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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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May 8, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782. uijt juu 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 8 May 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL IN'TELLIOENCE BULLETIN TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 pproved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 I We bLl�nc.. TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 /Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 wtild SECRET 8 May 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos. (Page i) 2. Congo: Leopoldville government's plan to try Tshombe for treason will heighten tension in Katanga. (Page 1t) 3. USSR: Khrushchev discusses international situation. (Page 'It) 4. USSR: Absence of Kozlov from recent public functions noted. (Page tit) 5. Japan seeks tripartite council to deal with Ryukyuan questions. (Page tit) 6. South Africa: Strikes and demonstrations expected during May. (Page 111) 7. Iran. 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Tha Thom Vang Vreng "st � is../..."�... �-�....; .VIENTIANE Borikhane\ ; Ban WI Fieup Pak Sane � -3 H A 510 100 I STATUTE MILES Korn Kent KH AM Nhommar Thokhek tAahaxay S annokhe SOUTH gine SAVAN HET 8 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 tild TOP SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 8 May 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: 'A 150-man South Vietnamese special forces group, which e r y moved into Laos disguised in civilian clothes, reportedly moved up to Tchepone and on 5 May assisted the A Laotian army commander and 300 men to exfiltrate east along .43,t_zi Route 9 to the border. A South Vietnamese infantry regiment has moved up to the Laotian border to the point where Route 9J*, 4 crosses into South Vietnarq itease-fire negotiators reportedly held another inconclu-,1 sive session on 7 May at a point just north of the Nam Lik Rivek7 'ENo major fighting has taken place since the cease-fire negotiations began, although press reports from Vientiane /Rs 4, ird � claim that the enemy has occupied a village 14 miles north of Luang Prabang. Laotian army forces during the past several days, have reported an enemy buildup in the area ranging in size from two companies to two battalions. Elsewhere, enemy guerrilla action and small unit probes continue. A Meo strong- hold in Xieng Khouang Province was under heavy molar fire on 6 May2 oviet airlift operations continued to be scheduled through 7 Mayaj (Backup, Page 1) (Map) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 '77V Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 `S--TOP---SECRET Congo: Foreign Minister Bomboko's statement on 7 May that the Leopoldville government plans to try Tshomb6 for treason will heighten tension among his followers in Katanga, who are already concerned regarding possible UN moves to disarm Tshombes armed forces. An official of the Katanga government has alleged to the American consul that the UN is preparing an "offensive" against Katanga, and warned that the Elisabethville government would sabotage key mining in- stallations rather than permit them to be turned over to the central government. according to reports from New Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru may now consider Dayal to have been a failure as UN representative in the Congo, and may be resigned to his re- moval. Hammarskjold has previously indicated that he hoped to appoint a committee to assume DayaPs functions, possibly after his return to Leopoldville for a token period-) USSR: Khrushchey's remarks on the international situa- tion during a 6 May speech in Yerevan were apparently in- tended to assure the US that recent events in Laos and Cuba have not damaged long-term prospects for the improvement of Soviet-US relations. According to Ambassador Thompson, the Soviet premier laid strong emphasis on the need for dis- cussion of substantive matters in bilateral disarmament ne- gotiations with the US. Khrushchev referred to talks which were to take place "soon" on the disarmament question and asserted that Moscow was preparing for these talks with "complete seriousness." Turning to the recent events in Cuba, Khrushchev called upon Cuba and the US to "live like good neighbors," and in generally restrained remarks on the situa- tion commented that the USSR would like to look "optimistical- ly" on the future course of Cuban-American relations. Khru- shchev reiterated that Moscow desires a genuinely independ- ent and neutral Laos. He made clear his view that an improve- ment in relations with the US depended not only on the outcome of disarmament negotiations but on the settlement of the Ber- lin and German problems as well. He repeated standard de- mands for a reorganization of the United Nations, but called 8 May 61 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRE T Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 / %tis�IN,14�SE-e-RE-7 11 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 for nations to settle outstanding differencps both bilaterally and through the UN. USSR: Party Secretary Frol Kozlov, by many indications the second-ranking man in the Soviet leadership, has been out of public view since mid-April. There has been no official explanation for his absence. The most important event he missed was the May Day celebration, which traditionally brings the top leaders out in full force. Mikhail Suslov, the other leading party secretary under Khrushchev, was the ranking party official at several Moscow functions during the latter part of Khrushchev's April vacation. Japan: [Foreign Minister Kvosaka has renewed Tokyo's re quest that a tripartite council be established to handle matter concerning Japan, the United States, and the Ryukyu Islands. Kosaka claims that such a council would undercut leftist agita tion in Okinawa and forestall attempts by the political opposi- tion in Japan to make the Okinawan issue a public controversy prior to Prime Minister. Ikeda's visit to Washington in June. The US high commissioner for the Ryukyus comments, how- ever, that establishing the council is likely to stimulate agita- tion for further concessions to reversionist forces in Okinawa and Japan. It seems likely that Japan's role in Ryukyuan af- s discussions during his visit herf) (Backup, Page 4) tc South Africa: LQnrest is likely to increase in South Africa k in the next few weeks. Non-white organizations, aided by Com- munists, are planning a series of strikes and demonstrations late in the month to protest the proclamation of a South African republic on 31 May. In an effort to head off the demonstrations, AI the police are carrying out a series of raids and have arrested or rest ' he antigovernment cam- pai n. "serious disturbances in the public order" during May. "the armed forces have been alerted and, if necessary, wi take harsh action. The white civilians are also preparing them- selves, and there has been a race to the city's gunsmiths." Backup, Page 6) 8 May 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET 111 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 "Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 kw/ 0 *Iran: Ali Amini, appointed Prime Minister of Iran on 6 May, has asked the Iranian public for time and an end to demonstrations to permit him to put his plans for social and economic reforms into effect, but he made no specific promises in his first public statement. The American Embassy in Tehran reports that Amini demanded from the Shah the right to name nearly all cabinet ministers and insisted on the for- mation of a special court to try cases of corruption. Amini announced that the Majlis would not be dissolved, although this was reported also to have been a condition for his ac- ceptance of the prime ministership. Amini may have a period of calm to try his programs, but the success of public protests in toppling the last two prime ministers makes it likely that he will face the same challenge unless he can move rapidly enoughto satisfy at nimum of popular expectations. Backup Page 8) 8 May 61 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 TOP SECRET time Situation in Laos following the Pathet Lao occupation of Tchepone, he had no choice but to establish con- trol over a perimeter six miles inside Laos along Route 9. I any Vietnamese Communist column attacking east from this point would neutralize Vietnamese Army defenses along the 17th parallel. Vietnamese special forces operating in Civilian clothes within the perimeter will control and defend the 'area and give early warning of a large-scale Vietnamese Communist attack. As of 7 May the situation was quie_g rBoun Qum declared, at a press conference on 7 May, his readiness to meet today with Souphannouvong and Souvanna to "find a path of reconciliation and to decide on a delegation" to represent Laos at Geneva. He insisted, however, that the meeting would have to take place on neutral ground, not at Ban Namone. He added that the delegation should represent all factions and should be confirmed by the National Assembly? Ethe cease-fire talks on 6 May bogged down in the dis- pute over a site for formal negotiations, but the enemy was represented for the first time by qualified officers. Liaison tents have been set up at Ban Hin Heup, and since there ap- pears to be no immediate disposition to break off contacts, both sides may be awaiting the arrival of the International Control Commission to art a, an intermediarB Pathet Lao - Kong Le stalling may stem in part from confusion. : the negotiators are in place and requests that the commanding general return immediately "as he is the only person to make any decision on the problem. " gouvanna Phouma. , expounded on the desirability of forming a government of national union before the Geneva Conference and reiterated his position that any government he might head would have to include Pathet Lao representa- tion. Souvanna would keep fig -Tee-SECRET May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 , TOP SECRETtufo a)efense and Interior portfolios out of "leftist" hands. Sou- vanna was definite that General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum would be excluded from a possible Souvanna government, but he adopted an equivocal position when asked if Phoumi could be given responsibility for military affairs at a sub-cabinet lev2.1j be Laotian Government considers that the primary ob- jective of the conference is to work out an internationally guaranteed neutrality status for Laos, but it considers the formation of a government of national union an internal af- fair. Ina 6 May press conference in Phnom Penh, Souvanna Phouma adopted the same position, saying it would be incor- rect for the conference to deal with internal Laotian affairs. Souvanna, proposed that the conference study the creation of a neutral zone which would include both Laos and Cambodi2) The Hanoi Foreign Ministry has charged that on 6 May US aircraft violated North Vietnamese air space four times. The alleged overflights are reported to have occurred in the southernmost provinces of Ha Tinh and Quang Binh. Hanoi warned that the US must "bear full responsibility for the con- sequences of its actions." Communist propaganda continues to place the blame on the US for the failure thus far to achieve productive cease- fire negotiations. A People's Daily commentary on 7 May terms Vientiane's refusal to meet at Ban Namone a "move to create new obstacles" to forming a coalition government and sending a Laotian delegation to Geneva. People's Daily also charges that the US desires only a "breathing spell" and that the "emphasis of US policy is still on intervention." goviet airlift operations continued to be scheduled through 7 May. On 5 May a total of 21 Soviet and North Vietnamese transports were involved in airlift operations; of this number, five Soviet LI-2s were noted in round-trip flights from Hanoi to Xieng Khouang. On 6 May 20 Soviet and North Vietnamese transports were involved in airlift operations; of these, eigh9 �TOP SECRUF 8 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Nave 1 .oviet IL 14s and one Soviet LI-2 are believed to have made round-trip flights from Hanoi to Xieng Khouaug -1or SECRET 8 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Nis CONFIDENTIAL Japan Seeks Broader Role in Ryukyuan Affairs ale US-Japanese peace treaty acknowledges Japan's re- sidual sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands but authorizes the United States to exercise exclusive authority there for an in- definite period. Since 1952, Tokyo has maintained a small, quasi-consular agency in Naha, Okinawa's capital cit_571 anscontent among the Okinawans was first manifest in 1956 when a Communist was elected mayor of Naha during a period when there was considerable resentment against US procedures in acquiring land for military purposes. Although land acquisition is not now a problem, it awakened reversion- ist sentiment in both Japan and the Ryukyus, and the Japanese have not diverted their attention from the Ryukyuan questio19 dhe Kishi government initiated moves for a greater Jap- anese role in Ryukyuan affairs in 1958. Tokyo has been per- mitted to provide technical and economic assistance on a project-by-project basis and to engage in teacher-training programs. The Government of the Ryukyu Islands, an indig- enous structure operating with limited powers granted by the US high commissioner, has been promoting Tokyo's causfy fihe high commissioner indicates that Okinawan support for reversionist activities has been somewhat greater recent- ly, possibly due to Ryukyuan hopes in connection with Ikeda's visit to Washington. He believes it desirable to expand con- sultation with the Japanese on purely technical matters but doubts that this would satisfy reversionist elemenlq &Japan, the moderate Democratic Socialist party (DSP) is introducing a bill in the Diet which would authorize seats for nonvoting representatives from the Hyukyus. The DSP, which heretofore has taken an equivocal position on the Oki- nawan question, is supporting Ryukyuan demands for increased autonomy for popular election of the Ryukyuan chief executive --he is at present appointed by the high commissioner--and for transfer of administrative jurisdiction from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. Symptomatic of CONFIDENTIAL 8 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 vire gpparently closer liaison between Japanese and Ryukyuan po- litical elements is an exchange of parliamentary delegations which is being undertaken3 ffhe Ikeda government prefers, for domestic political reasons, not to adopt a firm stand against reversionist agi- tation and may consider that an easier solution, consistent with the ultimate Japanese objective of regaining administra- tive control over the Ryukyus, is to seek concessions from US authorities-3 CONFIDENTIAL 8 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Nissi CONFIDENTIAL Tension Rising in South Africa [Planning for the demonstrations against the proclamation of the South African Republic on 31 May got under way late in March, following an antigovernment conference sponsored by leaders of the banned African National Congress (ANC) and dominated by the Communists. The conference called for dem- onstrations throughout May, to culminate in a general strike of all non-white communities on 29 and 30 May. The anti-Com- munist Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the white Liberal party dissociated themselves from the proceedings, thus giving the initiative to the Communist-influenced element. A Liberal official stated recently that his party and the PAC plan to "play the month of May by ear." They will find it difficult, however, to keep aloof from the protest movement should it gain mo- mentus9 The usually apathetic colored (mixed-blood) community, an important economic force in the Cape Town area, has shown considerable sympathy for the strike call. While the coloreds did not participate in the disturbances of March and April 1960, they now reportedly hope to impress the ruling Nationalist party with their strength and solidarity, in an ef- fort to deepen the split within the party over concessions to the coloreds) hough there is considerable sympathy for the demon- strations, police operations have further reduced the already tenuous organizational capabilities of the opposition groups. A few African Communists apparently still remain at large and are spending considerable sums to encourage support for the strike; otherwise, most of the potential leaders are either In jail or have had government orders served on them forbid- ding their participation in any meetings. The chief of the spe- cial branch of the South African police said in early May that there were no signs of rising tension in the native population. Nevertheless, the Union's Defense Ministry is increasing its CONFIDENTIAL 8 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 CONFIDENTIAL *new gyms purchases, and private white citizens reportedly are buying firearms at a record rate] ffimidation by both the police and African nationalists probably will be widespread as the strike date approaches. Moreover, white civilians, who fear and distrust African mobs, are likely to become increasingly nervous. Outbreaks of violence may occur] ONFIDENTIAL 8 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 SECRET %of Amini Appointed Prime Minister of Iran All Amini was recalled from his post as Ambassador to the United States in 1958 under suspicion of complicity in a plot against the Shah. Since that time he has come to be identified as an opponent of the Shah's regime, and the de- cision to appoint him as prime minister is a measure of the effect that the three days of rioting had on the Shah. Amini has had wide experience since he entered government service in 1932, particularly in economic and financial affairs. He is certainly more able than either of his two immediate pre- decessors, Eqbal and Sharif-Emami. He has made no secret in the last two years of his ambition to be prime minister and to give that office genuine authority independent of the Shah. Amini has stated, however, that there is no alternative to the Institution of the monarchy. He believes that the Shah could be a strong force in any responsible government, but that in order to preserve his position, the Shah must work in the background. FA-mini will probably have considerable support, at least initially. The anti-Shah National Front reportedly will give Amini a chance to prove himself, but it believes he will not succeed because he will not be able to resist the Shah and will not have military support. Amini reportedly will appoint Gen- eral Timur Bakhtiar to a high post in the army, however, and he has implied that Bakhtiar will run the army for him:g In his first statement on foreign affairs, Amini said that he proposes to improve relations "especially with neighboring countries," and intends to respect the provisions of CENTO. 8 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 kJ, V A' .L.1-0.1-41 V AL-11..La Nose THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTLILL Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/12 CO2049782