CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1954/04/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02020912
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: April 1, 1954

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1 April 1954
Copy No. 84
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. /8
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
fel DECLASSIFIED
CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S 0
NEXT REVIEW DATE' _2,909
AUTH; FIR 70-2
DATE�e842/7-9 REVIEWER:
�
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TfiECET
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Vyshinsky hints USSR may force Chinese issue at UN (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
2. Large-scale air exercise progressing in Soviet Far East (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Chinese Communist jet aircraft may be based at Liuchou (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Oil consortium negotiators expected in Tehran soon (page 6).
5. Comment on RCC's use of organized labor in Egyptian political
crisis (page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
6.
LATE ITEM
7. Comment on Soviet security pr9posals. (page 8).
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GENERAL
1. Vyshinsky hints USSR may force Chinese issue at UN:
The Israeli UN representative reports that
Soviet delegate Vyshinsky, in discussing the
Security Council resolution on Suez Canal
traffic, which he later vetoed, argued that
resolutions approved with the "KMT repre-
sentative" in the council were illegal. Vyshinsky did not object to
the resolution itself.
Comment: Vyshinsky publicly opposed this
resolution as an attempt to impose a decision unacceptable to Egypt.
While his private remarks concerning the resolution -- which Israel
favored -- could have been made to placate the Israelis, they may
foreshadow a Soviet plan to veto Security Council action on all issues
so long as Nationalist China is a council member. It is not likely,
however, that the USSR would again tie its hands by a walkont,on
the Chinese issue as it did in 1950, permitting UN action on Korea.
Sincethe Korean armistice, UN circles have
seemed more favorable to the eventual participation of Communist
China. Substantive discussion of the issue at the next General
Assembly session in September may be difficult to avoid.
SOVIET UNION
2. Large-scale air exercise progressing in Soviet Far East.
a. large-scale air exercise involving
extensive redeployment and inter-airfield
flights has been in progress in the Maritime
Military District since about 18 March.
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The only other comparable air exercise noted
in the Soviet Far East occurred in October 1953. The two exercises
are similar in that fighter units were temporarily redeployed in regi-
mental strength, usually to known bomber bases, and were noted
operating from their temporary locations immediately following the
moves.
This year larger numbers of algcraft and units
are involved, more naval air units are participating, and for the first
time there have been movements of jet light bombers from one field
to another.
Comment: The stress on high unit mobility
In this exercise may reflect continued Soviet emphasis on the role of
air units in tactical support of ground forces. Frequent change-of-
base exercises have been noted each year in the 24th Air Army in
East Germany.
FAR EAST
3. Chinese Communist jet aircraft may be based at Liuchow
on 23 March during an
advanced training exercise by the Chinese
Communist 26th Air DiviSior,a, which is based
at Liuchou in Kwangsi Province (see map, p. 5),
referred-Ito a landing approach speed of 178
knots. This suggests for the first time that jet planes may be operating
from that base. The reporting unit adds that the 26th Air Division was
previously known to have only a small number of conventional LA-11
and possibly LA-7 fighters.
Comment: The exercises were conducted on
both 22 and 23 March and are the first advanced training noted to date
In the area. Previous activity was apparently limited to basic training.
Meanwhile, it is estimated on the basis of
photo re4onnaissanrethat the Suichi airfield on Leichou Peninsula in
South China can be completed by 15 May. This is the largest airfield
in China, with a runway 10,000 feet long.
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HAIPHONG
Ning-rrang
Nan-ning
.u-chou
Under Co
e?
LE
San-0
LA-7:s
LA-115
Possible Jet Aircraft
Ch'ing-tam,
Wuchow
18
�15's
HONG KONG
SOUTH CHINA
Selected Roads
Railroads Operable
-4- Railroads Partially Operable
44111P Active Chinese Communist
Airfields
------ French Perimeter
50 100 150
Statute Miles
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Oil consortium negotiators expected in Tehran soon:
A negotiating team representing the oil con-
sortium is expected to arrive in Tehran
shortly after 3 April to begin negotiations
for settlement of the Anglo-Iranian oil disputes
according to the American embassy in London.
The mission will be composed of five princi-
pals: two from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, two from Royal Dutch
Shell, and one from the Standard Oil Company of New jerseys repre-
senting the American companies. These principals will be accompanied
by nine assistants. The Compagnie Francaise des Petroles will send
an observer.
Comment: Iranian officials probably will be
prepared to begin talks as soon as the mission arrives. The negotia-
tions, however, will be prolonged.
Prime Minister Zahedi's political position
will be strengthened, at least initially, by this indication that he is
having some success in his efforts to solve the oil problem.
5. Comment on RCC's use of organized labor in Egyptian political crisis:
The use of organized labor for political
purposes during the Revolutionary Command
Council's current contest with General Nagib
introduces a new and potentially important
I orce into Egyptian politics.
The council's effective manipulation of the
28-29 March general strike suggests that
it intends to depend increasingly on organized labor for its popular.
support. The regime is said to envisage the creation of labor and
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professional syndicates to be represented in the proposed advisory
council. The announcement on, 29 March of the immediate establish-
ment of a national advisory council, with organizational representation,
may be the first move toward developing a working alliance between
the council and organized labor.
Egyptian unions are relatively weak and
lack experienced leadership. Organized labor offers the military
regime, however, a fertile area for political exploitation, and if
effectively directed, would provide an important element of support.
LATIN AMERICA
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LATE ITEM
7. Comment on Soviet security proposals
In a note to the three Western powers on
31 March the Soviet Union said it now sees
no objection to American participation in the
Soviet-sponsored system of European security
and that it is prepared to consider "the question of the participation
of the USSR in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. " The note
says these proposals are an effort to resolve differences revealed
at the Berlin conference.
It is unlikely that Moscow considers its
proposals will be accepted. The Kremlin may hope, however, to
gain more serious consideration for its security proposals made at
Berlin by officially repairing Molotov's blunder of excluding the
United States from the European scene. The note also appears
part of a recently intensified campaign to create the impression
that the Soviet Union is fostering security while the United States is
building up its military strength. Underscoring Soviet "reasonable-
ness" by a substantive proposal at this time is presumably another
device to weaken Western unity prior to crucial negotiations at
Geneva.
The obscure offer to "examine the question
of participation" in NATO leaves the Kremlin free to introduce
demands for crippling changes in NATO policy and organization as
conditions for its membership. The Kremlin probably believes that
any Western refusal to consider Soviet membership would bolster
its claims, reiterated in this note, that NATO is directed against
the Soviet bloc.
The note again dangles before the French
the prospect of a divided and neutralized Germany. The Kremlin
does this by de-daring that Soviet membership in a revised NATO
would exclude "the possibility of the involvement of one or another
part of Germany in a military grouping."
Moscow implies in the note that it con-
siders both a revised NATO with the USSR as member and Molotov's
proposed European security organization necessary to an effective
system of collective security.
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