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August 27, 2020
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June 8, 1961
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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 ZITOP SECRET M2) 3.5(c) r/ 8 June 1961 Copy No. C s CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN -TOP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 04proved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 FL, TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 . � 1140 --TOP-SECRE 8 June 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos. (Page t) 2. Dominican Republic: Colombia reluctant to join pos- sible joint action against new regime. (Page ii) 3. Brazil: Argument between Quadros and minister of war over arrest of opposition leader. (Five iv) 4. Congo: Gizenga offers to negotiate with Leopoldville over site for reconvening parliament. (Page iv) 5. Zanzibar: Arab extremist leader reiterates opposi- tion to American space-vehicle tracking installation. (Page ,v) 6. UAR: Cairo still planning to send military officers to USSR fnr train ng despite propaganda battle. (Page v) 7. Arab ministerial conference: Foreign and defense ministers to discuss joint policy toward Israel. (Page v) 8. Morocco: Cabinet reorganization leaves absolute power of King Hassan unchanged: (Page vi) 9. Bolivia: State of siege proclaimed; key Communists arrested, (Page vi) 10. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Page vi) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Fel LUANG] PRA ANG uong Hound, Luang Prabang SAYABOURY L. hoc NORTH VIET AM Dien Bien Phu ���� XIENG 4/�( , 41111� ...K.HOUANG . Moon Soul � 40-khang Khay / heng Khoun � Xieng Khouang, 411111Pa Don ong Ngate Vang.rieng C - VIENTIANE rBorikhan5� Ban -tin Heup Pak Sane an Nong Khai THAI LAND NORTHERN LAOS Forces 41110 GOVERNMENT 4111 KONG LE - PATHET LAO KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS � GOVERNMENT (MEO) BASE AREAS 510 �TRAIL 0 ROUTE NUMBER 610608 STATUTE MILES 100 � I Kern Keut ----� K H A MM Nhommar Thokhek ovannakhet Pha Lane Jchepon-e=, Muong SAVANNAKH ong Hoi Houei VIETNAM 8 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page IT Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 rnb's TOP SECRET %.00 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 8 June 1961 DAILY BRIEF Laos: LLt. Col. yang Pao, commander of government 1 units at a Dong which were forced to withdraw on the night of 6-7 June, has establiOed a new command post some seven miles to the southwest!) the attacking force has large- ly expended its ammunition supplies in the successful assault on Pa Dong. The Meos may thus have a respite in which to reorganize their defenses in the area. LAt the 7 June session of the Namone tripartite talks, the government delegation presented its conditions for an eventual coalition government. The main point was a demand for the recognition of the authority of the King, the constitution, and the national assembly. The Pathet Lao has frequently attacked the present assembly as being the product of rigged elections In 1960 conducted under an illegal electoral ordinance. [In the military subcommittee talks at Namone on 11e 7th, the Pathet Lao challenged the government's assertion that the ICC Should be permitted to visit any trouble point in the coun- try, insisting that its visits should be confined to the forward points of the opposing forces on Route 13 south of Van Vieng. After failure to reach agreement on specific points, the sub- committee merely reported back to the plenary political com- mittee that the three sides had agreed in principle that the ICC be permitted to visit certain unspecified points] Bloc airlift operations into Laos were scheduled through 8 June. (Backup, Page 1) (Map) �12014-5-EC�RE�T-- sir 4-) frr Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Dominican Republic - Venezuela - Colombia: President Lleras Camargo of Colombia, the Latin American President most closely allied with Venezuelan President Betancourt's efforts to promote multilateral action against the heirs of Dominican dictator Trujillo, now apparently feels that Betan- court is pushing too fast on the issue. Ambassador Briggs, ow a special mission to Colombia, after conferring at length on 4 and 5 June with Lleras and his foreign minister, reported that the Colombian leaders had shared US and Venezuelan hopes that the extermination of Trujillo might be followed by a popular, democratically led uprising. However, the failure of such a movement to develop and the apparent success of "Ramfis" Trujillo in asserting his control have given Bogota "serious second thoughts." Colombian leaders doubt that "Ramfis" will change the old order and they feel that Presi- dent Balaguer offers little hope of exerting liberal leadership. The Colombians, however, would nowprefer to assess the in- ternal Dominican situation further before giving consideration to tripartite military action with the US and Venezuela. Betancourt, in 6 June conversations with Ambassador Stevenson, again urged decisive action through the OAS. Such action would depend on the report from the special OAS sub- committee that left for the Dominican Republic on 7 June. Though Betancourt is confident that the subcommittee will find evidence of drastic violations of human rights, the cur- rent thoroughly intimidated state of the Dominican dissidents and the regime's efforts to put on a good show make this by no means certain. Betancourt believes that after the report is received, at least 14 Latin American governments will support a vote in the Council of the OAS for intensified economic sanctions and that the US, Venezuela, and Colombia should then ask for more severe measures, including military action. If Colombia de- cides against participating in a military effort, Venezuela will "go it alone" with the US, he said. He is confident that a show of military force would be sufficient to bring about the ouster of "Ramfis" and associates, "because the armed forces do not want him." Betancourt added that if Balaguer should set up a 8 June 61 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET PA Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 rz" Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 4 o TOP SECRET joint military-civilian junta, announce a democratic program, and call on the Trujillo clique to leave, Venezuela would rec= ognize the new regime. Such recognition would be contrary to Betancourtis policy unless Balaguer remained as consti- tutional president. The Venezuelan President repeatedly stressed the undesirability of unilateral US action. 8 June 61 DAILY BRIEF iii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Aoproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 411111 Pointe Noire Banana Brazzaville Matadi Kitona 619519 LIBERIA INDIA TUNISIA NIGERIA g Gemena Scattered Forces MOBUTU Bangassou EQUATEU Coquilhatville MOBUTU 7,200 Scattered Forces EOPO DVILLE Leopoldv. ysville MOBUTU 800 � Boende Francqui uluabourg Bakw GHANA 1.600 Approximate area nominally controlled by: Luanda 1-1 Kasavubu-Mobutu Gizenga Kalonp Tshombe rl United Nations Forces (Service Forces Selected road not included) Selected railroad Selected airfield STATUTE MILES 40,0 ETHIOPIA 1,500 Vonga Bondo Aketi leyville GIZENGA 7,000 MALAYA, 900 KAONJI A I Kongolo K b lo Albertville LIBERIA ETHIOPIA MALAYA 500 INDIA INDIA NIGERIA 600 �Manono TSHOMBE 7,000 Elisabethville NIGERIA ..trysurnbura IRELAND 650 SWEDEN 870 8 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 4Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 kird Brazil: President Quadros has directed Minister of War Odilio Denys to arrest Marshal Lott, defeated candidate in the 1.960 presidential election, for granting a press interview on his political views. Denys is resisting the order because Lott insists he had not intended his remarks for publication and Lott's arrest would bring on a political-military crisis. Quadros' hostility to Lott has undoubtedly been intensified by remarks derogatory to Quadros reported in the interview such as, "I would not want to be minister to this peasant. " The military are unlikely to attempt to overthrow the Quadros administration at this time, but the arrest of Lott would add to the dissatisfaction in the officer corps caused by Quadros' transfers and reassignments of officers associated with..the previous administration. (Backup, Page 3) Congo: Gizenga's 6 June announcement that he is willing to negotiate with Leopoldville and the UN over the site for a reconvened parliament probably stems from misgivings con- cerning his isolation from the mainstream of Congo events, together with doubts regarding the long-term prospects for his regime. He probably also hopes to embarrass the Leo- poldville regime by contrasting his moderate stand with that of Kasavubu, who so far has refused to consider any site but Leopoldville. He probably will try to delay the actual opening of parliament in the hope of adding to his bloc of supporters. A late May estimate of parliamentary strengths by the Amer- ican Embassy indicates that at that time he had a substantial minority position. to which he may be able to add by bribes and persuasion. a Yugoslav aircraft, ostensibly on a Red Cross mission, arrived in Stan- leyville from Cairo on 5 June apparently after landing in Khartoum. It was scheduled to return from Stanleyville on 7 June. The aircraft was to pick up the children of various Stan- leyville Mures. however, this was to be a "pretext" to bring goods of an unspecified nature covertly to Gizenga. This is the first known occasion that an aircraft 8 June 61 DAILY BRIEF iv /C. TOP SECRET 2-- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Zanzibar: Me previously repartea reinforcement of woopF. in this British protectorate has led to an uneasy truce between the Africans and Arabs. Observers are concerned, however, �that when the Arabs recover from the shock of the African at- tack, they will attempt retaliation. The British Resident states that he has no indications yet of "Communist troublemakers or property damage directed against Europeans," but he plans to place police patrols in rural areas and said he would try to pro- cic vide protection for the American space-vehicle tracking proj- ect.. Meanwhile, Ali Muhsin, the Arab extremist leader in the new coalition government, has reiterated his strong denuncia- tion of the American Project Mercury installation by publicly saying, "We are determined to oppose this unless America can convince Russia and China of the innocence of the projecel (Backup, Page 4) USSR-UAR: the current propaganda exchanges between Moscow and Cairo apparently are not affecting implementation of the agreements providing for military collaboration between the two countries, a list of a contingent of 311 UAR military officers and tec moans whom the UAR plans to send to the USSR for training. About half the group are from ground forces units, including 35 officers who will receive training at the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow. Fifteen naval officers are among the trainees, as well as 130 air force personnel, including 20 fighter pilots and 8 bomber pilots. Soviet military deliveries to the UAR this year under new arms agreements concluded in 1960 have included T-54 � tanks, artillery, motor vehicles, and MIG-19 supersonic jet fighters. ArabifV.IinisterM Conference: Arab foreign ministers .or and defense ministers will meet in Cairo on 10 June to discuss joint policy regarding Israel's nuclear development program, 8 June 61 TOP SECRET DAILY BRIEF Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 "Fee 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 44S TOP SECRET its plans for diverting Jordan River waters, Jewish immigra- tion into Israel, and the Palestine refugee question. The con- ference, which follows a meeting of Arab military commanders in late April, is part of a stepped-up effort during the past few months to achieve greater Arab unity, particularly on issues in- volving Israel. Because of inter-Arab differences, however, the conference is unlikely to result in firm agreement on coor- dinated plans. Morocco: The cabinet reorganization of 2 June, which has been pending since Hassan II became King in February, involved no fundamental change in the complexion of the regime or in the status of Hassan as absolute monarch. The conservative Istiqlal party, whose president for the first time has accepted a post in the cabinet, has strongly endorsed the reorganization. The leftist opposition has labeled it a "continuation of the experiment with royal government which had already proven to be a failure." We do not expect that the leftists will take action at this time, however, against Hassan. (Backup, Page 6) *Bolivia: The proclamation of a nationwide state of siege on 7 June tends to confirm earlier reports that President Paz Estens- soro was planning a fake coup to justify arrests of opposition ele- ments. The government has asserted that the Communists are attempting to seize power. Key Communist labor leaders in Catavi, location of Bolivia's largest tin mine, are among those arrested. Paz probably anticipates that this will facilitate implementation of the US-sponsored mine rehabilitation nrozram scheduled Fn hPain in party Tilly H\.. r,zz WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that: A. No change from last week. B. No change from last week. C. Except for the capture of Pa Dong by the Communists in Laos, there have been no significant developments in that 8 June 61 DAILY BRIEF vi TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 / Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 �11I'd TOP SECRET country, in South Korea, or in Iran to change the main points of our recent conclusions on these countries. Spe- cifically: In Laos, the Communists are continuing to delay im- plementation of an effective cease-fire in order to ob- tain political concessions; In South Korea, the new regime remains unstable, with relationships between its military command and the UNC still untested; In Iran, the continuing success or failure of the Amini government remains in question. 8 June 61 DAILY BRIEF vii YV7 Wi A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Name The Situation in Laos the defending Meo units put up stiff resistance before withdrawing from their positions. the Meos' front lines were out o; ammunition but that their officers would not allow them to re- the joint attack force warning that if fresh supplies will be unable to continue the treat. was also short of ammunition, were not brought up soon, "we attack." "mopping up was not yet complete," and repeated the request for ammunition. Complaining of lack of support, the Kong Le commander added that "both the rear lines and the front lines have to do a little work. We are doing our best to bring off a victory, but the enemy is resisting strongly." The enemy's shortage of ammunition may have been a major fac- tor behind the Meos' apparent ability to withdraw relatively intact to their new positions some miles to the west and southwest of Pa Dong. Col. Khammouane, the pro - Sou- vanna Phouma commander who has maintained an uneasy co- existence with the Pathet Lao in Phong Saly Province, had reached agreement with the Pathet Lao on certain problems, including the establishment of a joint operations committee and apparently the division of the province into zones of respective responsibility for the two sides. such agreement as was reached was still somewhat tentatirve and will require fur- ther negotiations. CSouvanna Phouma's daughter, Princess Moun, and another member of the Souvanna delegation told an American official in Zurich that the main reason they had come to Zurich was to escape momentarily the pervasive influence of the Chinese Com- munist delegation at Geneva. They stated that they see the Rus- sians at Geneva only rarely. Other points of interest emerging from their three-hour conversation was the assertion of their intent to ask Souvanna to send delegation leader Quinim Pholsena7 RETt 8 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 '4111ei --SECRET [home on the grounds that he was a Pathet Lao "stooge"; their conviction that Souvanna and Khammouane were still inde- pendent; and their belief that national elections in Laos would have to be postponed long enough to permit formation of a _ina-Qq_mart_v_t_a_counterao flak Sat) Peiping continues to accuse the US of stalling at the Geneva conference. In describing the 6 June session, it said that Britain and France entered into substantive discussions, while the US only repeated its "wholly unjustifiable" demands for an effective cease-fire. Peiping labels the Western- backed French proposal for an ICC with sweeping investiga- tive powers an encroachment on Laotian sovereignty and a "big step backward" from the 1954 Geneva agreements. The Chinese Communists maintain that the two Soviet proposals should be the only items for conference consideration. Bloc airlift-associated activity for 6 June involved only three sorties, two by a Soviet transport and one by a DRV air- craft. No flights into Laos were noted, however. On 6 June another Soviet IL-i4 left Moscow for Hanoi. this plane is to con- duct aerial photo survey work at Hanoi. this aircraft will be used in Laos. -SEC-RE-T 8 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 It is possible that Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 SECRET Novi Political Military Crisis Threatened in Brazil A weekly Brazilian news magazine on 5 June published an interview in which Marshal Lott reaffirmed his denuncia- tion of "tyrant" Fidel Castro and called Quadros "this lover of Castro," declared himself against the proposed establish- ment of a defense ministry on the grounds that it would create interservice friction, and attacked Quadros for authoritarian- ism. The interview was granted several weeks ago but not published because of Lott's insistence that he had not intended his remarks for publication. Decision to print apparently fol- lowed an argument between Lott and the magazine over the substance of his comments. Quadros had previously indicated his intention to imple- ment the policy of some years' standing which prohibits mil- itary figures from commenting on political matters. Lott is drawing pay as a member of the reserve. Earlier in Quadros' administration a reserve officer was disciplined, with War Minister Denys' consent, for making political comments. The arrest of the titular leader of the opposition on such grounds could stimulate congressional factions friendly to him to work toward impeachment of Quadros. Arrest of Lott would increase unrest among high-ranking military officers who were ousted from key posts by the Quadros administration. These officers apparently drew up an unsigned manifesto presented to Congress by an opposition deputy on 6 June. The manifesto appeals to Quadros to eliminate discrim- ination in military appointments and is critical of the economic austerity program, but it does not endorse Lott's criticism of Brazil's present Cuban policy. 8 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 NesePCPPT'1�00 Situation in Zanzibar [The death toll in the rioting following the legislative elec- tions of 1 June has approached 65. The great majority of the casualties were Arabs living in a heavily African section of Zanzibar town. Some 300 persons have been wounded and over 700 jailed. The British civil secretary has admitted in a press conference that the situation not only in Zanzibar town but throughout the islands is "unsatisfactory." Despite the prospect of election disturbances, the police were unprepared for large-scale violence. By 6 June, British authorities had flown in some 800 troops and 700 police from Kenya and Tan- ganyikaj IA coalition government has been formed under the nominal leadership of Sheik Muhamed Shamte--president of the small Zanzibar and Pemba P_eople's party--but Ali Muhsin, the leader of the Communist-infiltrated Zanzibar Nationalist party, is the real power:3 [Ali Muhsin, who has had close ties with Cairo, appears primarily interested in protecting the traditional dominance of the Arab minority of 50,000 among Zanzibar's 300,000 people�many of them recent African immigrants from the mainland. The Arabs are the most advanced of the protec- torate's racial groups and are trying to entrench themselves in the civil service, police force, and other positions of in- fluence:7 [Ali Muhsin has already declared that Zanzibar must be= come an independent republic before he will even discuss a possible federation with the East African mainland territories. He has strongly denounced alleged efforts by both Kenyan and Tanganyikan African leaders to interfere in Zanzibar's elec- tion, and since the election he has stated that his new govern- ment will take strong measures to control African immigra- tion from the mainland and might expel voteless Africans al- ready on the island. At that time he was scathing in his de- nunciation of Nyerere's government in Tanganyika, claiming it was "subject to neo-colonialist domination of West Germany, -1 Israel, and the Catholic Church." Ali Muhsin has also indicated_ j SECRET 8 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 SECRET ,11.00 that Zanzibar would probably not remain within the Common- wealth after independencej [Although Ali Muhsin appears favorably inclined toward Communism, the ZNP's general secretary, Abdul Rahman Mohamed (Babu), is believed to have been the major influ- ence in moving his party toward acceptance of Communist influence_:1 8 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 CONFIDENTIAL The Moroccan Government Hassan, who continues to serve as his own premier in an essentially conservative political coalition, has solidified his position to some extent by eliminating from the cabinet sev- eral of the ministers who have differed most strongly with his policies. The addition of representatives from several minor political parties and the lack of a leader within the cabinet around whom potential dissidents could rally will further in- hibit any real challenge to Hassan's policies. The King has named no deputy premier, but his unpopular aide, Ahmed Reda Guethra, probably will continue to act as the King's deputy as well as function as minister of interior and agriculture. By failing to name a foreign minister and by distributing responsibility for various aspects of foreign affairs to several ministers of state, Hassan has created a situation which prom- ises even greater confusion in the conduct of Morocco's foreign relations. The leftist National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) will continue to be the major opposition to this government and to Hassan personally. The UNFP's membership is centered in coastal cities such as Casablanca and Rabat and is drawn largely from organized labor, intellectuals, and students. The large number of UNFP supporters within the civil service may be able to exercise an influence over routine governmental op- erations. The main question at issue between the UNFP and the King is the establishment of a constitutional regime. The King is committed to the December 1962 deadline set by his father for the promulgation of a constitutional regime, and he is likely to come under increasing pressure to honor this commitment both from the left and from many conservatives who are as anxious to attain this objective as is the UNFP. The King, however, is -CONFIDENTIAL - 8 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 CONFIDENTIAL unlikely to agree to a constitution which seriously diminishes his authority. The King probably now hopes to embark on economic and social development programs. Substantial progress seems unlikely in light of his record of erratic conduct of affairs and his tendency to substitute eloquence for action. CONFIDENTIAL 8 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 Approved for Release: 20T20708/11 CO2049797 THE PRESIDEN)"�' Nrol The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797 pproved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO20497; z.0 -TOP-SECRET-- Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2049797