CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/09/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02059477
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: September 4, 1953

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4 September 1953
Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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DATETIAV REVIEWER.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. American embassy comments on North Korean delegation to
Moscow (nage 3).
2.
()if Comment on new Iranian-Soviet trade agreement (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. zQuirtno may appoint political general as secretary of defense
(page 4).
ki Peiping reportedly plans to intervene against Nationalists in
Burma (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Ratification of Anglo-Libyan treaty encounters new difficulties
(page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
/Yugoslavia requests tripartite intervention in Trieste crisis
(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
/British move to modify moratorium on discussion of Chinese UN
representation (page 7).
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GENERAL
American embassy comments on North Korean delegation to Moscow:
The US embassy in Moscow considers that
the visit of the North Korean delegation to
Moscow probably indicates that the USSR
has decided to throw its full weight behind
the regime in much the same way it did with East Germany. The
embassy feels that Pravda's recent statement that a political confer-
ence held on the basis of the US resolution is "doomed to failure"
supports the view that at present Moscow has no serious plans for
Korean unification.
The embassy suggests that the Moscow
conversations may cover some kind of bilateral security agreement,
arrangements for formalizing the Soviet Union's recent promise of
aid, and North Korean rail reconstruction in which the USSR is
vitally interested.
Comment: From the composition of the
delegation, it appears thinE-6-7i7nference has been called to discuss
economic or political matters. The explosive character of the Korean
situation is likely to deter the USSR from making a formal security
commitment.
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3. Comment on new Iranian-Soviet trade agreement:
The commodities to be exchanged under
the terms of the Iranian-Soviet trade agreement reportedly signed
on 3 September, the details of which have not yet been announced,
are probably similar to those included in the 10 Juno agreement.
This made the USSR Iran's largest customer for nonstrategic com-
modities.
On 31 August, Prime Minister Zahedi
told Ambassador Henderson that Iran planned to sell nonstrategic
surplus goods to the USSR in exchange for commodities that could
be bought advantageously from the Soviet Union. Zahedi assured
Henderson that it was not in Iran's interest to strengthen Soviet
military power and asked to be informed of Iranian exports con-
sidered by the United States to be strategic.
Regardless of the new Iranian government's
willingness to cooperate with the United States, the 10 rune and 3
September trade agreements strengthen Moscow's economic ties with
Iran and advance Soviet propaganda capabilities.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Quirino may appoint political general as secretary of defense:
The American embassy in Manila has been 3.3(h)(2)
reliably informed that President Quirino has
offered the position of secretary of defense
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to former chief of staff Mariano Castaneda. The embassy comments
that the general feeling in Philippine military and political circles is
that eastaneda's appointment would be detrimental to free elections and
army efficiency.
Comment: Castaneda served as armed forces
chief of staff during the fraudulent 1949 elections when military forces
were used to ensure Quirino's election. He was removed in 1950 by
Magsaysay, who was then defense secretary, because of inefficiency
and corrupt practices.
5. Peiping reportedly plans to intervene against Nationalists in Burma:
Comment: This is the second report that the
Chinese Communists have proposed a military pact to Burma.
3.3(h
Other reports indicate that influential members
of the Burmese government have been considering for some time the
possibility of an approach to Peiping for aid against the Nationalists,
but only as a last resort.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Ratification of Anglo-Libyan treaty encounters new difficulties:
The Libyan senate has postponed considera-
tion of the British treaty, which has already
been approved by the chamber and cabinet,
and has recessed ostensibly to await assur-
ances that the British payment of 1,000,000
pounds annually for Libyan economic devel-
opment, as provided in the treaty, will be
considered as Libya's contribution to the
Libyan Development Agency.
According to the American embassy in
London, the British Foreign Office is not optimistic that a suitable
formula for a compromise on control of the British contribution can
be reached, in which case Prime Minister Muntasser might resign
and the treaty die.
Comment: If the Libyan position were
accepted, it would deprive the British of control over the use of
this money.
EASTERN EUROPE
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7. Yugoslavia requests tripartite intervention in Trieste crisis:
n 2 September, Yugoslav undersecretary 3.3(h)(2)
or foreign affairs Bebler asked for inter-
ention by the American, French and British
overnments to assure normalization of
Italian military dispositions in the Yugoslav-Italian border area.
Bebler asserted that if the Italian military
measures are not canceled, Yugoslavia will be forced to take "corre-
sponding measures." He noted also that Marshal Tito would "of course
be deeply influenced" in his 6 September speech by whether Italian
troops had returned to their original locations.
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Comment: Yugoslavia is basing its
threat on unconfirmed Italian press reports that Italian troops
have been moved into the border area.
Yugoslavia has an infantry brigade with
supporting tanks and artillery occupying Zone B of Trieste, and
one infantry division, one tank brigade and one mountain infantry
brigade in the general area near Italy. Major Italian units normally
located near Yugoslavia consist of two infantry divisions and a
mountain infantry brigade, and there also are two armored divi-
sions which just completed summer maneuvers in the area.
WESTERN EUROPE
8. British move to modify moratorium on discussion of Chinese UN
representation:
rftish UN representatives in New York
ave requested American views on a pro-
osed weakening of the Assembly resolu-
ion imposing a moratorium on discussion
f the Chinese representation issue. The
ritish government feels that the "changed
ituation" resulting from the armistice
hould be reflected in a new formula which
would not freeze the situation unalterably for the next twelve months.
In London the Foreign Office has stated
that it would have difficulty continuing support of the moratorium if,
for example, the Chinese Communists were to release all foreign
Internees and make concessions to British businessmen, or give
satisfactory guarantees on Indochina. On the other hand, if the
Chinese Communists make difficulties at the political conference,
the British would see advantages in maintaining the older arrange-
ment.
Comment: Reflecting a dominant public
attitude, the British press has virtually unanimously taken the view
that the Korean armistice has made possible and desirable the early
admission of Communist China to the UN.
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