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January 30, 2020
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October 10, 1958
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-Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 TOP-5-Mittl� 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2)e, 10 October 1958 Copy No. C 5, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. DECL SSIRED CLASR. CHANGED TO: NEXT RE. EW DATE: Al TH � 0 DATE. --REVIEWER: I-OP-SECRET- Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066167 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 _ ��������1�111111, ilk Irt11131 CIE"1120170 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 Approved for Rele-a-s�e72.020/01/23 CO2066867 �taor4 10 OCTOBER 1958 L THE COMMUNIST BLOC Moscow and Peiping trying to delay UN consideration of Taiwan Strait issue. Taiwan Strait - Peiping's warnings highlight Matsus. Chinese National- ist air clash with Oommunists re- ported. USSR - Khrushchev and Eric John- ston have five-hour informal talk. Peiping indicates concern over fu- ture attitude of new Burme _rumem it_.li_oorder issue. II. ASIA-AFRICA Lebanon - Karame cabinet may be replaced by technicians selected by Shihab. Tunisia - Bourguiba reiterates un- willingness to accept French arms. 0 Iraqi regime denies internal differ- elements seeking e in a Army ences. Communist influence. CI Pakistan - Initial reaction to Mirza's assumption of direct rule appears favorable. seek to prolong General Ne Wins tenure beyond scheduled six months. 0 Philippines - Criticism of Garcia administration gaining momentum. Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 /AApproved for Release: 2020/01/23 602066867 (../i �111010 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 10 October 1958 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Bloc UN tactics�Taiwan: Moscow is seeking through widespread diplomatic efforts to block consideration of the Taiwan Strait issue by the UN General Assembly. Peiping has shown apprehension that neutralist mediatory efforts in the UN might prejudice its claims to sovereignty over Taiwan, and has indicated that for the time being at least it prefers to pursue its aims through the Warsaw talks. (Page 1) *Taiwan Strait situation: Peiping's 26th warning on 9 October, together with the 25th warning, which are the first accusations of US intrusions in the Matsu area, are possibly intended to remind the United States and world opinion that the Matsu Islands are as important to the Chinese Commu- nists as Chinmen. A preliminary report indicates that Na- tionalist planes destroyed about five MIG's in a clash on 10 October. (Page 2) (Map and Chart) USSR: During a five-hour informal conversation with Eric Johnston on 6 October, Khrushchev ranged freely over a wide variety of topics,including Soviet and Chinese eco- nomic prospects, the UN, American violations of Soviet air space, Soviet naval strength in the Black Sea, and Soviet censorship. The Soviet leader's remarks appeared in some instances to be candid and in others patently false. After raising the subject of alleged American violations of Soviet air space, Khrushchev said the USSR would "continue to shoot down any planes that violate our border." In discussing Soviet TOP SECRET ,Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO20668 A Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 I 1-.1 mier Chou En-lai ister U Nu, that he hoped Nu's successor, General Ne Win, would continue Burma's relatively conciliatory stand on the border issue, and warned against US attempts "further to damage the friendly relations between China and Burma." Peiping is alert to a possible hardening of Rangoon's atti- (Page 5) economic prospects, he said for the first time that the USSR will have caught up with the US in "per capita production" by the conclusion of a second seven-year plan�in 1972. The First Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965), to be released prior to the January 1959 party congress, will presumably reflect this optimism. (Page 3) Communist China - Burma: Chinese Communist Pre- informed Burma's Prime Mi tude. Lebanon: President Shihab is apparently in the process of replacing the Karame cabinet with a government of techni- cians. He has asked Nizam al-Akkari, a semiprofessional civil servant whose background suggests that he probably fa- vors the Moslem rebel side, to act as formateur. A politically neutral government of civil servants and military officers would be a stopgap until a compromise between the militant Chris- tian and Moslem elements can be worked out. (Page 6) Tunisia: President Bourguiba reiterated on 8 October to the French and American ambassadors that he could not accept arms of French manufacture on any basis, including those sup- plied by the United States under offshore procurement, so long as the French continue their attempts to suppress the Algerian rebels. He declared that although acquisition of French arms might strengthen him militarily. they "might easily destroy" him politically. Iraq: The Qasim regime, in publicly denying the exist- ence�dri military plot in support of ex-Deputy Prime Minis- ter Aril, probably hopes to gloss over internal differences and 10 Oct 58 DAILY BRIEF ii TOP SECRET 4Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 400 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 I Ur JL,UKL, to avoid any possible p_uhlic_clispute_with the UAR which _ favors Aril's faction. Qasim is being pressed by army ele- ments to rid the government of Communist influences, which have supported him against the Arif group. � Pakistan: Immediate reaction from military and civil service personnel and the citizens of Karachi to Mirza's take-over and the imposition of martial law on 7 October is reported to be favorable. Some members of the press and intellectuals feel that unrest is likely to develop even- tually. Politicians in both East and West Pakistan are refusing to comment. Burma: the army will require as much as two years to prepare for national elections. )fficers may be expected to urge General Ne Win to extend his tenure as premier beyond the six-month period which he has agreed to accept. They probably hope to persuade Ne Win to give top priority to an all-out offensive against Communist in- surgents and front organizations. ,Page 7) *Philippines: Criticism of corruption and maladminis- tration in President Garcia's government is gaining momen- tum, particularly among Philippine military officials who are expressing concern over the national welfare. Several rank- ing defense and intelligence officials feel they are under pres- sure to resign in favor of Garcia's political henchmen and fear that the army may become a political instrument to counter growing national oppfsi1-' I IL �SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES � (Available during the preceding week) Special National Intelligence Estimate No, 30-4-58. The Arab-Israeli Arms Problem--Relative Capabilities and the Prospects for Control. 30 September 1958, 10 Oct 58 DAILY BRIEF iii TOP SECRET 4Approved for Release: 2020/0/23 CO206686/ "I-1 r Fr Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 N111.0 L THE COMMUNIST BLOC Bloc Diplomatic Tactics in Taiwan Strait Situation Moscow is providing diplomatic support for Peiping's efforts to head off mediatory moves in the UN which might involve neutralization of Taiwan and thus prejudice Peiping's claim to sovereignty over the island. On 6 October, Soviet diplomats made demarches to the Austrian and Ceylonese governments, requesting they support the USSR in opposing any move to debate the issue in the General Assembly. Sim- ilar requests have reportedly been made to other countries. the Soviet diplomat in Colombo who conveyed the USSR's request stated that if the question were raised, the "whole Communist bloc would leave," a move he said would "in effect break up the UN." Moscow's diplomatic activity complements a Chinese Communist effort to scuttle a declaration on the Far East under consideration by the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN. These moves contrast with Soviet propaganda in mid- September prior to the current General Assembly session when the Moscow press strongly urged discussion of the Tai- wan Strait dispute by the assembly. Sino-Soviet leaders now are desirous of postgoning such debate until they have had time to test the US attituCe in the light of such recent devel- opments as Peiping's cease-fire. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communists have indicated that they prefer at least for the time being to seek political benefits through the ambassadorial talks at Warsaw. TOP SECRET 10 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BIM I FTIKI page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 41104 TOP SECRET 4 Piston fighter + Jet fighter "ni% Communist troop 4- Piston light bomber Wki strength # Jet light bomber Ann Nationalist troop strength Of Ground-attack SELECTED AIRFIELDS INDICATED IN BOLD TYPE Hengyang, 80806/ 80927-2 NANCHANG Nanking CHUHSIEN CHANGSHU, 568,000 N A BAY Id-st, ,S f-----1 Foocholv. NANTA 2.,090 \_ ? LUNGTIEN ITCHING Pi- c HUIAN5 TAIWAN MACiinaYANY3 STRAIT NGC111+ ''-'*". --. WEITOU PEN / KAOCHI St CIENGNAI ' _.,z.Ar11", CANTON AMAN I � HANG Swath rfsiMki AO IS. EN LI' 43 L 000 1 SOUTH CHINA SEA EAST CHINA SEA STATUTE MILES TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 Mild:1_0M= Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 %�11 *110 Taiwan Strait Situation Peiping's Foreign Ministry issued its 26th "serious warn- ing" on 9 October, charging that two US planes "invaded Chi- na's territorial waters and air space" in the Matsu and Pingtan areas. This and the preceding warning are the first in the series to accuse the United States of intrusions in the Matsu area, and possibly are intended to remind both the United States and world opinion that the Matsu Islands are as impor- tant to the Chinese Communists as Chinmen. Communist China has followed up Defense Minister Peng Te-huai's 6 October offer to negotiate with the Nationalists with defection appeals from ex-Kuomintang personalities now on the mainland. Chen Shao-kuan, former commander in chief of the Kuomintang Navy and now vice governor of Fukien Prov- ince, on 8 October advised "military and administrative per- sonnel in Taiwan" to take the road of "peaceful liberation" and oppose the "common enemy of the Chinese people--US imperi- alism." there were two air clashes on the morning of 10 October. one over Chinmen and another near the Matsus at approximately the same time. The Nationtstg have annnunced that a cthsF took place near the Matsus. six Nation- alist F_ 86s engaged eight Communist MIG's in one clash, with the Nationalists claiming to have destroyed five MIG's; one was probably destroyed. One F-86' was reported lost after being struck by pieces of a disintegrating Communist fighter. There were indications hat additional Communist jet fighters were moving into coastal airfields. The fighters, possibly of regimental strength, flew from Nanchang to Liencheng, and subsequent reports suggest that at least some of them proceeded on to Lungchi and some to another undetermined location farther south. The movement may reflect rotation of units and possi- bly the deployment forward of a more exnerienced unit to the Chinmen area. TOP SECRET 10 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLEIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 ei 1-1 ro *in Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 dollk TAIWAN STRAIT TALLY SHEET Air Situation (Losses claimed through 9 Oct) Destroyed Probably Destroyed Today Cumulative Today Cumulative Communist planes 0 28 0 4 Nationalist planes 0 5* 0 0 *Includes 2 C-46's, 2 F-84G's, and 1 F-86 Chinmen Supply Situation - (Tonnage through '7 Oct) Sea Air Total Delivery - 7 Oct 0 131.1 131.1 Totals (since 7 Sept) 5.,802.6 Average Daily Rate for Sept 125 343 Average Daily Rate for Oct Minimum Austere Daily Requirements 320 Cumulative Deficiency Since 7 Sept 3,545 SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 CrrnrT Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 'NS Khrushchev Forecasts Rapid Economic Growth Khrushchev, in an interview with Eric Johnston on 6 October, said, "We are going to increase production dur- ing the next seven years and then we will have another seven- year plan and by that time will have caught up with the US in production per capita." In November 1957 Khrushchev predicted only that Soviet production of essential items would equal the present volume of US production in 15 years, and, in this context, made no references to per capita production. It is not clear in this latest statement whether. Khrushithev referring to the present or to the projected future level of US per capita pro- duction. An article in Pravda in July, however, stated that even allowing for US expansion the USSR will overtake the US in total industrial output in 10 or 11 years. Considering the growth in Soviet population, the article continued, "only a few more years will be needed to overtake and surpass the US in per capita output...." The coming Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), to be released about two months before the January party congress, will probably reflect this increased optimism by scheduling pro- duction goals higher than would have been necessary to con- form with Khrushchev's November forecasts. Khrushchev described the UN as a puppet show with the United States pulling the strings, and said, "We are thinking of getting out." He maintained that Soviet censors merely delete "lies," but the correspondents send them anyway through the diplomatic pouch. In line with China's extremely optimistic agricultural production claims, Khrushchev said that, accord- ing to Mao, the Chinese were producing so much grain this year that they "didn't know what to do with it." Khrushchev also claimed, "We have no navy in the Black Sea and no submarines in the Black Sea, and we are not going 10 Oct 58 CFNTRAI INTFI I InFtsICF Rill I FTIKI Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 c r,r Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 %Pi ve04 to put any there." Soviet order of battle in the Black Sea presently includes 84 sub- marines, of which 64 are long range; one battleship; eight cruisers; 46 destroyer-type ships; and over 300 patrol, mine, and auxiliary naval vessels. SECRET 10 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 '7' !ID rrID Crr Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 %NO Peiping Concerned Over New Rangoon Government Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai. expressed the hope that Nu would continue to promote a "reasonable" settlement of the Sino-Burmese border aues- tion, Chou said he hoped Nuts successor, Army General Ne Win, would continue Rangoon's relatively conciliatory stand on the border issue. Chou charged that the United States has been taking advantage of Burma's inter- nal situation "to carry out interventionist activities and fur- ther to damage the friendly relations between China and Burma." Ne Win is scheduled to take over on 28 October. Peiping's policy on defining the Sino- Burmese border has been to maintain discussions but forestall final agreement. By these tactics, designed to exploit Burma's eagerness for a settlement, Communist China may have hoped to obtain more favorable terms and to use the border issue as a lever for extracting concessions on other matters. Peiping fears the attitude of a new Burmese government may preclude discussion of the border dispute on terms acceptable to Communist China. Chou's reference to "further" damage to Sib-Burmese rela- tions implies that some damage has already been done by recent events in Burma. TOP SECRET 10 Oct 58 eFNITPAI IMTIIIrkIrc DI II I CTiki Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 Page 5 rtrixTrunritirru A I Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 N10# I L ASIA- AFRICA Lebanese Situation President Shihab is apparently in the process of replac- ing the Karame cabinet, which had been highly objectionable to the followers of ex-President Chamoun. ICarame's prob- able successor as prime minister, Nizam al-Akkari, a 52- year-old Moslem, is a professional civil servant whose past suggests sympathy for the rebels. He was prime minister for three days prior to the ouster of President al-Khuri in 1952. Al-Akkari will probably form a cabinet of civilians and military men which will rule directly for Shihab until a com- promise between the militant Christian and Moslem elements can be reached. Should the crisis be prolonged, Shihab might threaten to resign in an effort to force a compromise solu- tion. The Moslem attitude, typified by 1Carame, continues to be that no supporter of ex-President Chamoun should have a place in the government. Chamoun, for his part, has con- sistently refused to restrain his followers since he left office. CONFIDENTIAL 10 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 ovnnom Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 %410 Burmese Army Plans for Ne Win's Government Politically active colonels in the Burmese Army doubt that they can prepare for national elections within the six-month term set for Ne Win's "caretaker" government, pacification of the country will require from one to two years. the army's plan to destroy both the Communist insurgents and front organizations, will urge Ne Win to give top priority to security measures. They claim sufficient evidence has already been collected to convict leading front members of treason. If the colonels are able to persuade Ne Win to serve as premier for more than six months, constitutional provisions will require that he become a member of parliament, break his tenure of office by at least one day, or rule under martial law. At the outset, at least, Ne Win appears assured of almost unanimous support in parliament as premier. U�Nu is reported to have offered to resign his parliamentary seat to make way for a special election if Ne Win is willing to stand for parlia- ment. The chief obstacles to the colonels' hopes are Ne Win's distaste for political office and his disapproval of military par- ticipation in politics. He has publicized his intention to exclude military men from the cabinet and has personally guaranteed that elections will be held in April. He asserts that he will serve as premier in his individual capacity and not as the rep- resentative of the army. SECRET 10 Oct 58 CENTRAL INTELLInEwp RI II I FTIM page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 iJEd itrie THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Special Adviser to the President The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director United States Information Agency The Director CONFIDENTIAL Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867 TOP SECRET '7j� ,'7`f VJ ,zrz ,/7 TOP SECRET /j "Approved for Release: 2020/01/23 CO2066867/77m/AfAez,-,,z,-4,-,,