CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/01/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02058871
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: January 23, 1959

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23 January 1959
Copy No. C
CENTRAL
63
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
nOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANCED TO: 124 0
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23 JANUARY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev meeting with Finnish
President Kekkonen in Leningrad.
East German Premier Grotewohl's
visit to India unproductive.
IL ASIA-AFRICA
rsrael has probably received high per-
formance jet fighters from France
recently.
Arab countries setting up tanker
pany to carry Middle East oil.
corn-
Four of the seven autonomous repub-
lics in French West Africa draft con-
stitution for federal regime.
Japan - Prime Minister Kishi's re-
election on 24 January as Liberal-
Democratic party president virtually
assured, but his position remains
weak.
US ambassador thinks Indonesian Gov-
ernment may be shifting away from
dependence on pro-Communist and
Communist groups.
-s
,
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A
IIL THE WEST
0 Austria - USSR warns that bilateral
association with the ,European Com-
mon Market would violate Austria's
neutrality.
Argentina - Industrial stzikes will
probably evoke revision 9f govern-
ment's labor policies and_stronger
action against Peronistas, and Com-
munists.
1\0:4 Panama - Some antiadministration
elements plan civil flisorilers to
weaken National Guard as first step
in coup attempt.
Cuba will probably grant aid sought
by Haitian rebels in invasion attempt.
LATE ITEM
' 03 General Dap Chhuoh planning to de-
clare large region in western Cam-
bodia autonomous.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
23 January 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Finland: Khrushchev has made a sudden trip to
Leningrad�only five days before the ,party congress--to
meet with Finnish President Kekkonen,who is there on a
"private" visit. The presence of both the Soviet and Finnish
ministers of trade and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in-
dicates that trade as well as political discussions willtake
place. The Soviet leaders appear to be making a special ef-
fort to conciliate the Finns and may hope to obtain some
Finnish endorsement of the USSR's proposals on Berlin and
a German peace treaty. (Page 1)
East Germany - India: West German officials in New
Delhi have expressed relief that the visit of East German
Premier Grotewohl accomplished "nothing significant." They
report that Nehru rejected Grotewohl's proposals for diplo-
matic or consular representation so definitely that the East
German premier did not bring up the subject again in later
talks. US officials note that Grotewohrs visit was overshad-
owed by that of Tito and that Yugoslav representatives in New
Delhi snubbed the East German leaders.
(Page 2)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Israel-France: he unauthorized flight over Greece on
6 January of six French-made Mystere IV B-2 (Super-Mystere
high-performance jet fighters headed in the direction of Cyprus
strongly suggests that these aircraft were en route to Israel.
Israel is reported to have contracted for 15 such aircraft last
spring. These new aircraft would considerably increase the air
defense capability of the Israeli Air Force:I
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Arab states: Plans by the Arab League to set up an
Arab Navigation Company consisting largely of oil tankers
appear to be moving rapidly toward realization. The UAR�
which will control the company through its 40 percent in-
terest, is currently concluding a deal with Japan for the
construction of two 20,000-ton tankers which it hopes will
provide a nucleus for the Arab fleet. Since the company,
will be owned by Arab governments, political pressures
will probably be applied on Western oil companies to grant
long-term contracts to carry Middle East oil.
(Page 3)
French West Africa: The adoption on 17 January by
representatives of four of the seven autonomous "republics"
in French West Africa of a draft constitution providing for
a federal regime to be known as the Federation of Mali re-
flects the growing urge among politically conscious Africans
for greater unity. The new grouping, which is expected to
be endorsed in a referendum scheduled for 22 February,
will remain within the French Community for the present.
It will face extensive political and economic problems.
(Page 4) (Map)
Japan: A last-minute agreement between Prime Min-
ister Kishi and his rivals in the ruling Liberal-Democratic
11910 has halted the power struggle temporarily and virtually
assures Kishi's re-election as party president on 24 January.
Party leaders have agreed to close ranks, on as yet undis-
closed terms, in the face of a difficult Diet session beginning
28 January; Kishi will probably continue as prime minister
until summer at least, but his position remains basically weak.
(Page 8)
Indonesia: The American ambassador cites a savage at-
tack on the Communist party by a leading Djakarta daily, often
used as a government mouthpiece, as evidence that the govern-
ment may be shifting away from dependence on pro-Communist
and Communist groups. He considers it unlikely that such an
article would have been written without President Sukarno's
approval. (Page 7)
23 Jan 59
DAILY BRIEF
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III. THE WEST
*Austria USSR; Soviet Ambassador Lapin told a high
Vienna official a few days ago that bilateral Austrian asso-
ciation with the European Common Market would be consid-
ered a violation of Austria's neutrality. The Soviet warning
is a serious intervention in Vienna's conduct of its foreign
affairs. Should Vienna be unable to work out an acceptable
tie with the Common Market, Austria would face an eco-
nomic squeeze in view of its heavy dependence on access
to Western European markets. (Page 8)
Argentina: The costly strikes by industrial labor, along
with terroristic tactics against workers returning to their
jobs, will probably stimulate revision of government labor '
legislation and stronger action against the Peronistas and
Communists, possibly including outlawing the Communist
party. Such action may be deferred, however, until after
President Frondizi returns from the United States on 2 Feb-
ruary. (Page 9)
Panama: Some antiadministration elements in Panama
evidently feel they now possess enough contraband arms for
a coup against President de la Guardia. Unable to challenge
a united N tional Guard directly, they apparently intend first
to incite civil disorders, the repression of which would in-
crease the National Guard's un o ularity and weaken its sup-
port of the President. (Page 10)
Haiti.: Exiled opponents of President Duvalier are al-
ready concentrating in Cuba, expecting aid for their planned
',invasion of Haiti. The new Cuban leaders may be inclined to
grant them clandestine assistance; the establishment of a
friendly regime in Haiti would facilitate action against the
j�-,eneighboring Dominican Republic, which is the main target
of Castro followers who are intent on extending their "cru-
sade against dictatorship." (Page 11)
23 Jan 59
DAILY BRIEF
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*Cambodia: general Dap Chhuon is reliably reported
to be planning a declaration of autonomy in early February
for the large region in western Cambodia, over which he has
command. If Sihanouk fails to come to terms with him,
Chhuon would then issue a public call to arms and use this
territory as a base from which to conduct guerrilla warfare.
The general is described as fully determined to carry out
his plan23 (Page 12)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
NEE 41-58. Probable Developments in Japan's Inter-
national Orientation. 23 December 1958.
SNIE 72-1-59. Outlook for the Sudan. 6 January 1959.
23 Jan 59
DAILY BRIEF iv
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev, Kekkonen Negotiate
Soviet Premier Khrushchev, only five days before the
Soviet party congress, has made a sudden trip to Leningrad,
where Finnish President Kekkonen is making a "private
visit." Moscow appears to be making a special effort to con-
ciliate the Finns after the prolonged period of Soviet pressures
which last month toppled the Fagerholm coalition.
The presence in Leningrad of both the Soviet and Finnish
ministers of trade as well as Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
indicates that trade as well as political discussions will take
place. TASS announced that "opinions on questions of Soviet-
Finnish relations and some problems of the international sit-
uation" had been discussed. Khrushchev probably now hopes
to obtain a public Finnish endorsement for the specific Soviet
proposals on Berlin and a German peace treaty. Finland had
previously sent a prompt reply to Moscow favoring a confer-
ence on a German peace treaty. The communiqu�ssued after
Kekkonen's state visit last May endorsed a nuclear-test ban, a
Rapacki-type European disengagement zone, and "universality"
in international organizations--the first time Finland had joined
in such public statements. aresident Kekkonen and other Fin-
nish officials reportedly feel that the USSR will, if necessary,
use force to achieve its aims in Berlin and that Finland should
meet Moscow "halfwayd
he Finns are additionally concprned over the situation in
the Baltic and German rearmament, which they believe could
lead to a war inevitably involving Scandinavia The USSR may
also attempt to gain Finland's support for a Baltic "zone of
peace"--a statement which Soviet leaders unsuccessfully
"pressed hard" to include in the May communique. Mikoyan
on 3 January in Copenhagen stated that he desired the Baltic
"to become a sea of peace."
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East German Premier Grotewohl Unsuccessful in India
Premier Grotewohl's visit to India passed without signif-
icant developments, to the great relief of West German officials
in New Delhi, who had feared some progress toward recognition
of East Germany by the Indian Government. Grotewohl raised
the question of diplomatic or consular representation, but
Premier Nehru rejected the idea so definitely that Grotewohl
did not bring up the subject again, according to West German
diplomatic sources.
The American Embassy in New Delhi points out that Grote-
wohl's visit, after an initial splash of headlines, was overshad-
owed by the arrival of President Tito. American officials also
note that, although Yugoslavia has formal diplomatic relations
with East Germany, no Yugoslav representative appeared at the
airport to greet Grotewohl. ff_n contrast Tito's talks with Nehru
were far more cordial, the two leaders reportedly finding com-
mon ground in their mutual concern over Chinese Communist
intentions.i
After Grotewohl's attempts to secure an official invitation
for a visit to Burma were rebuffed by General Ne Win, the East
German premier flew to North Vietnam and Peiping. He pre-
sumably will proceed to Moscow in time for the Soviet party's
21st congress opening on 27 January.
23 Jan 59
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IL ASIA-AFRICA
Arabs to Establish Tanker Fleet
Plans to set up an Arab Navigation Company, largely to
operate oil tankers, appear to be moving toward realization
and may be completed by the time the Arab Petroleum Congress
meets in April. The Arab League Economic Council has de-
cided that the company will be capitalized at about $15,000,000,
with the shares distributed among the members of the Arab
League. The UAR will hold 40 percent, and operations will
probably be coordinated in Cairo. Other holdings are to be:
Iraq, 14 percent; Lebanon, 5 percent; the Sudan, 4 percent;
Jordan, 2.5 percent; Yemen, 2 percent; Libya 1.5 percent; and
the remaining 31 percent will be distributed among Kuwait,
Bahrein, and other Arab states.
The UAR, hoping to provide the nucleus of the fleet, is
seeking to conclude a deal with Japan for the construction of
two 20,000-ton tankers. The Kuwaiti government reportedly
has approved the plan, and the privately owned Kuwaiti tanker
company will participate in this project. The rest of the pro-
posed Arab fleet will be government-owned.
Meanwhile, Iran also is quite far along in its own program
to carry a part of its oil production in Iranian-flag vessels. The
first 33,500-ton supertanker for Iran was scheduled to be com-
missioned on 21 January and another of the same tonnage in about
six months. Five other supertankers of 50,000 tons are being
built in Swedish yards and will be delivered at the rate of one
each year from 1960 to 1965.
These tanker programs are being carried out despite the ex-
istence of surplus tanker capacity amounting to at least six mil-
lion dead-Weight tons.
SECRET
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Palk
Villa Ciente.
MAURITANIA
GUINEA
Conakry
Freetown
SIERRA' IVORY GHANA
LEONE
COAST
Monrovia Accra
LIBERIA Abdien
A T ANTIC , OC A
ALGERIA
CAINEPPONS
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Addis Ababa�
ETHIOPIA
KENYA
()Nairobi
TANGANYIKA
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Now, Awl
West Africans Creating New Regional Federation
African leaders representing Senegal, French Sudan,
Upper Volta, and Dahomey--four of seven autonomous West
African "republics" which opted to join the new French Com-
munity--approved on 17 January a draft constitution which
provides for a politically meaningful federal regime to re-
place the former largely administrative federation of French
West Africa. Popular endorsement of the new grouping, to
be called the "Federation of Mali" after a semilegendary em-
pire which embraced large areas of West Africa between the
13th and 16th centuries, is expected when the draft instrument
is submitted to a referendum in the four founding territories
on 22 February. Some 11 of the approximately 17 million in-
habitants of French West Africa will be included in the new
political entity as presently envisaged.
Although the 62-article draft constitution does not give
extensive powers to the federal institutions, it provides for
a federal executive, assembly, and separate judiciary, and
places administration of federal security forces in the hands
of the chief of the federation. It provides for the adherence of
new members and for secession.
This agreement represents a fundamental decision in favor
of regional consolidation by important elements of the two lead-
ing interterritorial political parties--the African Democratic
Rally (RDA) and the African Regroupment party (PRA). It
also reflects the growing appeal of pan-Africanism among po-
litically conscious Africans. Its achievement in the face of the
vigorous hostility of the Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny, cre-
ator and president of the RDA as well as minister of state in
the French Government, seems certain to heighten the serious
rift which the federation issue has already produced in the RDA.
Eventually, the attraction of such a federation for the three
territories presently remaining aloof may undermine the power
of Houphouet and other nonparticipating area leaders.
For the present, the new federation can be expected to
remain within the French Community, the constitution of which
CONFIDENTIAL
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provides specifically for such a "primary" grouping linked
as a unit with France. However, most of the African
Nationalists who formed the federation have not disguised
their Community's provision enabling a member republic
to become fully independent when it chooses.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Japanese Conservatives Reach Compromise
Prime Minister Kishi and his rivals in the governing Liberal-
Democratic party have agreed to halt the factional struggle which
has diminished conservative prestige and impeded Kishi's exer-
cise of effective leadership. The principal factors behind the
agreement appear to be concern for maintaining party unity in
the face of a difficult Diet session beginning on 28 January and
preventing possible losses in the upper house election in June.
The terms of the compromise have not yet been revealed, but
presumably involve a commitment by Kishi to give some of his
rivals important cabinet or party posts in the near future in re-
turn for agreement to hold a party presidential election on 24
January.
The prime minister's rivals, who had demanded that the
party presidential elections be postponed until after Kishi's term
expires on 21. March, have announced that they intend to nominate
former Education Minister Kenzo Matsumura as a candidate to
challenge Kishi. Although Kishi's re-election as party president
seems assured, the compromise gives him only a temporary
respite from the bitter factional struggle.
Kishi probably will continue as prime minister at least un-
til after the elections to the upper house next June. During the
Diet session, he will probably concentrate on passing the budget
and will avoid the introduction of controversial legislation, such
as his bill to increase police powers. The opposition Socialists,
encouraged by the defeat they administered to Kishi on the
police-powers bill during the last session and by the schism
within conservative ranks, will harass the government on every
occasion. the Socialists may
carry out a plan to implicate Kishi in an alleged reparations
s c andap
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Press Attack on Indonesian Communists May Have Had President
'Sukarno's Approval�
A "savage" editorial attack on the Indonesian Communist par-
ty on 20 January by the Djakarta daily Merdeka�a National party -
oriented paper--is the strongest condemnation to date in the run-
ning fight between the National and Communist parties. Since
Merdeka is frequently a government mouthpiece, however, the
editorial may also be a further indication of President Sukarno's
shift away from dependence on the Communists. Several Indonesian
sources recently have expressed their belief that Communist access
to Sukarno is decreasing steadily.
The paper attacked the Indonesian Communist party as a
branch of international Communism under the aegis of Moscow.
Merdeka stated that the party's purported defense of liberal democ-
racy, its previous wholehearted support of Sukarno's "guided democ-
racy", program, ,and Its. current position on a proposed revision
of the composition of parliament are only steps toward its goal of
seizure of complete pOwer.
According to Merdeka editor Diah, who is a National party
member, the current conflict between Sukarno and the Commu-
nists on the method of choosing an enlarged parliament offered
a clear and rare opportunity to attack the Communists and alienate
them from the President. The Communists heretofore have gen-
erally given vigorous support to Sukarno and have gained wide
popular approval through their identification with him and his
policies.
Diah evaded a direct statement on whether Sukarno had
prior knowledge of the editorial. The American ambassador
in Djakarta, however, believes it unlikely that Diah would have
made such a strong statement without consulting the President.
23 Jan 59
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III. THE WEST
USSR Warns Austria Against Association With the European
Common Market
Soviet Ambassador Lapin told the director general of the
Austrian Foreign Ministry "a few days ago" that bilateral
Austrian association with the European Common Market (EEC)
would be considered a violation of Austria's neutrality. Since
Lapin had told the Foreign Ministry some months earlier that
Austrian membership in the EEC would be objectionable, the
present warning is interpreted to apply even to a tenuous EEC
association. Lapin stressed that, while his approach was in-
formal, his government takes a serious view of the matter.
Since Austria's neutrality law binds it only to join no for-
eign military alliances and to permit no military bases on its
soil, the Soviet warning represents a serious intervention in
Vienna's conduct of its foreign policy. It recalls past Soviet
intimations that Moscow would object to Finnish association
with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC). Since the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, the
Soviet Government has been careful to remind Austria, on sev-
eral occasions, of its "obligations as a neutral state."
Austria has long been nervous about Soviet opposition to
its closer association with Western European economic organ-
izations, and already has decided that full membership in the
EEC is probably out of the question. Since about 50 percent of
Austria's trade is with the Common Market countries, some
kind of association with EEC has seemed essential--either bi-
lateral or, preferably, through the multilateral framework the
proposed Free Trade Area would provide.
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spe
Argentine Strikes May Prompt Stronger Steps Against
Communists and Peronistas
The Argentine Government may revise its labor policies
and take stronger action against the Peronistas and Commu-
nists because of the defiant attitude of Peronista-led unions in
the costly industrial strikes which began on 18 January. Ex-
tremist elements exacerbated the situation by adopting terror-
istic tactics against workers returning to their jobs. Action
may be deferred, however, until President Frondizi returns
from the United States on 2 February.
Government measures thus far have included the arrest of
Peronista and Communist labor leaders, and the closing of their
party headquarters, as well as the mobilization of petroleum
and city transport workers. Firm security measures re-es-
tablished transport services by 20 January, thus encouraging
the majority of nonindustrial labor to return to work.
Just before the President departed for Washington, the
Frondizi-dominated Congress began consideration of legisla-
tion requiring arbitration of disputes before strike action.
Anti-Peronista leaders, encouraged by the administration's
charges that the Peronista and Communist strike action had
subversive aims, will probably renew pressure on Congress
to modify the basic labor law, which they believe favors the
Peronistas' drive to regain control of organized labor in the
union elections now under way.
The government may even move to outlaw the Communist
party, but Acting
President Guido said on 22 January that he did not believe
this would be necessary. ..It, Seems more likely, that the
recent unrest may add impetus to efforts toward legislation
which would improve the investigation and control of Commu-
nist activities. Except under the current state-of siege meas-
ures, security forces lack such authority.
Frondizi's strong stand against labor agitation has strength-
ened his military backing.
23 Jan 59
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Coup May Be Attempted in Panama
frequent rumors that a coup may soon be triect
against President de la Guardia. Some of his opponents have
boasted that they have enough arms for a successful revolt;
several known political agitators have been in Miami and
Havana since Batista's fall, probably seeking weapons.
One of the plotters indicated that the coup would be pre-
ceded by incitement of civil disorders warranting repressive
action by the National Guard, Panama's only armed force.
The guard's corruption and its brutality in quelling previous
disorders--like those of May 1958--have made it extremely
unpopular. There have been reports of dissension among the
guard commandants, whose support has thus far ensured
De la Guardia's position.
De la Guardia has alienated most of his former supporters,
making him vulnerable to the clandestine political maneuvering
characteristic of Panama. But divisions and jealousies among
opposition groups, most of them interested primarily in the
economic benefits inherent in political power, have deterred
concerted action against him. He will be in real danger if the
megalomaniac former President Arnulfo Arias, who retains
great popular support, can unite the armed opposition factions.
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Haitian Opposition Seeking Cuban Assistance for Invasion
Plans for an invasion of Haiti by exiles and adventurers/
one of the leaders of the
plot, apparently not a Haifi hadiTved in Cuba
that he had already approached ex-Cuban President Prio for as-
sistance, and that he had a subsequent appointment with Fidel
Castro that week.
If all goes well we can be in Haiti in about
15 days with enough arms for 500 Haitians and 30 of us
earlier for two groups
of about 200 men each to land on the coast north and south of the
Haitian capital with arms for an unstated number of "allies" who
would apparently be waiting for them inside Haiti.
This plan is similar to the one reported
which implicated opposition leaders
Dejoie and Jumelle. Louis Dejoie, a leading Haitian exile in
New York, and Clement Jumelle are both presidential candidates
defeated by President Duvalier in the 1957 elections. Duvalier
has retained only a shaky hold on power after repeated purges of
the army and numerous political arrests. His 8 January pardon
for political prisoners and exiles appears a desperate attempt to
improve his international reputation.
The new Cuban leaders may be inclined to aid the Haitian
revolutionaries clandestinely. The establishment of a friendly
regime in Haiti would facilitate action against the Trujillo dicta-
torshin which is now a main target of Fidel Castro's followers.
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Name
Cambodia
LATE ITEM
Cdeneral Dap Chhuon apparently is determined to carry
out his move against the regime of Cambodian Premier
Sihanouk in the near future, probably between 8 and 10 Feb-
ruary.)
ghhuon's plans, as reliably reported, are to deploy his
troops--amounting to four battalions--in strategic positions
under the pretense of protecting Sihanouk against possible
moves by other plotters in Thailand. With his troops in place,
Chhuon would declare the large area of western Cambodia,
which he now commands, an autonomous area and mobilize
civilians therg
ahhuon hopes that Sihanouk, realizing there is consider-
able public opposition to his international and domestic pol-
icies favoring Communist interests, will come to terms.
Should Sihanouk fail to "compromise," the Cambodian people
will be urged to rise against him, and western Cambodia will
be used as a base from which to conduct guerrilla warfarej
'he ultimate attitude of General Lon Nol, army chief of
staff, remains a critical factor. Chhuon says he is sure Lon
Nol has no personal liking for Sihanouk. Chhuon in any event
feels confident of success, as his men have the advantage of
extensive experience in guerrilla warfare against the French,
while other army units have little or non9
flChhuon probably can count on the clandestine support of
Thailand and South Vietnam to help maintain his momentum;
their present anti-Sihanouk activites seem channeled more
through other disgruntled Cambodian elements$ although South
Vietnamese agents are believed to have made at least initial
contact with him. Unless Phnom Penh's capitulation can be
achieved speedily, Sihanouk will be in a position to appeal to
Peiping for direct sunoort for the "legitimate" government of
Cambodia3,
-T-OP SECRET
23 Jan 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2058871
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Approved for Release: 202-0702/21 CO2058871
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
rONIIDEN-TIAL--
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2058871
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TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2020/02/21 CO2058871