercept UN communications:
The commander of the North Korean 23rd Bri-
gade, assigned to coastal defense in western
Korea,learned "by intercepting the enemy
wireless telegram, of UN operational plans
n this area. e otttcer, reporting to his corps commander on 9 May,
stated that ROK guerrillas were evacuating islands north of the 38th
parallel and were concentrating on Paengnyon island, just south of the
parallel.
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3. Peiping sketches line for Asian "peace conference":
The Chinese Communists lmve asked the World
Peace Council to approve a preliminary state-
ment distributed to Asian representatives in�
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vited to attend a preparatory meeting for an
Asian "peace conference." The Chinese state-
ment alleges that the resurgence of militarism" in Japan, the inconclusive
negotiations in Korea, the Americans' alleged use of biological weapons,
and the establishment of military bases throughout Asia threaten all Asian
peoples sv!.th another war.
peace can be "won"
by opposing Japanese rearmament and all "foreign Intervention," and by
supporting "peaceful coexistence" and normal trade relations.
Comment: Representatives from several Asian
states are to meet in Peiping on 28 May to prepare for an elaborate "peace"
conference later this year.
Peiping's preliminary statement is the first
indication of the line that the conference will adopt. Most of these themes
represent a continuation of the basic Communist propaganda of the last
two years.
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4. Chtnetce Communists ditiriliS6 high officials:
The Central People's Governrana of China
announced on 6 May the removai of 1:4 officials
including a deputy director of the Ministry of
Public Security, the Director of Public Security
in East China, the two ranking officers of the Department of North China
Affairs, eight governors or deputy governors of provinces, and the mayors
of Tientsin and Anshan.
Comment: Although certain of the removed
officials may be reassigned to imi7ortant posts, the pattern of removals
suggests that Peiping is dissatisfied with the work of its governing appartus
in several regions and provinces, particularly in the North China area.
These dismissals do not appear to be connected with the "San Fan" campaign
which was directed chiefly against bourgeois elements.
SOUTH ASIA
5. Ceylon opens credit for Soviet rubber deal:
The Foreign Department of the Bank of Ceylon
states that a credit of 200,000 pounds sterling
has been opened in favor of R. Wanigatunga
and Co., for shipment in June of Ceylonese
rubber to the USSR v a otterdatn. Wanigaturtga recently returned from
the Moscow Economic Conference through Hong Kong. The American
Embassy in Colombo believes this credit is the first installment of an
anticipated one million pound sterling Russian credit.
Comment: This deal is in a more advanced
stage than any which appear TrraTe-Tesulted from the Moscow Economic
Conference. It is the first Soviet purchase of Ceylonese rubber since 1946
when 3,000 tons were bought The transaction further emphasizes the
official Ceylon policy of selling to all corners.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Iranian Parliament ielects credentials of opposition and gorr)rament leaders:-
�����*.�
In a stormy session on 8 May, the Majlis re-
fused to seat 22 of the 70 deputies who have
been elected. Those whose credentials were
rejected include several of the most important
leaders of the conservative opposition. The
conservatives, however, succeeded in obtaining
rejection of ten of the twelve Tehran deputies,
all of whom are members of the National Front,
and they are making a determined effort to have the Tehran elections an-
nulled altogether.
Comment: Conservative success in obtaining
rejection of the Tehran deputies represents a considerable set-back for
the Prime Minister, who reportedly hoped to purge the opposition from
the Majlis. Confirmation of the rejections, which are now being reviewed
by a Parliamentary board, would further postpone full convocation of the
Mains. Rejection of the Tehran deputies would permit some Communist-
sponsored deputies to be seated unless the Tehran elections are annulled.
7. King Farouk rejects British proposal on Sudan:
In rejecting the latest British proposal on the
Sudan, King Farouk stated that if he started
full-scale negotiation without a prior Anglo-
Egyptian agreement on this issue, he might
e ace w rime Minister Hilali's resignation. He emphasized that he
had no one in mind to succeed Hilali. Farouk also said that "under no
circumstances" could he or any Egyptian Government agree to prior con-
sultation with the Sudanese before Britain recognizes his new title as
"King of the Sudan."
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warned that he migh
his own position.
a.,
The King bitterly criticized the 11'111:1Sh and
forced. tu ienounce thein publicly In order to protect
Comment: This is the strongest warning of
possible internal disturbances in Egypt that Farouk has given to the Ameri-
can Ambassador since the time of the Cairo riots in late January.
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Indications seen that East Germans are tightening security:
American representatives in Berlin believe 3.3(h)(2)
that the 8 May East German press announcement
of the conviction of fifteen persons as foreign
saboteurs is more likely to be a preparation
for increased internal and external security measures rather than a true
reflection of sabotage In East Germany, They feel this belief is supported
by other East German press releases on Western "military provocations"
on the interzonal border and on the "dangerous" smuggling of East German
goods into West Berlin,
The suggested East German security measures
may be related to recent threats by Grotewohl and Pieck to "organize the
armed defense of the homeland" if Bonn goes ahead with the program of
Western integration.
Comment: Suggestive that new security
measures are being prepared�iii East Germany is the unexplained detention
of American and British military patrol vehicles on the Berlin-Helmstedt
autobahn starting on the evening of 8 May.
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9. Netherlands will not present obstacoas to signing of Defense Community
�
treaty:
Foreign Minister Stacker of the Netherlands
believes that the cabinet, which meets 16 May
to discuss the European Defense Community
treaty, probably will agree to sign the treaty
even though the problem of the German financial contribution is not solved.
The cabinet, however, is likely to take the position that a satisfactory
settlement must be reached before the treaty can be ratified by the Parlia-
ment.
Because the Netherlands is reluctant to commit
itself for a fifty-year membership in the Defense Community, Stikker is
considering proposing as a prerequisite of signature that it have the right
to withdraw from the Community should the British defense guarantee be
discontinued.
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