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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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March 4, 1961
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Approved for Release. 2020/08/11 CO2026616 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 4 March 1961 Copy No. C--40 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -OP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 r Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 TOP CRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616, TOP SECRET 4 March 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Congo: Belgium takes steps to withdraw milita7 personnel from Katanga. (Page t) 2. Soviet missile test of 3 March. (Page t ) 3. Britain and France reviewing policy on Communist China. (Page tt) 4. Communist China negotiating for additional grain purchases. (Page ii) 5. Poland will supply tool plant and foundry to Cuba. (Page itt) 6. South Korean Government under pressure from pub- lic and legislature on status-of-forces agreement. (Page itt) 7. Morocco: National Union of Popular Forces will press for establishment of parliamentary democracy � (Page tu) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 fell0 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 TOP SECRET -TOP-SECRET 4 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 /Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616, "OP SECIWT- 1�01 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 4 March 1961 DAILY BRIEF Congo: Belgian Foreign Minister Wigny has directed the immediate recall of all Belgian military personnel who arrived in Katanga after 1 July 1960. the government has no information on the identity of BelOan mercenaries under private contract with the Tshombe government. (The US consul in Elisabethville warns that wholesale and indis- criminate withdrawal of the Belgian military cadre�about 230 officers and men--would result in the disintegration of the Katanga army into lawless unitg:i the Soviet ambassador had twice seen the Suda- nese foreign minister but still had not obtained transit visas for Soviet diplomats to go to Stanleyville. The request for the visas was submitted in mid-February. Luluabourg was quiet on 2 March, with UN forces and Congolese troops cooperating to maintain order. (Backup, Page 1) USSR: A test vehicle was launched from Tyura Tam at about 1400 GMT (0900 EST) on 3 March. Preliminary analy- sis indicates the vehicle impacted in the Khabarovsk area--about 1,100 n.m. southwest of the nor- mal ICBM impact area on the Kamchatka peninsula�after a flight of some 2,700 n.m. Although determination of the spe- cific nature of the vehicle must await further information, the over-all character of the operation suggests an ICBM test in which the missile suffered a failure in guidance. Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO202661/61 Noy Britain - France - Communist China: rthe American Embassy in London believes that the Macmillan government will find it difficult to continue to support the moratorium on the question of Chinese representation in the UN this year. }-4- The government assumes that Communist China will inevit- ably be voted into UN membership this year or soon there- after, replacing Taiwan in both the General Assembly and jr.j, Security CounciL In the embassy's view, the Macmillan gov- ernment further believes that it has become impossible suc- cessfully to attach any conditions to the seating of Peiping. 4.,,,,A-1) The embassy concludes that recent public statements by For- ip eign Secretary Home and others are part of a British initia- tive designed to secure United States acquiescence to the shift in seats) Queried about the French position by the US Embassy in Paris, a Foreign Ministry official said his government will probably soon undertake a high-level review of French policy on diplomatic recognition of Communist China and Chinese representation in the United Nations. He denied, however, that any shift in the French position is imminent. In the past, Peiping's support of the Algerian rebels has been a major stum- bling block, but Foreign Ministry officials are now considering whether a French ambassador in Peiping would be useful for Influencing the representatives of new French-speaking African states which have recognized Communist China or may do so. (Backup, Page 3) Communist China: Peiping is negotiating additional grain purchases with Australia, Canada, and Argentina which may result in new orders for as much as two million tons. The Chi- nese have already purchased about $200,000,000 worth of food- stuffs in recent months, including about three million tons of food grains. Peiping has undertaken a variety of emergency measures, such as selling silver bullion and securing short- term credits from Hong Kong banks, to ease the pressure of 4 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET rcj A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 r these purchases on its foreign currency resources. Although there has been speculation that the USSR has advanced a hard currency loan to China to cover the emergency grain imports, there is no reliable evidence that such financial backing has been arranged. However, Sino-Soviet economic talks, which �have been under way in Peiping since early February, may re- sult in an accommodation designed to ease the Chinese balance of payments with the USSR by rescheduling Peiping's debt re- payments. Poland= Cuba: A contract under which Poland will provide Cuba with a tool plant valued at $1,959,000 was signed on 11 February. The agreement called for a 30-percent down pay- ment, with the balance payable in 12 semi-annual installments, probably at 5-percent interest. A similar contract was signed on 14 February for a steel foundry, worth $1,486,922, calling for 16 semi-annual payments. Although Poland claims these agreements are normal commercial transactions, the terms of- fered could be construed as economic aid by US standards. The fact that these agreements were made despite repeated US warn- ings that they could jeopardize Warsaw's chances of receiving financial aid from the US suggests that Warsaw is under some pressure to con ritnite fn thp Cnmrminist hincIS economic aid effort in Cuba. (Backup, Page 5) South Korea: Pressure stimulated by press and student groups for a status-of-forces agreement is creating an issue in South Korea's relations with the United States. The lower house of the national legislature on 2 March unanimously called for the "earliest" conclusion of an administrative agreement, and Prime Minister Chang Myon has been obliged to assure the public that the government is acting to resolve the issue. South Koreans consider that the lack of an agreement der- ogates their sovereignty, particularly because Japan has a status-of-forces pact. In addition, public sensitivities have been sharpened by the belief that recent economic measures � 4 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF 111 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 'Appror a4020/08/11 CO2026616 Ca revised foreign exchange rate, certain features of the new aid agreement, and increased utility rates--were adopted at the behest of the United �Statesp (Backup, Page 6) Morocco:aormer Premier Abdallah Ibrahim, a leader of the left-wing National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), has indicated his organization will give King Hassan II "some two weeks" to initiate steps leading toward the establishment of a parliamentary democracy .D One such step would be to set a date for the election of a national assembly to draft a consti- tution. Ibrahim indicated that the left would "hit the King hard" on his first "misstell" and stated that such opposition "could go as far as civil war!' 4 Mar. 61 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET - Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616,,,, 3/LLICL / %�10 Situkion in the Congo /The US consul in Elisabethville believes that as many as 250 Belgian mercenaries are integrated into Katanga army units with the full support of the Katanga government, and would be difficult to deport. Any deportation order would have to be enforced by the UN Command, with adequate strength to quell possible armed resistance The military cadre officers are members of the Belgian Army, and could be ordered by the Belgian Government to leave Katanga. However, reluctance to leave 10,000 Belgians in Katanga at the mercy of an undisciplined native army will probably cause the Belgian Government to proceed slow137-.3 iThere are probably 40 important official Belgian civilian advisers distributed among the Katanga government ministries, as opposed to Belgian adventurers. The American consul feels that loss of the official advisers would paralyze the Katanga government. The US Embassy in Leopoldville reports that the Leopoldville provincial and central governments include 400 or 500 Belgians and that their withdrawal would drastically reduce operations_3 paris would almost certainly refuse, as it has since UN operations in the Congo began last year, to pay its share of the costs. France continues to dis= approve of UN operations in the Congo, France had wished to reach a common US-UK=French position on the Congo, but the United States had not cooperated EDuring the week ending 26 February, commentaries broad- cast by Peiping on the Congo exceeded the number devoted to any international event in the past five years. Communist China, which in contrast to the USSR has opposed the UN's role in the Congo from the start, on .3 March endorsed Khrushchev's pro= posal to replace the UN operation in the Congo by a commission of African states. Obviously referring to Afro-Asian sponsorship of the 21 February Security Council resolution to strengthen the UN's hand, Peiping warned against "unrealistic illusions" about 3 --T-4913-SEeltEr 4 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616k --*4��OP SECRET ale UN a7 long as it is "under the manipulation of the United States.1 ossibly as the result of a power struggle, Gizenga has confined Anicet Kashamura, who until last week ran Kivu � Province. Although press reports from Stanleyville assert that Kashamura is still a member of the Stanleyville govern- ment, he was under house arrest on 1 March, at which time he contacted the UAR representative with a view to sending his children to Cairo. The UAR representative "dismissed him courteousej TOP SECRET 4 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616t. %me CONFIDENTIAL Western Positions on Communist China and the UN lThe Macmillan government's public position remains as stated by Lord Home in the House of Lords on 8 February. He argued that despite Peiping's lack of credentials as a peace-loving government, "the facts of international life re- quire that Communist China should be seated in the United Nations." He added that Britain had supported the morato- rium only because the choice had been "between the admis- sion of Communist China and the breakup of the United Na- tions. So long as that was the choice there was only one answer. [Britain's grudging support of the moratorium has come under increasingly heavy fire from the Labor opposition, from many Conservative MPs, and from public opinion gen- erally. Noting that the policy conflicts with Britain's 11- year-old recognition of Peiping, where a charg�s main- tained, the government's critics find the issue a most pop- ular one on which to belabor American Far Eastern policy and to charge British subservience to Washington. The British preoccupation with achieving a disarmament agree- ment provides powerful support for the argument that Com- munist China's isolation from the international community should be reduced. British officials tend to believe that bringing Peiping into contact with pacifying influences in the UN might lessen the chances of an attack on Taiwan or other areas. The British also desire to get more closely in step with African and Asian members of the Commonwealth, whose leaders will participate in the prime ministers' meet- tings opening in London on Wednesday, 8 March The American Embassy, as a result of its detailed ex- amination of the British position, concludes that the British have anticipated that the new US administration might make some changes in US China policy, and want to appear to have influenced Washington rather than to have followed "obediently" behind3 he French Foreign Ministry official in charge of Chinese affairs stated on 21 February that the British attitude as stated) 4 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 *1E10 -COPIFIBENTfirt *are Cby Lord Home was unlikely to change the French Government's opposition to seating Peiping. He indicated, however, that Paris was going to restudy the question. He himself believed that the situation within the UN was changing, although he felt that Communist China would probably spoil its own chances of admission by demanding unacceptable preconditions:) g)fficial circles in Paris apparently feel that the British experience in recognizing Communist China has been disap- pointing and that there is little likelihood of a major expan- sion of trade possibilities. If at some future date De Gaulle decides that to recognize Peiping would give France an advan- tage in its over-all power position, he would face no serious domestic opposition to doing so. Propaganda activity in sup- port of Communist China is being stepped up in France. The Sino-French Friendship Society reportedly feels that its cam- paign in favor of official recognition of Communist China and its admission to the United Nations has made enough progress to warrant extending its drive into the French provinces. The New China News Agency also plans increased activity in France. The prominent Paris weekly L' Express, which has hitherto concentrated on criticizing the Algerian war, is run- ning a series of pro-Peiping articles by the non-Communist leftist political leader Francois Mitterrand about his visit to China and his interview with Mao Tse-tung-7-s COther countries are reconsidering their position. The new Quadros administration recently announced that Brazil will support inclusion of the Chinese representation question on the UN General Assembly agenda at its next session. Malayan Premier Rahman, according to an unconfirmed re- port, plans to vote for the admission of Communist China next September. While Canada is reviewing its support of the moratorium, a preliminary paper on the subject contains no recommendation for a change in position [Taipei retained its seat in the UN last fall by the slimmest margin since 1951; 42 members supported the moratorium, 34 voted again t nd 22-- 1 ri an ndAsian staine� CONFIDENTIAL 4 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616401 Poland Signs Aid Contracts With Cuba Polish diplomats were reminded by US officials in Jan- uary and February that under the Mutual Security Appropria- tions Act of 1961 the US will refuse to grant assistance to any country that provides economic or military aid to the Castro regime. At the same time the US asked for information which would confirm or deny reports that Poland plans to grant eco- nomic aid to Cuba. Polish officials have made clear that they do not feel obli- gated to explain their trade with Cuba to the US, and have in- timated that some regime leaders objected to the American questioning. Nevertheless, a deputy minister of foreign trade allowed US Embassy personnel in Warsaw to scrutinize com- modity lists that purported to "explain" Poland's trade with Cuba. These lists, however, contained no information on the extent or� terms of trade, and did not in fact constitute a reply to the American inquiry. Both in Warsaw and Washington, Polish diplomats and trade representatives have attempted to confuse the issue by stressing that the extent of Polish trade with Cuba will be very small--some estimates ranging as low as $1,000,000 annually. However, despite a record 1960 sugar beet crop, Poland has already contracted for the purchase of $4,000,000 worth of Cuban sugar, and extensive negotiations are going on in other fields. An agreement was reached in December 1960 that Polish-Cuban trade for 1961 would total $44,000,000. -SECRET 4 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO20266161 -NwirTeRE-T- Soiith Koreans Demand Status-of-Forces Agreement e resolution passed by the lower house of the South Korean Assembly on 2 March called for a status-of-forces agreement "in which the legal status of United States armed forces stationed in Korea will be provided for, as promised in the joint communique issued by both governments on 8 August 1953." The Rhee government repeatedly emphasized its desire for such an agreement, and on this issue polit- ically conscious Koreans support their government now as they did then-0-) nationwide signature campaign is under way, and leaf- lets being distributed in the cities by various organizations urge conclusion of an agreement. Several demonstrations have recently emphasized the status-of-forces issue, and ed- itorial comment has been extensive. The chief opposition party advocates early, conclusion of an agreement, and Chang Myon has indicated his ruling party will adopt a similar posi- tion. Chang maintains that since there has been no fighting for nearly eight years, the public will not swallow the argu- ment that the "state of war" justifies special treatment of South KoreaD Cpolitical dissatisfaction this year has been aggravated by economic conditions and the early depletion in the southern provinces of winter food stocks. Consumer prices have risen sharply since the first of the year. Grain shortages in urban areas, the result of hoarding by speculators, and projected increases in transportation and power rates are expected to compound the inflationary rise and increase public restiveness) CGovernment spokesmen have attempted to discredit public agitation by linking it to Communist-motivated "impure ele- ments." Although there is no firm evidence to support the gov- ernmentb charges, such unrest provides an opportunity fot SECRET 4 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page .6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616- ECRET CEommunist subversive activity. the National Police have been alerted to seek out subver- sive agitators and be prepared to put down possible large- scale antigovernment demonstrations:j SECRET 4 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 WI. � T ����� ���� � S.W. � Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 *41.1 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investibation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director -gGNF49EN-T-t-A-t Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616 � 0 ?',%" 0 VI . 1/4 / ,/ / 1/ 1/ /04 / OP SECRET / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2026616