CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1961/05/06

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02049781
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2020
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2020
• Publication Date: May 6, 1961

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6 May 1961
Copy No. C (2;
CENTRAL
IN"TELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
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6 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Laos: Phoumi says enemy stalling on second cease-
fire meeting. (Page i)
2. Congo: Leopoldville may reconvene parliament.
(Page ti)
3. Communist China: Chou En-lai rejects offer of
American wheat from Burmese prime minister.
(Page ti)
4. Pyongyang invites South Koreans to visit North
Korea. (Page it)
5. Iraq: Moslem extremists reported planning to as-
sassinate Qasim. (Page tit)
6. Libya: Cabinet reorganized. (Page itt)
7. Iran: Appointment of new prime minister intended
to end demonstrations in Tehran. (page tit)
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6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
6 May 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laosahe cease-fire discussions held just north of the
Nam fira 5 May between representatives of the Vientiane
and Xieng Khouang factions were unproductive. General
Phoumi states that the low-ranking enemy representatives
apparently had no authority to make decisions except on local
problems--such as access to water supply in the area--and
he is convinced that they were a "second team." The enemy
representatives claimed that because of poor communications
another meeting would not be possible before 7 MayD
*The Vientiane government, meanwhile, has broadcast an
offer to meet in Luang Prabang at any time between 6 and 10 11-0---
May with leaders of the opposing party for discussions aimed
at a "general reconciliation." This offer may merely be in-
tended to give �an impression of reasonableness toward Sou-
vanna's proposal for political talks on the assumption that
Luang Prabang is unacceptable as a site. It could, however,
represent a modification of the government's professed op-
position to political talks prior to the Geneva conference, in
line with King Sayan& preference for an internal settlement.
Er he military situation is generally quiet, with only scat-
tered activity reported. About 150 South Vietnamese troops
are reported to have moved about 7 miles into southern Laos
in what is described as primarily a defensive maneuver to
�provide fallback positions for the Laotian garrison retreating
fro% Tchepone:),
lSoviet airlift operations into Laos continue')
(Backup, Page 1) (Map)
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Congo: akopoldville's Foreign Minister Bomboko--the
dominant figure at the Coquilhatville political conference--ap-
parently hopes to enlist UN support to disarm Tshombe's
troops, and subsequently himself move against Gigenga, ac-
cording to the American Embassy in Leopoldville There are
indications that the Leopoldville group may reconvene parlia-
ment--a move long sought by Gizenga--as a means of secur-
ing Gizenga's attendance at the current talks. Leopoldville
government leaders, who are still keeping Tshombe under de-
tention, apparently regard the present conference at Coquilhat-
vine as crucial to the Congo's future and have no plans to defer
outstanding issues to a subsequent meeting.
Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, who is also minister of
African affairs in the new cabinet, will seek to build up the
Leopoldville government at Tshombd's expense and to weed
out some of the more blatant Belgian supporters of Tshombe
in Katanga. Because of strong right-wing sentiment in Bel-
gium, however, he would be reluctant to see a general exodus
nf Ralcrinn crafflArc frnm Katnncra af fhp TTITcaitsistence,
(Backup, Page 4)
Communist China: Demonstrating an extreme sensitivity
to any suggestion that Communist China needs American help
in its present difficulties, Premier Chou En-lai rejected an
offer, extended by Burmese Premier U Nu in April, of some
300,000 tons of wheat from private American sources on favor-
able terms. Chou admitted that the purchase of Canadian and
Australian grain for hard currency was placing a heavy strain
on China, but declined to consider a proposal that would have
permitted payment for the American wheat in Chinese Commu-
nist currency. The Chinese premier he was
naive in dealing with the Americans and was being used by them
in a scheme to make propaganda capital out of Communist China's
food shorta s. China Chou added could t ke care of itse
North - South Korea: North Korea has offered to throw
open its borders and pay the bills for a wide variety of visitors 0 p
from South Korea. On 4 May Pyongyang issued .a statement en- "
dorsing a proposal for North-South contacts it said had been
6 May 61
DAILY BRIEF
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made the same day by a group of South Korean students.
Pyongyang invited the students to come North and offered to
provide "freedom of travel" and living facilities. Virtually
every segment of the South Korean population was promised
similar treatment in this offer, which Pyongyang undoubtedly
expects Seoul to denounce. Although the bulk of South Korean
political and student leaders probably will reject Pyongyang's
offer, public interest in reunification has been growing since
April of last year. (Backup, Page 5)
/iraq:CMembers of Moslem extremist groups are said to be planning to assassinate Prime Minister Qasim sometime
this month,
Among Qasim's most vocal critics have been Iraq religious
leaders, who have consistently opposed his past reliance on
the Communists for support and the suppression of rightist
religious political parties0
osiem retigious fanatics
are more prone to desperate action to achieve their ends than
are Arab nationalist elements' :- (Backup,
Page 6)
Libya: [The reorganization of Prime Minister Uthman's
cabinet on di May appears aimed at heading off a new govern-
mental crisis over graft and corruption among top officials.
Members of the Uthman government have in their six months
of power managed to find "legal" as well as sub rosa means
for extracting large sums from several Western-owned oil
companies. Although the pro-Western minister of foreign
affairs has been replaced by an experienced diplomat who has
also been favorably disposed toward the West, the composi-
tion of the revised cabinet as a whole suggests a continuation
of the gradual trend in Libya toward nationalist and neutralist
policies. (Backup, Page 7)
6 May 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
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Iran: -Confirmation by the Shah of reports that Ali Amini
has been appointed prime minister to replace Sharif-Emami,
who resigned on 4 May, would indicate an intent to appease
elements which have called for reform and an attempt to
quiet demonstrations which have been going on in Tehran
)since 2 May. amini, recognized as a conservative opponent
of the Shah, would have the support of General Bakhtiar, who
has been engaged in his own planning for a possible removal
of the Shali Amini would probably attempt a moderate re-
formist program, but his success would depend on the extent
to which the Shah is willing to support him against the ultra-
conservatives, who would oppose any reforms threatening
their interests. General Bakhtiar also talked to the Shah on
5 May and is a possible choice for prime minister, but he
Is reported to be reluctant to accept the post.
11-&-
6 May 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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Laos
Pha Lane, east of Savanna-
khe on Route 9, was still in government hands as of 1600 hours
on 5 May, contrary to an earlier Laotian Army report that the
town had fallen. North of Pak Sane, a government battalion in-
itiated a limited-objective attack on 5 May to improve its po-
gitinn No other military activity in Laos has been reported
a group
of aBout 100 Vietnamese special forces personnel is being as-
sembled for possible covert missions in Laos along Route 9.
One or two reconnaissance teams composed of such troops dis-
guised as civilians are already operating in the Tchepone dis-
trict, as of 4 May
Laotian Army troops still held four posts on noute 9 between
Tchepone and the Vietnamese border:`?
TASS has characterized the cease-fire discussions of 5
May as "unofficial negotiations" on the location of the perma,
nent armistice talks. It said the first meeting scheduled had
not taken place because the Vientiane delegation did not go to
Namone in accordance with Souvanna's proposal.
rIn discussing French policy on Laos at Geneva,
Paris favors having the
conference limited to the Laotian problem, with all substantive
decisions being unanimous. the goal of the conference
should be to seek a peaceful solution, but if the conference
failed, other steps, as noted in the SEATO resolution, would
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have to be taken. The French prefer to see a government of
national union formed in Laos before the conference, but the
spokesman admitted this seemed an increasingly remote pos-
sibility:3
working level believes it is
impossible to prevent the bloc rom gaining some advantages
from the conference because the West has "played its hand
too badly for too long." it is
unrealistic to hope to postpone the consicteration ot me for-
mation of a new Laotian government, preferably under Sou-
vanna with Pathet Lao representation. The British are en-
couraging the Laotion government to accept Souvanna's invita-
tion to political talks now in Laos. While agreeing on the
need for being prepared to take "vigorous action" if either
the conference or the cease-fire breaks down, London is op-
posed to measures of readiness which they fear might wreck
the negotiations, such as a troop build-up in Thailand or a
"conspicuous" increase in US military support. London thinks
any commission resulting from the conference must be truly
neutral, such as a supervisory commission composed of one
Western power, one Communist power, plus Cambodia, Burma,
and India7.-3
In a 3 May discussion with UK Ambassador Roberts, So-
viet Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin suggested that Sihanouk's
withdrawal of support for the conference was caused by the
United States. However, he pointed out that he saw no reason
why the conference could not proceed on schedule inasmuch
as it was being convened at the invitation a the UK and the
USSR. A Chinese Communist government statement of 4 May
implied that Ambassador Harriman's trip to Laos was for the
purpose of instigating the King of Laos to denounce Sihanouk's
proposal for the conference.
The Communists are also voicing suspicion over the Lao-
tian King's call for a National Assembly session on 11 May.
Hanoi characterizes this development as a move by the US
and Vientiane to "cook up" a new government rather than
join with Souvanna Phouma in the effort to form a coalition
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government and agree on a Laotian delegation to the Geneva
conference.
/:_-,Note: Henceforth, airlift statistics reported in the
Cen ral Intelligence Bulletin will be computed on the following
basis; 100 percent of all Soviet and North Vietnamese flights
scheduled into Laos less known cancellations, plus 50 percent
of all Soviet and North Vietnamese transports scheduled for
flights within North Vietnam. The latter category is considered
to be associated with the airlift. Airlift tonnages, when reported,
will be computed on the basis of 2. 25 tons per IL-14 sortie and
1. 5 tons per LI-2 sortie73
C.On 4 May, 15 transports were involved in airlift operations--
12 Soviet and 3 North Vietnamese. Of this number, 4 Soviet
LI-2s were reflected flvinz round-trip from Hanoi to Xieng
KhouanC
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Ns, CONFIDENTIAL -Now
The Situation in the Congo
According to press reports, Tshombe. has been advised
that he will not be released until he has guaranteed the par-
ticipation of Katanga deputies in parliament. In April, ele-
ments of the Congo Army nominally loyal to Gizenga report-
edly agreed to recognize General Mobutu's authority in return
for a reconvening of parliament as desired by Gizenga.
Bomboko may regard a reconvening of parliament as the
price which Leopoldville must pay to secure Gizenga's r-
ticipation in negotiations aimed at reuniting the Congo. The
American Embassy in Leopoldville reports that Gizenga has
"made long strides" in the past three weeks to increase his
parliamentary support. Gizenga appears assured of the sup-
port of over 40 deputies of the 136-man lower chamber--a
bloc comparable to that controlled by Lumumba during his
period as premier
Spaak has to contend with powerful rightist elements in
the cabinet which are hostile to any course which might ap-
pear to be sacrificing Belgian interests. An aggressive sup-
porter of a vigorous pro-Katanga policy, former Defense
Minister Gilson has been retained in the cabinet as minister
of interior as a concession to the rightist elements among
the Social Christians. Another "flight" of Belgians from the
Congo would have grave repercussions on public opinion and
seriously weaken Spaak's position as foreign minister.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
North Korea Seeks Contacts With the South
EThe Seoul University league for national unification which
Pyongyang states proposed North -South student talks, claims
to have affiliated organizations on a number of South Korean
campuses but probably speaks for only a small minority of
leftist-inclined students. However, the failure of the "April
revolution" of 1960 to provide anticipated economic improve-
ments has increased public interest in reunification as a solu-
tion for the country's ills-)
Aware of this interest, North Korea is conducting an in-
tensive propaganda campaign around the reunification theme.
Boasting of its economic progress in the past few years,
Pyongyang bombards the South with offers of economic assist-
ance and calls for a wide range of contacts as preliminary
steps toward reunification. Pyongyang has sought to make
Seoul responsible, in the eyes of the Southern population, for
thwarting these overtures.
Responsible South Korean government and opposition
leaders have been strongly opposed to any form of exchange
with the Communists and probably prefer to avoid any ini-
tiative on reunification. Last November, however, the Chang
Myon government showed some willingness to take a more
flexible position toward North-South contacts in order to con-
vince the public it was moving in a reasonable manner to satisfy
desires for reunification.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Nari --SEeRET� %or
Moslem Extremists Plan Assassination of Qasim
CIraq's Moslem activist elements are divided into three
groupings--the Islamic and Tahrir parties and the Moslem
Brotherhood. Qasim has opposed all three and only the Is-
lamic party received legal recognition following an appeal
to the Iraqi courts. Vigorously anti-Communist, the party
has been subjected to continued harassment by Qasim;- its
leaders were arrested last November and released in mid-
March. Party branches have been closed. It is extremely
conservative and a product of the traditional feudal strati-
fied society of Iraq. The Tahrir is similar to the Islamic
party--ultraconservative and religiously inclined. The
strength of this clandestine group is unteste
C-The Moslem Brotherhood, often referred to as the
Ilchwan, has an ideology based on the thesis that the Holy
Koran and Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad have estab-
lished for all time the most perfect guidance in every situa-
tion of private and public life. The Moslem Brotherhood be-
lieves these precepts should replace constitutional, admin-
istrative, and economic patterns copied from the West.
Founded in Egypt in 1929, the movement extends throughout
the Arab states. Because it clashes with Nasiris secular
policies, the Egyptian Ilchwan was dissolved by Nasir in Jan-
uary 1954. The following October radical members attempted
to assassinate him)
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:of
LibVan Cabinet Shake-Up
CThree of the six new cabinet appointees were drawn from
the House of Deputies' Committee on Finance and Economy, the
body which would have been most likely to attack the executive
branch effectively on the corruption issue. These appointments
are presumably a continuation of Uthman's maneuvers to frag-
ment the opposition in the House of DeNties.which brought about the
fall of the Kubar government last October. The charges then
centered on bribes and other irregularities in the government's
handling of the costly Fezzan road project. In spite of the past
scandal, both he and King Idris are insistent that construction
of the Fezzan road be continued by the same Libyan firm and
on much the same basis as originally plannecti
he government is also extremely vulnerable because of
the crudity of the favors. granted by top officials in response
to bribes from a few of the many Western-owned oil companies
operating in Libya. In March, for example, the government
unexpectedly opened several concession areas, accepted the
applications of two companies which had paved the way with
appropriate largesse, and immediately closed the bidding.
In a more open and "legal" fashion, federal officials have
worked with Libyan provincial governments to obtain large spe-
cial payments from companies in connection with pipeline
rights-of-way. Public resentment has rapidly increased and
tends to be directed against the Western oil industry as well
as against venal Libyan officials)
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-Noe, t kfiu v .11-0 A:a 1 V A. AL-X.-La
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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