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August 14, 2020
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August 27, 2020
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May 10, 1961
r Z C %.� C I 3.3(h)(2) Approved f Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 3.5(c) 10 May 1961 Copy No. C Si CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN --TO-P-SECR-Er- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 04proved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 TOP SECRET -TOP-SEORET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 vr 3EL.1.1i 10 May 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos. (rage t) 2. Iran: New prime minister announces cabinet. (Page it) 3. Congo: Tshombe to be detained without trial for Indefinite period. (Page 'tt) 4. Jordan: Baath (socialist) leader initiates planning for coup against King Husayn, (Page itt) 5. UAR: Previously reported mobilization exercise to begin today. (Page 'Mt) Morocco: Labor difficulties at American air bases. (Page ttt) 7. Brazil: Economic agreement with Rumania marks beginning of trade expansion with bloc, (Page ft) 8. Ecuador: Foreign Minister Chiriboga to resign; successor reported antagonistic to US Cuban policy. (Page ft,) 9. USSR-Berlin: Change of Soviet Berlin commandants suggests effort to play down quadripartite functions in Berlin. (Page v) 10. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin Situation. (page u) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 04proved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 .-- "'" \-- Phing t Saly ./N , , 1PHONG SALY, �"`'.- ... ADien Bien Phu' / -.... rr-- % It V Na-c.,L ' .. , ,.... , � ----- Hanoi Nam T ... ci ....1 .:,,...-- � NAM1THA � , . i k.itiong Sat . � Nam Bac . - , \ r i Sam Neuajk ----- NI_ LUANGiPRA ANG / �� \4. g'AM NEUA 1 Muang Noun. Luang Prabang /.1/ -- 7-;;;....-���:2�XIENG It% SAYABOURY � - KHOUANG \ MUsIni. SOvi -*-.... a, .P..)houa_Kanhouphn2ik . Muo Kaswc,�,� �r� ''s�Xieng Khouang ----, INII kvBan Ta Viangi amone Thom Vang eng VIENTIANE � Borikhone� Ban Hiss Heup Pak Sane p. Vientiane I ti A NORTHERN LAOS GOVERNMENT Forces in KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS --ROAD I ....1-- -TRAIL P 0 ROUTE NUMBER , 50 STATUTE MILES Kern Keut Thakhek- Maaxay 419avannakhet Pha Lane Tchepone - Muong gine SAVANOAKHET vs"---4 t 1 10 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 ver 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 '�,4000i Lir aciL,rtn I Nue CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 10 May 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: Pathet Lao statements continue to stress that the ICC can fulfill its function only after the three Laotian parties OK have agreed on all questions concerning a cease-fire. On 9 May, ICC officials accompanying the government delegation to 7? another unproductive meeting at the Nam Lik site were snubbed by the enemy delegation, which said it had no instructions to deal with the ICC. Meanwhile, delegations representing the Souvanna Phouma "government" and the Pathet Lao arrived inp,,,) Moscow on 9 May en route to the Geneva Conference in com- pany with the Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese dele= 3 ',I- 6 gations. The Boun Oum governmpt delegation is expected to leave Vientiane on 10 or 11 May. Un the military situation, the pattern of scattered skirmishing continues, and Meo guer- rilla positions south of the Plaine des Jarres are still under enemy attackp Airlift operations were scheduled through 10 May. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Pointe Brazzavillem Noiv Banana Kitona 616504 2 Matadi Luanda LIBERIA INDIA TUNISIA NIGERIA � Gemena Bangassou Lis � Monga Bondo Scattered Force Bumba MOBUTU Basoko 3,400 800 � = - MOBUTU + Coquilhatville I ETHIOPIA . 200 MOBUTU 7,200 Leopoldv ysville Scattered Forces � Boende GIZENGA 7,000 Francqui uluabour Bak anga GHANA 1600 Approximate area nominally contro led by: 11 Kasavubu-Mobutu Gizenga Kalonji Ti Tshombe. E-1 United Nations Forces (Service Forces � Selected road not included) --tro: Selected railroad Imr Selected airfield STATUTE MILES 400 Luputa MALAYA 470 KALONJI 1,500 LIBERIA ETHIOPIA ETHIOPIA MALAYA 300 INDIA Bukav Kongolo Kabalo Albertville NIGERIA 900 �Manono TSHOMBE 7,000 Flisabethville. � td V.* 4var NIGERIA 500 Usumbura IRELAND 650 SWEDEN 650 10 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 040.00, 1 471 01.4%.,1�..1d 1 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Iran: S The nine new members of Prime Minister Ali Amiiirg�cabinet appear generally less experienced and capable than their immediate predecessors. All have had some gov- ernment experience, mostly at a rather low level. Two of them have past histories of as,�_ociation with the Communists, although not in recent years. ("our ministers were held over from the previous cabinet, two of them, the ministers of war and interior, at the insistence of the Shah. Two posts remain unfilled) The new appointees, however, probably owe their primary allegiance to the prime minister rather than to the Shah. *On 9 May the Shah dissolved both houses of parliament and Palled fnr nPw elections under revised electoral laws. (Backup, Page 3) *Congo: The 9 May announcement by the Leopoldville government that Tshombe will be detained without trial for an indefinite period probably stemmed from misgivings re- garding anticipated international reactions to any trial of the Katanga leader. The Leopoldville government may also have feared that appeals on Tshombets behalf by the former French Congo and others might force UN intervention to protect Tshombe. At the NATO ministerial: meeting in Oslo, Belgian For- eign Minister Spook indicated concern over the possibility of action by the UN and Kasavubuts forces against Katanga and the chaos which might result. Spook said these questions should be discussed in NATO, and that such consultation should not be confined to fact-finding. Spaak warned that Bel- gium, which could not solve these problems alone, would other- wise have to seek a firmer basis of consultation in some other international organization, presumably a reference to the pos- sibility of political consultation on this issue among the six Common Market-countries',- 10 May 61 DAILY BRIEF ii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 tiled 1 11,All 01:01.414.L4 I "Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 / Sort:Ian: A leader of the Baath (socialist) party of Jordan has said he p ans to begin at once to organize a coup d'etat in Jordan, which might involve the assassination of King Husayn. Dr. Munif Razzaz, be- lieves that the virtually unanimous disapproval in Jordan of Husayn's engagement to an English girl has made this a pro- pitious time for the Baath, in cooperation with certain other proscribed political parties, to attempt some action. While Razzaz' thoughts are still preliminary, his ultimate objective is to integrate Jordan with the UAR, whose support he intends to seek. Razzaz professes to be unconcerned about the pos- sibility that Israel might move into Palestinian West Jordan in reaction to a pro-UAR coup, because he feels that if the West would not deter the Israelis, the USSR would.) (Backup, Page 5) (.0 UAR: The UAR's previously reported mobilization ex- ercise involving both the Syrian and Egyptian armies is sched- uled to begin today, Orders from Cairo to various military units�in- cluding supply and transportation groups--on 6 May suggest some troop movements will occur. If large-scale troop movements take place, Israel may take similar measures, which would increase tension. No Morocco: Moroccan workers at the American air bases, who have struck three times within a month for higher wages and other benefits, are reported to be considering new pres- sures to gain their objectives. The base union, which is subordinate to the leftist Moroccan Labor Union, is consider- 0,L ing "embargoing"--through strikes of transportation workers --the passage of US military materiel through Casablanca port and harassing US military personnel and dependents. 4-etc/LA...to Such action on the part of the workers would provide the press and all Moroccan political parties with new opportunities to 10 May 61 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 460, br NA-AL i Nue reiterate their demands for an accelerated withdrawal of American forces in Morocco. now scheduled for completion by the end of 1963. (Backup, Page 7) Soviet Bloc - Brazil: The Rumanian-Brazilian economic agreement signed in Bucharest on 5 May marks the beginning of a significant expansion in bloc economic relations with Brazil. The five-year trade pact calls for total trade of at least $64,000,000 annually�an amount exceeding Brazil's current trade with any bloc country. In addition, under the agreement Rumanian trade agencies may grant credits up to a total of $50,000,000 to finance deliveries of oil and chemical industry equipment. The Brazilian mission which negotiated this agree- ment has also concluded trade pacts with Albania and Bulgaria and is scheduled to conduct economic talks with the rest of the East European satellites. Separate Soviet-Brazilian trade talks are under way in Moscow, and the Chinese Communist trade delegation has arrived in Brazil. (Backup, Page 8) Ecuador: aoreign Minister Chiriboga advised the US am- bassador on 6 May that he plans to resign--probably on 10 May--in consequence of his failure to convince President A; 0 Velasco to alter his pro-Cuban policy. Chiriboga stated that his replacement would be Ecuadorean Ambassador to Chile Wilson Vela, whom he described as antagonistic toward the US and US policy on Cuba. Velasco, who has long harbored resentment toward the US and is a close friend of Ecuador's principal pro-Castro leader, made a number of pro-Castro statements both before and after the 17-19 April insurgent landings in Cuba. Cuba, which has been the only Latin Amer- ican country to support Ecuador publicly in its boundary dis- pute with Peru, has recognized the value of Velasco's posi- tion by frequently publicizing his statements on the Castro re- gime and lauding his policies-.D "Ecuador will never lend itselt to punitive action" in the event the OAS Council or the American' 10 May 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET iv / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 , A, 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 TOP SECRET Goreign ministers convene to consider the Cuban issue. USSR -Berlin: Major General Zakharov's replacement by Colonel Solovyev as the USSR's Berlin commandant will--un- less Solovyev is promoted--reduce the Berlin command to the level of other Soviet city garrisons in East Germany, which are customarily headed by colonels. Solovyev's rank and the circumstances surrounding this shift suggest the USSR is con- tinuing to dissociate itself from the four-power control mech- anism in Berlin and may have decided to strip its Berlin Kommanclatura of its special quadripartite functions and re- soonsibilities deriving from the occupation status of the city. (Backup, Page 10) CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USLB SUBCOMMITTEE ON BERLIN SITUATION The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situa- tion for the period 11 April 1961 through 8 May 1961: 1. There are suggestions in Soviet and bloc official statements that the USSR is preparing the ground for a for- mal diplomatic initiative on the Berlin problem and that the Berlin situation will become increasingly spotlighted in the coming months. The Soviet call for a resumption of negotia- tions could come at any time. Khrushchev himself, however, used a 24 April conversation with West German Ambassador Kroll to offset any impression that he felt committed to a showdown on Berlin before the Soviet party congress in Octo- ber, thereby extending his previously vague but implicit "deadline" of not waiting for the West German elections in September. 2. There have been no significant developments adversely affecting access to Berlin and East Berlin during the period covered by this report. 10 May 61 DAILY BRIEF Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 r Nape Situation in Laos CGovernment reports indicate continuing maneuvering by enemy elements on the immediate northern and eastern ap- proaches to Luang Prabang. The situation is obscure, and the anxiety of the Laotian Army commanders in the area is compounded by the poor quality of the city's defending forces, which comprise mostly volunteer-type troops and new re- cruits. Meanwhile, Muong Houn, about 50 miles west of Luang Prabang, has fallen into enemy hands as a result of abandonment of the position by the government garrisoni) The Souvanna delegation going to Geneva is headed by Quinim Pholsena, information minister and acting finance, defense, and foreign affairs minister in the "Royal Laotian Government"; the Pathet Lao group is led by Phoumi Yong- vichit, secretary general of the central committee the Neo Lao Hak Sat�the political arm of the Pathet Lao. The pro- posed Boun Own government delegation consists ofTPhoumi and fellow cabinet members, Nhouy Abhay, Ngon Sananikone, and Sopsaisana, plus several adviserS jn Saigon, South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau has told Ambassador Nolting that the Diem government considers it vital that the Boun Oum government delegation be seated as the official Laotian representation at Geneva. Mau said that any compromise which would not permit the government delegation to be seated would be degrading, but he indicated that an observer role for the Pathet Lao would be acceptable. He said that he would prefer to see Laos not represented at all rather than by observers from the opposing factions, as this would equate the government and the rebels. Mau indicated that the Diem government had not yet decided on its own participation, but Ambassador Nolting expects South Vietnam to atten Chou En-lai has written Prince Sihanouk urging him to join in the Geneva Conference on Laos. There has been some indication that Sihanouk would like some face-saving pleas TOP SECRET 10 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 I J1 1 I-4 I NSW from other participants that would permit him to join the con- ference gracefully. Chou's appeal to Sihanouk that the confer- ence "cannot be held without participation of your royal high- ness," was coupled with an attack on the US-."continually try- ing to sabotage convening of such a conference." The day Chou's letter to Sihanouk was published in Phnom Penh, 8 May, the Chinese Communist premier also implied concern lest Peiping be denied its first major diplomatic con- frontation with the US since 1954. Speaking at a Peiping ban- quet for the Geneva delegations of North Vietnam, the Pathet Lao, and Souvanna Phouma's "lawful government," Chou em- phasized Peiping's support for the conference and complained, "but no one really knows whether the US will in fact partici- pate." 6-...)n 7 May airlift operations consisted of a total of six sorties, one of which involved a Soviet LI-2 in a round-trip flight from Hanoi to Xieng Khouang. On 8 May, airlift oper- ations involved a total of 20 sorties, five of which involved Soviet IL-14s in round-trip flights from Hanoi to Xieng Khouang. An additional five sorties by Soviet transports may have been flown into Laos on 8 May via Dien Bien Phu. On 9 May, five Soviet IL-14s and one North Vietnamese LI-2 made flights to Xieng Khouang. Nine Soviet IL-14s and two Soviet LI-2s were scheduled for flights into Laos from Hanoi on 10 May-;) TOP SECRET 10 May. 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Noe lyre New Iranian Cabinet rime Minister Amini gave in to the Shah's insistence tha eneral Naqdi be retained as minister of war and General Amir-Azizi as minister of the interior. Both Naqdi and Amir- Azizi are capable officers with whom Amini feels he can work. Amini had, however, earlier demanded that he be free to choose his cabinet without interference; his apparent willingness to compromise on this point may indicate the extent to which he is willing to go to remain prime minister, as well as a reali- zation that the Shah is not likely to tolerate any interference with the army. In 1953, the attempt by Mossadeq, then prime minister, to take over control of the army was a turning point In his relations with the Shah and one of the major factors which led to his downfalf3 [The new minister of justice, Nur ed-Din Alamuti, was once a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist Tudeh party, but he claims he broke with that party in 1946. Minister of Industry Gholam Ali Farivar, although apparently not a Tudeh member, has supported and been supported by the Tudeh in the past. Minister of Agriculture Hassan Arsenjani has been described by various sources as a leftist, but there is no evidence that he was ever a Tudeh member, and he has in the past publicly opposed the Tudeh. Arsenjani has, how- ever, frequently been associated with groups opposed to the monarchyJ The over=all composition of the cabinet suggests an attempt by Amini to establish a balance between right and left and thus prevent the pressure on him from either side from becoming too strong. The Iranian constitution requires that elections for a new parliament must begin within a month after dissolution of the previous parliament. New elections would give Amini an op- portunity to establish a parliamentary, base of power. He had earlier been reported reluctant, however, to hold new elections until he had an opportunity to make some progress in other areas. The Shah, in his decree, said that a new electoral law must be drafted before new elections are held, and it is probable SECRET 10 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 SECRET that the one-month time limit for starting new elections may be ignored. It is also not clear whether parliament was dis- solved on the initiative of the Shah or the prime minister. If the move was made without Aminits consent--which seems unlikely--a strong reaction from Amini, possibly even his resignation, can be expected. SECRET 10 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 �SEeREr Ba\efiist Leader Plans Coup in Jordan CThe coup plans of Dr. Munif Razzaz are in effect an up- dating of longer range plans that Baath party leaders have discussed with other dissident parties for eventually over- throwing King Husayn's regime. Razzaz reportedly feels that the major problem will be to overcome deep-seated fear and general inertia among Jordanian subversives caused by the failure of various previous coup attempts. He believes the government is capable of forcibly suppressing anti-regime demonstrations and therefore does not favor them. He con- siders that some dramatic action--such as an "accident" for the King--is "the most effective way to set things in motion," after which it will be "easy" to mobilize nationalist and popu- lar support for necessary further action against pro-regime elements 011ie National Socialist and the Qawmiyin al-Arab (Arab Nationalist) parties are the other groups with which Razzaz expects to cooperate. The National Socialists include sev- eral prominent former Jordanian leaders�e. g., former Prime Minister Fawzi Mulqi�and they probably have the greatest potential popular base of support. The Baathists, on the other hand, have developed an apparently effective � clandestine apparatus which receives arms infiltrated from the UAR and the pan-Arab Baathist leadership-T.3 Ciordanian Baathist activities have been hampered by in- ternal factionalism during, at least the past year and a half. These differences resulted in 1959 in the expulsion of party leader Abdullah Rimawi, a former Jordanian cabinet minis- ter. The UAR's Nash', who has suppressed Baathist activi- ties in Syria, subsequently backed Rimawi as leader of a splinter Baathist group in an apparent attempt to usurp con- trol of the party and its assets and activities throughout the Arab world. C_Nasir's plan does not appear to have been very success- ful. Dr. Razzaz, in discussing Baathist factionalism, now claims that Rimawi is "finished" and that the rival factions in Jordan have drawn closer together again. He expects th SECRET- 10 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Nue --SEekEIL� (forthcoming effort to unseat Husayn's regime will sublimate if not eradicate any remaining differences') (The success of Razzaz' plans also depends on the achieve- ment of some accord between the UAR and the pan-Arab Baath- ist leadership. He said he realizes the UAR will drive a hard bargain with the Baath, but expressed willingness to subordi- nate party doctrines, for the time being, in the interest of uni- fied action. It is not presently known whether Razzaz has dis- cussed his plans with the leaders of the pan-Arab Baath party in Beirut-) [Razzaz--to whom all the problems involved in such a coup seem surmountable�believes the United States probably would continue to provide economic assistance through the UAR to the new regime he envisages for Jordan. If not, he assumes the Soviet bloc would provide such assistance (organized political parties were banned in Jordan in 1957 � after a free election almost resulted in a pro-UAR coup. The party organizations have persisted despite arrests and other harassment, and Husayn has even approached them about in- stalling certain of their members in the government as a means of increasing support for his regime. Razzaz was among those approached, and last December he reportedly requested the Baath party's pan-Arab leadership to approve the participation of Jordanian Baathists in the government under certain con- ditions. The central headquarters is said to have rejected the request, directing the party in Jordan to join instead with other Jordanian nationalists in forming a "national front" in opposition to Husayn SECRET 10 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN` Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 (flMTIflTTVT1A 1. ;,rwo Moroccan Workers at American Bases Consider New Pressure Tactics Leaders of the United States Baseworkers' Association, established in 1956 and affiliated with the left-wing Moroccan Labor Union (UMT), have been agitating for several months for wage increases and other benefits. Their control over Moroccan workers at the bases has been demonstrated in a series of increasingly effective strikes within the past month. A one-hour sit-down strike was held on 7 April when strike leaders also threatened a demonstration in front of the US Embassy. Subsequently, on 17 April and 3 and 4 May, 24- hour and 48-hour strikes were called, absenteeism being nearly 100 percent on 3 and 4 May. The US Embassy anticipated in late April that the left- wing National Union of Popular Forces and the UMT, which have been seeking ways to attack the Moroccan Government, might use the presence of the American bases and alleged disregard of workers' rights for a convenient and popular pretext for a "protest and display of muscle." Full UMT support of the base workers could lead to placing a cordon around the bases to interfere with the water supply and oth- er contractual services, halting the movement of military material, or refusing to handle US military shipments through the port of Casablanca. The Istiqlal party press, particularly since the announce- ment early in March that France had speeded up the sched- ule for evacuation of its troops, has been pressing the gov- ernment to obtain an accelerated schedule for American withdrawal. Conversely, however, representatives of the Istiqlal-dominated union on 24 April maintained that wages and labor relations on the bases were satisfactory and that baseworkers' demands were only a "reflection of irrespon- sible leadership!' though Moroccan officials suggested a year ago that the schedule for American evacuation might be stepped up;) King Hassan II implied to an American correspondent in� mid-March that the 1959 agreement would stand. 10 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 A Bloc Economic Overtures to Brazil As in all bloc aid programs, details of the Rumanian credit must be worked out later. The agreement, however, is the largest credit arrangement ever offered by Bucharest and is the first in which Brazil has accepted substantial eco- nomic aid from the bloc. The only previous bloc aid to Brazil has been in the form of medium-term commercial credits, amounting to less than $4,000,000 to finance Czech and Polish exports. Ithrushchey, in a conversation with the head of the Brazilian trade delegation now in Moscow, stated that the res- toration of diplomatic relations between the two countries would provide a "strong stimulus" for a significant expansion of trade. Since Quadros was inaugurated, Brazil has expanded its diplo- matic ties with Eastern Europe to include all the satellites ex- cept East Germany. These countries now are responding fa- vorably to Brazil's requests for credits, technical assistance, and expanded trade. The Brazilian mission touring Eastern Europe is likely to conclude further aid agreements, and Mos- cow probably will offer a sizable credit to Brazil if arrange- ments are made for the eventual exchange of diplomatic repre- sentatives. The Chinese Communist trade delegation now in Brazil is assessing the opportunities for Sib-Brazilian trade. Peiping's contacts with Latin American countries, except Cuba, have been extremely limited. Leftist Brazilian Vice President Goulart reportedly has said he will visit China in June to "for- malize" the trade contacts being made now. The Chinese prob- ably envisage the conclusion of a trade agreement as a prelude to political recognition. The initiation of a Soviet bloc aid program in Brazil will serve to promote bloc interests far better than normal trade contacts, which in Brazil have not proved particularly success- ful. Bloc-Brazilian trade rose moderately last year to nearly $150,000,000--some 6 percent of Brazil's foreign trade. Poland and Czechoslovakia accounted for more than half this amount, while the USSR's share increased to nearly 20 percent. Despite -CONFIDENTIAL- 10 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 CONFIDENTIAL the increase, however, the goals of the major trade agree- ments with the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were not met. Any significant expansion of trade depends on the bloc's willingness to accept greater amounts of coffee, cacao, iron ore, and other raw materials from Brazil. Bloc credits will facilitate long-term trade while adjustments are made to ac- commodate greater bloc purchases of these products. Brazil's poor prospects for increasing its exports sub- stantially�accentuated by the world's surplus of coffee--are prompting the country to explore bloc relations in the hope of stimulating new markets. Brazil is expected to produce 40,000,000 bags of coffee in the 1961-62 crop year, while recent exports and internal consumption have come to only 25,000,000 annually. The Quadros administration is also negotiating for for- eign aid from the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the International Monetary Fund on a far more extensive scale than from the bloc. The Brazilian mission which is touring Eastern Europe has also concluded a trade and aid agreement with Yugoslavia. 10 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Noe Nitre Soviet Commandant in Berlin Transferred Maj. Gen. N. F. Zakharov, former Soviet commandant in Berlin, left the city on 30 April for transfer to an undis- closed post. He departed without making the usual formal calls on his opposite numbers. US Commandant Osborne first learned of Zakharov's departure on 1 May when an officer at the Soviet Kommandatura in ICarlshorst called to say that Zakharov would not be able to receive Osborne the following day. Osborne had wanted to take formal leave prior to his own departure for another assignment. Zakharov, who took over the Berlin post in February 1958, had been absent in recent weeks on sick leave. His political adviser, Lt. Col. Odintsov, also slipped out of town, apparently in late March, without taking formal leave of his Western opposite numbers. Soviet Ambassador Pervukhin in East Berlin presum- ably would take over certain functions now exercised by the Soviet commandant--notably contacts with Western occupation authorities--while other functions would be transferred de facto to East German authorities in East Berlin. Such a move was foreshadowed last December when Pervukhin told US Ambassador Dowling that he, Pervukhin, was solely competent in matters of Soviet- American interest in Berlin. He further declared that the Soviet commandant was in no sense a sector command- er, on par with the US commandant, but was merely head of the Soviet garrison in East Berlin. From the USSR's viewpoint, downgrading the com- mandant's post would tend to underline East Germany's "sovereignty" over the Soviet sector andrwouldOefyetan- other step toward the formal incorporation of East Ber- lin in East Germany. 10 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 14,...WITA"IllEJ1111111-1.14 NW/ THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director - CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784 SECRETr TOP 9;p4 -TOP-SECRET-- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049784