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Document Creation Date: 
July 15, 2019
Document Release Date: 
July 22, 2019
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Publication Date: 
November 6, 1953
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15677493].pdf322.23 KB
r0 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO20594797" -, / TOP SE r."5 � : SECU NFORMATION 0 6 November 1953 3.5(c) �re /4! /f Z r., f // Copy No. 84 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. 4(9 NO CHANGE IN CLASS. CI DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE 200_9 AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE:e0//79 REVIEWER Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY , TOP SE T SECU FORMATION 3.5(c), ?Frio Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 1 r k_diN.J.:, SECURITY INFORM 3.5(c) SUMMARY GENERAL .4/ . Soviet ambassador fears adoption of EDC (page 3). SOVIET UNION 2. USSR increases jet bomber strength in Far East (page 3). 3. Soviet anti-American propaganda stepped up (page 4). FAR EAST / . Air activity noted opposite Formosa (page 4). SOUTHEAST ASIA Chinese Nationalists hint at pressure on US (page 5). Indonesian Communists exploiting UnUed States tin policies Ao, (page 5). lir Indonesian government party ordered to cooperate with Communists (page 6). 8. Burmese report Sovet commercial offer (page 7). NEAR EAST - AFRICA 9. Mossadeq supporters and Tudeh reportedly plan demonstration 10. 11. EASTERN EUROPE 12. Comment on probable new government in Finland (page 9). -2 91.ErCgii" 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 6 Nov 53 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 1 V ) SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) GENERAL 1. Soviet ambassador fears adoption of EDC: In a recent conversation in Paris with Soviet ambassador Vinogradov, the French ambassador to Moscow obtained the impression that Vinogradov, in con- trast to his position last summer, appeared to fear that EDC would be adopted. Vinogradov repeated his earlier views that the Soviet Union and France had a common interest in prevent- ing German remilitarization, that EDC ratification is not in the best interest of France, and that the two nations should consequently ex- change views on the German problem. Comment: Qn 8 August Malenkov made a pointed reference to the Franco-Soviet pact as a basis for European security, an idea reintroduced in the Soviet note of 3 November. Soviet propaganda has similarly attempted to capitalize on French reluctance to accept German rearmament in any form. SOVIET UNION 2. USSR increases jet bomber strength in Far East: Between 7 September and 1 November at least 120 IL-28's were ferried from European Russia to the Soviet Far East and the China-Manchuria area. These represent almost a third of all jet light bombers transferred to the Far East since the first arrivals in June 1952. Comment: This report highlights the rapid modernization of the Communist air forces in the Far East. More than half of the 25 Soviet light bomber regiments and all the - 3 - 3).PsE 3.3(h)(2) 6 Nov 53 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 --I I Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 Nope 1 'V r ix.L.� i ) ie SECURITY INFORMATION Soviet fighter regiments in the Far East are now in some stage of conversion to jets or already fully equipped. At least 40 of the jet light bombers ferried to the Far East since 7 September flew into Manchuria, probably for transfer to the Chinese air force. 3. Soviet anti-American propaganda stepped up: Ambassador Bohlen has noted a revival of Soviet "hate-America" propaganda and a sharpened anti-American tone in current output. He points out that propaganda since Stalin's death has been primarily of a general nature, drawing the usual Marxist distinction between conditions in a Communist state and those in the outside world where workers and colonial peoples are subject to capitalist exploitation. In Bohlen's opinion, however, the more specific type of propaganda directed toward developing hate and fear of a particular country, which was prevalent in Stalin's last years, has been making a comeback during the past two months, although it is still not predominant and still far below that of the Stalinist period. He believes that propaganda of this type comes to the fore in periods when Soviet leaders are unwilling even to enter negotiations. FAR EAST 4. Air activity Doted opposite Formosa: flight UitiSSU13nn y planes, in Fukien Province opposite Formosa. The focus of this activity appears to be Chienou airfield, about 90 miles inland. - 4 - TOP RET 6 Nov 53 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 nproved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 Nor' J ix.L. I SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) Comment: There have been indications that the Chinese Communist 1201 Air Division was transferred during October from Peiping to an unidentified base south of Shanghai. An unconfirmed report of early October specified that elements of this division were at Chienou airfield, which was used by the United States air force during World War II and is believed capable of sustaining jet fighter operations. Deployment of a jet fighter unit in the coastal area between Shanghai and Canton, where no other tactical aircraft are known to be based, would be a logical defense measure. SOUTHEAST ASIA 5. Chinese Nationalists hint at pressure on US: The American embassy in Taipei has been shown portions of a message, pur- portedly sent to General Li Mi by sub- ordinates still at Mong Hsat in Burma, protesting merican u port of the Burmese. According to a Chinese Nationalist Foreign Ministry official� the message also contained a paragraph asserting that, in the event of continued American pressure endangering the existence of Nationalist forces in Burma, they would "make known to the world the relations which once existed between our troops and the United States and let the world pass fair judgment." Comment: The message may be genuine, but might also have been invented or elaborated in Taipei. National- ist officials in either place might well believe that such a threat would induce the United States to relax its pressure for evacuation of Li Mi's forces. 6. Indonesian Communists exploiting United States tin policies: American tin purchases are assuming primary political importance in Indo- nesia and have been seized on by the - 5 - 6 Nov 53 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 Noe SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) Communists as an issue on which to attack American policy according to Ambassador Cumming in Djakarta. The Com- munists are encouraging the belief that the United States will buy tin only to the extent that Indonesia is willing to make po- litical concessions. The ambassador comments that the Indonesians have not forgotten the government crisis of 1952 over the question of American aid, which many of them con- sidered was being used as an instrument of political policy. He emphasized that falling markets for Indonesian tin and other products might well lead to further social unrest which the Com- munists could exploit. Comment: The United States is about to negotiate the third annual purchase of approximately 20,000 tons of tin unde-k terms of a contract signed in March 1952, The Communists apparently are trying to make it appear that the an- ticipated decrease in price, which is subject to negotiation in the third year of the contract, represents an effort to exact political concessions. 7. Indonesian government party ordered to cooperate with Communists: The American embassy in Djakarta confirms a report that the chairman of Indonesia's National Party, the major element in the present govern- ment, recen y s he had instructed the party's branches throughout the country to "establish good connections" and co- operate with the Communists. He said that since the Communists were supporthig the government in parliament, such instructions were completely logical, Natthnal Party and t the past six months Comment: Relations between the come ver close during Through cooperation, the Communists have achieved a major voice in Indonesian affairs while escaping the responsibilities of cabinet office. - 6 - TC3 ErE61E-T 6 Nov 53 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 �,..Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 oS./..ELA.....LX.C. I SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) 8. Burmese report Soviet commercial offer: Kyaw Nyein, Burmese minister of industryl told Ambassador Sebald that the Soviet Union had offered on 30 October to provide vehicles, medicines, building material and industrial equipment in exchange for rice, lead and beans. He stated that the prime minister had issued instructions to prepare for negotia- tions, 3.3(h)(2) On the other hand, Kyaw Nyein expressed the fear that his country was entering a Soviet trap and was concerned that any trade agreement would lead to an influx of Soviet technicians. He also indicated that an early American decision to provide Burma with military equipment would do much to strengthen its anti-Communist orientation. Comment: It is probable that Kyaw Nyein's remarks were made 3.3(h)(2) primarily in an effort to obtain American arms and to get help in disposing of the current rice surplus. NEAR EAST - AFRICA 9. Mossadeq supporters and Tudeh reportedly plan demonstration: The pro-Mossadeq National Resistance 3.3(h)(2) Movement, in collaboration with the Tudeh, is planning a one-day demonstration against the Iranian government The Movement, acting for nine pro- Mossadeq groups, reportedly plans demonstrations in the bazaar. If they are successful, a Tudeh demonstration will be started in Majlis square. -7 :)$)t- P-S 6 Nov 53 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) It is understood that the demonstrators will fight any civilian crowds which the government may raise, but have not decided on the tactics to be used if the troops are called out. Mossadeq, now in prison awaiting trial, allegedly has approved these plans. Comment: A demonstration may be attempted in connection with Mossadeq's trial, but it probably will not be large. Most of the pro-Mossadeq groups are relatively insignificant, and it is not believed that the Tudeh is willing to make an all-out effort now. The security forces should be able to control any disturbances. TC,AER;T 3.3(h )(2) 6 NQV 53 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 lirApproved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 IL/--cf7E,k_01\1; _ SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) 11. EASTERN EUROPE 12. Comment on probable new government in Finland: A coalition of the Social Democratic and right-of-center parties is expected to succeed Premier Kekkonen's Agrarian-controlled minority government which resigned on 4 Nov- ember. Such a government, with a working majority of 106 out of 200 parliamentary seats, would be stronger than its predecessor and be assured of the support of a large share of labor as well as business interests. Its ability to agree on measures to solve Fin- land's economic problems will be limited, however, by the wide disparity of views on economic issues held by the members of the proposed coalition. -9 TO,P,StiCET 3.3(h)(2) 6 Nov 53 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479 NeAPProved >1. SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) The Soviet Union has indicated its dis- pleasure at the prospect that strongly pro-Western elements will be included in the cabinet by bitter press attacks on representar ewes of the Social Democratic and conservative parties. Since Sovilet-Finnish trade negotiations are currently under way in Moscow, the USSR could further manifest its disapproval by engaging in dilatory tactics and attempting to force less favorable terms on the Finns. - 10 - TO CRET 6 Nov 53 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2059479