CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/02/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02046546
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 20, 1952

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SEC r INFORMATION
20 February 1952
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Copy No.43
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 1Q
DAT
REVIEWER:
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
I. Soviet interceptor technique in Korean air war improves (page 3).
2. Burma's policy toward China explained (page 3).
3. American aid used as excuse to attack Indonesian Cabinet (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4, Iranian Senate fast losing patience with Mossadeq (page 5).
5. International Bank representative's departure from Iran upsets British
(page 5).
6. Long illness of Saudi Arabian King arouses interest in royal successor
(page 6)
7. Farouk's adviser offers suggestions for Anglo-Egyptian settlement
(page 6).
8. British considering concession on Sudan question (page 7).
EASTERN UROPE
9. Czechs fear loss of transshipment points in Belgium and Netherlands
(page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Comment on possible Italian plea at Lisbon for emigration assistance
(page 8).
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1.
FAR EAST
Soviet interceptor technique in Korean air war improves:
3.3(h)(2)
A high degree of proficiency has been developed
by Soviet personnel operating on the Soviet GCI
net in northwestern Korea, according to afield
analysis of intercepted voice traffic.
The ground controllers, tracking large UN air
formations, now wait for elements of two or four UN aircraft to break off
from the major group before ordering the Soviet-piloted MIG-15's to attack
the smaller elements.
Comment: This improvement in tactics, in
addition to demonstrating the good quality of Soviet radar equipment, indi-
cates that the lessons of combat have proved valuable to Soviet radar oper-
ators as well as to Russian pilots.
2. Burma's policy toward China explained:
The Burmese Ambassador in Peiping on
14 February was asked by his Foreign Office
for an explanation of his recommendation
that Burma adopt a "positive and definite"
policy toward China. He was reminded that
Burma was the first non-Communist country to recognize the Chinese
Communist regime and that, by always championing Peiping's cause at
international conferences, Burma had demonstrated its desire to cultivate
Chinese friendship.
The Burmese Foreign Office stated that the
Chinese, despite their "correct" attitude, had supported the Kachin rebel
leader Naw Seng and his forces in China for over a year. Such action
gives grounds for suspicion of China's assurances that it has no designs
on Burma.
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The Foreign Office reiterated that its policy
remained one of neutrality, and emphasized that any thought that Burma
was only interested in a "jump to the winning side" was erroneous.
3. Ameridan aid used as excuse to attack Indonesian Cabinet: 3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador Cochran in Djakarta, in analyzing
the cabinet crisis in Indonesia, emphasizes that
general dissatisfaction with the government
actually derives from an accumulation of domestic
factors. The weak cabinet has failed materially to improve internal security
and has frequently been attacked by various political parties aspiring for
greater power. Political opposition, wishing to "tie a crisis" to some inter-
national problem, ."by chance" seized on the Mutual Security aid issue.
Ambassador Cochran further states that during
the furor created by recent discussions over Mutual Security aid, "not one
official Indonesian voice was raised in behalf of friendship for the United
States."
Comment: The cabinet crisis arose when it
became known that Foreign Minister Subardjo had agreed on 7 January �
wi th the approval of the Prime Minister but without the knowledge of the
rest of the cabinet or Parliament � to accept American aid within the
terms of the Mutual Security Act. Subardjo was accused .of acting uni-
laterally to compromise Indonesia's position of neutrality in the East-West
conflict.
President Sukarno, whose influence is the
most important factor in Indonesian politics, has not yet stated his position
In the controversy. He can intervene to prevent the early collapse of the
cabinet.
TO1SECI�T
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Iranian Senate fast losing patience with Mossadeq:
3.3(h)(2)
The majority of the Iranian Senate has reached
the limit of its patience with Mossadeq. Three
Senate spokesmen have asserted to the American
Ambassador that failure of the present talks
with the International Bank would probably be followed by a Senate vote of
no confidence in Mossadeq and a request that he resign.
One of the Senators stated his belief that public
enthusiasm for Mossadeq was waning and maintained that, if it shouldbecome
clear that the United States did not intend to aid Mossadeq, the Senate would
unanimously vote him out of office immediately, regardless of the attitude
adopted by the Shah.
Comment: Mossadeq, despite some suggestions
to the contrary, has given no evidence of being ready to retire. His political
success in the past suggests that he would be able to forestall Senate action,
although the Senate does have the constitutional power to unseat him by a
vote of no confidence.
5. International Bank representative's departure from Iran upsets British:
3.3(h)(2)
The British Foreign Office fears that the Iranian
Senate's interest in an oil settlement might
abate while International Bank Vice President
Garner is in London and that upon his return
negotiations might have to be resumed from the beginning.
The American Embassy in London pointed out
to the Foreign Office that the Bank's representative, in order to convince
the Iranians that he was not acting for Britain, must make a determined
effort to negotiate with it.
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Comment: The intervention of the Iranian
Senate in an effort to keep negotiations going has aroused some hope that
the International Bank might be able to find an interim solution for the oil
problem. Any plan acceptable to Iran, however, would still have to be
negotiated with Britain, and that country so far has given little indication
that it is willing sufficiently to modify its demands.
3.3(h)(2) -
6. Long illness of SaudiArabian King arouses interest in royal successor:
The continuing illness of King Ibn Saud, who
occasionally lapses into a semi-comatose state,
has aroused considerable speculation regarding
future political developments in Saudi Arabia.
According to Ambassador Hare in Jidda, the
King has already designated Crown Prince Saud as his successor. Unless
the King reconsiders, Saud should succeed to the throne without undue
difficulty despite rumored opposition to him. Hare believes, however,
that Prince Saud's greatest test would come after his accession to power,
for it would be difficult to control a political situation which has already
been "cracking at the seams" under the "ultra-forceful rule" of the aging
Ibn Saud,
Comment: There has been considerable
speculation over the probable course of events in Saudi Arabia if Ibn Saud's
death should be sudden. Internal tensions might increase as the Crown
Prince attempted to consolidate his popular support. On the other hand,
friction between the Saudi Arabian Government and the Arabian American
Oil Company might diminish, since the younger Saud would probably attempt
to strengthen relations between his country and the West, toward which he
has exhibited Considerable friendliness.
7. Farouk's adviser offers suggestions for Anglo-Egyptian settlement: 3.3(h)(2)
Amr Pasha, recently Egyptian Ambassador to
London and now a political adviser to King
Farouk, informed the American Ambassador
in London that a reduction of the number of
British troops in the Canal zone to the figure specified in the 1936 treaty
would give Egypt a boost in morale. This would enhance the possibility
of gaining full cooperation from all the Arab States in the defense of the
Middle East.
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He added that if Great Britain made the gesture
of -formally scheduling the departure of its remaining forces in the Suez
Canal zone, the Egyptian Government would probably permit some British
troops to remain until Egyptian replacements could be trained and equipped.
He also stres�ed the importance of recognizing the symbolic tie between
the crown of Egypt and the Sudan.
Amr Pasha warned that the continued impasse
had enabled the Soviet Union to increase its propaganda activity in Cairo
and that this had had a marked effect upon the simple Egyptian public. He
added his belief that Prime Minister Ali Maher might not be able to continue
in office if he did not soon show some success in solving this problem.
8. British considering concession on Sudan question:
3.3(h)(2)
The American Embassy in London believes that
Foreign Secretary Eden is still reluctant to
recognize Farouk as King of the Sudan before
the Sudanese are in a position to decide for them-
selves. The Foreign Office has suggested that the question be postponed
until a Sudanese parliament is established and that meanwhile some high-
ranking Egyptian go to the Sudan to discuss the matter.
The Foreign Office, noting that discussions
between the British Ambassador in Cairo and the Prime Minister have not
yet begun, believes that the latter is still drafting proposals for a settlement.
Comment: Eden is now believed to agree that
some concessions must be made on the Sudan issue, but there is still no
indication that he is willing to meet all of Egypt's demands.
EASTERN EUROPE
9. Czechs fear loss of transshipment points in Belgium and Netherlands:
The Czechoslovak Foreign Office informed 3.3(h)(2)
Its Legation in The Hague on 17 January of
reported discussions in Paris on the introduction
of licensing requirements in all Western Euro-
pean ports still used for strategic shipments.
e Foreign ice pointed out that this would curtail transit through:
Amsterdam and Rotterdam and instructed its Legation to report on de-
velopments.
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Comment: At the Coordinating Committee
meeting in Paris, the Western powers are trying to work out some way of
stopping leakage of strategic goods to the Soviet bloc, in particular through
Dutch and Belgian free ports. Belgium and the Netherlands make no
physical check on the destination of shipments in transit.
rrhnt rzechoslovakia makes good use of Rotterdam
and Antwerp listing the transit of lead, tin, copper
and brass. Czechoslovakia also uses Belgian and: Dutch forwarding firms
for the purposes of clandestine trade. 3.3(h)(2)
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WESTERN EUROPE
10. Comment on possible Italian plea at Lisbon for emigration assistance:
At the Lisbon NATO conference Italy may ask
again for prompt and coordinated measures to take care of its excess
manpower. Failure by NATO members to help solve the population problem
is likely to reduce Italian cooperation.
Italy is worried that NATO may emphasize
military measures to the neglect of the over-all economic situation in
Europe. It believes that NATO cannot fulfill its proposed rearmament
program unless Italy's excess manpower is transferred to countries, such
as Britain and France, that are handicapped by serious labor shortages.
Some ten percent of Italy's employable
population of 19,000,000 are now unemployed. The Temporary Council.
Committee of NATO believes that at least 400,000, and preferably 500,000,
should emigrate each year if that country is to achieve a balance between
manpower and economic resources.
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