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May 5, 1961
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vow �11J1F�JEV1ITC1� 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 3.5(c) 5 May 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL IYTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 pproved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 -Tor SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 SICRFTNINO 5 May 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos. (Page t) 2. Congo. (Page it) 3. France: Paris to maintain stand on independent nu- clear force at 8-10 May NATO conference in Oslo. (Page it) 4. France: Further JAEIC statement on fourth nuclear test. (Page 'it i) 5. France-Algeria: De Gaulle believes complete army reorganization needed; plans no cabinet changes at this time. (Page tii) 6. Communist China: Evidence that Soviet technicians have not returned to China. (Page iv) 7. India: Food-grain production reaches new high in 1960-1961. (Page tv) 8. Iran: Teachers' strike developing into popular dem- onstrations against regime. (rage tv) 9. Ghana: Nkrumah extends direct personal control in recent cabinet and party changes; strengthens more radical elements. (Page v) SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 00A�iiproved for Release: 2020108112CO2049780. a / ���� 1 Saly 1PHONG SAL Y1 'Z.. zif ...0 � �,..,,, Nam TR; � 1 .. N N A M 1TH A ... 1,.. rf/ , LUANGIPR .,4u; ong sa_i -- ..- / ',..-.........eAB_ANG 1 i -''.. i ,/ Muong Houn "... � Luang Prabang SAYABOURY Muon � Kasw r' amone NORTHERN LAOS iso GOVERNMENT Forces in 4�10 KONG LE - PATHET LAO I Contact KONG LE - PATHEr LAO AREAS - --ROAD - � -TRAIL ROUTE NUMBE 610505 Nom Bac Lou Den Bien Phu - Vi�\. Sore I (../ m ' (AM NEUA .\"."'Isst XIENG :..-KHO-U A N G \ muon,6 Soui P ou Khoun - Xieng Khouang Ban Phc.iiiik LBan To Viang/ Tho Thorn Vang VIENTIANE Borikhang Ban Hin Heup Pak Sane 3 3 5t0 100 STATUTE MILES Vientiane Kam Kee KHAMM i_Nhornma Thakhek 9 avannakhet inh .mif. tAahaxay ����� Pha Lane; Tchepone Hanoi png SAVANNAKHET 5 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 , Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 bitafeP�SEeRET� CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 5 May 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: Procedures for formally establishing the cease- fire Trios have not yet been agreed upon. General Phoumi e:/_c67P has countered Souvanna's proposal that political and military talks begin in Nam one on 5 May with a suggestion that the talks be limited to military topics and that they be held in /, 2), 3, neutral territory just above the Nam Lik. Pha Lane, about 40 miles east of Savann-akhet, is 7 now in enemy hands. Aside from this development, there has been little change on the major fronts, although there are con- tinuing unconfirmed reports of Pathet Lao Qiuerrilila operations in western Luang Prabang Province. I 1 raoviet airlift operations into Laos continu9 (Backup, Page 1) (Map) TOP SECRET VA z Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 WTI Pointe NOV Banana 4 Brazzaville Kitona 610504 2 Matadi Luanda LIBERIA 200 INDIA 800 TUNISIA 3,200 NIGERIA 400 Bangassou Gemena Lisala Scattered_For MOBUTU 3 ,400 �Coquilhatville MOBUTU 7, 200 Leopolthille Thysville ETHIOPIA 200 Scattered Forces Bumba MOBUTU 800 �Boende Ikela. .Port Francqui uluabourg Bak GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominally controlled by: ET Kasavubu-Mobutu ri Gizenga Kalonji Tshombe United Nations Forces (Service Forces Selected road �tr� Selected railroad =Selected airfield not included) STATUTE MILES 400 nga � Bondo Buta Luputa Ake! Basoko GIZENGA 7 000 MALAYA 470 LIBERIA ETHIOPIA 1,500 tanleyville Bukavu Kindu ETHIOPIA MALAYA 300 INDIA Kongolo Kabalo Albertville � Manono TSHOMBE 7,000 isabethville NIGERIA ditel.Jsumbura IRELAND 650 SWEDEN 650 5 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Congo: In Elisabethville, remarks by UN officials im- plyinTimat the UN will not intervene on Tshombe's behalf may have shaken the initial disposition of Tshombe's lieutenants to cooperate with the UN. In Coquilhatville, the inconclusive character of resolutions so far passed without the presence of representatives of the Gizenga and Tshombe regimes may stimulate new efforts, particularly by the army, to "encourage" participation of Elifsabethville and Stanleyville representatives in the conference. gthanaian President Nkruman is aiarmed at casualties in-. curred by Ghanaian troops in a clash with Congo Army forces at Port Franqui, ancl unless Ghanaian troops were reinforced he would withdraw them from the Congo. Although military operations have lately been on a reduced scale there is a danger of new violence in northern Katanga, where a Malayan force plans to disarm an unspecified numper of hostile Katanga gendarmerie.) ranct-NATo: Le_aris apparently inyenas tuipi Ubb sLrlizigiy its argument for an iiiaependent French nuclear striking force at the 8-10 May Oslo conference of NATO foreign ministers and will certainly do so during President Kennedy's visit to France 31 May - 2 June. The French deputy permanent repre- sentative to the NAC advised his Foreign Ministry in a 12 April memorandum that French participation with the US and UK in strategic nuclear planning for the alliance is the only guarantee that Europe will not be "sacrificed" in a nuclear war, and that such participation is unlikely unless France acquires its own striking force. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, purportedly reflecting De Gaulle's personal views, told Ambas- sador Gavin on 19 April that France considered it "unrealistic" to assume that the US would initiate the use of strategic nu- clear weapons "merely because Germany or France were be- ing overrun," and that therefore France could not surrender its responsibility for national defense "to NATO or anyone else,23 (Backup, Page 3) 5 May 61 DAILY BRIEF 11 \--yut ----T-13P�SEG4EX / Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 'IS TOP SECRET ' France: 'Rhe Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAETM�ssued the following statement on 4 Mazy:3 1. /The fourth French nuclear test, previously reported in the JAEIC statement of 25 April 1961, was detected by one acoustic station and by four electromagnetic stations of the Atomic Energy Detection System as having occurred at the Reganne Proving Ground at 0508Z on 25 April 1961, and had a yield of 1/4-2KT. Radioactive debris from this test was in- tercepted on 28 April 1961 and a preliminary analysis of this debris indicated that the French test device utilized plutonium as the fissionable materiag 2. IA report has been received that the French were test- ing a prototype device of a weapon planned to be compatible with the Mirage IV bomber and expected to yield 15 to 17 kilotons. They further reported that the yield was about 1 KT and that the test was a failurej 3. Pthe Mirage IV bomber can accommodate a weapon with a diameter of approximately 45 inches and a weight of 3,000-5,000 pounds. If the device tested were intended for this bomber and failed to give the expected yield, it would in- dicate that the French weapon development program is lagging and/or encountering severe design probleaq France-Al eria: De Gaulle had been "surprised and bitterly deceived" by the recent coup attempt in Algeria. De Gaulle believes a complete reorganization of the French Army and administrative security services is needed, and said he is less upset by those who actively opposed him than by "fence-sitting" officials who waited to see which side would win out in the crisis. Contrary to numerous press stories, Lyuu De Gaulle does not anticipate making changes in nis cabinet at this tim 5.e Gaulle anticipates that negotiations with the Algerian rebels will begin about 11 or 12 May, but professes pessimism about the prospects of these negotiations because of divisions within the rebel leadership. Describing tension among t12:9 5 May 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET ;oy %A Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 %kal�n7P-3-rtit0-1� European settlers in Algeria as greater now than ever before, De Gaulle questioned how long the Moslems will remain calm, and indicated he feels new outbreaks of terrorism in both Al- geria and France a5e probabC n, 4, CoMmum hma - Ubbn: While Sino- Soviet trade talks were concluded with the signing of the an- nual trade protocol on 7 April, discussions begun in Febru- ary involving Soviet long-term assistance and technical aid for China are still dragging on, and do not appear to be going smoothly. Technicians are not likely to return unless some position agreement is reached in these ta - India: A bumper rice harvest, combined with an increase in other food-grain crops, has resulted in a new high in In- dian food-grain production during 1960-61. While these re- sults reflect in part New Delhi's strenuous efforts to expand acreage and yields, the key factor appears to have been gen- erally favorable weather. The average food-grain production over the past three years nonetheless represents a gain of about 42 percent over production a decade ago, thus more than keeping pace with India's 22 percent population rise during the same period. (Backup, Page 5) Iran: The strike of government-employed teachers de- manding higher pay which started in Tehran on 2 May is snow- balling into larger popular demonstrations against the regime. Large crowds were reported on 4 May to be demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Sharif-Emami, and the army has been called in to help maintain order. Employees of other 5 May 61 DAILY BRIEF iv TOP SECRET e Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 *44�1 TOP SECRET f government ministries are considering joining the demon- strations. Communist sympathizers, who are strong in the Ministry of Education, will welcome the occasion to harass the government, although they did not instigate the strike. *Army and police units are reported very much in evidence. These forces have the capability of maintaining order, but the degree of their loyalty to the government is uncertain. A repetition of the violence which has already caused the deaths of two teachers would further alienate the already considerable body of moderate opinion, which is turning against the Shah. packup, Page 6) Ghana: Changes in government and party positions an- nounc-iffIri Accra on 1 and 2 May represent the latest in a series of moves by Nkrumah aimed at extending his direct personal control over virtually all key governmental func- /�. 3-/xt 7Ri tions and over the apparatus of the ruling Convention Peo- ple's party. The changes apparently are motivated largely by domestic considerations--especially Nkrumah's dissatis faction over the pace at which Ghana's development programs are being implemented--but also reflect frustrations he has encountered in his pan-African policies. The cabinet re- shuffle has weakened the regime's "old guard," and appears to have strengthened younger and more radical elements, many of whom are impressed by the social and economic experiences of Communist countries. (Backup, Page 7) 5 May 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 SECRET __ Laos a.lie political situation in Vientiane is becoming more un- stable as a result of widespread disgruntlement within the gov- ermental structure over the bleak military and political outlook. Ambassador Brown, reports there is increasing dissatisfaction among the armed forces and the National Assembly with the Boun Oum Phoumi leadership. There is talk in local polit- ical circles of a possible move by the deputies to bring about, a change in the government when the assembly reconvenes on 11 May. Sihanouk's report that King Savang was planning a shake-up on that date stemmed from a misunderstanding of Savang's remark that the formation of a new government might be discussed when the assembly reconvenes, irSihanouk has notified the British and Soviet ambassadors in hrTom Penh of his intent to stay away from the Geneva con- ference. He is described as being in a highly emotional state, feeling that he was insulted during his visit to Luang Prabang and accused by King Sayan in so many words of meddling in Laos' affairs. Sihanouk's agitation also reflects his serious concern over .Cambodia's welfare as a result of Communist gains in Lao_si the 14-nation conference on Laos e pos pone a wee or e days. further time would allow both Sihanouk and Kin Savang to be persuaded of the value of the conference. L more time was also needed to coordinate Western pc)sIno1s. In Bangkok, Thai For- eign Minister Thanat Khoman has expressed the view that the opening date of the conference will have to be postponed to enable the ICC sufficient time to do its work and report to the co- chairma9 North Vietnam announced on 4 May that its delegation to the 14-nation conference had been appointed and would be led by Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem. the Chinese 5 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 SECRET 4109' Communists are planning to send a sizable delegation. three TU404's would fly from Moscow to Pei- ping on 5 May and that these aircraft would be used by the Chinese delegation to the conference in Geneva. A fourth TU- 104 is being held in reserve for the Chinese. While the Chi- nese probably will not fill these airplanes to capacity, each TU-104 is capable of carrying at least 75 passengers /resident Diem and South Vietnamese military leaders, at a 3 May meeting in Saigon, are reported to have decided to form a task force of three infantry battalions and position them on the Vietnamese-Lao border at Route 9 for possible intervention in Laos. Some Vietnamese military elements in civilian clothing have previously entered Laos to help repel thP Communist forces since Com- ., munist incursions into southern Laos osed a grave threat to South Vietnam, the Diem government must take immediate countermeasures. These included the possible dispatch of Vietnamese troops into Laos along Route 9 as far west as Muong Phine. this was the recommen- dation of General Don, Vietnamese army commander of the Second Military Region just below the 17th paralltg rdeneral Phoumi is reported to have asked South Vietnam on 1 May for help in stabilizing the situation in the Tchepone area. As of 4 May, the former Laotian garrison at Tchepone was still holding a defensive perimeter two miles southeast of the town. At a minimum, Diem probably feels that the situa- tion in Laos is sufficiently threatening to require troops on the frontier to guard against rInggihl P Cnrnmunisf .ncursions into Vietnamese territory-.7 5 May 61 �5E-eRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Noe' �SECRET- France Renewing Arguthents for Independent Nuclear Force 'aere were indications last year that De Gaulle intended to "wait for a new US administration" before renewing his de- mands for US nuclear assistance and tripartite strategy and policy coordination. He reopened one of these subjects in his 11 April press conference when, after reiterating his familiar argument against integration of French forces in NATO, he sharpened his long-standing demand for tripartite Western policy and strategy coordination in terms of the "necessity to thoroughly clarify the question of the use of nuclear armaments of both Western powers who possess them2' trie Gaulle's views were elaborated on 19 April by Couve de Murville, who told Gavin that he thinks "NATO"--and im- plicitly a variety of related problems--will be the first item of interest in the forthcoming talks between the French and US presidents. According to Couve, NATO is unrealistic as now conceived, particularly as regards the strategy of US nuclear retaliation to save Europe from being overrun by the Soviets. He said De Gaulle believes that in any major Soviet attack Germany would be overrun and the "battle of Europe" decided in France. Couve stated that the West would neces- sarily use tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet forces but would not use strategic weapons against the USSR unless the latter first used them against the US. Therefore France has concluded that "warfare under NATO auspices" would result in the total destruction of western Europe. With this pros- pect, Couve said any nation is "extremely reluctant" to give responsibility for its own defense to anyone else, such as SAC EU13.7 ambassador Finletter reported on 3 May that he had been shown copies of French deputy permanent representative Jurgensen's memorandum in connection with the latter's sum- mary of what he expects to be the French position on military matters at the Oslo conference. The memorandum's discus- sion of the need for and ways of maintaining strategic nuclear weapons in Europe described the idea of a multilateral NATO deterrent as "not necessary," asserted that purely maritime deployment of missiles is unsatisfactory, and argued that therefore "possession by France on its territory of its own 5 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Noe &clear strike force is in the interest of all western Europe." The memorandum concluded that France must either "go it alone" to acquire its own strike force, or must receive from the US technical cooperation, both nuclear and missile, sim- ilar to that given the UK. The memorandum hinted that if this were provided, France's position in NATO would be more cooperativg Lin view of past French performance at North Atlantic Pact sessions during periods of De Gaulle's efforts to assert France's claims to a special position with the US and UK in NATO, the French may criticize and stall in Oslo conference discussions �primarily with the idea of laying the groundwork for De Gaulle's talks with President Kennedy in Paris. SECRET 5 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 CONFIDENTIAL Nai Indian Food-Grain Production at New Highs for 1960-61 As a result, government food-grain stockpiles now amount to nearly 3,000,000 long tons, the highest level since independ- ence was attained in 1947. The program to build up these stockpiles as a buffer against adverse weather in future years is being aided substantially by New Delhi's purchases of Amer- ican surplus agricultural commodities under the PL-480 pro- gram. The improved food supply situation will help the ruling Congress party, facing elections in Orissa State next month and nationally early in 1962. In addition, it will help the ca- reer of Food and Agriculture Minister S. K. Patil, an ener- getic Bombay politician who originally shied away from the job because of the possible hazards to his ambitions. While he now is in a position to capitalize on agriculture's successes and has strengthened his party position by assuming several key responsibilities for the 1962 elections, he must accelerate the pace of food-grain production during the next five years. The Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66) calls for an addi- tional increase in food-grain production--by more than 31 per- cent over this year's 76,000,000 long tons�largely through im- provement of techniques and extensive production and use of chemical fertilizers. This food program is at the heart of the Third Plan, and the importance of achieving its goals is em- phasized by the fact that India's population--now about 438,000,- 000�has already exceeded the level expected for 1966 made by Indian planners during preparation of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1955. �efftNFIDENTIAL- 5 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 �sEeRET- Nome Demonsi4 ciLLUIlb 1,11 Cd.D /II ainvilaat,y khe present demonstrations are more serious than those following the rigged parliamentary elections earlier in the year�demonstrations which had been confined almost en- tirely to university students and attracted little public sup- port. The strike has been planned for some time and cli- maxes a period of increasing teacher activity which has in- cluded peaceful one-day strikes in Tehran and the provinces. Prime mover in the teachers' activities has been Mohammad Derakhshesh, chairman of the "Licentiates Society," who was arrested on 1 May in an attempt to head off the strike. He has since been released. The standard teacher's salary is about $40 per month, little better than that of many common laborers. The government budget for this year provides for an additional $4,400,000 to raise salaries by 10 to 15 percent, but the demonstrators now are demanding an even greater in- crease. A probable further complication is Derakhshesh's desire to demonstrate his influence with the teachers. His rival for leadership of the teachers, who was government- sponsored, was elected to parliame1.2g rale schools and the bazaar are closed and there are rumors that employees of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Health, as well as bus and taxi drivers, may join the strike. The antigovernment National Front is reported to be debating whether or not to throw its support to the strikers. The National Front will have an opportunity to turn out in force on 5 May to attend the commemoration services being held on the 40th day after the death of former Prime Minister Mos- sadeq's finance minister,/ IThe army, unlike the police, is not trained in riot con- trol, and further large demonstrations could lead to more bloodshed. However, the willingness of the army to fire on the demonstrators has not been tested; if it refuses, this would probably mark the beginning of a precipitous decline in the prestige and influence of the Sha_113 SECRET 5 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 CONFIDENTIAL Nad Nkrumah Widens Personal Role in Ghana President Nkrumah, who was endowed with far-reaching executive authority under the republican constitution Ghana adopted last July, announced in mid-February that he planned to take over the secretary generalship of the Convention Peo- ple's party (CPP) as of 1 May. al. the same speech he ex- pressed dissatisfaction with the "ideological deficiencies" of many of his supporters and promised to strengthen the mech- anism of the CPP) Nkrumah's wider purpose and his dissatisfaction with in- creasing intra-party bickering were brought into clearer focus early last month in a major policy address calling for tighter party discipline and the complete subordination under the CPP of Ghana's labor, farmers, cooperative and women's organiza- tion. At the same time, he demanded that members of parlia- ment must either liquidate their private investments or resign, and pledged, in unprecedentedly forceful fashion, to root out the traditional evil of official corruption. In subsequent pub- lic statements on 18 April and 1 May, Nkrumah announced modifications in the government's structure and innovations in the party apparatus--such as directing regional administra- tive officers to act also as regional party secretaries�increas- ing his own direct influence over the regime. He described his campaign as a move to "put our house in order" in anticipation of new phases of the pan-African movement abroad and the "industrial and technical revolution" at home. The American Embassy in Accra reports that these initi- atives by Nkrumah have sharply accentuated differences in out- look among ministers, and other party and government lead- ers. This was particularly apparent during the week preceding the announcement of the new government when a group com- posed primarily of early Nkrumah supporters, many of whom, such as Finance Minister Gbedemah and Agriculture Minister Botsio, have acquired substantial personal holdings, waged a better struggle against the radicals. The absence of any dramatic personnel changes in the new cabinet indicates that the older leaders apparently succeeded in forcing Nkrumah to forego, at least temporarily, the sweeping changes which seemed 5 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 CONFIDENTIAL to have been in the offing. Nevertheless, both Gbedemah and Botsio have had their powers curtailed while former Minister of Social Welfare Quaidoo, who attacked the party and indirect- ly Nkrumah in parliament on 25 April, has been dropped from the cabinet entirely. The left wing's representation, mean- while, has been strengthened by the inclusion of former CPP secretary general Adamafio as minister of state for presidential affairs. CONFIDENTIAL 5 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 k..11 V A . .L THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049780 'Approved%1R