THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 5 (AS OF 12 NOON EST) - 1968/01/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02412677
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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� CENTRAL INGELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
31 January 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM �
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The Situation in South Vietnam No, 5
(As of 12 'NOON EST)
The focus of Communist military action appears
to have shifted back to the northern part of the
country .on the night of 31 January. Major thrusts
yore mounted against cities 'along the central coast. It
ap-
pears possible that the enemy is attempting to whip
saw the.allied reaction, perhaps in the hope of im-
peding the friendly reaction.
More fighting, however, is also reported in the
Saigon area, while some of the Delta towns are ap-: .
parently also still under enemy pressure Reports
indicated that fresh enemy attack's were expected in
some areas of the Delta on the night of 31 January.
1. Saigon: Information on the situation in
the city has been reported through about 10 PM local
Saigon time 31 January. In general, the scene of the
action has shifted to the southwest part of the town,
with Communist elements dug in and apparently beseiged
at various points, including the bank of the Kinh Doi
river and possibly the An Quang pagoda. Other fight-
ing is also reported in the Gia Dinh sector near
Ton Son Nhut airfield. Friendly air action has ap-
parently been conducted in this area and has resulted
in at least one fire in a residential section.
2. It is not clear whether the fighting now re-
ported in Saigon represents the rear guard action of
retreating Communist elements, or the attempted
entry of new Communist components into the area.
\the enemy planned, to renew his at-
tack on the night of the 31st, using in part fresh
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elements from Communist units to the southwest, pre-
sumably from Long An Province. The Vietnamese au-
thorities were anticipating contact with the enemy
elements in this area.
3. The only ground fighting possibly still
underway in the central city area was reported dur-
ing the afternoon of the 31st (local Saigon time) in
the area of the presidential palace where police were
said to have trapped and beseiged some VC remnants
in a residential home.
5.. It appears that American casualties in the
attack on the VS Embassy may have been higher than
earlier reported. At least 4 US military police �
were killed and possibly over 20 wounded. One Marine
was also killed and 7 wounded.
6. In the attack on the main Saigon radio sta-
tion, the enemy apparently penetrated the building.
Reportedly, the enemy intended to broadcast a message
of general revolt to the local populace. The enemy
reportedly seized several other radio stations in
the attacks on central coastal cities on 30 January.
He probably also intended to use these facilities to
broadcast calls for support from the populace at
large. There is no detailed information as yet on
this aspect, however.
7, The Delta: No major new attacks have been
reported in the D61ta area in information received
-through about 10 PM local time on 31 January. The
situation in varions provincial capitals, however,
is net yet wholly clear. It appears that the enemy
offensive in this area also involved numerous attacks
on Smaller district towns and allied facilities, some
of which were reportedly overrun. Following is the
current situation in the Delta towns and provinces
for which some detailed information is available:
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7. Soc Trang (Ba Xuyen Province): On the late
afternoon ofthe 31st, light fighting was reportedly
still going on in this town, with more expected to-
night. The airfield at Soc Trang was attacked, ap-
parently on the 31st.
B. Bac Lieu (Bac Liu Province: The town was
quiet on the afternoon oi the 3fSi after a mortar and
small arms attack. Possibly there was no ground
probe in this area.
.0. Ca Mau (An Xuyen): Some firing was still
going on in Ca Mau on the afternoon of 31 January,
but was reported sporadic. More.fightingwas expected
at night.
10. Can Tho tPhuong Dinh Province): This town
was under friendly control on the afternoon of 31
January, but heavy fighting was reported throughout
parts of the province. The VC possibly still held
a few strongpoints in the town, including one pagoda.
11.- Rach Gia Men Giang Province): The situa-
tion had settled down here on the afternoon of the
31st after a day of sporadic mortar and small arms
fire.
� 12. My Tho (Dinh Thong Province): On the after-
noon of the 31st the situation was improving, although
some firing was still reported. Heavy maneuver activ-
ity was also reported throughout the province. The
district town of Cat Be was mortared.
13. Bon Tre (True Giang): In this capital of
Kien Hoa Province the VC penetrated the city and en-
gaged the ARV N in street fighting, The enemy'had :
been driven to 'the outskirts of the town. The District
towns of Ba Tri*and Binh Dai in Kien Hoa were also
mortared.
. 14. Tra Vinh (Vinh Binh PrOvince): On the �
evening of the 31st, some local US authorities con-
sidered the situation "serious" and had requested
troops from the ARVN 0th Division.
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15. .Vinh Long Province: An estimated 3 enemy
companies were involved in .the a'ttack on the Vinh
Long air base, Five aircraft were damaged. The
district town of Vinh Lien in this province was
reportedly overrun,
16. Chau Phu (Chan Doc PrOvince): According
to an unconfirmeirreport, this prOvincial town had
been overrun on the 31st. The deputy province chief
was.reported missing. Reinforcements were enroute,
and .all US civilians were being evacuated.
It Corps Area
Quang Tri City: Communist forces have
reportedly oCaiiiiiiirliositions to the north, east,
and west of the Quang Tri provincial capital,
and a.major assault was expected on the night of
31 January. An enemy battalion which entered the
city during the night of 30 January has been driven
to the suburbs by ARVN reaction forces. Three ARVN
battalions are presently on the north side of the
city with another allied battalion in position to the
east. The security situation is still considered
in good shape, under the prevailing circumstances.
There had been earlier fragmentary reports
that at least two Viet Cong sapper
companies had penetrated the Hue citadel, were.
patrolling streets inside the citadel, and had
hoisted a Viet Cong flag atop the main citadel
building.
19. Da Nang: Small arms, mortar, and
artillery Z.EiTiarlited through the night of 30-
31 January south of Da Nang city where the
US Marine airbase near Marble Mountain absorbed
its second consecutive rocket attack. Da Nang
airbase is fully operative after brief closure
for civilian traffic on the morning of 30 Jantary.
There have been no Viet Cong-initiated incidents
or acts of terrorism within Da Nang city itself.
Demonstrations and.a rally wore instigated by
the enemy on 30 January at Tin Hoa Pagoda in
an attempt to persuade participants that the
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Viet Cong had won a significant Victory and taken
over the city. This enemy propaganda play generated
little popular support, and GVN authorities made a
number of arrests.
US authorities in Da Nang feel the Viet Cong
attack against Da Nang city failed in its Initial
thrust, and has reduced enemy capabilities in the
area to mortar/rocket harassment of military
targets combined with isolated and uncoordinated
sapper-typo actions.
20. Quang Nam: South- Korean forces have
apparently dislodged an estimated force of 300
Viet Cong heavily dug-in and interspersed with
the civilian population at the east end of Roi
An, the Quang Nam provincial capital. The city
has been declared under allied control.
21. Quang Tin: The provincial capital of
Tam Ky.came under heavy mortar, small arms, and
grouna attack early on 31 January by elements of
the 21st NVA Regiment reinforced by two additional
NVA battalions. The attack wasrepulsed, however,
with enemy losses reported in excess of 400 killed
(body count), the majority of whom were young boys.
Although the situation is now relatively quiet,
Communist forces remain on the Outskirts of Tam
Ky, with further enemy offensive activity antici-
pated on the night of 31 January.
22. Quang Ngai City: The Quang Ngai previn-
cial capital, alongwith three nearby district
headquarters, came under heavy dnemy attack dur-
ing the early morning hours of 31 January. Ac-
cording to late reports, the assault was repulsed,
with very heavy Viet Cong and rdlatively light
allied casualties resulting. Elements of the 2nd
ARVN Division have been committed to bolster tie
area defenses. Small pockets ot enemy troops are
apparently still active in the .city, but they
are believed to pose no serious.threat at this time.
The Central Highlands
23. Kontum City: The sitdation remains
unclear; however, at last report two enemy
battalions continued to control the Kontum pro-
vincial capital. Tactical air strikes have been
launched against a concentration of some 600-700
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city is under heavy mortar fire. Heaviest action con-
tinues to locus on the MACV comp:hind. US personnel
report that VC within the city have been seen chang-
ing into civilian clothes. US airborne and ARVN
reaction forces are attempting to bloc enemy routes
of withdrawal from the city.
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'Other Related Developments
31. Communist propaganda is continuing to give
heavy play to the upsurge in military activity in the
South and stressing that it show � the US cannot ac-
complish its objectives. The unstated, but clear im-
plication,. is that the US must resort to a political
_compromise.
32. Hanoi has made no attempt, however, to por-
tray the current offensive as a conclusive or final
stage in the struggle, but is treating it as further
proof that Communists forces hold the initiative and
still are able to launch large-scale, coordinated at-
tacks. A broadcast on 31 January said the upsurge in
Communist military activity is a continuation of suc-
cess achieved during the past month.
33. There has been no Chinese CommUUnist com-
mentary on the situation as yet. Soviet broadcasts,
however, are carrying both Western and Vietnamese
Communists accounts of the action and stressing the
US predicament. A commentary in Pravda on 31 January
skii74. the Communist have launched a "new major Offen-
si!!T ' which disproves "US propaganda" that Viet Cong
foi s are "depleted."
34. First accounts from the French press take
the line that by launching a "general offensive" the
Communists have again successfully demonstrated their
military capabilities and shown that the U$ has reached
an "impasse."
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