CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/07/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02050144
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: July 14, 1953

for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2050144
sTEC�PU SINFORMATITON ?/111/0efOr311/71/.17/
14 Tuly 1953
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. _
C:HANGE II
TO': TS
DAT7. 2,
H 70
DATE ( I REVIEWER:
3.5(C)
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. Moscow embassy comments on Berta ouster (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Prospects good for early formation of Indonesian cabinet (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
3. Pakistan reportedly plans to ease relations with Afghanistan (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Turkish company reportedly signs oil contract with Iran (page 5).
5. Comment on Egyptian situation (page 5).
6. Villard comments on possible failure of Anglo-Libyan negotiations
(page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on Rakosi's speech defining Hungarian policies (page 6).
8. Czechoslovak and Rumanian leaders rumored to be in Moscow
(page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
9. General strike reportedly planned to enforce East German demands
(page 8).
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SECURITY INFORMA110N
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SOVIET UNION
1. Moscow embassy comments on Beria ouster:
merican embassy officials in Moscow 3.3(h)(2)
consider that Beria's removal, while it
shows a weakness in the regime, strengthens
Malenkov's position and indicates that he had
completi�ii&�F�flh�ty. Through the appointment of Kruglov as
MVD minister, Malenkov may now have gained a similar position with
respect to the police. The embassy does not consider that Molotov or
Defense Minister Bulganin is at present likely to challenge Malenkov.
The embassy adds that during the past 24
hours, aside from one completely unconfirmed rumor of Zhukov's
arrest, there is no sign of trouble from the military nor any indica-
tion that Bulganin is contending for supreme power.
The embassy sees the continuing emphasis by
the regime on collective action as indicative of top-level agreement on
Beria's arrest. Malenkov will probably continue this emphasis in order
to share the burden of governmental responsibilities and to take advantage
of this policy's popular appeaL
The embassy feels that the promotion of Kruglov,
who was for many years Beria's deputy, raises doubt as to the number of
Berta proteges in the police who would necessarily be purged.
Comment: The accusation that Beria had been
selecting MVD personnel on the basis of loyalty to himself suggests that
a purge of some size, at least within the MVD, will be publicized.
It is unlikely that the army will play more than
a neutral role in the power struggle unless it becomes intensified to a
point where one faction must depend directly on military power. Such
dependence on the army would facilitate a coup by the military over the
political leaders -- an eventuality which has been carefully guarded
against for 35 years by permeating the military with police and party
controls.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Prospects good for early formation of Indonesian cabinet:
The American embassy in Djakarta believes 3.3(h)(2)
that prospects are good for the formation of
an Indonesian cabinet by 15 July. Although
efforts to achieve a National Party-Masjumi
coalition may be unsuccessful, a right-of-center Masjumi-led govern-
ment, excluding the Nationalists but commanding 130 of the parliament's
212 seats, is entirely possible.
Comment: The last cabinet, a National Party-
Masjumi coalition, fell on�rYtiri7, The embassy has predicted that a
new government excluding the National Party would have a short and
stormy existence, and that despite basic differences between the coun-
try's two largest parties, another National Party-Masjumi coalition
would have a better chance to survive until the 1954 elections.
SOUTH ASIA
3. Pakistan reportedly plans to ease relations with Afghanistan:
Subject to confirmation by the cabinet, the
Pakistani government has decided to ease
its relations with the Afghan government in
"every practicable manner," according to
3.3(h)(2)
the Pakistani ambassador in Kabul. If this decision is confirmed by
the cabinet, Pakistan will withdraw many trade restrictions on Afghani-
stan, permit the re-export of Pakistani imports, such as iron and steel,
and considerably increase port and transportation facilities for Afghan
transit trade through Karachi.
Comment: Such an independent, concrete
move toward friendlier relations would face the Afghan government
with the decision of diminishing its anti-Pakistan propaganda campaign
or of subjecting itself to widespread criticism.
If formally announced before the meeting between
the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers on 25 July, the new policy toward
Afghanistan could be used by Pakistan, if necessary, to place the onus on
India for failure of those talks.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Turkish company reportedly signs oil contract with Iran:
On 11 June a private Turkish company signed 3.3(h)(2)
a contract with Iran involving the exchange of
Turkish goods for 4,150,000 metric tons of
crude oil and oil products during the next five
years,
The products reportedly will include aviation and
regular gasoline, kerosene and diesel oil.
.3(h)(2)
the transaction could save Turkey about $300,000,000 in exchange and
open an important outlet for Turkish surpluses.
3.3(h)(2)
5. Comment on Egyptian situation:
Egypt's rejection of a British ultimatum for
the return of a RAF airman, allegedly kidnaped in Ismailia on 9 July,
and the consequent British occupation of the town to establish controls
over all movements have created new tensions in the Anglo-Egyptian
dispute. This action could set off widespread guerrilla attacks against
the British.
The ultimatum was issued by the British com-
mander in the Suez area, and Britain appears to be prepared to risk the
consequences to implement its present firm policy toward Egypt.
The Egyptian military regime may be expected
to remain obdurate in its refusal to accept the British ultimatum. It
will use this incident as added evidence that the mere presence of British
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troops is a threat to Egyptian independence. Unless impelled by
popular sentiment, the regime will continue for the present to main-
tain public order and to look for a Washington-inspired solution to the
Suez issue.
This flare-up will make more difficult a re-
sumption of the suspended Anglo-Egyptian talks, and coming during
the Washington conference, it highlights once again the seriousness
of the situation and the need for a settlement.
6, Villard comments on possible failure of Anglo-Libyan negotiations:
American minister Villard in Tripoli reports 3.3(h)(2)
that the rapidly growing anti-British attitude
of the Libyan king, cabinet and parliament may
block a treaty with Britain.
Villard comments that if the current Anglo-
Libyan negotiations for a military agreement fail and British forces
are barred from Libyan soil, the United States may be faced with full
responsibility for the welfare and continuance of the Libyan state as
well as the defense of the entire territory.
Comment: Despite Prime Minister Muntasser's
initial optimism in early Tune that the agreement with Britain could be con-
cluded in London within ten days, no progress has been reported after a
month of negotiation.
Even if a treaty were signed, the attempt at
ratification would face further problems in view of the reported Egyptian,
activity among members of the Libyan parliament.
EASTERN EUROPE
7. Comment on Rakosi's speech defining Hungarian policies:
Hungarian party leader Rakosi's speech on
11 July probably was aimed at clarifying the new governmental program
for party members who had been confused by Premier Nagy's address
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of 4 July outlining a more relaxed policy. While the speech was in
substantial agreement with that of Nagy, it stated the limits of the
concessions, pointing out that the goal was still socialism and that
a return to capitalism would not be allowed.
The show of party unity in connection with
the speech, as evidenced by the appearance of several leaders who
had been demoted from the politburo or the cabinet, was probably
planned to offset the confusion of the party rank and file over the
suddenness of the recent personnel and policy changes.
8. Czechoslovak and Rumanian leaders rumored to be in Moscow:
Czechoslovak president Zapotocky and 3.3(h)(2)
Rumanian premier Gheorghiu-Dej are
rumored to be in Moscow, according to the
American diplomatic missions in Prague
and Bucharest. Czech deputy prime minister
Dolansky and minister of national defense
Cepicka accompanied Zapotocky, according
to rumors circulating in Prague. The Ameri-
can legation in Bucharest reported on 12 July that Georghiu-Dej had
been absent from his house f or two weeks, and that
the premier left Rumania for Moscow on 3 July.
Comment: These Satellite leaders may
have been summoned to Moscow to receive instructions on the imple-
mentation of the current "liberal" Orbit policy in their respective coun-
tries and to be briefed on the Beria purge. Both Zapotocky and
Gheorghiu-Dej have been proponents of all-out industrialization
programs at the expense of labor.
The ministerial reorganization and liberal-
ization policy announced in Hungary on 4 July followed the return from
Moscow on 19 June of party leader Rakosi and then minister of war
Farkas.
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WESTERN EUROPE
9. General strike reportedly planned to enforce East German demands:
plans have been made
for a general strike In mid-July. Reports
from six other cities tell of plans for strikes
on unspecified dates. The East German Ministry of Interior reportedly
expects a new uprising and has prepared detailed plans for strict
countermeasures.
Comment: American military observers in
Germany report that Soviet troop units have remained on the alert in
East Berlin and other cities.
Premier Grotewohl's denunciation of President
Eisenhower's food offer will greatly intensify the bitterness of the work-
ers against the Communist authorities. The possibility of a general
strike is enhanced by the East German government's admission that
workers have the constitutional right to strike and by BIAS broadcasts
reminding East Berlin workers of this right.
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