CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/10/10

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02066867
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: October 10, 1958

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TOP-5-Mittl� 3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)e,
10 October 1958
Copy No. C 5,
CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECL SSIRED
CLASR. CHANGED TO:
NEXT RE. EW DATE:
Al TH � 0
DATE.
--REVIEWER:
I-OP-SECRET-
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10 OCTOBER 1958
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Moscow and Peiping trying to delay
UN consideration of Taiwan Strait
issue.
Taiwan Strait - Peiping's warnings
highlight Matsus. Chinese National-
ist air clash with Oommunists re-
ported.
USSR - Khrushchev and Eric John-
ston have five-hour informal talk.
Peiping indicates concern over fu-
ture attitude of new Burme
_rumem it_.li_oorder issue.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Lebanon - Karame cabinet may be
replaced by technicians selected by
Shihab.
Tunisia - Bourguiba reiterates un-
willingness to accept French arms.
0 Iraqi regime denies internal differ-
elements seeking e in a Army
ences.
Communist influence.
CI Pakistan - Initial reaction to Mirza's
assumption of direct rule appears
favorable.
seek to prolong
General Ne Wins tenure beyond
scheduled six months.
0 Philippines - Criticism of Garcia
administration gaining momentum.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
10 October 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Bloc UN tactics�Taiwan: Moscow is seeking through
widespread diplomatic efforts to block consideration of the
Taiwan Strait issue by the UN General Assembly. Peiping
has shown apprehension that neutralist mediatory efforts
in the UN might prejudice its claims to sovereignty over
Taiwan, and has indicated that for the time being at least
it prefers to pursue its aims through the Warsaw talks.
(Page 1)
*Taiwan Strait situation: Peiping's 26th warning on 9
October, together with the 25th warning, which are the first
accusations of US intrusions in the Matsu area, are possibly
intended to remind the United States and world opinion that
the Matsu Islands are as important to the Chinese Commu-
nists as Chinmen. A preliminary report indicates that Na-
tionalist planes destroyed about five MIG's in a clash on 10
October. (Page 2) (Map and Chart)
USSR: During a five-hour informal conversation with
Eric Johnston on 6 October, Khrushchev ranged freely over
a wide variety of topics,including Soviet and Chinese eco-
nomic prospects, the UN, American violations of Soviet
air space, Soviet naval strength in the Black Sea, and Soviet
censorship. The Soviet leader's remarks appeared in some
instances to be candid and in others patently false. After
raising the subject of alleged American violations of Soviet
air space, Khrushchev said the USSR would "continue to shoot
down any planes that violate our border." In discussing Soviet
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I 1-.1
mier Chou En-lai
ister U Nu,
that he hoped Nu's successor, General Ne Win, would continue
Burma's relatively conciliatory stand on the border issue, and
warned against US attempts "further to damage the friendly
relations between China and Burma."
Peiping is alert to a possible hardening of Rangoon's atti-
(Page 5)
economic prospects, he said for the first time that the USSR
will have caught up with the US in "per capita production" by
the conclusion of a second seven-year plan�in 1972. The
First Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965), to be released prior to
the January 1959 party congress, will presumably reflect this
optimism. (Page 3)
Communist China - Burma: Chinese Communist Pre-
informed Burma's Prime Mi
tude.
Lebanon: President Shihab is apparently in the process
of replacing the Karame cabinet with a government of techni-
cians. He has asked Nizam al-Akkari, a semiprofessional
civil servant whose background suggests that he probably fa-
vors the Moslem rebel side, to act as formateur. A politically
neutral government of civil servants and military officers would
be a stopgap until a compromise between the militant Chris-
tian and Moslem elements can be worked out.
(Page 6)
Tunisia: President Bourguiba reiterated on 8 October to
the French and American ambassadors that he could not accept
arms of French manufacture on any basis, including those sup-
plied by the United States under offshore procurement, so long
as the French continue their attempts to suppress the Algerian
rebels. He declared that although acquisition of French arms
might strengthen him militarily. they "might easily destroy"
him politically.
Iraq: The Qasim regime, in publicly denying the exist-
ence�dri military plot in support of ex-Deputy Prime Minis-
ter Aril, probably hopes to gloss over internal differences and
10 Oct 58
DAILY BRIEF ii
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I Ur JL,UKL,
to avoid any possible p_uhlic_clispute_with the UAR which
_
favors Aril's faction.
Qasim is being pressed by army ele-
ments to rid the government of Communist influences, which
have supported him against the Arif group.
� Pakistan: Immediate reaction from military and civil
service personnel and the citizens of Karachi to Mirza's
take-over and the imposition of martial law on 7 October
is reported to be favorable. Some members of the press
and intellectuals feel that unrest is likely to develop even-
tually. Politicians in both East and West Pakistan are
refusing to comment.
Burma:
the army will require as much
as two years to prepare for national elections. )fficers
may be expected to urge General Ne Win to extend his tenure
as premier beyond the six-month period which he has agreed
to accept. They probably hope to persuade Ne Win to give
top priority to an all-out offensive against Communist in-
surgents and front organizations. ,Page 7)
*Philippines: Criticism of corruption and maladminis-
tration in President Garcia's government is gaining momen-
tum, particularly among Philippine military officials who are
expressing concern over the national welfare. Several rank-
ing defense and intelligence officials feel they are under pres-
sure to resign in favor of Garcia's political henchmen and
fear that the army may become a political instrument to
counter growing national oppfsi1-'
I IL �SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
� (Available during the preceding week)
Special National Intelligence Estimate No, 30-4-58. The
Arab-Israeli Arms Problem--Relative Capabilities and the
Prospects for Control. 30 September 1958,
10 Oct 58
DAILY BRIEF
iii
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L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Bloc Diplomatic Tactics in Taiwan Strait Situation
Moscow is providing diplomatic support for Peiping's
efforts to head off mediatory moves in the UN which might
involve neutralization of Taiwan and thus prejudice Peiping's
claim to sovereignty over the island. On 6 October, Soviet
diplomats made demarches to the Austrian and Ceylonese
governments, requesting they support the USSR in opposing
any move to debate the issue in the General Assembly. Sim-
ilar requests have reportedly been made to other countries.
the Soviet diplomat in Colombo
who conveyed the USSR's request stated that if the question
were raised, the "whole Communist bloc would leave," a move
he said would "in effect break up the UN."
Moscow's diplomatic activity complements a Chinese
Communist effort to scuttle a declaration on the Far East
under consideration by the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN.
These moves contrast with Soviet propaganda in mid-
September prior to the current General Assembly session
when the Moscow press strongly urged discussion of the Tai-
wan Strait dispute by the assembly. Sino-Soviet leaders now
are desirous of postgoning such debate until they have had
time to test the US attituCe in the light of such recent devel-
opments as Peiping's cease-fire. Meanwhile, the Chinese
Communists have indicated that they prefer at least for the
time being to seek political benefits through the ambassadorial
talks at Warsaw.
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4 Piston fighter
+ Jet fighter
"ni% Communist troop 4- Piston light bomber
Wki strength
# Jet light bomber
Ann Nationalist troop
strength Of Ground-attack
SELECTED AIRFIELDS INDICATED IN BOLD TYPE
Hengyang,
80806/ 80927-2
NANCHANG
Nanking
CHUHSIEN
CHANGSHU,
568,000
N A
BAY
Id-st, ,S
f-----1 Foocholv.
NANTA 2.,090
\_
?
LUNGTIEN
ITCHING Pi- c
HUIAN5 TAIWAN
MACiinaYANY3 STRAIT
NGC111+
''-'*". --. WEITOU PEN
/ KAOCHI
St
CIENGNAI ' _.,z.Ar11",
CANTON
AMAN I
� HANG Swath rfsiMki AO IS.
EN LI' 43 L 000 1
SOUTH CHINA SEA
EAST CHINA SEA
STATUTE MILES
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Taiwan Strait Situation
Peiping's Foreign Ministry issued its 26th "serious warn-
ing" on 9 October, charging that two US planes "invaded Chi-
na's territorial waters and air space" in the Matsu and Pingtan
areas. This and the preceding warning are the first in the
series to accuse the United States of intrusions in the Matsu
area, and possibly are intended to remind both the United
States and world opinion that the Matsu Islands are as impor-
tant to the Chinese Communists as Chinmen.
Communist China has followed up Defense Minister Peng
Te-huai's 6 October offer to negotiate with the Nationalists
with defection appeals from ex-Kuomintang personalities now
on the mainland. Chen Shao-kuan, former commander in chief
of the Kuomintang Navy and now vice governor of Fukien Prov-
ince, on 8 October advised "military and administrative per-
sonnel in Taiwan" to take the road of "peaceful liberation" and
oppose the "common enemy of the Chinese people--US imperi-
alism."
there were two air clashes
on the morning of 10 October. one over
Chinmen and another near the Matsus at approximately the same
time. The Nationtstg have annnunced that a cthsF took place
near the Matsus. six Nation-
alist F_ 86s engaged eight Communist MIG's in one clash, with
the Nationalists claiming to have destroyed five MIG's; one was
probably destroyed. One F-86' was reported lost after being
struck by pieces of a disintegrating Communist fighter.
There were indications
hat additional Communist jet fighters were moving
into coastal airfields. The fighters, possibly of regimental
strength, flew from Nanchang to Liencheng, and subsequent
reports suggest that at least some of them proceeded on to
Lungchi and some to another undetermined location farther
south. The movement may reflect rotation of units and possi-
bly the deployment forward of a more exnerienced unit to the
Chinmen area.
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TAIWAN STRAIT TALLY SHEET
Air Situation
(Losses claimed through 9 Oct)
Destroyed
Probably
Destroyed
Today Cumulative Today Cumulative
Communist planes
0
28
0
4
Nationalist planes
0
5*
0
0
*Includes 2 C-46's, 2 F-84G's, and 1 F-86
Chinmen Supply Situation -
(Tonnage through '7 Oct)
Sea Air Total
Delivery - 7 Oct 0 131.1 131.1
Totals (since 7 Sept) 5.,802.6
Average Daily Rate for Sept 125
343
Average Daily Rate for Oct
Minimum Austere
Daily Requirements 320
Cumulative Deficiency
Since 7 Sept 3,545
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Khrushchev Forecasts Rapid Economic Growth
Khrushchev, in an interview with Eric Johnston on
6 October, said, "We are going to increase production dur-
ing the next seven years and then we will have another seven-
year plan and by that time will have caught up with the US in
production per capita."
In November 1957 Khrushchev predicted only that Soviet
production of essential items would equal the present volume
of US production in 15 years, and, in this context, made no
references to per capita production. It is not clear in this
latest statement whether. Khrushithev referring to the
present or to the projected future level of US per capita pro-
duction. An article in Pravda in July, however, stated that
even allowing for US expansion the USSR will overtake the US
in total industrial output in 10 or 11 years. Considering the growth
in Soviet population, the article continued, "only a few more
years will be needed to overtake and surpass the US in per
capita output...."
The coming Seven-Year Plan (1959-65), to be released
about two months before the January party congress, will
probably reflect this increased optimism by scheduling pro-
duction goals higher than would have been necessary to con-
form with Khrushchev's November forecasts.
Khrushchev described the UN as a puppet show with the
United States pulling the strings, and said, "We are thinking of
getting out." He maintained that Soviet censors merely delete
"lies," but the correspondents send them anyway through the
diplomatic pouch. In line with China's extremely optimistic
agricultural production claims, Khrushchev said that, accord-
ing to Mao, the Chinese were producing so much grain this
year that they "didn't know what to do with it."
Khrushchev also claimed, "We have no navy in the Black
Sea and no submarines in the Black Sea, and we are not going
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to put any there." Soviet
order of battle in the Black Sea presently includes 84 sub-
marines, of which 64 are long range; one battleship; eight
cruisers; 46 destroyer-type ships; and over 300 patrol,
mine, and auxiliary naval vessels.
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Peiping Concerned Over New Rangoon Government
Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai.
expressed the hope that Nu would continue to promote a
"reasonable" settlement of the Sino-Burmese border aues-
tion,
Chou said he hoped Nuts successor,
Army General Ne Win, would continue Rangoon's relatively
conciliatory stand on the border issue. Chou charged that
the United States has been taking advantage of Burma's inter-
nal situation "to carry out interventionist activities and fur-
ther to damage the friendly relations between China and
Burma." Ne Win is scheduled to take over on 28 October.
Peiping's policy on defining the Sino- Burmese border has
been to maintain discussions but forestall final agreement.
By these tactics, designed to exploit Burma's eagerness for
a settlement, Communist China may have hoped to obtain
more favorable terms and to use the border issue as a lever
for extracting concessions on other matters.
Peiping fears the attitude
of a new Burmese government may preclude discussion of
the border dispute on terms acceptable to Communist China.
Chou's reference to "further" damage to Sib-Burmese rela-
tions implies that some damage has already been done by
recent events in Burma.
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I L ASIA- AFRICA
Lebanese Situation
President Shihab is apparently in the process of replac-
ing the Karame cabinet, which had been highly objectionable
to the followers of ex-President Chamoun. ICarame's prob-
able successor as prime minister, Nizam al-Akkari, a 52-
year-old Moslem, is a professional civil servant whose past
suggests sympathy for the rebels. He was prime minister
for three days prior to the ouster of President al-Khuri in
1952.
Al-Akkari will probably form a cabinet of civilians and
military men which will rule directly for Shihab until a com-
promise between the militant Christian and Moslem elements
can be reached. Should the crisis be prolonged, Shihab might
threaten to resign in an effort to force a compromise solu-
tion.
The Moslem attitude, typified by 1Carame, continues to
be that no supporter of ex-President Chamoun should have
a place in the government. Chamoun, for his part, has con-
sistently refused to restrain his followers since he left office.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Burmese Army Plans for Ne Win's Government
Politically active colonels in the Burmese Army doubt that
they can prepare for national elections within the six-month
term set for Ne Win's "caretaker" government,
pacification of the
country will require from one to two years.
the army's plan to
destroy both the Communist insurgents and front organizations,
will urge Ne Win to give top priority to security measures.
They claim sufficient evidence has already been collected to
convict leading front members of treason.
If the colonels are able to persuade Ne Win to serve as
premier for more than six months, constitutional provisions
will require that he become a member of parliament, break his
tenure of office by at least one day, or rule under martial law.
At the outset, at least, Ne Win appears assured of almost
unanimous support in parliament as premier. U�Nu is reported
to have offered to resign his parliamentary seat to make way
for a special election if Ne Win is willing to stand for parlia-
ment.
The chief obstacles to the colonels' hopes are Ne Win's
distaste for political office and his disapproval of military par-
ticipation in politics. He has publicized his intention to exclude
military men from the cabinet and has personally guaranteed
that elections will be held in April. He asserts that he will
serve as premier in his individual capacity and not as the rep-
resentative of the army.
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itrie
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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