CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/02/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02026612
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: February 21, 1961

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21 February 1961
Copy No. C 77
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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TOP'S-ECKEL,
The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.
-717P-SECREL_
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21 February
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
4. Iran-Iraq: Dispute over Shatt-al-Arab River approaches
to Abadan refinery has again broken out. (Page ti)
5. USSR: Gromyko says Khrushchev will not attend UN
General Assembly session resuming 7 March. (Page itt)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
21 February 1961
DAILY BRIEF
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Iran-Iraq: The long-smoldering dispute between Iraq and elo te_
Iran over navigation rights on the Shatt-al-Arab River, which
21 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF
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controls the approaches to the oil refinery of Abadan, has
again broken out. Iranian insistence on 17 February that hence-
forth its personnel, rather than Iraqi pilots, handle tankers
calling at the refinery has halted tanker traffic. Heretofore,
only Iraqi pilots have worked on the run to Abadan. As many
as two dozen tankers, chartered by the consortium of Western
oil companies which operates Iran's oil industry, are probably
already involved. Meanwhile a shortage of storage space has
forced the Abadan refinery to cut back production from the nor-
mal 350,000 barrels a day to less than a third of this figure on
20 February. Output probably will be cut further,perhaps to
50,000 barrels a day--in an effort to avert a complete shutdown,
which would further weaken Iran's already strained economy,
Page 7) (Map) (b)(3)1
FUSSR: Foreign Minister Gromyko told the Finnish for-
eign minister recently that neither he nor Khrushchev will
attend the UN General Assembly session, which resumes on
7 March. He stated, however, that Khrushchev was still will-
ing to come to the US for talks with the President. Gromyko's `74.76
remarks suggest that Khrushchev has reversed his decision
since First Deputy Premier Kosygin's assertion to the West
German ambassador in early February that Khrushchev would
attend the UN meeting. The Soviet premier probably recog-
nizes that his decision to exploit Lumumba's death to the max-
imum and renew his attacks on Hammarskjold will make a sharp
US-Soviet clash unavoidable, and that his personal participa-
tion in such a debate would undermine the prospects of a meet-
ing with the President during the UN session.
21 Feb 61
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Situation in the Congo
The conciliation commission is subordinate to Ham-
marskjold's Congo advisory committee, and its members
are nominally divorced from the policies of their govern-
ments. On it are represented those African and Asian
nations which have had troops in the Congo--with the ex-
ception of Guinea, Mali, Indonesia, and the UAR, which
refused to participate because the commission refused to
recommend outright the reinstatement of Lumumba's
"legitimate government." As a result of the absence of
these neutralist states, the commission has definite mod-
erate and pro-Western leanings.
Since its recommendations use the Ilea government as
a starting point for re-establishing a national regime, the
report is likely to be pleasing to Kasavubu. However,
Tshombe, who is now almost completely isolated inter-
nationally and who is currently pushing a military cam-
paign to consolidate his position, will probably be unwill-
ing to accept it; in fact, recent reports indicate that
Tshombe and his entourage are unlikely to accept any
reconciliation proposals in their present mood.
The reaction of the Gizenga regime will probably depend
on the dissidents' estimate of their ability, to resist continued
economic, political, and military pressure from a broadly
based Leopoldville government. Although Gizenga's position
apparently is weakening, he has little to hope for in a rap-
prochement with Kasavubu and would be reluctant to accept
a political solution imposed by the UN unless assured of sig-
nificant influence in the Leopoldville government.
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The Shatt-al-Arab Question
Between the Persian Gulf and a point a few miles north
of Khorramshahr the Iranian-Iraqi frontier runs along the
low-water mark on the Iranian shore of the Shatt-al-Arab ex-
cept for two short stretches opposite the major Iranian ports
of Khorramshahr and Abadan, where it follows the thalweg
--the middle of the river--so as to leave these two ports in
Iranian waters. Sea-going vessels bound for these Iranian
ports thus have to pass through Iraqi waters. Navigation
on the river is governed by the Iranian-Iraqi treaty of 4 July
1937.
For several years Iran has periodically agitated for a
commission to negotiate changes in the 1937 treaty and has
threatened to take unilateral action if Iraq refuses to co-oper-
ate. This treaty recognizes most of the Shatt as Iraqi terri-
torial waters. Tehran has complained that the treaty was
invalid because it was signed under British pressure. De-
spite this view, Iran was willing to leave control of the Shatt
to Iraq as long as the Basra Port Authority was, for practical
purposes, under British control.
An important change in the Iranian position took place
following the July 1958 coup in Iraq which brought Qasim to
power. Viewing the Qasim regime as basically unfriendly
and wary of the presence of Soviet technicians in Basra,
Iran began to demand a greater voice in control of the Shatt,
including adoption of the thalweg principle along the entire
length of the river. Since 1958 there has been a series of
incidents between the two countries. Iran's present insistence
on use of its pilots is its most ambitious effort thus far to
pressure Iraq to begin negotiating. However, fully a third
of Iran's oil production of more than 1,000,000 barrels a
day is refined at Abadan, and with an already shaky economy
the government could ill afford m7re than a token shutdown.
TONFIDENTIAL_
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� THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
--CONFtaElki-T4AL.--
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