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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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May 6, 1961
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�%,� r aG%�1%.16 I 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 vao, New 6 May 1961 Copy No. C (2; CENTRAL IN"TELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TO P-S EGRET- //7 A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 14:proved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 I Ur 5W11t-11-- --TOP-SEeRET� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 V. "Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 SECRET-101 6 May 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos: Phoumi says enemy stalling on second cease- fire meeting. (Page i) 2. Congo: Leopoldville may reconvene parliament. (Page ti) 3. Communist China: Chou En-lai rejects offer of American wheat from Burmese prime minister. (Page ti) 4. Pyongyang invites South Koreans to visit North Korea. (Page it) 5. Iraq: Moslem extremists reported planning to as- sassinate Qasim. (Page tit) 6. Libya: Cabinet reorganized. (Page itt) 7. Iran: Appointment of new prime minister intended to end demonstrations in Tehran. (page tit) SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 BURMA / --- / 1 -- i Nam T1711.- �''' *,-.., (,-\ Na Moi l./ 1 .....� '.../- N A Mi. T 1-1 A mia0:g sa / Nam Bac ...........' ,/,1 ."--...,-; I - � LUANGI PRA Muong Houn ... . Luang Proban ;;,,'ir�--.,;...,-.-------/.--;---� SAYABOURY Muon Kass/ arnone LA NORTHERN LAOS 440- GOVERNMENT Forces in 4�10. KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS ROAD - - TRAIL 610506 XIENG txt Viry ,KHOUAN G n air Khoun Ban Phak \ Bap Ta IN, Vang Weng The Thom C ENTIAI AKE- Ea?hoonec p k rr Ban Htn tieup 3 510 .109 STATUTE MILES ROUTE NUMBER Korn Keut -- KHAMM Nhommar vannakhet SAVANU,a-HET 6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 �41/14 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 6 May 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laosahe cease-fire discussions held just north of the Nam fira 5 May between representatives of the Vientiane and Xieng Khouang factions were unproductive. General Phoumi states that the low-ranking enemy representatives apparently had no authority to make decisions except on local problems--such as access to water supply in the area--and he is convinced that they were a "second team." The enemy representatives claimed that because of poor communications another meeting would not be possible before 7 MayD *The Vientiane government, meanwhile, has broadcast an offer to meet in Luang Prabang at any time between 6 and 10 11-0--- May with leaders of the opposing party for discussions aimed at a "general reconciliation." This offer may merely be in- tended to give �an impression of reasonableness toward Sou- vanna's proposal for political talks on the assumption that Luang Prabang is unacceptable as a site. It could, however, represent a modification of the government's professed op- position to political talks prior to the Geneva conference, in line with King Sayan& preference for an internal settlement. Er he military situation is generally quiet, with only scat- tered activity reported. About 150 South Vietnamese troops are reported to have moved about 7 miles into southern Laos in what is described as primarily a defensive maneuver to �provide fallback positions for the Laotian garrison retreating fro% Tchepone:), lSoviet airlift operations into Laos continue') (Backup, Page 1) (Map) Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 /r k Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 w SECRET %ispl Congo: akopoldville's Foreign Minister Bomboko--the dominant figure at the Coquilhatville political conference--ap- parently hopes to enlist UN support to disarm Tshombe's troops, and subsequently himself move against Gigenga, ac- cording to the American Embassy in Leopoldville There are indications that the Leopoldville group may reconvene parlia- ment--a move long sought by Gizenga--as a means of secur- ing Gizenga's attendance at the current talks. Leopoldville government leaders, who are still keeping Tshombe under de- tention, apparently regard the present conference at Coquilhat- vine as crucial to the Congo's future and have no plans to defer outstanding issues to a subsequent meeting. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, who is also minister of African affairs in the new cabinet, will seek to build up the Leopoldville government at Tshombd's expense and to weed out some of the more blatant Belgian supporters of Tshombe in Katanga. Because of strong right-wing sentiment in Bel- gium, however, he would be reluctant to see a general exodus nf Ralcrinn crafflArc frnm Katnncra af fhp TTITcaitsistence, (Backup, Page 4) Communist China: Demonstrating an extreme sensitivity to any suggestion that Communist China needs American help in its present difficulties, Premier Chou En-lai rejected an offer, extended by Burmese Premier U Nu in April, of some 300,000 tons of wheat from private American sources on favor- able terms. Chou admitted that the purchase of Canadian and Australian grain for hard currency was placing a heavy strain on China, but declined to consider a proposal that would have permitted payment for the American wheat in Chinese Commu- nist currency. The Chinese premier he was naive in dealing with the Americans and was being used by them in a scheme to make propaganda capital out of Communist China's food shorta s. China Chou added could t ke care of itse North - South Korea: North Korea has offered to throw open its borders and pay the bills for a wide variety of visitors 0 p from South Korea. On 4 May Pyongyang issued .a statement en- " dorsing a proposal for North-South contacts it said had been 6 May 61 DAILY BRIEF 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 *�..# �SECRE-T-- ;gad 0 made the same day by a group of South Korean students. Pyongyang invited the students to come North and offered to provide "freedom of travel" and living facilities. Virtually every segment of the South Korean population was promised similar treatment in this offer, which Pyongyang undoubtedly expects Seoul to denounce. Although the bulk of South Korean political and student leaders probably will reject Pyongyang's offer, public interest in reunification has been growing since April of last year. (Backup, Page 5) /iraq:CMembers of Moslem extremist groups are said to be planning to assassinate Prime Minister Qasim sometime this month, Among Qasim's most vocal critics have been Iraq religious leaders, who have consistently opposed his past reliance on the Communists for support and the suppression of rightist religious political parties0 osiem retigious fanatics are more prone to desperate action to achieve their ends than are Arab nationalist elements' :- (Backup, Page 6) Libya: [The reorganization of Prime Minister Uthman's cabinet on di May appears aimed at heading off a new govern- mental crisis over graft and corruption among top officials. Members of the Uthman government have in their six months of power managed to find "legal" as well as sub rosa means for extracting large sums from several Western-owned oil companies. Although the pro-Western minister of foreign affairs has been replaced by an experienced diplomat who has also been favorably disposed toward the West, the composi- tion of the revised cabinet as a whole suggests a continuation of the gradual trend in Libya toward nationalist and neutralist policies. (Backup, Page 7) 6 May 61 DAILY BRIEF iii --SEERET- 0 k Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 %4111� --iggrCREZ khiso Iran: -Confirmation by the Shah of reports that Ali Amini has been appointed prime minister to replace Sharif-Emami, who resigned on 4 May, would indicate an intent to appease elements which have called for reform and an attempt to quiet demonstrations which have been going on in Tehran )since 2 May. amini, recognized as a conservative opponent of the Shah, would have the support of General Bakhtiar, who has been engaged in his own planning for a possible removal of the Shali Amini would probably attempt a moderate re- formist program, but his success would depend on the extent to which the Shah is willing to support him against the ultra- conservatives, who would oppose any reforms threatening their interests. General Bakhtiar also talked to the Shah on 5 May and is a possible choice for prime minister, but he Is reported to be reluctant to accept the post. 11-&- 6 May 61 DAILY BRIEF iv SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 ' TOP SECRET Laos Pha Lane, east of Savanna- khe on Route 9, was still in government hands as of 1600 hours on 5 May, contrary to an earlier Laotian Army report that the town had fallen. North of Pak Sane, a government battalion in- itiated a limited-objective attack on 5 May to improve its po- gitinn No other military activity in Laos has been reported a group of aBout 100 Vietnamese special forces personnel is being as- sembled for possible covert missions in Laos along Route 9. One or two reconnaissance teams composed of such troops dis- guised as civilians are already operating in the Tchepone dis- trict, as of 4 May Laotian Army troops still held four posts on noute 9 between Tchepone and the Vietnamese border:`? TASS has characterized the cease-fire discussions of 5 May as "unofficial negotiations" on the location of the perma, nent armistice talks. It said the first meeting scheduled had not taken place because the Vientiane delegation did not go to Namone in accordance with Souvanna's proposal. rIn discussing French policy on Laos at Geneva, Paris favors having the conference limited to the Laotian problem, with all substantive decisions being unanimous. the goal of the conference should be to seek a peaceful solution, but if the conference failed, other steps, as noted in the SEATO resolution, would SECRET 6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 have to be taken. The French prefer to see a government of national union formed in Laos before the conference, but the spokesman admitted this seemed an increasingly remote pos- sibility:3 working level believes it is impossible to prevent the bloc rom gaining some advantages from the conference because the West has "played its hand too badly for too long." it is unrealistic to hope to postpone the consicteration ot me for- mation of a new Laotian government, preferably under Sou- vanna with Pathet Lao representation. The British are en- couraging the Laotion government to accept Souvanna's invita- tion to political talks now in Laos. While agreeing on the need for being prepared to take "vigorous action" if either the conference or the cease-fire breaks down, London is op- posed to measures of readiness which they fear might wreck the negotiations, such as a troop build-up in Thailand or a "conspicuous" increase in US military support. London thinks any commission resulting from the conference must be truly neutral, such as a supervisory commission composed of one Western power, one Communist power, plus Cambodia, Burma, and India7.-3 In a 3 May discussion with UK Ambassador Roberts, So- viet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin suggested that Sihanouk's withdrawal of support for the conference was caused by the United States. However, he pointed out that he saw no reason why the conference could not proceed on schedule inasmuch as it was being convened at the invitation a the UK and the USSR. A Chinese Communist government statement of 4 May implied that Ambassador Harriman's trip to Laos was for the purpose of instigating the King of Laos to denounce Sihanouk's proposal for the conference. The Communists are also voicing suspicion over the Lao- tian King's call for a National Assembly session on 11 May. Hanoi characterizes this development as a move by the US and Vientiane to "cook up" a new government rather than join with Souvanna Phouma in the effort to form a coalition TOP SECRET 6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 New ---rop�sEeRE-T- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 1.11P4 government and agree on a Laotian delegation to the Geneva conference. /:_-,Note: Henceforth, airlift statistics reported in the Cen ral Intelligence Bulletin will be computed on the following basis; 100 percent of all Soviet and North Vietnamese flights scheduled into Laos less known cancellations, plus 50 percent of all Soviet and North Vietnamese transports scheduled for flights within North Vietnam. The latter category is considered to be associated with the airlift. Airlift tonnages, when reported, will be computed on the basis of 2. 25 tons per IL-14 sortie and 1. 5 tons per LI-2 sortie73 C.On 4 May, 15 transports were involved in airlift operations-- 12 Soviet and 3 North Vietnamese. Of this number, 4 Soviet LI-2s were reflected flvinz round-trip from Hanoi to Xieng KhouanC TOP SECRET 6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Ns, CONFIDENTIAL -Now The Situation in the Congo According to press reports, Tshombe. has been advised that he will not be released until he has guaranteed the par- ticipation of Katanga deputies in parliament. In April, ele- ments of the Congo Army nominally loyal to Gizenga report- edly agreed to recognize General Mobutu's authority in return for a reconvening of parliament as desired by Gizenga. Bomboko may regard a reconvening of parliament as the price which Leopoldville must pay to secure Gizenga's r- ticipation in negotiations aimed at reuniting the Congo. The American Embassy in Leopoldville reports that Gizenga has "made long strides" in the past three weeks to increase his parliamentary support. Gizenga appears assured of the sup- port of over 40 deputies of the 136-man lower chamber--a bloc comparable to that controlled by Lumumba during his period as premier Spaak has to contend with powerful rightist elements in the cabinet which are hostile to any course which might ap- pear to be sacrificing Belgian interests. An aggressive sup- porter of a vigorous pro-Katanga policy, former Defense Minister Gilson has been retained in the cabinet as minister of interior as a concession to the rightist elements among the Social Christians. Another "flight" of Belgians from the Congo would have grave repercussions on public opinion and seriously weaken Spaak's position as foreign minister. CONFIDENTIAL 6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 CONFIDENTIAL North Korea Seeks Contacts With the South EThe Seoul University league for national unification which Pyongyang states proposed North -South student talks, claims to have affiliated organizations on a number of South Korean campuses but probably speaks for only a small minority of leftist-inclined students. However, the failure of the "April revolution" of 1960 to provide anticipated economic improve- ments has increased public interest in reunification as a solu- tion for the country's ills-) Aware of this interest, North Korea is conducting an in- tensive propaganda campaign around the reunification theme. Boasting of its economic progress in the past few years, Pyongyang bombards the South with offers of economic assist- ance and calls for a wide range of contacts as preliminary steps toward reunification. Pyongyang has sought to make Seoul responsible, in the eyes of the Southern population, for thwarting these overtures. Responsible South Korean government and opposition leaders have been strongly opposed to any form of exchange with the Communists and probably prefer to avoid any ini- tiative on reunification. Last November, however, the Chang Myon government showed some willingness to take a more flexible position toward North-South contacts in order to con- vince the public it was moving in a reasonable manner to satisfy desires for reunification. CONFIDENTIAL 6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Nari --SEeRET� %or Moslem Extremists Plan Assassination of Qasim CIraq's Moslem activist elements are divided into three groupings--the Islamic and Tahrir parties and the Moslem Brotherhood. Qasim has opposed all three and only the Is- lamic party received legal recognition following an appeal to the Iraqi courts. Vigorously anti-Communist, the party has been subjected to continued harassment by Qasim;- its leaders were arrested last November and released in mid- March. Party branches have been closed. It is extremely conservative and a product of the traditional feudal strati- fied society of Iraq. The Tahrir is similar to the Islamic party--ultraconservative and religiously inclined. The strength of this clandestine group is unteste C-The Moslem Brotherhood, often referred to as the Ilchwan, has an ideology based on the thesis that the Holy Koran and Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad have estab- lished for all time the most perfect guidance in every situa- tion of private and public life. The Moslem Brotherhood be- lieves these precepts should replace constitutional, admin- istrative, and economic patterns copied from the West. Founded in Egypt in 1929, the movement extends throughout the Arab states. Because it clashes with Nasiris secular policies, the Egyptian Ilchwan was dissolved by Nasir in Jan- uary 1954. The following October radical members attempted to assassinate him) 6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Noe SECRET :of LibVan Cabinet Shake-Up CThree of the six new cabinet appointees were drawn from the House of Deputies' Committee on Finance and Economy, the body which would have been most likely to attack the executive branch effectively on the corruption issue. These appointments are presumably a continuation of Uthman's maneuvers to frag- ment the opposition in the House of DeNties.which brought about the fall of the Kubar government last October. The charges then centered on bribes and other irregularities in the government's handling of the costly Fezzan road project. In spite of the past scandal, both he and King Idris are insistent that construction of the Fezzan road be continued by the same Libyan firm and on much the same basis as originally plannecti he government is also extremely vulnerable because of the crudity of the favors. granted by top officials in response to bribes from a few of the many Western-owned oil companies operating in Libya. In March, for example, the government unexpectedly opened several concession areas, accepted the applications of two companies which had paved the way with appropriate largesse, and immediately closed the bidding. In a more open and "legal" fashion, federal officials have worked with Libyan provincial governments to obtain large spe- cial payments from companies in connection with pipeline rights-of-way. Public resentment has rapidly increased and tends to be directed against the Western oil industry as well as against venal Libyan officials) �SECRET-- 6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 -Noe, t kfiu v .11-0 A:a 1 V A. AL-X.-La THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781 opproved for Release. 2020/08/1TOP 5ECRT -TOP-SECRET- -e4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049781