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May 16, 1961
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////1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO204.9787 3.3(h)(2) �wr aiG�mc 3.5(c) 16 May 1961 copy NO. L; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 $0,7pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 FLPIP SLUHLT --TOP-SEGREIE� Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 1167--i-cri��..nr, 11 16 May 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1.. South Korea. (Page t) 2. Laos. (Page tt) 3. Neutralist Conference: Preparatory meeting pro- posed for 5 June in Cairo. (Page tit) 4. UAR: Khrushchev again chides Nasir for anti-Com- munist measures within UAR. (Page tit) 5. Iran: Shah says he supports Aminits reform program but will not become a figurehead. (Page itt) 6. Morocco: Most political factions oppose King's maneu- vers to concentrate power in own hands. (Page tv) 7. West Germany: Parliamentary meeting in West Ber- lin under consideration despite likely Soviet protests. (Page tv) 8. USSR: Soviets say further nuclear tests by French "may compel" USSR to resume testing. (Page v) Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 � 4SLCUL-1. Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 1101 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 16 May 1961 DAILY BRIEF *South Korea: (Information available as of 0500 EDT) The only military units thus far identified with the military coup staged in Seoul in the early morning hours of 16 May are elements of the South Korean Second Army and some marine units. The rest of the army, the air force, and most navy elements reportedly have not thus far participate in the revolutionary activity; which way they will throw thei support is not clear. Although the "military revolutionary committee" set up shortly after the coup claims that it con- trols the entire country, and evidently does control the city �of Seoul, and possibly Taegu, it is still questionable whether the coup leaders have sufficient support to retain power. The "military revolutionary committee," which claims to be anti-Communist, pro-US, and pro-UN, has been is- suing proclamations over the name of Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen, Chang To-yong. Early on 16 May Chang asked the commander of UN forces in Korea, US General Magruder, for the assistance of American forces in putting down the revolt, and the revolt leaders may be merely using his name. Chang has, however, since been in contact with the coup leaders, and his present position is not known; it is possible he is working for a compromise which would avoid further armed conflict. In any event, the real leader and chief planner of the coup appears to be Maj. Gen, Pak Chong-hui, deputy commander of the Second Army, who was reported last month to be planning a coup. The whereabouts of Prime Minister Chang Myon is not known; but he apparently escaped when the coup leaders tried to capture him and is now in hiding. According to press reports, a number of other govern- ment officials are under house arrest in Seoul. 03 z ECRET A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 New' Phing Soy IPHO G SALY' I --- �1 Nam Tha _ Na Mot NAMI THA ' M'uong Sal 1 LUANG' PRA Muong 1'1�unit' Luang ig-abang SAYABOURY Muoni Kaiv AM NEUA / � +4/ \f's"..., XIENG 1.1% K H OUP N G Muoni Soul Bon Ban A ou Khoun Xieng Khouang Ban Ta Vlang iJonn t....Tha Thom Vang Vieng � ' 'VIENTIANE Ran Hin Heup Pak Sat-, 3 Viecinane NORTHERN LAOS Forces in 40' KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact temet C.70VERNMENT KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS �ROAD _ __TRAIL t ?iiiiii 50 ,I09 STATUTE MILES 0 ROUTE NUMFR 610512 Kam Kevt Thakhek Mahaxay .* Pha Lane ;IUTV Tchetsattte a g PRine SAVANNAKHET M 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Ii AApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 14%1�1-11: etc_ te...P-AJ *Laos: 514.ipartite talks at Namone between the Boun Oum ' government, the Souvanna group, and the Pathet Lao continue 4141 /7-4) to be inconclusive. The third session of 15 May broke up 6, without agreement on the agenda, with the Pathet Lao continu-( ing to insist that political matters be placed high on the agenda,;, and the government urging that detailed cease-fire arrange- �,t1`, ments be discussed first. The next meeting is scheduled for 17 May, with another to follow on 19 Max.? The military situation in the major operational are" re- mains quiet, although the progovernment Meo guerrilla base at Pa Dong is still under enemy artillery harassment. Airlift operations were scheduled through 16 May. , (Backup, Page 3) (Map) ii TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 %esi 'jr azg,nE. Neutralist Conference: Plans for a conference of some 20 "nonaligned" countries are now taking definite form, with the UAR and Yugoslav governments�prime movers in organ- izing the conference�proposing that a preparatory meeting be convened in Cairo on 5 June. India and Indonesia are being asked to join in is- suing invitations to this meeting, which will consider the agenda, time, and place of a neutralist summit conference. Egehru, under pressure from Nasir and Tito, has agreed to participate, at least in the preparatory meeting, but has strong reservations about the value of such a conference. Aside from the problem of differentiating between uncom- mitted and committed nations, Nehru is concerned that the conference will be used primarily as a forum for anticolo- nialist tirades which would intensify rather than moderate the cold wa...13 (Backup, Page 4) k reportedly attacked the UAR for claiming to be a socialist state but at the same time jail- (e)Lj_jx) ing Communists. Khrushchev claimed that Nasir did not un- � ie f? derstand "anything about socialism or Communism." While '- Moscow has displayed irritation with the UAR from time to I.? time, usually through the international Communist press, '"4"413 governmental relations between the two countries are rela- tively smooth, and bloc economic and military aid to the UAR continues. Nasir is reported to have responded to Khrushchev's attack by ordering on 4 May a shift in Cairo's propaganda out- put. Over the past week the Communist bloc has received some adverse treatment by the UAR press and radio, with a marked decrease in UAR criticism of the United States. ) (Backup, Page 6) Iran: he Shah has told the American ambassador that )the ferciim s being undertaken by Prime Minister Amini are necessary and that he will support them. Nevertheless, he said, the center of power in Iran has traditionally residedlij 16 May 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 reApproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 // � %kuil I CA" 31.:A.-1�CL )*Ehe Crown and must continue to do so. He added that he would abdicate rather than become a figurehead being told what to do and say by successive governments. The Shah is still sched- uled to leave on 17 May for an official visit to Norway, but plans to return directly to Iran rather than vacation elsewhere in Europe as originally schedu (Backup, Page 8) Morocco: aing Hassan II is continuing maneuvers to con- centrate power and government administration into his own hands. :Apparently enthusiastic crowds during his recent offi- cial visits to major cities seem to have convinced Hassan that he can rule without political parties. Most major political fac- tions, however, are becoming bolder in their attacks on the King's personal rule. They will probably resent the appoint- ment of a new cabinet, which is said to be imminent�if, as reliably reported, Hassan chooses only nonpolitical technicians loyal to him. The King is aware of this political opposition, and some evidence suggests he is planning to initiate strict police and military controls in the major cities of Moroc_cg (Backup, Page 9) oA West Germany: West German and West Berlin party lead- ers are reported considering holding a meeting of the Bundesrat --the upper house of the West German parliament--in West Ber- lin, possibly on 16 June, the eve of the "Day of German Unity" which commemorates the East Berlin uprisings of 17 June 1953. Khrushchev told the West German ambassador on 24 April that the bloc would be willing to postpone the conclusion of a separate peace treaty provided the West made no "unexpected moves," presumably such as a parliamentary meeting in Berlin. It is *7- doubtful, however, that a Bundesrat meeting would materially alter the timing of Soviet moves regarding Berlin. The inten- sity of likely Soviet protests would depend to some extent on the possibility of a meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy. (Backup, Page 10) 16 May 61 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 kijoi1ePr-3MITM- *USSR-Nuclear Test Ban Conference: The formal Soviet statement at Geneva on 15 May warning that further French nuclear testing will make a test ban agreement "impossible" and "may compel" the USSR to resume testing, appears de- signed to divert attention from control issues. The long delay in reacting to the French test of 25 April suggests that the Soviet leaders hope to inflate the question of French testing into a major point in the discussions between Presi- dent Kennedy and De Gaulle. By repeating previous charges that the French have tested in order to perfect weapons for the benefit of NATO and thereby gain "unilateral advantages" for the West, Moscow apparently hopes to minimize recent Western concessions and create the impression that the Wgst has not negotiated seriously. 16 May 61 DAILY BRIEF TOP SECRET 0 k Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 %.4.01 antArn-i- Noe South Korea Major General Pak Chong-hui was court-martialed in 1948 on charges of being a Communist and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. At the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, he was recalled to service, and subsequently was pardoned because of his war record. He is not known to have re-established contacts with the Communists or to have been connected with South Korean leftist groups since 1948. How- ever, because of alleged efforts to stir up discontent among officer elements following the revolt which toppled Rhee in April 1960, there was some question of his loyalty and whether he would soon be dropped from the Army. The South Korean Second Army is largely composed of training and logistical units. It is not known whether units of the First Army--South Korea's combat ready force de- ployed along the Demilitarized Zone facing North Korea-- support the uprising. First Army support for the coup could ensure its success. Although a proclamation of the "revolution- ary committee" has named the First Army commanding general Yi Han-lirn as "martial law commander" in the front line areas, Yi is reliably reported to be against the coup. In a six point proclamation the insurgents, who have pro- claimed martial law, have announced that they interd to strength- en anti-Communist measures, observe the UN charter, wipe out government corruption, rehabilitate the economy, work for Korean unification, and eventially return the government to civilian authority when their mission is accomplished. How- ever, according to the reports of last month, Pak and his sup- porters had no definite plans for administering the government after they seized power. There also were indications that the Pak group was discontented over the loss of the privileged po- sition enjoyed by the military under the Rhee regime. In the year since Rhee's ouster, many senior officers have been cashiered from the service, a civilian committee has been set up to investigate military affairs, and the press has been per- mitted to criticise the armed forces. Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen, Chang To-yong was one of those widely criticized in the press for his support of the Rhee regime and accused of acquiring an illegal fortune through SECRET 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLF,TINT Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 %re I graft and corruption. Chang knew that Pak was planning a coup, but claimed last month that he lacked sufficient evi- dence to arrest the plotters. It is possible that Chang now may be playing both sides of the fence in an effort to assure his position whatever the outcome. The North Korean regime has not yet commented on to- day's events in South Korea. The only Communist bloc re- action noted thus far has been a Moscow TASS item, and this essentially was a repeat of American press reports. 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 �4ittftiELF-- -Noe Situation in Laos Additional information indicates that on 14 May, a total of three aircraft may have been involved in airlift operations. Two of these--Soviet LI-2s--were scheduled for Xieng Khouang but were not actually reflected in flight. Flights scheduled for 15 May indicate a resumption of nearly normal airlift activity after a two-day lull on 13 and 14 May. The Soviet AN-12 en route to North Vietnam from the USSR left Canton and arrived at Haiphong on 15 May. .� he Communist Chinese have rebroadcast Pathet Lao charges of 15 May that some South Vietnamese forces have crossed into Laotian territory. This is the first Communist bloc reaction to the 4 May movement of South Vietnamese special forces to a point several miles inside Laos along Route 9, The Peiping broadcast avoids any direct threat of retalia- tory action but charges that recent South Vietnamese and Thai troop movements are aimed at sabotaging a peaceful settlement In Laos7 � 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 v.., Of' 5t...CHL 1 Preparations for Neutralist Conference Nehru's initial reaction to the Tito- Nasir initiative, which took the form of a joint diplomatic note sent in mid-April to the heads of 17 Asian-African and four Latin American states, revealed considerable pique over being presented with a fait accompli. Nehru has long expressed the view that an ill- planned gathering of neutralist nations, either on a world- wide basis or limited to the Asian-African bloc, would merely dramatize the lack of agreement among these governments on various international questions and contribute little toward solving them. The Indian leader also is reluctant to encourage the formal establishment of any "third bloc" or alliance to offset the major power blocs, both because this would be in- consistent with New Delhi's strict adherence to a nonalignment policy and because it might lessen Nehru's prestige and free- dom of action as an independent world leader. In talks with UAR and Yugoslav representatives in New Delhi, Nehru immediately raised the problem of how to differentiate between uncommitted and committed nations and questioned the omission of certain neutralist European and African countries from the list of those to be invited. Nehru expressed sapprova o e inc usion o government he apparently feels is formally aligned with the "socialist" camp. New Delhi also fears that Cuba's presence would inject a strident anti-US note into the discussions which would merely heighten international tension and possibly also have a harmful effect on Indo-American relations. The question of inviting European states to the summit conference, along with the question of what constitutes non- alignment, will probably be thrashed out at Cairo. Cairo's interpretation of nonalignment explain- ing the criteria for the invitations to the Cairo meeting. Each country invited was considered to have adopted and officially declared a policy of nonalignment and was not linked militarily to either major power bloc or to any one of the great powers. Cairo further stated it would be TOPS 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 %,�11 UP�ZEritt-t� Nue pleased to invite "any" country which was prepared to proclaim such a policy. Indonesia is expected to co-sponsor the meeting, despite Djakarta's reported conviction that Nasir and Tito, in calling a "neutralist summit," have seized the initiative from Presi- dent Sukarno, who has been urging a second Afro-Asian polit- ical conference for almost a year. Sukarno, midway on a global tour, arrives in Cairo on 16 May and presumably will clarify Indonesia's position. In Latin America, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela have been invited Brazilian Ambassador Thompson in Cairo reported to his Foreign Ministry on 9 May that "there is some thought of inviting Ecuador and Bolivia also." None of the Latin Americans has clearly accepted. Cuban Foreign Minis- ter Roa apparently rebuked the Cuban Embassy in Cairo as a result of a UPI report that a spokesman for that embassy had announced Castro would attend. Roa instructed the embassy to clarify that the embassy has not received official notice in this respect. Brazilian President Quadros is apparently pursuing an equivocal course. of- ficials in Belgrade and Cairo have indicated that Quadros has accepted, and the Cuban press reports that he recently told a spokesman of the visiting Sukarno entourage that Brazil would attend. However, the Brazilian foreign minis- ter denied the acceptance to US Ambassador Cabot. TOP SECRET 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 %se %We Khrushchev Criticizes UAR Policies Nasir cannot prevent Egyptians from being Communists and that "what you are doing will lead to revolution and you will be overthrown just like you overthrew King Farouk." Khrushchev. said, "Everybody knows that UAR neutrality is for hire. You are a nation of corruption. " Such remarks resemble those made by Khrushchev during the public exchange of recriminations between Moscow and Cairo two years a...gig aelations between the Soviet and UAR governments, however, have been relatively good in recent months. Work on the Aswan Dam, for which Moscow has already extended credits totaling $325,000,000, appears to be progressing satisfactorily. Soviet technicians are also working on a number of projects in the Egyptian region under a $175,000,- 000 credit granted in 1958. In early 1961 the USSR resumed large-scale deliveries of arms, including MIG-19 jet fighter_s3 Lkiloscow has voiced approval when the UAR has taken a stand in opposition to the West or in support of some Soviet position. However, Soviet leaders have been irritated by such actions as Cairo's refusal to endorse Khrushchev's proposal for replacing the UN secretary general with a three-man secretar- iat and to give fuller support to the USSR at the UN during the Congo crisig3 fflie Nasir regime's attitude toward Arab Communists has been a consistent source of irritation to the USSR. Khru- shchev's public criticism of arrests of Egyptian and Syrian Communists in late 1958 and early 1959 caused a deteriora- tion of Soviet-UAR relations. Since then some features of Nasir's policies, including the continued suppression of Com- munists and the relatively slow pace of agrarian reform in the UAR, have been criticized from time to time, usually through international Communist journals and the Communist) SECRET 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Napo' .../LALICG I aress in Lebanon. The current issue of the World Marxist Review, published in Prague, carries a strong attack by an anonymous author on the treatment of Communists in the UAR glasir is sensitive to such criticisms and to the unfavor- able comments made by Khalid Bakdash--head of the Syrian Communist party who is in exile in the bloc�about the grow- ing domination of Syria by Egyptians since the merger in 1958) (The US Embassy in Cairo believes that the recent shift in UAR propaganda is also related to the deterioration of its foreign exchange balance and to the Nasir regime's desire to appear somewhat more friendly in anticipation of forth- coming negotiations for additional US assistance in the form of surnlus agricultural products] 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 at.,UKL I Developments in Iran rfhe Shah told the American ambassador on 13 May that he felt charges of corruption among government officials were highly exaggerated but that arrests of those believed by the public to be corrupt were necessary to calm the situation. Those arrested would be tried, and if found guilty they would be pun- ished. If they are found not guilty, the people's anger would be directed against the minister of justice, and not against the Crowa.j the Shah noted that Prime Minister Amini now is rela- tively popular, chiefly because he has been out of public office for some time. He added that this popularity would diminish as Amini failed to meet the demands of the people now support- ing him. The monarch maintained that the recent crisis could not have been solved if he had not had the power to dissolve parliament and appoint a new governmentj In other developments, Tehran announced that Mohammad Der hshesh, who led the teachers' strike which caused the collapse of the previous government, had been appointed min- ister of education. The teachers have been granted a 100-per- cent increase in salary. This success is likely to encourage demands and strike threats from other government workersi he government has also announced the dismissal of ten Mims ry of Justice officials, and the public prosecutor has stated that more than 100 electoral council members will be tried for election irregularities. Several thousand electoral council members participate in overseeing the elections in 154 constituencies. Cases of illegal interference with elec- toral procedures could Probably be made against most of the...72D �SECRET- 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 vige ..71.LikoAXE. 1 Moroccan King V0.116 LU U1LUiLU. rL bOlIcL1 EI_Ihe King's tours around the country, accompanied by most members of the cabinet, have resulted in an almost complete paralysis of government operations in Rabat. The US Embassy comments that the city is empty of any Moroccan at the policy or decision-making leveD ET-he US charge, who was with Hassan's retinue during "triumphal tours" of Casablanca, Fes, Marrakech, andMeknes, feels that the vast majority of simple, uneducated people sup- porethe idea of an absolute feudal monarch and fully accept Hassan in this role, but that politically conscious elements of all tendencies are increasingly irritated by the King's tactics. The political parties are particularly incensed over the King's delegation of the prime minister's powers last week to Ahmed Reda Guedira, chief of his personal cabinet. Moroccan Min- ister of Justice Torres said on 11 May that members of Hassan's entourage had cited the King's "great popularity" with the masses to help convince him that cheering throngs, rather than a con- stitution or political parties, held the key to the retention of royal powe3 'ale police and security controls that Hassan reportedly in- tends to establish in Casablanca, Marrakech, Rabat, and Tangier will in effect constitute a state of military siege, with the right to assembly either abrogated or greatly curtailed. Apparently these measures, if taken, would be designed pri- marily to hobble the vigorous Moroccan Labor Union (UMT), whose strength--which was impressively manifested in a May Day parade in Casablanca is regarded by the King as a dan- gerous political force. Such measures would require the loy- alty of the army, and although Hassan has recently reassigned some officers suspected of anti-monarchial sentiments and taken other steps to maintain discipline, there continue to be reports of wide-scale, although so far ineffectual, disaffection within the arni..) �SEeRE-T-- 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 !we �CVN Bonn Reported Planning Bundesrat Meeting in West Berlin The East German news agency declared on 11 May that a Bundesrat meeting in West Berlin would be "provocative," re- iterating the contention that "West German attempts to treat West Berlin as part of the Federal Republic grossly violate the existing unequivocal legal position and constitute a provo- cation" against the regime. Earlier, the East Germans charged that Mayor Brandt was attempting to foment a revolt in East Ger- many and they probably would claim that scheduling such a meet- ing on 16 June would be intended to spark a revolution. Since July 1959, �when Khrushchev attacked the meeting in Berlin of the West German national convention which elected West German President Luebke, the USSR has been attempting to make an international issue of the question of holding meet- ings of West German parliamentary bodies there. Annual meet- ings of either or both the Bundesrat and Bundestag had been held in West Berlin from 1950 to 1959 in order to foster the idea that the city is still Germany's national capital and to stress West Berlin's ties with the Federal Republic. These meetings have been increasingly under attack by the Communists, and last July Khrushchev threatened to "consider" signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany if Bonn held its annual Bundestag ses- sion in Berlin. Following consultation with British, French,, and American representatives, Chancellor Adenauer last fall decided against a Bundestag meeting in order to avoid doing anything which might aggravate tensions in the city. Berlin officials, however, have frequently expressed regret over the failure of the Bundestag to meet in Berlin last year and stress the view that it would be dangerous to let such an important link between Bonn and Berlin as legislative sessions in Berlin be discontinued. Mayor Brandt is reported to have raised the issue of a meeting of only the upper house in Berlin with Franz Meyers, president of the Bundesrat, during the latter's appearance in Berlin on May Day. Meyers, who is now visiting the United States and scheduled to visit in Washington from 21 to 24 May, 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 14611_, iW is legally empowered to convene the Bundesrat where he chooses, but he is not likely to do so if Adenauer strongly objects. Adenauer faces a difficult decision on this question since failure to support a parliamentary meeting in Berlin could be exploited by the opposition Social Democrats in this fall's elec- tion campaign as showing a lack of sympathy for Berlin. On the other hand, he probably believes holding such a meeting would be beneficial to the Socialists by focusing attention on the city and on his opponent in the election �Mayor Willy Brandt. CONFIDENTIAL 16 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 'Se CONFIDENTIAL THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049787 r/Z ,3q1Wilic8:0