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February 23, 1961
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I //. Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 %IV JE%1IVE I 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 23 February 1961 Copy No. C c;7_71 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOVSECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 -TOP-SECRET- f"'� 401a-SEGRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 %OOP SECRET 23 February 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS Note: Items I, 2, 7, 8, and 20 appeared in the Daily Brief for 22 February. Backup material has been added in this issue. USSR: New 2,000-nautical-mile IRBM has undergone extensive flight testing since last June. (Page i) USSR - West Germany: Moscow's 17 February memo- randum to Bonn repeats call for free city in West Ber- lin and a German peace treaty. (Ave i) 3. Congo: Leopoldville army officers reported preparing anti-Ileo coup. (Page t) 4. Laos: Souvanna Phouma's speech on arrival in Xieng Khouang blames US for preventing national harmony in Laos. (Page it) 5. Burma: Leftist-led riots may lead to further demon- strations. (142ge iii) 6. North Vietnam: Premier Pham Van Dong relinquishes Foreign Ministry portfolio. (Page iii) Portugal: Defense minister demands Salazar effect reforms in Lisbon's African colonies. Oklge )3. Saudi Arabia: Rivalries within royal family weaken position of King Saud. (Page iv) 9. Ghana: President Nkrumah endorses Western aid for Volta River hydroelectric project. (Page iv) . Watch Committee conclusions. (Page v..) Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 �VApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 �iwtop-sEeRE-T tad CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 23 February 1961 DAILY BRIEF USSR: The Soviet series-"65" 2,000-n. m. intermediate- range ballistic missile (IRBM) has been undergoing intensive flight testing since last June. There have been 21 test opera- tions to date--six of them in a recent three-week period--with only one known failure. The high priority apparently accorded to development of this new missile suggests that Soviet author- ities have placed a premium on the development of a missile system which can be deployed in more secure areas within the USSR and can reach all the wartime targets on the Eurasian periphery. (Map) (Backup, Page 1) USSR-Germany: Ehe Soviet memorandum of 17 February to Bonn probably is a reminder to the West that the Berlin and German questions remain unsolved. It may have been timed to Influence Chancellor Adenauer's talks with Prime Minister Macmillan on 22 February. Although the memorandum asserted that negotiations cannot be further deferred, it avoided estab- lishing an explicit deadline. Moscow makes no new proposals and reaffirms its long-standing positions on establishing a free city in West Berlin and concluding a German peace treaty. The memorandum does not exclude the possibility of an interim so- lution of the Berlin question under a definite time limit, and repeats the general threat to conclude a separate peace treaty') ) (Backup, Page 2r co /' *Congo: :'reparations for a possible military coup against h)ta_, .9-,-}`-'4- the Ileo government in Leopoldville by s � '-:77- I Lt. Col. Boboso c A)54 4 di The officers are_,4et concerned over the loss of their privileged positions if they] TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 �717P�SEERET-- &oops are disarmed by the UN under the recent Security Council resolution. They do not believe that Ileo will resist the UN Command, although Ileo yesterday publicly denounced any UN disarmament of Congolese forces. The army, which retains its tribal loyalties, reportedly is also angered at the recent execution by the South Kasai government of seven Congolese, who came from, several tribal groups which are also represented in the arml.) Tshombe appears to have modified his initial reaction to the UN Security Council resolution; on 22 February he announced his agreement with UN representatives to stop all troop move- ments in Katanga Province, In Orientale Province, the Stanleyville government told local authorities on 21 February that it alone can impose the death sentence. Officials henceforth are only to arrest for- eigners and transfer them to Stanleyville under a "good mil- itary escort." If any locality fails to comply it will be subject to "very severe judgment." The order was inspired by reports reaching Stanleyville of "massacres of Europeans and Asiatics." In Accra the foreign ministers of Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR have reaffirmed their support for Gizenga and called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign diplomats from the Congo. (Backup, Page 5) *Laos: Former premier Souvanna Phouma arrived by air 62 In the Plaine des Jarres on 22 February, according to a TASS broadcast from Moscow, and was greeted by Pathet Lao chief Seig-&-- Prince Souphannouvong and Captain Kong Le. (is afternoon 26,2a, arrival, following departure from Phnom Penh the previous evening by Soviet aircraft, apparently confirms an earlier re- port that he would travel by way of Han.2,i2 According to Hanoi radio, Souvanna, "premier of the legal aotian government," made a speech on his arrival in Laos blaming the United States for "hindering the realization of the policy of peace, neutrality, and national harmony in Laos" and congratulating "the government, 23 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF -TDP�SECRE-T- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613' 4.00) army, and Pathet Lao fighting units for having liberated Xieng Khouang and the Plaine des Jarres." T3l_oc airlift operations were continuing on 20 February, when at least two Soviet IL 14s flew into Laos from Hanoi. e Soviet AN12 heavy transport which recently left Irkutsk arrived in Hanoi on 22 February. It reportedly was carrying annrnximatply ninel elY10 flf ti vcrn rerrthrthler A nevi. 4vt esA T � znimilici; mile riming in nangoon on zi Ivebruary was the - most violent anti-American demonstration ever held in Burma; well planned and directed, it probably has set the stage for fur- ther disturbances. The leaders were leftist students and rep- resentatives of groups in the pro-Communist National United Front who had received police permission to demonstrate against the murder of Patrice Lumumba and against the supply of American materiel to the Chinese Nationalist irregulars in northeastern Burma. They were forbidden, however, to approach the American Embassy. Although a number of police and demon- strators were injured and two deaths have been reported, thus far 130 Americans have been hurt and property damage has been limited to smashed windows in the embassy building and at the Pan American Airways office. 6)/_� *North Vietnam: Premier Pham Van Dong will no longer hold the Foreign Ministry portfolio, although he retains the pre- miership. According to a 22 February announcement, Hanoi's new foreign minister is Ung Van Khiem, a fast-rising former guerrilla leader who has been linked with the current intensified drive to overthrow South Vietnam's President Diem. Khiem is a close associate of party First Secretary Le Duano Over the past year, several of Le Duan's guerrilla colleagues have moved up in the party and government structure, suggesting that Le Duan is reinforcing is position as Ho Chi Minh's most likely successor 23 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF �TOP SECRE. Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 leticef'--SECRE�T� \\\ \\\ N 23 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF iv N TOP SECRET Portugal: Defense Minister Botelho Moniz claims he has given Premier Salazar a virtual ultimatum that imme- diate economic and social reforms must be undertaken to alleviate the deteriorating situation in Angola and the other African provinces. Moniz told Salazar .a few days ago that action had to be taken before the UN General Assembly re- convenes on 7 March and that his ministry would "take the matter into its own hands" if Salazar did not comply. In northern Angola the leading non-Communist Angolan nationalist organization, which is based in Leopoldville, re- portedly plans to launch a terror campaign about 15 March in an effort to focus world attention on Portuguese Africa while the UN General Assembly is in session] (Backup, Page 8) Saudi Arabia: Flivalries within the Saudi royal family continue, and several princely factions, including backers of Crown Prince Faysal, have combined against King Saud. The King has already been forced to order two of his liberal advisers out of the country as ambassadors. A showdown over the King's "progressive" cabinet and its "liberal reform" policies is likely. However, dissension will continue and will weaken the family's hold on the country. This development would give further encouragement to anti-monarchical ele- ments, which include some army offic,ers as well as dis- gruntled younger� Saudi "intellectual@.!1 (Backup, Pagi, *Ghana: President Nkrumah, in his address to the Ghanaian parliament on 21 February, endorsed the Volta River hydroelec- tric project being developed under Western auspices. He men- tioned, but did not emphasize, the recently concluded agreement 710 with the USSR for the construction of a smaller dam. There had been a report that Nkrumah, in an emotional reaction to devel- opments in the Congo, might denounce American aid because of his disagreement with the United States' policies, which he feels are frustrating his Ilan- Afriran Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 002026613 NV Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613' 4.110.13 SECRET *re � WATCH COMMITT7 CONCLUSIONS Z_D the basis of findings by its Witch Co ittee,ilthe United States Intelligence Board concludes th:1;17 A. E_To Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the imme- diate futur_e3 B. ao Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US al- lies or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate fu- tur.2 C. Ennmunist forces in Laos continue the active defense of their base area in the Plaine des Jarres. The bloc shows no inclination toward a political settlement except on its own terms. The Communist forces in Laos retain the capability to increase somewhat their military efforts in support of their political objectives D. Efiective implementation of the strengthened UN mandate In the Congo will probably tend to arrest the disintegration of the Gizenga regime, to inhibit the military activity of Mobutu's forces, and to raise a serious possibility of armed 23 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF -TOP-SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 'Rengeheed - Tyura Tam xre MISSILE RANGE FACILITIES EMPLOYED IN FLIGHT TESTING OF SOVIET SERIES2'65" IRBM Kapustin Yer Missile test range 1050 n.m. Impact area Sary Shogon 300 n.m. Impact area Primorskiy Itray 23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 NieirrOP SECR Soviet IRBM Devolopment Program The first two firings of the Soviet series-"65" missile were made to the 1,050-n. m. impact area of the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range in June 1960, probably as part of the early propulsion tests. There have been four other "half- range" firings. There have been 14 successful test firings to an impact area in Central Siberia, first used on 3 August 1960, about 2,000 n. m. from the launch point at ICapustin Yar, with the latest firing on 15 February. At present it is not known whether a similar intensity of activity marks other aspects of the development of this weapons system--production of missiles and supporting equipment, site construction, and troop training--which also influence the achievement of operational readiness. the series-"65" missile probably uses non-storable liquid propellants. The operational version will probably have a guidance system combining radio command and inertial components giving it a circle of probable error of 1-2 n. m. It is estimated that this missile will become operational in late 1961 or ear- ly 1962. The USSR already has available, in the 1,100 n. m. sur- face-to-surface missile which is estimated to have become operational in late 1958 or 1959, medium-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching most of the probable wartime targets on the Eurasian periphery either from positions in satellite states or border areas of the USSR. An IRBM system provides an advantage illustrated in the case of operations against targets on Okinawa. Because of its range, the launch positions of the 2,000-n. m. missile could be as far inland as Chita, whereas a 1,100-n. m. missile would have to be deployed in southern Primorskiv_KravwhereJtwouId be more vulnerable to attack. 23 Feb 61 TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 %ftod SECRET Moscow's Memorandum to Bonn Restates Position On Germany and Berlin Elie Soviet memorandum-of 17 February probably rep- resents the first of a series of diplomatic moves to reactivate the Berlin question and test the Western attitude toward a re- sumption of high-level negotiations on Germany and Berlin. The move was apparently in response to Adenauer's private ef- forts, acting through the Austrian and Norwegian foreign min- isters last fall, to gain some clarification of the Soviet position. Furthermore, in reply to Adenauer's statement to Smirnov in early January that the disarmament question should be given priority over, the Berlin and German problems in East-West talks, the memorandum calls for negotiations on Berlin with- out further delay and describes the "working in" period for the new US administration and the need to await the West German elections as a "train of delaying arguments! Etk� the first formal and complete recapitulation of the Soviet position since the Paris summit, the memorandum reaffirms standard proposals but does not insist on immediate implemen- tation of the free city and refers to a possible interim solution with a fixed time limit. This approach is similar to the last Soviet proposal--made on 9 May, before the abortive summit meeting--when Moscow offered a two-year interim solution, at the end of which the four powers would be committed to estab- lish a free city and sign a peace treaty with both German states. The memorandum also repeats the Soviet claim that a separate treaty, which would be signed either at the end of the interim period or in the event that West Germany refused to participate in the peace settlement, would liquidate the occupation of Berlin and force the Western powers to negotiate access to Berlin with East German0 5 dealing with the interim solution, Moscow asserts for the first time that Bonn has no authority to participate in negotiations on such an agreement. This position ignores the fact that both East and West Germans participated as observers at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference discussions in 1959, which cov- ered an interim agreement. It also contradicts the Soviet note of 2 March 1959, proposing that both German states participate 23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 *void �SECRET Mt negotiations on the questions of West Berlin and a peace treaty with Germany. The new gambit is probably designed to elicit a West German claim to take part in any discussions, which the USSR could use as an argument for including the East Germans, or to draw a West German refusal, which the USSR would then represent as an acceptance of its position that West Germany has no legal relationship to West Berlilg Ehe remainder of the Soviet memo reaffirms that unifi- cation and a peace treaty are separate issues and charges that West German "revisionism" over border questions necessitates the conclusion of a peace treaty. The memo also indicates the USSR will consider West German counter-proposals if they are taped on the "present situation," meaning the existence of "two Germanie�...J � Eollowing an easing of Moscow's propaganda attacks on West Germany last fall, Adenauer has sought to exploit the "improved atmosphere" in hopes of forestalling any sharp tension over Ber- lin at least until after the West German national elections in September. Adenauer also continues to favor reducing tensions through an agreement on disarmament before tackling the Berlin and Germany problems. However, if talks on Berlin are unavoid- able, he will press for Bonn's participati2E7 K.hrushchev's letter to Adenauer dealt only with the question of repatriation of German nationals in the USSR. Khrushchev re- turned to the official Soviet position of early 1960 that formal repatriation ended on 31 December 1959 and henceforth would proceed only in the framework of Soviet law. In a private talk on 17 October Khrushchev told the German ambassador that any Soviet citizen was free to leave and that the matter could be reopened in official talk.0 he repatriation of Germans from, the USSR has had consid- erable domestic significance in West Germany. Nearly 10,000 German war prisoners were released in 1955-56 in connection with the 1955 agreement to establish diplomatic relations betwefg -SECRET, 23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 SECRET lEi2nn and Moscow, and their return enhanced Adenauer's pres- tige. On the basis of a 1958 agreement, approximately 13,000 Germans went from the USSR to West Germany, but Bonn claims that there are still 10,000 eligible Germans in the USSR seeking to emigra_tf3 SECRET 23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 or 3icnc-T-- The Situation in the Congo Tshombe had initially reacted vigorously to the UN Security Council's 21 February resolution, charging that the resolution was a "declaration of war by the UN against Katanga and the whole former Belgian Congo!' He announced the mobilization of the province's population to "defend lives and property menaced by the United Nations, which would be responsible for any bloodshed as a result of the resolution. Pressures on Tshombe from hard-line mining interests which counseled an immediate attack against UN forces were sub- sequently softened by his official Belgian advisers. Tshombe is reported to believe he was "fighting for his job and life" in the face of UN determination to punish him for the death of Lumum1,2 ape Stanleyville administration is said to have consolidated its au hority locally but not necessarily for Gizenga's benefit. The native elements there are reported to be under the provin- cial leader, Bernard Salumu, while Gizenga is said to be re- garded as a "foreigner" from Leopoldville and his "central government" officials are inactive. Frictions inherent in this situation may well develop further as a result of Lumumba's death and the reported execution of 15 political and military opponents of Gizengaj aleanwhile, Gizenga appears to have been drawing on the cash reserves of the Stanleyville branch of the central bank to pay his troops--whose loyalty, at least in the Stanleyville area, apparently can be counted on only as lone as they are paid unless replenished, cash available for troop payment prob- ably will not last through March. Gizenga and his subordinates probably could be persuaded to permit disarmament of these forces, especially if Gizenga's cohorts are offered responsible posts in the Ileo government. The best disciplined and least undependable of Gizenga's forces are reported to have been sent into Katanga and Kivu provinces and against Mobutu's reported "invasion" up the Congo River Supporters of the Gizenga regime continue to attempt to send in aid and personnel through th ndnoviet authorities TOP SECRET 23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page .5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613_ ligolOP SECRET in Moscow have requested the Sudanese Embassy to grant transit visas for eleven Russians traveling to the Congo, The "Communist Congolese party" proclaimed by a local Baluba official on 15 February has received considerable pub- licity in the country. An anti-Communist Baluba leader in Leopoldville denied on 20 February that such a "youth move- ment" had been formed; cautioning against "dissem- inating your protests or declarations over any radio against anyone except through the UN." However, the Communist label apparently has considerable appeal to organizations of Lumum- ba's supporters; a local group in western Kivu Province tffiliating itself with the new party. The Accra conferees wound up a three-day conference with a communique reaffirming recognition of Gizenga's regime as the legitimate government of the Congo and making several pro- posals aimed at "preventing civil war in the Congo." In addition to re-endorsing Ghana President Nkrumah's plan for reconstitut- ing the UN force into an African command, the conference pro- posed that the UN should immediately halt all mobilization in any part of the Congo and expel all Belgian and other foreign military units not belonging to the UN force. It also recommended that foreign intervention be checked by halting the flow of arms, per- sonnel, and money into the Congo except through agreed UN methods, and that all foreign companies, banks, and other com- mercial organizations be controlled and inspected. Finally, the communique recommended the establishment of a neutral com- mission to investigate the events leading to the death of Lumumba, the freeing of all political prisoners, and the reconvening of par- liament. TOP SECRET 23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 ' CONFIDENTIAL Rioting in Rangoon The anti-American demonstrations in Rangoon were professionally led and clearly intended to result in violence. Supplies of bricks and stones�and, Molotov cocktails intended for burning the embassy uil ing--were stored in the park across the street before the demonstrators arrived. Order was restored only when the army reinforced the 200-man police guard at the embassy and fired into the mob. The leaders--left-wing students from the pro-Communist Rangoon University Student Union .and he All-Burma Federa- tion of Student Unions, as well as representatives from the Communist-dominated Burma Trade Union Congreg and the National United Front�flouted police orders to stay away from the embassy. AE.s soon as the mob turned violent, a number of the student demonstrators returned to the univer- sity c.a,mpus to pass resolutions condemning the "police bru- tality.Lj' Such a move has in the past preceded expanded student strikes and demonstrations and, although Rangoon remained quiet on 22 February, there were widespread reports that new violence aimed primarily at the police would be undertaken. Student-led demonstrations have long been major political weapons, and only the army-led administration of General Ne Win was uninfluenced by them. Now provided with "mar- tyrs"--two dead and 33 injured, according to the latest re- ports--as well as the emotionally charged issue of American materiel captured from the Chinese Nationalist irregulars, student demonstrators may again become a significant influ- ence on government policy. The popularity of the demonstrators' cause is under- scored by a statement issued by the ruling Union party on 22 February which sympathized with the demonstrators' "strong spirit of nationalism" and appealed to the people to "observe restraint" but failed to condemn the mob violence. Although responsible government officials have not sought to stir up anti-American sentiment, their own handling of the irregulars issue has served to promote the violence. CONFIDENTIAL 23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 ladSECRET � Portuguese Defense Minister Demanding Changes In Lisbon's African Policy aoefense Minister Moniz cum uLD mcial epui Leuty veileVe that Lisbon must choose between two courses of action in Africa: (1) either trying to hold on to Angola by military force and having it eventually turn into another Congo, or � (2) improving living and working conditions sufficiently that the African provinces will be willing to remain with Portugal in a voluntary political relationship. They are demanding that Salazar cancel all industrial monopolies in Angola and issue orders providing social benefits, minimum wages, and similar � reforms, in return for which Moniz is said to have assured Salazar the complete support of the Defense Ministry3 ahe defense minister expects further difficulties in Africa soon, and reportedly is putting into effect a 13 February or- der giving his ministry control over the security forces in Angola. Portuguese military leaders are said to be more con- cerned over, the "extremely serious" situation in the Angolan district of Malange than they are over the recent Luanda dis- turbances. The powerful industrial combines are exploiting native labor in Malange under conditions of virtual slavery. Military authorities report difficulties with their white troops, who observe the w_a_.the colony is run and realize government propaganda is false. FITh.e chief non-Communist Angolan nationalist organization, the Union of the Angolan People (UPA), which has its headquar- ters at Leopoldville in the Congo, apparently is concerned that a majority of Angolan youths are becoming pro-Communisto Its leaders believe it must launch a terrorist campaign to spearhead the struggle for independence, but it is hampered by a shortage of funds and limited military equipment. The UPA allegedly has some 100 rifles--purchased from Congolese soldiers--and a small number of submachine guns, hand grenades, and land mines. Be- cause of the recent disorders in Luanda and pressure from adher- ents in Angola, the UPA reportedly now is reversing the policy of restraint it has followed heretofore, and about 15 March will start a campaign of attacks on white-owned plantations and other civil disturbances in an area between Luanda and the Congo bor- dfli 23 Feb Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 �SeeRET--- low? Showdown Between king Saud and Royal'Princes Near [Aker more than two years of intermittent maneuvering, King Saud succeeded in reasserting his authority over the Saudi Government on 21 December by assuming the post of prime minister and forming a "progressive" cabinet. To oust his brother Faysal, Saud obtained the support of Saudi Arabian "liberals" by naming four of them to cabinet posts and includ- ing several among his personal adviserg Ewing Saud's "liberal" cabinet as a threat to their in- terests, several factions among the princes have combined to return Faysal to power as prime minister. Motivations be- hind the opposition are varied�support of Faysal, mistrust of some cabinet ministers, resentment by some princes who had been ousted from the cabinet, and dissatisfaction over the dis- tribution of the King's largess. A strongly worded petition signed by 45 princes is said to have been presented to Saud on 13 February demanding the restoration Of Faysal to full authority. Since that time Riyadh has been the scene of "fren- zied" activity. Apparently, Saud has attempted to conciliate as well as divide his opponents by dropping two controversial advisers and appointing them to ambassadorships. Jealousy between cabinet ministers and advisers, as well as cabinet dissension, has further weakened the King's position. He is likely to appoint one or two dissident but important princes as advisers in a further effort to split the opposition:7 (Frown Prince Faysal, who following his ouster as prime minister had been on a hunting trip in the Hijaz, where his support is strongest, has returned to Jidda and is holding court. Ambassador Heath, who talked with Faysal on 18 February, found him in better health than usual. Faysal said emphatically that he had not given up in any way his "interest in life.? Gaud's "liberal" cabinet also appears to have alarmed re- ligious leaders of the powerful Wahhabi sect--Islamic reaction- aries who adhere to strict interpretation of the Koran and have -SEeRE-T-- 23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Nrs, an.g been a bulwark of the Saudi state. In early February one Wahhabi emissary sounded out Jordan's King Husayn regarding his attitude toward acceptance of the Saudi throne should thp Saudi dynasty be overthrown] 23 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 N1100 1.2..1 4 1.44 I I 4-1. 1.4 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor The Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613 wrIt�lo KC 1 04, TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026613