CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02444315
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2016
• Case Number: F-2014-02699
• Publication Date: March 13, 1961

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CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
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The Daily Brief of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is
produced by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation
with representatives of departments and agencies of the United
States Intelligence Board. Back-up material is produced by CIA
with as much consultation with other departments and agencies as
is practicable. When, because of the time factor, consultation with
the department or agency of primary concern is not practicable,
the brief will be produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Intelligence in this publication is based on all sources, including
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication rep-
resent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modi-
fication in the light of further information and more complete
analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated
specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items
may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
MI
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MO
WARNING ip
This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793,794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to
an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial
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13 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Khrushchev's conversation with Ambassador Thompson.
(Page 0
2. Situation in Laos. (Page 0
3. Congolese reportedly believe Indian troops are coming
to enforce "Dayal's plan for a UN tutelage of the Congo."
(Page it)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
13 March 1961
DAILY BRIEF
USSR: In his conversation with Ambassador Thompson
on 9 March, Khrushchev raised the Berlin and German ques-
tion and stated his desire not to worsen but to improve US-
Soviet relations. He refrained from proposing resumption of
negotiations or setting a deadline for action, but did reiterate
his warning that the USSR would sign a separate_peace treaty
with East if the le wartime allies did not pee to a
treaty with both Geymmates.
On the disarmament issue, Khrushchev again tied Soviet
agreement to general disarmament with the proposal to reor-
ganize the UN secretariat, and used the Congo situation to
ueedJrrevision of the UN.
*Laos: Vientiane re resentatives and Souvanna Phouma
are expected to meet t is wee o iscuss
erai pgram announced 6 General Pluiumi and Souvanna
their talks at Phnom Penh. Souvan.na's departve from islizio�rri
Penh on a world tour is still scheduled for 15 March.
Moscow characterized the Phnom Penh discussions as a
diplomatic defeat for the Phoumi forces and emphasized that
Souvanna stood firm on the need to convene an international
conference to settle the Laotian problem. Both Peiping and
Hanoi have indicated that they are interested in the ,ya&ue_ly
worded communi ue onl as de rture oint for r2Quar477,
dizing the deteriorating _position of the Boun Oum re imp,.
Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces in both the Phou IChoun and
Muong Kassy sectors apparently are consolidating their posi-
tions. Their patrols continue to maintain contact with govern-
ment forces.
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Congo: The d r f n nt
of India's troop N with its
p,311_, e ozgz.loordin or Tim-
ne
berlake. He feels that there is widespread belief among the
Congolese that India's troops are coming to enforce "Dayal's
plan for a UN tutelage of the Congo."
Khrushchev, in his recent talk with Ambassador Thomp-
son, showed little interest in the possibilities of a Congo set-
tlement and used the occasion to reiterate Soviet charges of
the ineffectiveness of the UN policies in the Congo.
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Khrushchev Spells Out Soviet Position on Germany,
Disarmament, and the UN
At the end of his conversation with Ambassador Thompson,
Khrushchev spelled out the Soviet position on Germany and
Berlin along the lines of the recent memorandum to Bonn. He
stressed the necessity of a peace settlement with both Germanys
in order to confirm postwar developments and provide a legal
foundation for the postwar borders. He denied that the bloc had
any desire to expand to the West and offered to make a state-
ment to this effect if the US was prepared to begin peace treaty
negotiations.
In connection with his threat to sign a separate treaty with
East Germany, Khrushchev was careful to evade any response
to the ambassador's question on how a separate treaty would
affect the Allied position in West Berlin. Khrushchev reaf-
firmed that a peace treaty would include a clause providing
creation of a free city for West Berlin, but urged that the US
and USSR join in working out a new status for West Berlin.
Khrushchev showed some flexibility in his discussion of
the Berlin problem in asserting that the USSR would provide
any guarantees necessary to preserve the internal situation in
West Berlin and to assure the United States that its prestige
would not suffer. As examples of guarantees, he mentioned
a joint police force, presumably composed of the four powers,
and he repeated a previous Soviet proposal to permit stationing
of symbolic forces of the four powers in West Berlin. He made
it clear that East Berlin was excluded from a settlement on the
grounds that it was the capital of East Germany, but he com-
mitted Ulbricht to sign any guarantees for West Berlin.
The Soviet leader concluded his remarks by repeating that
if the US and USSR could sign a treaty on Germany, it would
mark great progress in their relations and establish an atmos-
phere of trust. He added that a treaty could be implemented by
installments and provide for a gradual withdrawal of Soviet and
American troops from Germany, which would aid in negotiations
and disarmament.
The most notable aspect of IChrushchev's statements was his
failure to stress the urgency of early negotiations on Berlin, as
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he has in his recent conversations with Western diplomats
and the Soviet memorandum to Bonn. This suggests that the
USSR will continue to hold the Berlin question in reserve un-
til the Soviet leaders assess more fully the US position on
major East-West questions. Khrushchev's remarks on Ade-
nauer's role and references to the memorandum to Bonn also
suggest that he may be awaiting a reply as a pretext for pre-
senting a more exact demand on negotiations. A French For-
eign Ministry official was recently told by his Soviet counter-
part that Moscow was considering a foreign ministers'
conference on Berlin and Germany.
On the disarmament question Khrushchev implied that the
Western powers were attempting to defer negotiations. His
insistence that Soviet acceptance of general disarmament was
linked to UN revision was the same position he took last fall
at the UN General Assembly. At that time, however, he ex-
plained that the reorganization scheme was not a prerequisite
for negotiations.
In his statements to Ambassador Thompson on the Congo,
Khrushchev labeled UN policy as "colonialist" and stressed that
the USSR would oppose it "with all its means." He emphasized
that a reorganization of the UN was necessary to prevent another
situation such as that in the Congo, and argued that the US should
have an interest in reorganization, since it might be in a minor-
ity position some time in the future. Khrushchev's revival of the
link between UN revision and disarmament, which has been
played down in recent Soviet statements, probably foreshadows
a more intensive effort to use the appeal of disarmament to gain
support for at least Harnmarskjold's resignation or progress to-
ward a greater Soviet role in the UN executive organs.
Khrushchev showed considerable satisfaction when informed
by Thompson that the US hoped shortly to lift its ban on Soviet
crabmeat imports, although he expressed some disappointment
at the recent canceling of a license for precision grinding ma-
chines. Khrushchev reiterated the Soviet position that trade
relations must be normalized and again emphasized that the USSR
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trades with other Western powers. In addition, he pointed out
that the USSR does not compete with the US in trade and could
be a very good customer for American exports. Ithrushchev
avoided mentioning Moscrv's previous reauest for credits to
finance Soviet purchases.
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The, Situation in Laos
General Phoumi has told Ambassador Brown that during
his recent visit to Phnom Penh, he was able to clear up the
misconceptions of the Cambodian foreign minister over King
Savang's proposal for a neutral nations commission--com-
posed of Cambodia, Burma, and Malaya--and that Souvanna
himself now would attempt to persuade Sihanouk to reconsider
his rejection of the commission's chairmanship.
Although Phoumi and his aides returned to Vientiane ap-
parently convinced of Souvanna's acquiescence to an investiga-
tive commission prior to a full-scale international conference,
there is already some indication that Souvanna may have been
temporizing. Souvanna is reported to have stated publicly on
11 March that the three-nation commission should meet "about
the same time" as the 14-power conference proposed by Si-
hanouk, in order to enable the conference to give directives
to the commission.
Phoumi also reports that he and Souvanna, in their discus-
sion of the question of a coalition government including the
Pathet Lao, agreed that Communists should hold no posts.
Phoumi, however, apparently did not rule out the possibility
that "non-Communist" members of the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS),
the Pathet Lao's political arm, might be included. A long-
standing argument of Souvanna, which has found favor among
many Laotian officials, is that Prince Souphannouvong--head
of the NLHS--and many other party members are nationalists
rather than Communists.
Moscow's initial reaction to the discussions between Phoumi
and Souvanna Phouma indicates that the USSR will claim that the
general compromised his own position as a result of his visit to
Phnom Penh and that Souvanna will accept no solution in Laos
which does not make the convening of an international conference
the first order of business.
A Pathet Lao statement, rebroadcast by both Peiping and
Hanoi, vigorously attacked Phoumi's mission to Phnom Penh as
an effort to "use the name of Premier Souvanna Phouma" to split
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the Laotian people. The Pathet Lao radio claimed it was
only because of military reverses that Phoumi "attempted to
compel Prince Phouma to negotiate with and make conces-
sions to the traitors' clique." The statement clearly indicated
that the Communists do not recognize the Phnom Penh commu-
nique as in any way restricting their freedom of action.
Reflecting some uneasiness over the possibility that Sou-
vanna may have made some deal with Phoumi, the Pathet Lao
radio stressed the unflinching support of the Pathet Lao forces
for Souvanna. It pointed out that Souvanna's speeches and
statements made in Xieng IChouang during his visit there prove
that he would refuse "to knuckle under in any circumstances
before the traitors' clique in Vientiane." The statement reit-
erated the bloc contention that an international conference must
be held, to be followed by an international commission to work
in Laos in accordance with the specific powers granted to it
by the conference.
The recent successes of the Kong Le - Pathet Lao forces
appear to have been due less to aggressive action on their part
than to withdrawal by the Vientiane forces in the face of such a
threat. Vientiane troops north of Phou Khoun junction are re-
ported in a state of low morale and unlikely to put up much re-
sistance to any further Pathet Lao advance. All supplies that
had been stockpiled by these troops at the junction were left
intact when they withdrew and now are in enemy hands.
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Situation in the Congo
Hammarskjold recently sent a conciliatory letter to
Kasavubu, who is attending the Tananarive conference of
Congolese leaders, in an attempt to lessen the likelihood of
a conflict between Indian and Congolese troops. He tried
to reassure Kasavubu that the arrival of these troops was not
part of a planned military build-up to be used against the
Congolese Army, explaining that the Security Council had not
authorized such action in connection with the proposed reor-
ganization of the army.
In a discussion with an American official, Hammarskjold
indicated a belief that "some kind of political game was going
on in Leopoldville" between two rival acting prime ministers
in the absence of Ileo, who accompanied Kasavubu to Tananarive.
He noted that acting Prime Minister Evelvaux modified his earlier
hostile attitude toward the UN and became willing to negotiate
after Massa suddenly "took over" that office. Hammarskjold
remarked that "there are too many untutored people with guns
who become involved in political moves" in the Congo.
Tshombe's apparent success in dominating the proceedings
at Tananarive has been complemented by another success in
Katanga. Before leaving for the conference, Tshombe�appar-
ently fearing that his deputy Kibwe and French Colonel Trinquier
were plotting to oust him--ordered Trinquier to leave the coun-
try by 10 March. The American Consul in Elisabethville reported
that Trinquier, under pressure from Katangan authorities and
possibly the UN, departed for Brussels on 11 March.
When informed that Brussels intended to remove some 30
Belgian military technicians from Katanga, Tshombe indicated
he would oppose this action by all means possible and that he
might close the Belgian Consulate General in Elisabethville.
In his conversation with Ambassador Thompson, IChrushchev
said it was clear that the US and the Soviet Union were in com-
plete disagreement on the Congo. IChrushchev failed to respond
to Ambassador Thompson's remark that there was nothing in the
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Congo situation basic to US or Soviet interests. The ambas-
sador noted that the Soviet premier refrained from mention-
ing any new approach to a solution of the Congo problem and
referred to the internal Congo situation only in terms of the
past.
Ithrushchev used the Congo question to launch a vigorous
attack on UN policies; he told the ambassador that the US and
the Soviet Union had different positions on this question and
prospects were not bright. He reiterated the standard charges
that e UN and Hammarskiold were responsible for Lumumba's
death.
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A L.. LI �
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
TONFH3EALT-LAI._
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