CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1957/06/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Keywords: 2018 Sanitization
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02066860
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2019
• Publication Date: June 23, 1957

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23 June 1957
3.5(c)
Copy No, 4 I)
1 a '1
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
Li DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: H 70
DAT �1RPVIEWER
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP
ET Weicemied, "r 9/40
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tJ4II
CONTENTS
. RHEE REJECTS PROPOSAL TO REDUCE SOUTH KOREAN
ij FORCES (page 3).
2. PEIPING WARNS OF "FIGHT TO DEFEND" KOREAN ARMI
STICE (page 4).
A153. QUEMOY ISLANDS TARGET OF HEAVY CHINESE COMMU-
NIST BOMBARDMENT (page 5).
p, PATHET LAO SYMPATHIZER DESIGNATED TO FORM
" GOVERNMENT IN LAOS (page 6).
1105. KING HUSSAIN REPORTED ATTEMP'"ING TO TAKE JORDAN
INTO BAGHDAD PACT (page 7).
0 tp. RETURN OF SAUDI-TRAINED OMANI REFUGEES MAY PRE-
SAGE INCREASED PRESSURE ON SULTAN OF MUSCAT
(page 8).
Alb 7 REPORTED RIFT BETWEEN KING SAUD AND CROWN
PRINCE FAISAL (page 10).
04. POLISH STALINISTS WAGING VIGOROUS CAMPAIGN TO
o
GAIN PARTY CONTROL (page 12).
9 SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN MEDITERRANEAN
(page 13).
23 June 57
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SEC
1. RHEE REJECTS PROPOSAL TO REDUCE SOUTH
KOREAN FORCES
President Rhee on 21 June resisted an
American proposal that South Korea's
military forces be reduced in favor of
economic development, stating in effect
at this could not be done at present despite the American
decision to modernize US forces in Korea and improve the
South Korean forces.
Comment
South Korean military leaders generally
acknowledge that the pay and living condi-
tions of the forces must be improved to reverse the decline in
troop morale and that such action requires either a reduction
of manpower or an increase in American aid.
Fthee may accept a reduction of forces
in order to obtain additional jet aircraft, but can be expected
to try to obtain further benefits before he gives his consent.
He has long professed a desire that American aid counterpart
funds be used for economic purposes rather than diverted to
the defense budget.
23 June 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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None
2, PEIPING WARNS OF "FIGHT TO DEFEND"
KOREAN ARMISTICE
Comment on:
The warning issued by Radio Peiping
on 23 June that the "Korean-Chinese
side would fight to defend" the Korean
armistice agreement is the first strong
reaction to the recent move to modernize UN forces in South
Korea.
Peiping's blast characterized the US
move as having "seriously threatened" the armistice agree-
ment. Peiping has apparently chosen to regard the ac-
tion as falling short of abrogation of the agreement. Its
threat to "fight" in defense of the agreement is apparently
aimed at Syngman Rhee, who is charged with "clamoring to
take advantage of this opportunity to tear up the whole agree-
1,1ent."
Some continuation of this line can be ex-
pected in Communist propaganda. Major emphasis, however,
will probably be placed on the long-standing Communist ob-
jective of bringing about the withdrawal of all foreign forces
from Korea and unification of the country by negotiation between
the North and the South. In a broadcast of 22 June, North Korean
leader Kim Il-sung reiterated these goals as a "peaceful solution"
to the Korean problem.
23 June 57
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CONFID AL
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3. QUEMOY 1SL TARGET OF HEAVY CHINESE
COMMUNIST BOMBARDMENT
Chinese Communist artillery on 22
and 23 June fired more than 1,500
rounds on the Quemoy Islands--the
heaviest shelling since early 1956.
Chinese Nationalist Defense Ministry
spokesmen describe the shelling as
probing and harassing fire in which they
see no particular invasion threat.
Since 10 May, when the year-long lull
which had prevailed in the Quemoys was suddenly broken
by a Communist barrage of over 600 rounds, artillery duels
in the Quemoy area have increased in frequency, but the
Communists have seldom fired more than 200 rounds. The
Chinese Communists fired 6,000 rounds on 3 September 1954,
and 3,000 rounds on 20 January 1956.
The Chinese Communists allege that the
current bombardment was in retaliation for earlier Chinese
Nationalist shelling of several coastal villages. Moreover,
according to a Peiping radio broadcast, the Nationalists
opened fire on the British freighter, White Bee, which en-
tered the port of Amoy on 19 June. Most of the artillery
duels of the patit year have been initiated by the Nationalists,
who have recently reaffirmed their intention to fire on for-
eign ships entering the port of Amoy.
23 June 57
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4. PATHET LAO SYMPATHIZER DESIGNATED TO FORM
GOVERNMENT IN LAOS
Comment on:
/ Bong Souvannavong, opposition leader
and Pathet Lao sympathizer, has been
designated to form a new government
in the three-week-old Laotian cabinet
crisis. Bong's chances of winning the
necessary two-thirds assembly approval appear slight, al-
though he can be expected to make a persuasive appeal for
a, neutralist foreign policy and an immediate settlement with
the Pathet Lao. He will probably use divisive tactics in an
effort to split the alliance between the former political ene-
mies Independent Party leader Phoui Sananikone and Nation-
alist Party leader ICatay.
Bong's designation, however, is regarded
as a maneuver by the crown prince to afford Phoui additional
time in which to improve his prospects for investiture. Phoui
supported Katay in his recent unsuccessful efforts to form a
government and is a critic of Souvanna Phouma's "soft" policy
toward the Pathet Lao.
23 June 57
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6..43e91.E. leme#
5, KING HUSSAIN REPORTED ATTEMPTING TO TAKE
JORDAN INTO BAGHDAD PACT
Comment
Association of Jordan with the Baghdad pact
could be Iraq's price for providing the finan-
cial assistance so desperately needed by Jordan. Iraq has long
sought the inclusion of other Arab states in the Baghdad pact, in
which it is at present the only Arab member. Hazza Majali was
premier of Jordan for a short period in December 1955, when he
unsuccessfully attempted, under British pressure, to take Jor-
dan into the Baghdad pact. He was forced to give up his attempt
in the face of widespread Egyptian-inspired rioting.
23 June 57
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CONF1LH liAL
6. RETURN OF SAUDI-TRAINED OMANI REFUGEES MAY
PRESAGE INCREASED PRESSURE ON SULTAN OF MUSCAT
Comment on:
An increase in Saudi-inspired unrest
against the British-supported Sultan of
Muscat is suggested by a recent report
from the American consul general in
Dhahran.
400 to 500 refugee Omani tribesmen, whose lands were
taken over by the Sultan of Muscat in 1955, have been under-
going military training in eastern Saudi Arabia and returned
23 June 57
UNCLASSIFIED
:13 JUNE 1957
Current Intelligence Bulletin
COAVTIAL
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COM" 1AL
by sea to Muscat in mid-June. This group was preceded last
month by about 100 other Omanis who had been similarly
trained.
the Oh-Janis, after landing on the coast, have
returned to their former homeland in the interior. The con-
sulate general believes that the Omani force may be used to
heighten pressure on the Sultan of Muscat. This in turn will
probably hamper the current British effort to effect a rapproche-
ment with Saud.
23 June 57
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7. REPORTED RIFT BETWEEN KING SAUD AND CROWN
PRINCE FAISAL
Comment onc.'
The differences between the king and his
brother are said to be of both an institutional and policy nature.
Faisal has,
become increasingly annoyed with the king's steady centraliza-
tion of state power and his own consequent declining influence.
It is claimed that Faisal has striven to make the Council of
Ministers a genuine advisory council to the king. Faisal is al-
so alleged to have been frustrated in this by Royal Counselor
Yasin who, jealous of his own position, has persuaded King Saud
that Faisal was trying to take over some of the royal powers.
On matters of policy, Faisal reportedly does
not favor rapprochement with Iraq, preferring to support Egypt.
Faisal's bitterness over the Palestine question, stemming from
his leadership of the Saudi delegation to the UN in 1947 and 1948,
has resulted in reports that he is anti-American. Some reports
state that there is also divergence between Saud and Faisal over
succession to the throne--each favoring his own eldest son as
second in line after Faisal himself. Others suggest that Faisal
was aware of the existence of the cache of Egyptian arms and ex-
plosives discovered in the king's palace in Riyadh during April.
believes there has
actually been a divergence of views between Faisal and the king,
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Nur;
but for the present doubts that the trouble is serious enough
to be a direct threat to the throne. Nevertheless, the exist-
ence of a rift and the possible loss of Faisal's support at a
time when Saud is undertaking a basic reorientation of his coun-
try's foreign policy, together with the newly earned enmity of
Egypt's antimonarchical re ime, would presage new difficulties
for King Saud.
23 June 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
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8. POLISH STALINISTS WAGING VIGOROUS CAMPAIGN
TO GAIN PARTY CONTROL
The Stalinist Natolin faction of the Polish
Communist Party has launched a vigorous
campaign aimed at gaining control of the
party at its congress in December,
The Natolins appear to have
a carefully wor e out p an esigned to gain "grass-roots" sup-
port among party members which would in turn strengthen their
position at the congress and isolate Gomulka,
Their tactics at local party meetings are to
have a series of speakers vigorously attack various features of
Gomulka's political, ideological, and economic policies, Natolin
speakers also have concentrated their fire on two Gomulka sup-
porters, Ochab and Zambrowski, hoping thereby to bring about
their elimination from party offices at the congress.
Many party members are said to be impressed
by the vigor and sell-assurance of the Stalinists. People who re-
cently were outspoken in their support of Gomulka now remain
quiet, fearing reprisals if the Natolins should regain power.
Comment This campaign is a determined attempt by
the Natolins to recapture the party leader-
ship. They realize that the December congress will probably
be their last opportunity to unseat Gomulka and regain control
of the party apparatus. By concentrating their attacks on the
Polish leader at meetings of local party organizations, they are
endeavoring to take advantage of the weakness of Gomulka's in-
fluence in the lower echelons of the party apparatus.
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9. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN MEDITERRANEAN
Orie Soviet Sverdlov-class cruiser and
two Riga-class destroyer escorts en-
tered the Mediterranean through the
Turkish Straits on 20 June, One Skoryy-
class and two Kotlin-class destroyers
followed on 21 June.
Comment The cruiser and two
destroyer escorts were
reported early on 23 June lying to in the Sicilian Straits, ap-
parently awaiting the Skoryy-class destroyer, then about 15
miles to the southeast. A Soviet tanker which left the Black
Sea on 18 June was refueling the cruiser and one escort.
The two Kotlin-class destroyers, which
apparently parted from the Skoryy in the Aegean Sea, arrived
In Port Said on the morning of 23 June. The Soviet military
attach�o Egypt boarded one of the destroyers, after which
the two ships, accompanied by a large Soviet naval tanker which
left the Black Sea on 19 June, began a transit of the Suez Canal.
The Soviet minesweeper which escorted the
three Soviet submarines from the Baltic to Alexandria got un-
der way on 23 June en route to the Black Sea.
23 June 57
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