Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
July 15, 2019
Document Release Date: 
July 22, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 8, 1953
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15671665].pdf312.46 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 , r17./(/ d,002 TOP SJe11ET Fr SEC INFORMATION 8 January 1953 Copy No, 58 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NPAte 140 CHANGE IN CLASS. DECL ASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S NEXT REJIEW DATE: AUTH: R 70- DATE: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP RET ITY INFORMATION Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 REVIEWER: 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019-706/26 CO2064886 TtrP ET 3.5(c) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Status of Egypt softens agreement Turkish (page 4). Chinese (page 5). Burmese (page 5). SUMMARY GENERAL Egyptian-Soviet barter agreement uncertain (page 3). attitude toward West German-Israeli restitution (page 3). Foreign Minister favors Yugoslav membership in NATO FAR EAST Nationalists admittedly not ready for mainland invasion SOUTHEAST ASIA 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) seriously disturbed over Chinese Nationalists NEAR EAST - AFRICA WESTERN EUROPE 7. Labor protests may bring East German crack-down (page 6). 8. President of West German S enate opposes treaty ratification (page 7)L 9. Backing for Mayer in French Parliament uncertain (page 7). LATIN AMERICA 10. Attempted coup strengthens leftists in Bolivia (page 8). * * * * 2 3.5(c) TO ET Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 SERET 3.5(c) GENERAL 1. Status of Egyptian-Soviet barter agreement uncertain: Egypt has concluded a barter deal with the Soviet Union providing for an exchange of cotton valued at 3,000,000 pounds sterling in return for industrial materials, chiefly machinery, trade negotia- tions were in progress with Poland, Czech- oslovakia, and Communist China. The Egyptian Government, however, has denied that the barter deal with the Soviet Union has gone "beyond the exploratory stages." It has also stated that it is not negotiating a cotton agreement with Poland, Czechoslovakia, or China. Comment: The Nagib regime is under in- creasing pressure to seek cotton markets because Britain, Egypt's major customer, is curtailing purchases. The Soviet Union and Egypt have had barter arrangements in the past. Aside from possible propaganda opportu- nities, the USSR and Orbit nations may be particularly interested in cotton purchases, since the Soviet crop in 1952 was poor and the Orbit has had an inadequate supply for several years. 2. Egypt softens attitude toward West German-Israeli restitution agree- ment: 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) have stated that Egypt would no longer attack the German-Israeli resti- tution agreement if Bonn agreed to buy appreciable quantities of cotton, to send an industrial mission to Cairo, and to have a "neutral" observer supervise goods going to Israel. 3 TOP RET Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 3.5(c) not to pass 3.3(h)(2) this information to anyone in the Egyptian Government or in the Arab League. He added that he would probably have trouble in the forth- coming meeting of the League's Political Committee over this problem. Comment: This is the first time that any Arab state has made a conciliatory gesture on the Israeli restitution agreement. Any such arrangement between Cairo and Bonn is likely to be strongly criticized by the other Arab countries as well as by Israel. 3. Turkish Foreign Minister favors Yugoslav membership in NATO: Turkish Foreign Minister Koprulu believes 3.3(h)(2) the time will shortly be ripe to attach Yugo- slavia to NATO. He believes the Yugoslays would accept membership in two or three ountries would have no objection if Italy could montns, an be persuaded to approve. If direct admission is impossible, he be- lieves a Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav alliance with reciprocal guarantees with NATO would be an alternative. Comment: No other member has suggested that Yugoslavia be admitted to NATO and Italy would be strongly opposed. While the Yugoslav attitude toward firm military planning with Western powers has changed markedly in the last two months, there have been no indications that the Yugoslays would yet go so far as to become an actual NATO member. Koprulu's statement is in line with his desire to subordinate any agreement with Greece and Yugoslavia to Turkey's NATO commitments. The British Foreign Office has expressed a view that guarantees of assisth.nce to Yugoslavia in case of attack can not be given by NATO, or by any member or groups of members of NATO. 4 TOP RET ./Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 TtiP RET 3.5(c) FAB EAST 4. Chinese Nationalists admittedly not ready for mainland invasion: Chinese Nationalist leaders realize that n invasion of Communist China by their ores would require "years" of prepara- tion, The merican mbassy comments that many Nationa is leaders have recently expressed this thought Comment: Nationalist opinion on this question changed sharply during 1952. As late as last July, Chiang Kai-shek told an American official that he believed an early invasion of the mainland, with American support, to be feasible. In his 1953 New Year's statement, however, Chiang described the coming year as one of preparation for action. 5. Burmese SOUTHEAST ASIA seriously disturbed over Chinese Nationalists: Burmese stated on 7 January that the problem resulting from the presence of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma has "reached serious proportions." He saiLd that additional Nationalist units have �t�hThafland and that he was undecided whether to concentrate Burmese forces. against the Communist insurgents or the Nationalists. Comment: In recent weeks, Burmese officials have been increasingly concerned over reports that the Chinese Nationalists are receiving supplies and reinforcements from Thailand. Their concern is aggravated by increasing Nationalist cooperation with the insurgent Karens. 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) - 5 TO R ET Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 3.5(c) � Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 T(7,ECRET 3.5(c) 6. NEAR EAST - AFRICA WESTERN EUROPE 7. Labor protests may bring East German crack-down: Recent investigations conducted by East German authorities have revealed a sharp increase in anti-- regime activities in the nationalized plants o a er in. equalities of incentives granted various categories of workers-are said to have led to general labor dissatisfaction, some organized protests and strikes, illegal agitation, and even sabotage. officials in Frankfurt believe that the investigation may lead to the adoption of stern measures to improve discipline in plants. 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) - 6 - 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 TOP ET 3.5(c) Comment: Worker unrest in East Germany is probably more widespread than is indicated by isolated reports of strikes and agitations. Failure to pay the usual Christmas bonuses reportedly resulted in much criticism of the government's labor policies. A further increase in labor dissatisfaction would aggravate production difficulties in an economy already troubled by shortages of skilled and supervisory personnel; 8. President of West German Senate opposes treaty ratification: Reinhold Maier, President of the West German Senate, and his Baden-Wuerttemberg supporters now oppose ratifying the Bonn and Paris treaties. They urge instead that the government adopt a forei policy acceptable to the opposition Social Democrats. Maier's new attitude is also calculated to promote his candidacy for the Chancellorship in the event that a coalition of conservatives and Social Democrats if formed after the forthcoming elections. 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) Comment: Without the support of Maier, who is also the Free Democrat chairman of the key Baden-Wuerttemberg sen- atorial delegation, the treaties cannot be ratified. His new stand stems largely from his belief that the treaties may not reach the Federal qenate before the new elections, and that he has more to gain politically by op- posing them now. Should the treaties surmount within the next few months current constitutional obstacles, however, Maier, whose party is a member of the coalition, would almost certainly vote for their approval. 9. Backing for Mayer in French Parliament uncertain: Although Radical Socialist leader R ene Mayer has been authorized to form a cabinet, the American Embassy in Paris doubts that there - 7 - 3.3(h)(2) TICSECTT Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2-619/06/26 CO2064886 has been a real meeting of minds with the Gaullists and the Popular Republicans, The Gaullists apparently believe that Mayer is willing to surrender the supranational character of the EDC; the Popular Republicans, however, are convinced that he intends to defend this aspect of the treaty and they may insist that the new Foreign Minister be from their ranks. Comment: Lack of Socialist support forced Mayer to effect an apparent reconciliation of Gaullist and Popular Republican views on the EDC in order to obtain a larger vote than Pinay. Disagreement between these two parties over Mayer's can- didate for Foreign Minister, however, could still result in the Na- tional Assembly's failure to approve his cabinet. If Mayer is confirmed as premier, he may have the advantage of alternative supporting majorities, one including the Gaullists on domestic issues, and the other without that party but including the Socialists on foreign policy. LATIN AMERICA 10. Attempted coup strengthens leftists in Bolivia: The United States Embassy in La Paz be- lieves that the attempted revolt in Bolivia on 6 january was precipitated by the de- cision of President Paz to side with Juan Lechin and the left wing of the governing National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) in the army reorganization controversy. The "premature and abortive" coup at- tempted by right-wing military and civilian leaders of the MNR was frustrated by prompt government action. The Lechin group may now dominate the government. 8 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) TOP CRET Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 TOP SECRET 3.5(c) Comment: The right wing of the MNR had planned to reopen the military academy and recruit a new army in order to counterbalance the superior might of the armed laborers. Lechin, however, reportedly threatened a revolt if Paz supported this plan. TOP TET Approved for Release: 2019/06/26 CO2064886 3.5(c)