THE COMMUNIST TET OFFENSIVE - 1968/01/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02547971
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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Intelligence Memorandum
THE COMMUNIST TEl OFFENSIVE
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31 January 1968
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
31 January 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Communist Tet Offensive
Summary
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The current series of coordinated enemy attacks
in South Vietnam appears designed for maximum psycho-
logical impact and to demonstrate the Communists' con-
tinued power despite the presence of strong US forces.
Th a Communists clearly have made careful preparations
for the offensive. These preparations point to a major
assault: in the Khe Sanh area possibly in conjunction
with a drive throughout the northern I Corps area, and
widespread attacks against US installations may be pre-
paratory to or in support of such action. The enemy
probably hopes to score some major battlefield successes
during their campaign. Their military actions appear
related to Hanoi's recent offer to open talks, but it
is questionable that the Communists are making a final
desperate bid before suing for peace.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and
coordinated with the Special Assistant for Vietnamese
Affairs.
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1. The current coordinated series of enemy
attacks in South Vietnam, so far targeted primarily
against population centers and US installations
from I Corps to the delta, appears primarily
designed for maximum psychological impact. The
Communists appear to be trying to demonstrate to
the South Vietnamese, to US and world opinion and
probably to their own forces that, almost three
years after the intervention of US forces, they
can still enter major towns and bases, threaten
the US Embassy itself, and seriously disrupt the
country, if only temporarily.
2. Extensive harassment of US airfields,
logistical centers, and command and communications
centers appears--in addition to its shock effect--
partly designed to inhibit immediate allied
reaction and retaliation. It may be preparatory
to or intended to support further impcnding enemy
actions in the Khe Sanh/DMZ/northern Quang Tri
area. So far this area has been relatively quiet
during the latest round of attacks, but the enemy
concentration in this area remains the most ominous
in the country.
3. Evidence has been building up for the past
several weeks that the Communists intended a major
nationwide offensive in connection with the Tet
season. Enemy propaganda, however, had stressed
an intention to honor a seven-day cease-fire regard-
less of the period of the allied standdown. This
line may have been intended to enhance the surprise
factor of attacks on the day of Tet itself. It may
also Le that the Communist timetable--in past years
calling for stepped up action just prior to and
immediately following the Tet truce--was sufficiently
flexible to call for action during the Tet if the
allies could be put in the position of apparently
bearing the onus. In any event, Communist propa-
gandists were clearly ready with the line that the
enemy attacks were "punishment" for allied violations.
4. It is clear that the Communists made care-
ful and, most recently, urgent preparations for
the current offensive. These preparations seem to
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point, in coming days or weeks, to a major assault
around Khe Sanh, possibly in conjunction with a
campaign throughout the northern I Corps area.
The Communists probably hope, in addition to
psychological gains, to score some dramatic battle-
field successes, ideally (from their standpoint)
the overrunning of Khe Sanh or a US withdrawal
from this or some other key garrison. In launching
a series of bold actions, they incur the risk of
serious defeats or retaliation, with possible
repercussions on their own forces. Nonetheless,
they probably hope to gain the strategic initiative
and to pin down substantial numbers of allied
troops over wide areas in which the Communists hold
some military advantages. A major objective of
the entire Communist "winter-spring" campaign since
autumn appears to be to draw off US forces while
the VC attempt to erode the pacification effort
through guerrilla-type actions. Furthermore, the
Communists certainly hope to make political mileage
out of heightened US casualty rates and a demonstra-
tion of continued VC strength.
5. There seems to be little question that the
present Communist offensive activity bears a relation
to Hanoi's recent offer to open talks. Foremost,
the Communists probably hope to improve their
political and military image in the event that any
negotiations are initiated in coming months. Prior
to the initiation of the "winter-spring" campaign,
Communist forces throughout the country were
intensively indoctrinated on the importance of the
campaign. At least in some areas, the campaign
itself was linked, directly or by implication, to
the possibility of a political settlement. Some
of this indoctrination may have been propaganda
intended to instill a victory psychology among
troops possibly discouraged by hardships and talk
of "protracted war." Although the current surge
of Communist activity involves both a military and
political gamble, it is highly questionable that
the Communists are making a final desperate effort
for a show of strength prior to suing for peace.
Despite evident problems of manpower and supply,
enemy forces continued to display improved fire-
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power, flexibility of tactics, and a considerable
degree of resiliency. Their current offensive is
probably intended to convey the impression that
despite VC problems and despite half a million
US troops, the Communists are still powerful and
capable of waging war.
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