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July 20, 1976
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. NO. 13 GOVERIVENT AFFAIRS GENERAL EASTERN EUROPE WEST EUROPE NEAR EAST AFRICA EAST ASIA LATIN AMERICA CLASSIFIED BY: 008354 DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS 50.1:4�11Al. Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 23 34 36 39 41 43 44 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 airs THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1976 The C.I.A. Cloud Over the Press By Daniel Schorr ASPEN, Colo.�One of Wil- liam E. Colby's less exhilarating moments as Director of Central Intelligence was having to call a news conference to demand deletion from the Senate report on assassination plots of a dozen names, including such underworld figures as Sam Giancana and John Rosselli. However misguided the re- cruitment of these worthies in the C.I.A.'s designs on Fidel Castro, they had been promised eternal secrecy about their roles, and, for the agency, de- livering on that promise was an .article of faith as well as law. 'Again, when Mr. Colby was subpoenaed by the House In telligence Committee for the names of certain intelligence officers, he faced up to a threat- eneck contempt citation by mak- ing, .it clear that he would rather go to jail' than com- promise intelligence sources. . This goes, as well, forrn the names of journalists who have served the C.I.A. And Mr. Col- by's successor, George Bush; has said there, will be absolute, ly no change in that policy. , because he is "dedicated to the . protection of sources." The principle is that an intelligence agency that rats on its agents, past or present, won't have very many in the future. This poses a problem to the journal- istic community, 'which, out of concern for the compromising of the First Amendment, would , like the intelli- gence community to expose the infil- trators. - But banging on.a closed door seems a. fruitless diversion, and there may, be a more fruitful way of going about this. There has clearly been a pattern of cooperation between the C.I.A. and employers of journalists. Managers, with less legal restraint, should be able to provide some of the informa- tion about their employees' roles and their own. . "Where an American news organiza- tion provided cover, for a C.I.A. offi- cer," says an intelligence veteran, "the practice was to make arrangement with management." Such an arrangement was necessary,' if only to cover transfers, absences and other hard-to-explain movements. There is reason to believe that some of these arrangements may have original- ly been formalized irt memorandums of understanding between C.I.A. directors and the employers concerned. There have been published sugges- tions of management involvement with the C.I.A. For example: Wayne Phillips, former staff member of The New York Times, has stated, with the support of documentary Material, that the C.I.A. tried to recruit him in 1952 while he was studying at Columbia University's Russian Insti- tute. He said an agency official told him that the C.I.A. had "a working arrangement" with Arthur Hays Sulz- berger, then publisher of The Times; and that the agency could arrange to get him assigned to Moscow. � (Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, the present publisher, has said: "I never heard of The Times being approached either in ' my capacity as publisher or as the son of the' late Mr. Sulzberger.") - Sig Mickelson, former president of CBS News, has said that in 1954 he was called to the office of William S. Paley, CBS boaid chairman, in whose presence two C.I.A. officials told him that Austin Goodrich, a CBS News stringer in Stockholm, was a � C.I.A. agent. (Mr. Paley has denied that there was any such meeting.) There are also unconfirmed reports, pursued by investigative reporters, of arrangements by newspapers in Flor- ida and California to provide C.I.A. officers. Most of this goes back to the 1950's, when the C.I.A. deputy director Frank Wisner cultivated news media execu- tives and was reputed to have boasted of playing the press. like a "mighty' Wurlitzer." No such formal arrange- Tom Hachtmark- ment is believed to exist today. The C.I.A. says it has stopped using "ac- cedited" correspondents of American news media, and more recently has stated that it will also phase out the use of part-time correspondents of American news organizations. Current trews executives profess to be mystified about the nature of the. clandestine lines that C.I.A. ran into their organizations in past years. But- there are executives and retired ex- ecutives, who could help dispel the cloud hanging over the press by com- ing forward to tell the arangements they made with the C.I.A. If restoring the fair name of the free press requires exposure of reporters who served the C.I.A.. often after ap- peals to their patriotism, then the parade could well be led by employers who made the practice possible�pre- sumably out of equally patriotic mo- tives. Daniel Schorr is a CBS television in- vestigative reporter under suspension pending Congressional resolution of its inquiry into his leak of the House Select Committee on Intelligence's re- port on the Central Intelligence Agency to The .Village Voice. � Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 � On the Separation of Church and State Some preliminary observations on the lamentable consequences of the Senior Senator from Idaho for the national intelligence services. by James Aneleton and Charles J. V. Murphy siepookeraorteolems Mr. .Angteton spent 31 years with the Office of Strategic Servtces [OSS] and the Central Intelligence Agency. and through the last 20 years was Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA. Mr. Murphy is a retired writer. Time-Life and Fortune magazine. When the first revelations in Washington of the alleged mis- deeds of the Central Intelligence Agency became a sensation in the European press 17 months ago, a veteran diplomat in Bonn expressed his consternation that the government of a great country should let itself be driven to disgorge vital state secrets affecting the security of the nation and its allies. "You don't have a country over there," he scolded The New York Times" correspondent, "you have a huge church." � That subtle witticism went right over The New York Times' good, gray, humorless head. The friendly diplomat had shrewd- ly perceived at the source of the orgy of self-criticism convulsing Congress and the press alike something more primitive than witch-burning or the whiplash of Puritan conscience. What he had discerned was not so much the return of a rebuking godly in- stitution to American politics as the emergence of a fresh evan- gelical phenomenon in the affairs of State--a church spelled with a capital "C." Frank Church, to be precise, the senior Senator from Idaho. Events have borne out the diplomat's appraisal. In May, Senator Church emerged as a bustling candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination. In June, he was ma- neuvering on Jimmy Carter's coattails for the Vice-Presiden- tial spot. Church is a blown-in-the-bottle, copper-riveted, 24-carat ex- ample of the rough diamond from the frontier polished into a po- litical celebrity within Washington's liberal left-wing Establish- ment. At 51. to be sure, he still �slides easily when out on the hustings into the arm-waving, tub-thumping and rolling rhetoric that earned him in Time the accolade of -the boy orator of the Snake River Valley." But he is also master. as The Wash- ington Post's senior political analyst David S. Broder re- cently noted, of the �cool, controlled" style that is most effec- tive on television and over cigars and brandy in Averell Harriman's drawing rooms. And, in common with most am- bitious politicians, he has kept both ears glued to the ground. Broder makes this additional observation: "He is a man who says, with a straight face, that only someone with 20 years' ex- perience as a Washington insider has the know-how to take on : the dreadful bureaucracy." It takes more than a straight face for a man of Church's asso- ciations to carry off such a posture. It takes a strong stomach, too. Church has been a member of the Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee for 19 sears. During his service there he made his mark as an Establishment man. When the Johnson admin- istration presented the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964, he voted for it. He was ranged alongside the rest as the calls ; tame for ever bigger appropriations to carry on the Vietnam war*. The sea change in his.opinion about the American role in the outer world came only after the public had become disillu- sioned with the feckless strategy devised by l'resident Johnson and Defense Secretary McNamara to satisfy the lib- eral establishment of which he is part. By Nixon's day, Church's interventionism had turned isolationist. Under the 2 new colors he, enlisted with the turncoats. and co-authored the divisive legislation trimming the President's war powers and bringing disgrace and shame to the American exit from Southeast Asia. He was all for suspending foreign aid as early as 1971. While our troops were fighting in the field, he took his fam- ily on a junket to the Soviet Union, the chief arms supplier to our enemies. His virtuosity on the negative .side of foreign policy makes him the logical successor to the aging Sparianan as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--or, as Church would render it, the Little or No Foreign Relations Committee. The Statesman as Muckraker Church's swift rise inside the Liberal. left-wing Establishment has been sped by far more dramatic actions than these, however. In April. the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, of which he was Chairman and in full control, issued a two-volume. 815. page report advocating no less than 183 measures designed to re- - strict the various intelligence activities conducted by the Federal Government. That work was 13 months in the making and dur: : ine that interval scarcely a day passed that a bewildered nation - did not see Senator Church's name on the front pages of the newspapers or his round. bejowled presence crowding the tele- : vision screen. All that while he kept a sideshow going in an adjoining tent that was almost as destructive as the other. Four years ago, he took over the Chairmanship of a subcommittee of the Foreign Re- lations Committee that was set up to investigate the operations of American-owned multinational corporations. His progressive disclosures of certain regrettable practices adopted by famous, corporations to sweeten thiir sales pitches in foreign lands have been hardly less destructive of our nation's reputation abroad than the shocks produced by his exposes of the CIA and the FBI. Eminent personages in Japan. the Netherlands, Italy, and Saudi Arabia have been embarrassed. possibly ruined, by the details which he and his staff leaked to the press. Governments of friendly nations have been dismayed and shaken by the evi- dence of scandal in their own ranks, sprung upon them without warning and certainly without the benefit of judicial process. There is an old-fashioned word for these lurid enterprises. The word is muckraking. The Economist of London, a journal ; which follows American affairs with a perceptive eye, described ! Church in January as "the scourge of immorality in undercover intelligence operations. and the inquisitor of corrupt practices by American corporations. abroad"--prosecutor-cum-judge-cum- jury on the dirty tricks of his countrymen in other lands. � Let us give the muckraker his due. The CIA and the FBI in their arcane and overlapping responsibilities did engage in some illegal and ill-advised operations, although these were by no � means altogether reprehensible when weighed in light of the na- tional security considerations prevailing .at the time. The CIA did briefly consort with political assassins who appear to have been recruited from �the gang that couldn't shoot straight." and it did allow itself to be briefly drawn into unworthy technolo- gies associated, among other things. with explosive cigars. And in the realm of international commerce, where saints would starve, such respectable corporations as Lockheed and Northrop did pay out large sums to foreign agents and middlemen in ways which abroad, in most cases, were within the prevailing custom Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 and usage for paying commissions. finder's fees, Or whatever. h has all been laid out for the rest of the world to see--the crum- bled skeletons rooted out of the closets of six administrations. Now is the time to measure the benefits, if any, from the muckraking-and to take the measure of the muckraker as well. The auto-da-fe proceedings against the plane makers and the arms dealers remain alive, and while they last it is quite impos- sible to tell how many jobs of American workers they will even- dually lose, how much foreign exchange will be sacrificed, and .how much of the market for the world's best goods of their kind Will be dosed off. But the Select Committee on Intelligence has finally been disbanded, without tears, and its huge staff returned to the rear corridors of the Federal ant heap. Now the Senate in its collective wisdom must decide for itself how far it is prepared to go in fining to the intelligence services, and most importantly to a now shaky and harassed CIA, the straitjacket Senator Church and the Committee's staff have brazenly tailored for it. .It's a good time, too. for the rest of us to start making up our minds about the real lessons to he drawn from the whehaentidy experience and deciding what is to be salvaged from the thaadas. A Fantasy to Match the Idaho Mountains For these weighty. deliberations, Senator Church's report isn't much of a help. He personally pays lip serviee to the max� int that reliable and timely intelligence is desirable in the inter- est of national security. He praises himself and the committee staff for the discretion he would have us believe they exercised where national secrets were concerned. The truth is. of course. that it was an open secret in Washington that just about every in- telligence secret revealed in Camera before the committee found its way to the press. The Committee's report had exhausted its surprises long before it ever went to the printer. - The document is disappointing in other and more serious re- spects. Senator Icihn G.. Tower of Texas. the Vice Chairman.. re- fused to put his name to the report. and he was joined in his ab- stention by Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona; Senator Tower reproved the Chairman and the majority members for ignoring the main task laid upon them by The Congress: that was to weigh the nation's needs in intelligence, measure the performance of the various intelligence agencies in meeting those needs. and suggest how best the intelligence work could henceforth go forward without upsetting "the delicate balance between indi- vidual liberties and national security." Instead, the document is overwhelmingly a political tract for those Senators who wish to reduce the American position in. the world: a scornful sermon on the inequities that, by their liahrs,. are inherent in the intelligence process. especially in the field' , of covert political action. The report. by and large. denigrates: the virtue of vigilance and prudence. It takes a harpy's delight in dogging the occasional misdeeds and misdemeanors, the impro- prieties. the blunders. There is contemptuous reference to the CIA's implied proclivity for the -dark arts Of secret interven- tion-bribery, blackmail, abduction. assassination"--put at -the- service of reactionary and repressive regimes," a bias which the. chairman and his staff has caused U.S. foreign policy to become generally identified With -the claims of the old order, instead of the aspirations of the new." ! Beyond all that. Senator Church argues airily that the CIA's covert activities, as well as those of the FBI in espionage mat- ters, are largely stimulated by an exaggerated and now outmod- ed fear of Soviet intentions which he fails to define. American in- terests abroad, he would have us believe, would be far better served if the CIA were to become less edgy about Soviet ts-tions and indeed if it ignored altogether the less blatant Sovi-.-fos- toted interventions in distant parts of the world. "We have ;pin- ed little, and lost a great deal from our past policy of sompulSive intervention." he argues. and from this conclusion he has com- pounded a peculiar prescription for taking the United States out of the Cold War, which was not of our making. and out of the world itself. He urges us all to take "a longer view of history"--hardly an original piece of advice. He becomes more specific. though. when he bids the Executive Branch to rid itself of "a fantasy"--a figment of presumably overheated imaginatiops-that has -en- trapped and enthralled our Presidents." His precise terra for this deranged condition it "the illusion of American omni- I)'eeho of forma:. Senator 3. lrint 's idid phrase, the srrogance of power." . which reazked, earlier American efforts hote 'Truman throtigli Lyndur, � ,lohnson �to stay communist aggression and �still�ersion; � Yet. on the recent evidence, it is Senator Church and his 'feat- - ous supporters who have beconie enthralled with fantaaa --the fa.nt ass that the Russians have called off the Cold War. � His- long service on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should have . armored him against such a fancy. � It is even more bewildering . that he should still hold that notion after devoting so much time. inquiring into the work of an agency whose principal business it is to contend with Soviet subversion and strategic deception. �Th e CIA. files on the, counterintelligence. side of the. House . have been�consistentiv clear on the point that the Kissinger di- p:omacy has not deflected the Kremlin from its basic objectives: Detente is a sham, a tactic: it is Soviet communism's Potemkin Village for waging Cold War. . It could be that Senator Church is only a cynic. as Mr. Broder suggests. That is no uncommon trait in a politician.. Or it may be that he has decided to present himself as detente's man for all seasons. Be that as it may. the intellectual boundaries that sepa- rate him from the real world in which the CIA until recently op. crated so spiritedly and the one that fills his private vision are as stark as the 'mountains that wall off his native heath in Idaho. � One has only to examine the Committee's findings on the CIA's intermittent intrusions in Chile, between 1963 and 1973,. to appreciate how successful. the man from Idaho has been .in rais- ing a fantasy to match his mountains. The High Stakes in Chile � � That the United States Government. starting with President Kennedy, channeled support;some of it through the CIA, to pro- American conservative and moderate political groupings in Chile is not in dispute. although one might. question the wisdom of making the issue a shuttlecock in our domestic politics. The efs � forts of the late Salvadore Allende-Gossens to capture Chile for a. 'communist minority in 1964 were foiled in some. part by the CIA. Allende was already looking to FidelCastro.and.. through him, to . Moscow for the funds and managerial skills he had to have for , making full-scale revolution. Th; American motive ,was to pre- vent Castro from Spreading his influence into the Andes. The CIA's intervention in the Chilean political process consisted of little rnore than of providing funds for political rallies and �edi- ' tonal debate aimed at inducing the Christian Democrats and the. moderate parties, who commanded a massive majority, to put j aside their differences in the common interest of � keeping, . Allende and his Marxist coalition from slipping into the Presi- dency through the gap between them. ' That glancing intervention succeeded on an investment of but �I a few million dollars and the talents of a handful of specialists. � Six years later,' the contest was re-enacted, with the noncommu- nists again split and Allende and the radicals- still controlling only 36 percent of the popular votes. This time he won because :.Kissinger was too much engrossed in wangling a visa to Peking.' corning to terms with Hanoi, and cultivating detente with Mos- . row to heed the intellig.ence warnings from Santiago. -.Had the Army not risen against Allende in September 1973, he would to- � clay rank se,..oad only to Castro in the communist Lit-rare/1y out- side the. Soviet bloc. The inischief in Church's handling of the CIA role in Chile is- sues from the crude attempt orhis staff to saddle the CIA with . ! the Hanle for Alhirtie's fall. A scpai.ite report issued by � the. . tat, which was drafted outside the Committee's cognizztnce hut � issued v,.ith the Chairman's sanction. chil.rged the agency with .. . . having -worked through the covert prOecss to subvert demo- cratic processes" and having thereby. brought **an en:.1 to consti- tutional goverrinient- in 'that Storni-tossed country. . � Such a tinding is. to say the least, the shameless tlistt,i :ion of the facts that Senator Goldwater in his dissent said it was. To ar- rive at i, Sc:::::or Church's ss.-bolars had to Ooze Allende's !.� avowed schemes. in open association with platoons of Soviet and !Cuban advisors, f3t- silencing all political opposition. int industry. collectivizing, the /and, and firing up a re.olutiont � that would support Castro's campaien to destroy .American ia- , uence root and braach. below the Rio Grande. � "Cuba in the Caribbean."' Allend pri.ciattnett in "antl. a Socialist make revolution in Latin America." Cas- tro touted Chile before the 1970 election to rall.� the discontented to Allencle's b?.imer. Allende hinisell made no less than' nine - trips to Ilavana between 1936 and 19-0., in �1468. he saw to it. as 3 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718.. President of the Chilean Senate. that Cuban survivors from .Che CoteVara's fiemdered. guerrilla war- in Bolivia were 'given safe -passage home; and, later, as President he permitted Castro use Cuba's diplomatic offices in Chile to run his espionage and, political agents in Bolivia: the Argentine, Brazil and Uruguay. There was no doubt about Allende's ambition.: i4 was to set the Andes all Chile escaped sinking into a communist Cffetatorship by the skin of its teeth. The U.S. had little influence in the outcome. As for the liberal, left-wing panjandrunis in the Congress and the press, it is depressingly plain that they still would have us be- lieve that the overthrew of Aliertde was a crime against the con- stitutional order. They seem to have learned waiting from the test: Castro and the Soviet revolution-makers did. Allende's in-. it ial.success in 1970-. for which they orchestrated the strategy, en- couraged.them in the belief that Chile would provide communists in other. societies %,-ith a model of how an electoral minority could achieve mastery inside parliamentary seeieties througlt skillful Manipulation of the democratic process-a strategy prese ently being pursued with delicacy in Italy. France and Portugal. Allende's failure drove home the lesson that where the margins are thin the power cannot be held .unless the armed forces have been brought under communist control. When. therefore, Moscow's man in Portugal. Alvaro Cunha}, made his move in Port ugaljn1974. just about a year later, he did so front what appeared a solid base of support within the armed forces themselves. Fortunately- for Europe. the base was . not as solid as at first it seemed. Once it started to crumble, as it finally .did last winter, Cunhal prudently yielded the fida with scarcely a shot. Then in Angola. &textbook application of Cuban military forcebehind a locally contrived "Popular Front"finallv produced a decisive result-another fallen domino. We would do well to ponder two inescapable questions: What %veight would American counsel carry throughout Latin America. now that Castro has conquered an immensely promising strate- gic base for communist expansioa in southern Africa. if Allende. his grateful ally. stood astride the Andes' today? � What if anything can we expect from a Senate Foreign Rela- tions Committee dominated by a man as befuddled as Frank .Church is by the fantasies of detente. when Castro returns his at- tentions to Latin America, as in due course he will and must, to knock down for good the Chilean domino Allende all but toppled? ' The Missed Opportunity � The missed meaning of the struggle for Chile is central tO an understanding of the Church Committee's failure in what could , and should have been a landmark inquiry into the methods and worth of intelligence. Quite above and beyond the question of whether the CIA was a "rogue elephant" running amok inside a constitutional society-the Committee to its credit ruled other- -. wise-there was the larger continuing question of whether it is up to the job. To understand what the job is, one has to take stock of the threat that the communist bloc presents to national security. On this crucial subject the report is all but silent. Nowhere in its wordy, censorious document is there to be found a reasonable appraisal of the threat which the CIA was created to meet and fend off; nor of the changing disguises which that threat wears; nor of the changing targets at which it is aimed. There is no helpful information for American citizens about the character and resources of the KGB and the 27 other clandestine intelligence and espionage organizations which the Soviet bloc has mounted against the West. One looks in vain for a judicious assessment of the competence of the CIA to cope with these adversary services. And as for judging the performance of our own agency in appraising the Soviet Union's true capabili- ties and'exposing its intentions, the pages are disgracefully blank. American. intelligence, along with its brilliant successes in the reconnaissance technologies, has sufferedat least three serious- failures over the last eight years. It was surprised by the Soviet bloc invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It failed to call the Tet offensive in Vietnam earlier that same year. And it missed the Arab strike prepared for Yom Kippur. What is even more em- barrassing, the communist war memoirs that have lately � ap- -. peared in Hanoi convey a sinister hint that the highest Ameri- can and South Vietnamese war councils were thoroughly pene- trated by the enemy. Finally, on the analytical side. the CIA has lately concluded that it has been underestimating the annual Soviet investment in weapons, forces, and military research and development by as much as 100 percent. These are matters that Senator Church might profitably have addressed. Last fall, the House of Representatives own parallel Select Committee on Intelligence under Representative Otis Pike of New York made a promising start toward identifying the reasons for these failures. Unfortunately, that high purpose was quickly knocked aside by a left-wing majority bent on surpassing the rival committee in the volume of its leakage. Its final and still classified report, passed to a radical newspaper in New York. was consigned to the dust in by an embarrassed House. Unfortunately, the mischief has by no means ended. In May, the Senate responded to the Church Committee's report by cre- ating a permanent I5-member select committee to oversee the operations not only of the CIA but also those of, all the �the--; in- telligence agencies�the National Security Agency -De- fense Intelligence Agency as well. The Armed Services C011.1- mittees and the Appropriations Committees in both Houses will, as in the past, retain a jurisdiction in intelligence opera- tions. The range of oversight had earlier been greatly widened by the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of October 1974 requiring that six committees in Congress�with half the Senate and 20 Repre- sentatives on their rosters�be apprised in advance of any covert action by the CIA under consideration by the President. In emptying the CIA's "bag of dirty tricks," in Church's melo- dramatic phrase, the Congress had thus ended up by unclothing and all but disarming that agency at the same time. The vulnera- bility of the new committee to the vagaries of political self-in- terest can be ascertained from a cursory examination of the stands taken in the Senate on defense and foreign policy issues by the majority of its members. A sobering benchmark is the National Security Voting Index published in April by the Ameri- can Security Council. This index rates the members of both Houses of Congress, on a scale ranging from zero to 100, by their votes on ten critical national security defense issues which a poll taken by the Opinion Research Corporation has estab- lished are favored by most Americans. On that index and in terms of the relative weights of their support of legislation most Americans consider critical to the nation's security, the eight most liberal members of the new intelligence oversight com- mittee rank as follows: � Hart, Colorado 0% - � Bayh, Indiana 17% Stevenson, Illinois 0% Biden. Delaware 0% Case, New Jersey 11% Hatfield, Oregon 0% Huddleston, Kentucky 25% Inouye. Hawaii 43% It comes as a shock to realize that the paramount authority over the CIA and the associated military intelligence agencies will henceforth be exercised for the Senate by a body the major- ity of whose members are convinced, with Church, that the Soviet threat has waned. They will be supported, as he was, by a staff drawn from specialists of congenial outlook. Senator Mans- field has assured us that the traditional rules of self-discipline binding these bodies to reticence can be depended upon to pro- tect the nation's intelligence secrets from disclosure. Alas, the feeble gestures the House of Representatives has so far made toward uncovering the source of the leak of the Pike Committee report to Daniel Schorr of the Columbia Broadcasting System hardly makes for confidence on that score. Intelligence is the nation's first line of defense. In weighing the numerous other proposals put before it by the Member from Idaho, for further crippling and truncating the intelligence function, the Senate would be well advised in the Bicentennial year to give heed to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers: to keep Church (Frank) and State (affairs of) separate. at least where these life-and-death matters are concerned. AMERICAN CAUSE, INC. 905 16th St., N.W. � Suite 304 � Washington, D.C. 20006 * (202) 638-4006 4 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 4. � The Washington Star By Walter Taylor Waskngtoo Star Staff Writer The only Democrat on the � now-defunct House intelli- � gence committee testified today that the leak of the panel's final report pro- vided a "bonanza' of secret information to enemy intel- � ligence agents. In testimony before the � House Ethics Committee. � Rep. Dale Milford, D- . Texas, said the report, which was published in � February by a New York � newspaper, ccntained "bits and pieces" of classified � information the disclosure of which "seriously jeop- ardized on-going intelli- � gence operations.' � Milford told the ethics � committee, which is inves- tigating the leak of the re- port, that it must obtain testimony from CBS report- er Daniel Schorr as to how � he obtained the confidential document. � SCHORR HAS acknowl- � edged that he received the � report and passed it on to the Villa York Voice, a weekly New York newspaper which published the document. The ethics committee has been investigating the leak of the report since Febru- � ary, but, testimony during. � two days of public hearings � has indicated, it has not � uncovered the source of the leak to Schorr. However, beyond an � informal invitation 'to voluntarily discuss the case with its investigators, the � committee has not sought � to compel Schorr to disclose his source. Committee sources have indicated that the panel hopes to avoid a First Amendment clash with Schorr on the question � of a reporter's confidential � sources. IN A 54-PAGE state- ment, chief leak investiga- tor and former FBI agent David Bowers detailed an extensive investigation of � the intelligence commit- tee's security procedures in general and the steps taken to safeguard its final report in particular � testimony � that painted a picture of only the loosest type of protection for the 77,000 pages of classified material that passed through the lands of the panel. For example, Bowers gave this.description of cir- cumstances surrounding the dissemination of a draft copy of the report, a docu- ment which other testimony Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 902623718 Tuesday, July 20, 1976 indicated contained more classified material that the version later adopted by the committee but which was supressed by the full House. "There was no specific control system." Bowers testified. 'Copies of the draft contained no identi- � fication whatever. They were not� numbered, nor were they charged out so they could be accounted for." Copies of both the draft report and the more sani- tized final version appar- ently received wide dis- semination within executive agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, the White House and State, Justice and Defense departments, according to the Ethics Committee investigator. BOWERS REPORTED that his investigation had� revealed a number of otlier � leaks of supposedly secret information � including one that might be a key to uncovering the original source of the document that Schorr had admitted giving to the Voice. Ironically, that leak was to the CIA, itself he prime target of the committee's investigation. Bowers testified that the intelligence committee chairman, Rep. Otis G. Pike, D-N.Y., had refused to make a.. copy of his panel's final report avail- able to the CIA, but that an unidentified member of the committee had secreted one of the documents to the agency. It later was learned that Bowers, during a closed- door session of the Ethics Committee early yesterday afternoon, had identified Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., as the source of the leak to the CIA. � Aspin, who was to appear as a witness before the Ethics Committee today, later confirmed that he had loaned a copy of the report to the CIA. He told the As- sociated Press that he did so in negotiating with the agency to get as much information as possible de- classified and into the final. report. The report turned over to the CIA on Jan. 24 essen- tially was the same version of the document obtained by Schorr and passed on to the Village Voice. THE BOTTOM LINE in Bowers' report to the � Ethics Committee, how- ever, was that there still was no hard evidence of who actually slipped the document to Schorr. He said he and other investigators have recover- ed or examined most of the copies of the report known still to be in existence and that the wording of none of them precisely matches the document published by the newspaper. For example, Bowers said, the copy reportedly given to the CIA --- and subsequently duplicated and circulated within several executive branch agencies, including the �White House � "had one page the Village Voice did not have, was missing two pages Which the Village Voice did have and contain- ed significant differences in test on two other pages." FACED WITH the con- tinuing mystery, the Ethics - WASHINGTON POST 2 2 JUL 1976 Ford Orders. CIA 'Briefing 1For Carter By Cynthia Kadonriga Washington Post Staff W.aitgr i President Ford yesterday �I instructed the Central Intel �iligence Agency to give Dem- ocratic presidential nominee Jimmy Carter an intern-, hence briefing. � Presidential spokesman Ron Nessen said CIA Direc- tor George Bush, and possi- � bly other agency offIcials. would go to Carter's home, in Plains, Ga., for the brief- - ing next week. Bush would provide the same information to Demo- cratic vice presidential :nom- inee Walter F. Mondale "if rr',5 11 Li Committee has begun haul- ing in members of the Intelligence Committee and its staff for' public interro- gation on the leaked material � after conduct- ing some 420 private inter- views already with no suc- cess in pinpointing the source of the leak. � There also is the possibil- � ity that the committee will subpoena Schorr and other reporters who received information about the Intel- ligence Committee's inves- tigation. Thus far, all of the newsmen involved have re- fused to talk to committee , investigators about their stories. A spokesman for the panel said that public hear- ings on the matter could go on for up to two weeks. He declined to say who would be called to testify or whether witnesses would be asked to testify voluntarily or would be subpoenaed. he wants it," Nessen said. Such briefings are tradi- tional, but usually are pro- vided by the Secretary of State. Carter, however, 'has said he would prefer the CIA to brief him rather than Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, whose policies Carter has criti- cized. Nessen said there are- no plans for Kissinger to brief Carter. The way such briefirigs are handled has varied un- der each administration., President Johnson, for ex- ample, personally briefed the 1968 Republican nomi- nee, Richard M. Nixon. N.cs- ,sen said. Democratic nand- -nee George McGovern de- ' clined such a � briefing in � 1972. McGovern sharply crit- icized U.S. foreign policy,� �particularly in Vietnam, during that time. U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 12 JULY 1976 * Nelson Rockefelkr's choice to replace him as No. 2 on a Ford ticket: George Bush, one-time Republican National Chairman and now head of the. CIA. 5 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 � WASHINGTON STAR 20 'JULY 1976 What the House of Representatives needs least right now is a further demonstration of its infinite capacity for low comedy. . It is, nevertheless, grinding ahead with two weeks of activity on that front, putting to itself a question that never should have been asked: Who gave the CIA report to Dan Schorr? If the Ethics Committee knew the answer, it might be one thing. But although the staff has been hard at it since April I, it has been unable to crack the case. Oh Kojak, where are you when we need you most? The House sleuths have tried, but in 970 interviews they have not even found a good lead. The members of the Ethics Committee are not self- conscious about their failure; for reasons beyond comprehension, they insist on airing it. The amateur theatricals taking place in the Armed Services subcom- mittee room, which is decorated with manly, murals of jungle warfare, tend to reinforce the impression that the real scandal about the House is not its gaudy and well publicized sex- ual revels, but its incompetence. THE POINT ABOUT the Pike Corrimmittee report on the CIA was not that it got out, as Chairman Otis Pike, D-N.Y.., kept telling the Ethics Committee, but what was in it. But the members of the Ethics Commit- tee, like the members of the House NEW YORK TIMES 22� JUL 1976 Ex-Counsel Asserts Security Was Lax In Intelligence Unit , WASHINGTON, July 21 [UPI) �Security in the House intelli- gence committee was so lax that staff members kept top se- cret papers n their desks and copied material for their own files, a former committee coun- sel testified today. The description of sieve-like security at the now-defunct panel came during hearings by . the House ethics committee on the matter of who gave a secret Congressional intelligence re- port to Daniel Schorr, a CBS reporter. The ethics panel went into closed session as soon as the security details came to light, presumably for fear that sensi- Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 itself, cannot see it that way. � They quail at the thought of Wayne Hayes and company, and the terrible repercussions at the polls. But the reminder that they spent a million dollars of the taxpayers' money for an investigation and then refused to look at the results strikes them as the height of patriotic virtue. They still do not want to know about CIA blun- ders in places like what one of the members called "Angolia." � As Rep. James Quillen, R-Tenn., round face contorted with worry, said, "The House voted 246 to 129 not to read the report." Pike, who was a much better wit- ness than he was a chairman, replied sharply, "The House voted not to re- lease a document which it had not seen � our committee voted, to re- lease a document it had seen." How, Pike asked the members, could a committee of Congress investigate a secret agency without publishing classified information? If he had acceded to the deletions requested by the CIA, the report would have been cut in half. The House hates to get into controversies like that. They decided that they did not want to know anything about the CIA that the President, the agency's shield and defender, didn't want them to know. "Our basic problem," said Pike, after he had reviewed for the Ethics Committee the security procedures of his own group, "is that almost no- body in Congress has read the re- port." HIS BASIC PROBLEM was illus- trated by the fact that one of the members of his own committee, Rep. Les Aspire is said to have taken it _ upon himself to give an early draft to the CIA, without Pike's authorization. This was an exercise in unilateral declassification that invites compari- son with Dan Schorr's, but so far Aspin's action has escaped censure. live or embarrassing details might be made public. During the open session in the morning, James Oliphant, counsel to the intelligence panel, said proper security rules "were not followed" by the panel during its long inves- tigation late last year and early this year of covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency. "Security was very, very lax" Mr. Oliphant said. 'People in charge of files did not have any library or any security back- ground. People kept materials in their own desks, includng classified material � top se- cret." He said some staff members even copied confidential ate- riats on office duplicating ma- chines and put the copies in their own files. The ethics panel is in the final phases of a $150,000 investiga- tion into who gave Mr. Schorr The Pike Commmittee fiasco was the CIA's most successful operation. Nothing known in its long history of infiltration and subversion quite matches its record in turning the tables on its investigators. The chairman could never keep his troops intact when he hurled his contempt threats at the White House. He could not keep the members from telling secrets. He could not convince the House that the report did not endan- ger either the agency or its agents. By the time the Village Voice printed his findings, his colleagues were so impatient with his perform- ance that they would have refused to read the report if it had been publish- ed by the Book of the Month Club. PIKE TRIED without any success to tell the members that Congress is really as good as the executive branch, and in fact coequal, quite as able to declassify material as the executive branch is to classify it. Congress had a brief spell of thinking it was as smart as the president dur- ing the Watergate business, but it went back as soon as it decently could to the old habit of deferring to him on foreign policy, and. Pike was as much a victim of that syndrome as of his own haplessness. His colleagues chose him -for his judgment and his ability to control difficult situations. But when they sent him in against the CIA, they asked too much of him. The CIA tried to preempt him, which was out of the question. When that failed, they went to war with him. Tire is no question of who Won. 1. He says, as pointedly as he dares to, that the only beneficiary of the Schorr leak has been the CIA. But the Ethics Committee does not take the hint. By giving the report to the lage Voice, Schorr unwittingly as- � , sured of a new lease on life and gave Congress the chance to : play detective, a role in which it is as miscast' as it was to be' investigator of ,the CIA. a copy of the intelligence ,committee's ,final report, a document laced with confiden- tial material and highly critical of C.I.A. operations. . The House voted to keep that report secret untA. President Ford could censor it. Mr. Schorr admitted he got a copy from a source he refused to name and gave it to The Village Voice -neWiPaper of New York, which published much of it. Ethics panel investigators have testified ,they have only been able to narrow the field of suspects to a broad range of individuals in government, because so many copies of the report were distributed around Washington. CHICAGO TRIBUNE � 8 JULY 1976 Belli comes to Ruby's defense. �AN FRANCISCO�Attorney Melvin Belli says it is not true that Jack Ruby met secretly with Fidel Castro In ViKi to plot tho, assassination of President John Kennedy. Belli, who knew Ruby as a irend and client, says Ruby wa:4 "an intensely loyal Ame:ican who wor- shiped Jack Kenn.ady." Ruby, a Dallas nightclub own- er, killed Lee Darvey Oswald, the man believed to have assassinated Kennedy, in Dallas on Nov. 24, 1053.� A former CIA agent has charged that Ruby met Castro while in Cuba trying to make a drug deal. But Belli 6 said Ruby never saw Castro and called the allegations "CIA bull," Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 WASHINGTON PO ST 2 2 JUL 197i Joseph Kraft Dropping the Schorr Case An underlying � condition' of Anglo'. - � Saxon democracy is that sensible peo- ple .do not press to the. linnt questions to whieh there are no good. answers. :That rule of thumb applies with a � vengeance to the current investigation . by the House ethics committee of the , intelligence comniittee report given by Dan Schorr of CBS News to the Village � Voice. The investigation touches an unset- tied area of constitutional law. The in- terest of all parties�including both the Congress and especially. the -press�is that the unsettled area be kept unset- tled, that the moment of Constitutional truth-be avoided. . The elementary facts of the case are simple. A House conunittee Under Con-. -gressinan 'Otis Pike prepared a report . on activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. Copies of thrireport were ac- nuked by Mr. Schorr' of CBS:ind John,. Crewdson of the New York Timea. Both men made known the contents of the'. :report through their respective news. agencies. The full Congress then voted to make the report secret. - WheregpOn, .Schorr, after some complex inaneu.. . 'vers, passed his copy off to the Village ..Noice, a weekly put out New York, 'which it claimed, possibly wrongly, was - 'the full text of the report That sequence of events -setup 'a po- tential conflict between two traditional : rights rooted in the Constitution. One is the freedom of the press, as guaranteed'. ..,by the First Amendment. The other is the right of the Congress to discipline its members, and to. punish bY con- tempt proceedings persons refusing 'cooperate with legitimate -congres� sional investigations. � , The freedom of the press 'aid. the First Amendment need' no endorse- ment in this quarter. Democracy means government by the people which. im- � plies� open discussion and 'the eircula... tion of information as distinct froth en- forced orthodoxy. The right to a free press is thus a peculiarly cherished fea- ture of our system, rightly :enshrined in the 'Constitution. . . , The exercise of that right was central to revelation and prosecution of the � . Watergate scandal, and tri the public . awareness of the true nature . of the Vietnam war. The right deserves to be� guarded jealously, as it was by those. who successfully fought in the Su- preme Court the attempt of a Nebraska � judge to apply a gag rule to coverage of. a murder trial; , By extension, moreover; the First Amendment confers certain rights and privileges. The courts have given al- most blanket immunity to news agen- cies against civil suits' for' llbel. But the privileges and rights growing out of the First Amendment are not unlimited� especially in the eyes of the present Su- preme Court Thus in 1972 the Supreme Court, in the Branzburg case, held that the right of a grand jury to investigate crimes took precedence over the First Amendment privilege. In consequence, reporters are now obliged to divulge sources to grand juries in criminal cas- es. - The same issue is potentially posed by ,the Schorr case, with the congres- sional committee in the place of the grand jury. The ethics committee clearly has the right to investigate the leak of the secret report. It can discipline congressmen and staff members responsible for the leak. It can certainly subpoena Mr. Schorr and, if he refused to answer questions, hold him in contempt So far the committee has refused such an approach. Wisely,.! think, from its point of view. Politically, the Con- gress would suffer by pressing to the ultimate a case in which the breaking of the secrecy seal caused no discerni- -ble harm. � But those of us in the �press should not be gloating over the --coramittee's behavior. We should be applauding its restraint. For we have nothing to gain � from a constituional test of First Amendment rights against the congres- sional right to discipline and Invest!-' gate. On the contrary, the circumst- ances of the Schorr case suggest that it affords the weakest possible ground for such a test. Mr. Schorr, though, a veteran re- porter with a fine record, seems re- cently to have been prompted as much by entrepreneurial and self-glorifica- tion interests as by civil liberties con- siderations. At one point he offered to _write up the material in a series of newspaper articles. � At another he made it a condition of publication that he write the introduction to the text In the end, after having refused bona fide offers from responsible press or- gans to' print parts of the text they thought were newsworthy, he let it go to a paper with poor credibility which, used the document, as Laurence Stern pointed out in the Columbia Journal- ism Review, for heavily promotional purposes. It is even asserted by Mr. Stern and Nora Ephron in Esquire Mag- azine, though denied by Schorr, that when the going got rough inside CBS, he had a brief fling at trying to put the blame on a colleague, Leslie Stahl. What is at stake here, is professional behavior, not constitutional liberty. We. will all be better off if the affair is al- lowed to fade away without being made a federal case. WM Field Enterprises, Inc. Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 BALTIMORE SUN 23 July 1976 Staff leak to Schorr is denied By JIM MANN Washington Bureau of The Sun Washington�A. Searle Field, the former staff director of the House Intelligence Com- mittee, denied under oath yes- terday that he played any role in leaking a copy of the com- mittee's report to a CBS report- er, Daniel Schorr, or to the New York weekly Village Voice. "I did not provide a copy of the report to anyone outside the committee, at any place, at any time," Mr. Field told the House ethics committee. When he dis- covered that the report had been leaked, Mr. Field said, "I was extremely disturbed . . . This was the one thing that could destroy our committee and discredit it." Mr. Field said he felt certain no one on his Intelligence Com- mittee staff had leaked the re- port, which the House voted not to publish. But, he added, "I'm not going to speculate about committee members" that is, -the 13 congressmen on the com- mittee. He said Mr. Schorr also might have obtained the report from the Central Intelligence Agency or other agencies with- in the executive branch. Under questioning, Mr. Field conceded that at one point, less than a month before the report was leaked, he telephoned Mr. Schorr for help in trying to de- cide whether to hold a news briefing. Mr. Field explained that he merely -wanted to find out whether CBS had news pro- grams on New Year's Eve. � Mr. Field, 31, a Connecticut lawyer, came to the Intellig- ence Committee after serving as legislative assistant to Sena- tor Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R., Conn.). Both Mr. Weicker and Rep- resentative Otis G. Pike (D. N.Y.), former chairman of the Intelligence Committee, sat be- hind Mr. Field for most of th three hours in which he was questioned by the ethics com- mittee. Mr. Weicker also took the witness chair himself to tell th ethics committee, "What this town needs is more Searle Fields." The senator said his former employee, like himself, was willing to "stand up against the establishment and be count- ed." The ethics committee, offi- cially called the House Com- mittee on Standards of Official Conduct, is holding hearings to determine bow Mr. Schorr ob- lathed the Pike committee re- port. Mr. Schorr himself has ac- knowledged supplying the copy that was published in the Vii- loge Voice after the House vot Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 WASHINGTON STAR 2 1 JUL 1976 A copy for everyone The House Ethics Committee has spent some might say wasted � $150,000 and four months time trying to find dut who leaked a House Intelligence Committee report on the Central Intelligence Agency to Daniel Schorr, the CBS investigative reporter. The investigators don't appear to be much closer to the leaker than they were when they started, despite having interviewed 420 persons and reinterviewed 385. Now the Ethics Commit- tee has begun hearings to see if it can find out in public what its gumshoes couldn't find put in private. Significantly, the investigators never ques- tioned Mr. Schorr, who peddled the leaked docu- ment to the Village Voice in New York, which printed the report for anyone to see who had the price of the paper. They haven't questioned Mr. Schorr apparently because the committee, hav- ing been told that Mr. Schorr would not tell it where he got the report, is leery of getting into a constitutional confrontation over freedom of the press. It has never been clear exactly what the House intended to prove when it authorized the probe of the leak. Surely it did not intend to set Mr. Schorr up for a contempt citation and throw him into the hoosegow when he refused to name the person who gave him the report. It might not � get away with it, and in any event such a specta- ed not to release the report. Mr. :Ield sought to counter allegations that his committee staff had been lax in its hand- ling of classified and sensitive intelligence materials. "I don't think the CIA pos- sesses any God-given ability to organize and maintain informa- tion," he asserted. "They lost records. They lost receipts, the receipts they kept on the back of envelopes. We found records for them." He said the intelli- gence agencies were "sloppy" in their handling of materials. The former staff director made it clear he considered the press an ally of the Intelligence Committee in its frequent bat- tles with the agencies it was in- vestigating. Last New Year's Eve, for example, he said, the commit- tee was told that a witness tes- tifying about a kickback scan- dal within the FBI had partially recanted his testimony as a re- sult of threats by the FBI. "I was quite concerned that the FBI was going to unleash a publicity wash on us, saying a witness had recanted his testi- mony," Mr. Field said. He said be called Mr, Schorr to find out if CBS had a news show and lat- er held a New Year's Eve press briefing to counteract such a "publicity wash." TIMES, Roanoke 26 June 1976 cle probably would heap more discredit on the House than on the press. If the leaker turned out to be a congressman, that certainly would be an embarrassment that the House had not counted on. And if the leaker were an employe of the House, the House prob- ably couldn't do much more than fire him. There may be something of value in the probe, though. The investigators reported that the House Intelligence Committee maintained an al- most total lack of security over reports and se- cret material. Copies of the report, at various stages of drafting, were distributed widely through the legislative and executive branches and these were multiplied by copying machines all over town. Three copies of one draft even wound up overseas within a few hours of being distributed. Classified material reportedly was sometimes ieft lying around committee offices and disclo- sures to reporters were almost commonplace, according to the Ethics Committee's chief inves- tigator; Mr: Schorr was among three reporters given a New Year's Eve 1975 briefing on one as- pect of the investigation. But it doesn't take an expensive investigation to discover the laxness of Congress in handling confidential material. Everyone already knew that Congress can't keep a secret. Maybe it will be worth the $150,000 if the investigation causes Congress to tighten its lip. CIA: Power corrupted Anyone inclined to pooh-pooh the , -dangers and arrogance of the old Cen- ltral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) should take note of the findings of the Senate Intelligence Committee. t A President of the United States had been assassinated (John F. Kenne- dy, Nov. 22, 1963). The nation was in a ; state of shock and anger. A commis- sion of most trusted citizens was' put together to get to the bottom of the affair (the Warren Commission). Few things could have been more important than finding the truth of the Kennedy tmurder. But nobody in the CIA came for- ward to tell its piece of the truth: that the CIA had an operation going on to kill Premier Castro of Cuba. Nobody from the FBI, which included agents with knowledge of the CIA plot, re- vealed the truth even though the FBI was charged with the investigation. - Neither intelligence, nor goodwill, nor patriotism, nor sense of duty, nor ethics, nor concern for the national se- eurity, nor any other good impelled these Great Protectors of the Nation to come forward with a piece of informa- tion that might have made a differ- ence. The whole affair confirms a con- clusion we reached long ago: The cov- ert action (dirty tricks) division of the CIA should be rooted out and the soil for it permanently sanitized. The de- gree of control now established over the J. Edgar Hoover-less FBI should be made permanent. Perhaps the CIA's anti-Castro af- fair had nothing to do with Lee Os- wald's assault on President Kennedy. But the Warren Commission had a right to know of it; the nation had a right to assume that all the pertinent facts were revealed to the commission. The right of the commission and of the nation was denied because trusted Americans in the top echelons of the CIA and the FBI lacked the simple courage to come forward and do their simple duty. Never was more vivid the proof of Lord Acton's axiom: Power Corrupts and Absolute Power Corrupts Abso- lutely. Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 BALTIMORE SUN 23 July 1976 Mary McGrory House Hears, Reads No Evil about CIA Washington � What the House of Repre- sentatives needs least right now is a further demonstra- tion of its infinite capacity for low comedy. It is, nevertheless, grinding ahead with two weeks of ac- � tivity on that front, putting to itself a question that never should have been asked: Who gave the CIA report to Daniel Schorr? If the Ethics Committee knew the answer, it might be one thing. But although the staff has been hard at it since April I, it has been unable to crack the case. Oh Kojak, where are you when we need you most? The House sleuths have tried, but in 470 interviews they have not even found a good lead. The members of the Ethics Committee are not self-conscious about their fail- ure; for reasons beyond com- prehension, they Insist on air- ing it. The amateur theatrics tak- - lug place in the Armed Ser- vices subcommittee room, which is decorated with man- ly murals of jungle warfare, tend to reinforce the impres- sion that the real scandal - about the House is not its gaudy and well publicized sexual revels, but its incom- petence. The point about the Pike Committee report on the CIA was not that it got out, as Chairman Otis Pike (D., N.Y.) kept telling the Ethics Com- mittee, but what was in it. But the members of the Ethics Committee, like the members of the House itself, cannot see � it that way. They quail at the thought of Wayne Hays and company, and the terrible repercussions at the polls. But the reminder that they spent a million dol- lars of the taxpayers' money for an investigation and then refused to look at the results strikes them as the height of patriotic virtue. They still do not want to know about CIA blunders in places like what one of the members called "Angolia." As Representative James H. Quillen (R., Tenn.), his round face contorted with worry, said, "The House voted 246 to 129 not to read the re- porta Mr. Pike, who was a much better witness than he was a chairman, replied sharply, "The House voted not to re- lease a document which it had not seen; our committee voted to release a document it had seen." How, Mr. Pike asked the members, could a com- mittee of Congress investigate �a secret agency without pub- lishing classified information? If he had acceded to the � deletions requested by the CIA, the report would have been cut in half. The House hates to get into controversies like that. They decided that they did not want to know anything about the CIA that the President, the agency's shield and defender, didn't want them to know. "Our basic problem," said Mr. Pike, after he had re- viewed for the Ethics Com- mittee the security proce- dures. of his own group, "Is that almost nobody in Con- gress has read the report." His basic problem was il- lustrated by the fact that one of the members of his own committee, Representative Les Aspin, is said to have tak- en it upon himself to give an early draft to the CIA, without Mr. Pike's authorization. This was an exercise in unilateral declassification that invites comparison with Mr. Schorr's, � but so far Mr. Aspin's action has escaped censure. The Pike Committee fiasco was the CIA's most successful operation. Nothing known in its long history of infiltration _ and subversion quite matches' -its record in turning the tables on its investigators. The chairman could never keep his troops intact when he hurled his contempt threats at � the White House. He could not keep the members from tell- ing secrets. He could not con- vince the House that the re- port did not endanger either � the agency or its agents. By the time the Village Voice printed the commit- tee's findings, his colleagues , � were so impatient with his performance that they would have refused to read the re- port if it had been published by the Book of the Month, Club. Mr. Pike tried without any success to tell the members that Congress is really as good as the executive branch, and in fact co-equal, quite as able to declassify material as the executive branch is to classify it. Congress had a brief spell of thinking it was as smart as the president during the Wat- ergate business, but it went back as soon as it decently could to the old habit of defer- � ring to him on foreign policy, and Mr. Pike was as much a � victim of that syndrome as of his own haplessness. His colleagues chose him for his judgment and his abili- � ty to control difficult situa- tions. But when they sent him in against the CIA, they asked too much of him. The CIA � tried to pre-empt him, which was out of the question. When that failed, they went to war with him. There is no question of who won. � He says, as pointedly as he dares to, that the only benefi- ciary of the Schorr leak has been the CIA, but the Ethics Committee does not take the . hint. By giving the report to the Village Voice, Mr. Schorr un- Wittingly asssured the agency of a new lease on life, and � gave Congress the chance to play detective, a role in which it is as miscast as it was to be investigator of the CIA. ST. LOUIS POST � DISPATCH � 29 JUNE 1976 Bung-ling Hidden , At the time of the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investiga- � tion seem to have been more interested in pursuing their own ways and protecting their images� than in helping make possible a thorough investigation of the Kennedy murder. These are the obvious conclusions to be drawn from a �report by a Senate panel on the intelligence agencies' involvement in the as- -,sassination ioquiry; - ' � In its final report, produced by a subcommit- tee, the Senate Select Committee on Intern; � gence said the intelligence agencies did not f011ow up significant leads relating to the � assassination and that Richard Helms, a �senior CIA official, and J.:-Edgar Hoover, � director of the FBI, kept. important informa- tion' from the Warren Commission, which was investigiting Kennedy's death; The "unpur- "sued- leadt3:' concerned, travel between the ' United Statesand Cuba by two persons who might have had some connection with the assassination. Not only did the agencies fail to investigate fully these persons!. movements � right after the Kennedy murder but they also apparently neglected to tell the presidentially- appointed Warren Commission about the sub- jects. � . � Moreover, the CIA, represented by Mr. Helms, failed to' tell the commission that on � the very day Kennedy was shot a CIA agent met with a Cuban\official to advance a plot to murder Cuban Premier Castro. For its part, the FBI, _represented by Hoover, failed to � inform: the commissiom, about a threatening letter written by Lee Harvey Oswald, the� reputed assassin, and about the disciplining of 17 FBtagents for not recognizing Oswald as a securitythreat Although the Senate-panel emphasized that it had no evidence that Premier Castro or other Cubans had plotted Kennedy's death in retalia- I tion for CIA-backed plots against Castro, it did say its inquiry should be followed up by the permanent Senate Intelligence Committee. , With the trail now more than 12 years old, such an inquiry may not produce much, and surely not enough to satisfy numerous doubt- ers of the Warren Commission. But one clear � lesson that emerge from the latest Senate report is that bungling and cover-ups by the CIA and FBI show more than ever that these agencies must be brought under stronger legal control and supervision. 9 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 _ THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY JULY /AUGUST 1976 NL ki t, G t Facts by Gregory G. Rushford Woodrow Wilson observed that "Congress stands almost helplessly - outside of the departments. Even the special, irksome, ungracious investiga- tions which it from � time to time institutes... do not afford it more. than a glimpse of the inside of a small province of federal administration. . It can violently disturb, but it cannot often fathom, the waters of the sea in which the bigger fish of the civil service swim and. feed. Its dragnet stirs without cleansing the bottom.", This elegant statement summarizes what I learned during the irksome, ungracious, congressional in vestigat ion of the CIA, - As a staff 'member of the 1-louse Select Committee on Intelligence, I was charged with investigating how. well the intelligence agencies had been doing their job. It was a simple and reasonable question, but in trying to get an _answer, I encountered the bureaucratic obstacles that hide the truth about government performance. The 'story of those obstacles, and our attempts to surmount them, sheds light oil the present balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. Despite recent press stories that Congress is reasserting itself, the CIA�exceptional in many ways but in this one quite typical�used every -ex- ecutive branch tactic to frustrate our investigation. The CIA's idea of a perfect investi- gation was roughly as follows: The committee's staff members woi:1.1 he inv...!stigated by the FBI, and if ee passed, we would rek.;eive Top Set. ret security clearances. We would sign CIA employee secrecy oaths and would be denied access to the win- partments of information beyond Top Secret�that is, to most of the files. � CIA censois would read every docu- ment we requested. Those censors would have authority to delete words, paragraphs, even entire pages. If we took notes liorn documents at agency headquarters, the notes would be cell- Gregory G. Kushford ll'US On the staff of the House Select Committee on in telli.:;ence. sorecl. Monitors would be present every time we in tervie d agency employees. Moreover, the committee would sign agreements limiting the areas of investigation and agree to disclosure restrictions. The chairman of our com- mittee, so the CIA intended, would keep much of his information from other committee members. The com- mittee, in turn, would keep inforrna- � tion from the rest of Congress. Arne-never I requested documents from the CIA (or the State Depart- ment, or the Pentagon, or whatever agency we were studying) the liaison officer would ask why I needed them. Did I realize how sensitive they were? Wasn't I worried about showing such secrets to congressmen? We started off with a series of hearings on the. intelligence budget. Senior officials came from all over the intelligence community to brief us.. But the briefings were canned affairs - in �which the .officials took hours to read from tables and charts and to initiate us into the nuances of bureau- , cra.tese. We saw the same budget books they present to the appropria- tions conunittees and learned how vague they were. After repeated tele- phone calls, we managed to get a few documents delivered right to our of- fices, but when we looked at them, we found entire pages missing,�only the "Top Secret" stamp remained. Staff investigators who asked for further details conk' not get them. With only a week left hetore the scheduled opening oz. cm:- hearins, Rep. Otis � Pike had to call the Pentagon and threaten to hold a press conference before we received any information from therm The National Security Agency (which monitors foreign com- munications) would not give us even the basic document which controls its operations. Despite all this, we had, by July 31, assembled at least as much infor- mation as the standing appropriations � committees traditionally have, a re- flection less of our diligence than of 10 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 � the other committees' timidity. � During the next eight dayS We held our first seven hearings. :Deaf' and Diunh � The Comptroller General Of the United States, Elmer Staats, was the - first witness. He testified that he knew very little about where the intelligence agencies put their money because he had to depend on them for all the � , information about their programs. The General Accounting Office, which . Staats directs, had written to the CIA . in January 1975, for instance, but never received a reply. Ever: when the CIA came up with the� information � Staats wanted, he had no way to � verify it independently. � Next came James Lynn, director of the Office of Management and Budu-. � et. Lynn repeatedly refused to discuss anything of substance as long as the committee sat in open session. If we ,would only lock the doors and go into closed session, Lynn said, he was ready to answer all questions. The committee closed the doors: After waiting for nearly a half hour, while experts "debugged" the hearing room, we discovered another � problem. Lynn said he would not discuss certain subjects because the stenographer was cleared only for Top ; Secret: When the 'committee finally :got . to question Lynn, he was � not . I much more specific than he had been :in the public session. Pike later called . the experience "miserable and worth- ; less." Lynn Certainly, could not dem- �. onstrate that his organization had any i sort of grasp on the CIA's budget. The Lynn experience Was repeated , !time and again that week with other 'witnesses. In public, we were prorn- ised full cooperation; in private we clic' ,not get it. William Colby, then the !director of the CIA, gave us little ;lectures on the evils of COmmunism, iillustrated with a "Freedom of Infor- ' :rnation" chart. "We live in a free .society," ht said, pointing to a series I of X's on the American side of the !chart.. The X'S marked off such institutions as newspapers, television, gov- ernment publications, and, naturally, .-congressional hearings. That was how the Russians gathered intelligence on us. But on the Russian side�aha!�the X's were controlled. Such gimmickry' prompted Rep. Philip Hayes to tell CiAlay he was tired Of hearing "appeals to a very low level of political sophis- tication." The testimony of Colby and Gen. . Lew Allen of the National Security . Agency illustrated one other way the intelligence agencies have traditionally thwarted congressional oversight. Over the years both the CIA and the NSA have answered hundreds of questions from congressional 'committees by providing summaries of internal docu- ments, almost always self-serving, and not the documents themselves. What . is the difference? Colby .had said, in one of our closed sessions, that "cer- tain differences had arisen between a ..certain ambassador and the CIA per- sonnel" over the .wisdom of one cov- ert operation. .We finally'got hold of � the Original document, which put the matter in somewhat different terms. The ambassador had actually said to the CIA station chief, "To hell with your headquarters. if � you don't go .along with this, I will instruct the Marine guards. to take you and place. - you on the airplane and ship you out � of here." � In August, we questioned the Pen- � � tagon's top civilian intelligence offi- cial, Albert Hall. He explained, help- fully, that his organization worked :very well. When asked if the system ..had 'broken down at any time in. I recent crises, Hall responded, "Well, if you are talking about the 1973. Middle' 1East war, in fact, the outbreak of war was foreseen, and this information I was handled correctly and was pro-. vided to the people who should have �I had it." Here -too the documents told I. a different story. Weeks later we - � .1received the basic CIA post-mortem on that war, Which began: "There was an intelligence failure in the weeks �...preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on October .6.. Those elements of the intelligence commu- nity responsible for the production of � finished intelligence did not perceive � the growing possibility of an 'Arab�. 'attack and thus did not warn of its imminence.". � Hall also demonstrated some of the more incongruous aspects of the clas- sification system. Published informa- � tion put out by the Defense Depart- � silent revealed that military attaches were stationed in 86 different coun- � tries, including two recent additions, Algeria and Bangladesh. But the De- fense Department said that the numbers and locations of the attaches � were � classified as "secret." 'Hall, looking embarrassed, could not � explain the disparity. Rep. Aspin � . termed such. practices "bizarre" and pointed out the weaknesses of a .'classification system which permitted executive branch officials to &el( 'apparently on whim, What to kte':. .seeret. Repeated experiences with th.. sort of, capriciousness fostered th_. committee's subsequent decisions to publish information despite the � executive branch's unwillingness to do so. . I Many frustrations � lingered after the August bearings were over. On � June 10, � before the hearings had begun, President Ford said publicly that he would give the committee 11 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 material .from the Rockefeller -Com- mission's investigation of intelligence abuses, "plus. any other material that is available in the executive branch." Yet we did not receive an tmcensoreil -version of the "family jewels," th. Ix house CIA study of abuses, unt mid-October, 15 minutes' before Pi!'.. held a press conference to charge thai there had. been a coverup and ntor than four months after Ford had . promised to supply the material_ On September II,the committee � � held a hearing .On one of the mos widely suspected instances of incom- petent intelligence�that associated with the 1973 Middle East war. We knew- of several instances in the past � when the intelligence system had failed�the 1968 sTet offensive, the Soviet iavaSion of Czechoslovakia in .1968, the 1974 coups in Portugal and Cyprus, and India's nuclear .in 1974. The Mideast heaeino, , designed to explore why the intell- '� gence agencies had failed at the. they were supposed to carry oto -- namely, to provide accurate informa- � tion on international developments.. , Just one day after we held that hearing, President Ford announced that we wo.nid be denied any fuethe.r � . classified information_ tie asked us to 'return our files and later coma,.tred us to 'common criminals_ What the com- mittee had done the previous after- noon was to vote in closed session to � .publith a portion ,of an official CIA post-mortem of the Mideast failure_ Under �the resolution which SCE up the committee, we were supposedly 'authorized to disclose information which related to tlt intelligence agencies' activities_ in public �session the CIA .had read. us two of the seven paragraphs of the post-mortem, both moderately favorable to the agency. But it had refused to declassify the other five. That afternoon the core mittee Spent hours on those five pare-- graphs and realiied the CIA had ra ;reasonable grounds for keeping them . secret. They did not reveal any intelli- gence sources and methods�the two items the CIA might legitimately want 1 to protect�but they did demonstrate just how badly .U.S. intelligence had !performed prior to the Middle East war. There was no "national security" :at stake, only bureaucratic self- . protection. For example, the CIA wanted to suppress one sentence which revealed only a misjudgment: "The movement of Syrian troops and Egyptian mili- tary readiness are considered to be coincidental and not. designed to lead to major hostilities." Another para- graph the CIA wanted to censor noted that a "Watch Committee," which was supposed to judge the imminence of hostilities, failed to do so even after the war had begun. 12 So the committee decided to pub- lish. The CIA's reaction was predicta- ble; among other things, it called a press conference and told reporters � that the release of four words ("and greater communications security") en- dangered national security. , President Ford finally agreed to deliver more classified information, promising we would get everything we needed�but only after a full month of negotiation and on the condition that he could veto any material the com- mittee chose to publish. But we still faced repeated delays. On � October 20, for example, Pike wrote to �the President, asking permis- sion for me to visit the National Security Council. There I was to obtain a list of all CIA covert opera- tions authorized by the top-level "40 Committee" since 1965 and to find out the committee's procedures for approving the operations. We needed this information in order to confirm or refute other indications that the procedures had often been haphazard. After repeated calls I did get the list_ On it I found each CIA operation described as follows: "On [date giv- en] the 40 Committee approved a covert operation in ----." Or, "A -media project was authorized for ---." Not one actual operation was disclosed. CIA Monitors In � one way, however, even this document contained a major revela- tion. Beside each blank from May 1972 until the end of 1974, the word "telephonic" appeared. I asked Gen. . Brent Scowcroft, Ford's National Se- curity advisor, what that meant. He said that the approval had been given , over the telephone, without formal meeting. In other words, the 40 Com- mittee, the most sensitive committee in government, had not met in more than two years. Nearly 40 CIA opera- tions had been approved without the . opportunity for debate, or a consider- ation of risks and alternatives by anyone outside the CIA. (We held a public hearing on that point the fol- lowing week. Since then, -President Ford has taken steps to -insure that meetinas are held and accurate records maintained.) As the investigation progressed, the CIA dropped even the pretense of cooperation. All of the intelligence agencies went to great lengths to keep us from informal contact or interviews with their employees. They were also adamant about having monitors pres- ent. A monitor came along from the National Security Agency when I in- terviewed an NSA Middle East ana- lyst, The poor monitor panicked vhen 1 left him behind in the front office.. After a quick phone call to NSA Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 headquarters, he broke past our Capi- tol Hill police guard and ran through the committee room yelling that the witness should not say anything to 'those people," Genuinely afraid that the scene would lead to violence, committee staff director Searle Field agreed that the monitor could sit in on just this one interview. Kissinger Balks The NSA had reason for its fears. :� The analyst I interviewed was one Who had accurately forecast war in ' the Middle East before it broke out on October 6, 1973. The NSA leadership had discounted her coutomous predic- tions. Truly excellent technical intelli- gence had gime unheeded. Henry Kissinger, of course, threW up the most obstacles. We had to request information from him; he. chaired three crucial panels�the Q. Committee, the NSC's Intelligence .Committee, and the Verification Pan- el, which handled intelligence related-- to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). But Kissinger refused to give up a -- single piece of paper without a fight. He termed one of � our subpoenas .� merely a. -"request" and refused to honor it. It took a contempt of Congress resolution approved by the committee to get him to honor several *subpoenas. He silenced witnesses* and at one point issued instructions. that, nobody in the -State Department was. � to talk to anyone from the Pike � Committee unless an official' State Department monitor was present. . We wanted, for example, to ask one of Kissinger's subordinates'to explain -a mysterious contradiction in � out policy toward Greece. We had heard that, When tensions were rising .On Cyprus, the State Department had warned that Greek dictator Dimitrios loannidis was moving to overthrow Archbishop Makarios. But the CIA, at just that time, was conducting diplo- matic talks with loannidis� in Athens. !We learned that Thomas Boyatt, a ; foreign service Officer, might be able to explain what the CIA station had :.been up to. But Kissinger refused to �. let us talk to Boyatt without a State Department monitor present, and the monitor forbade the *man to tell . us � even the most .basic � Later I interviewed another foreign service officer on the same subject, with the� same result. We called one of Kissin- � ger's deputies to ask for cooperation.' He asked us to put the PSO on the phone and.then told him again not to'. give us any help.. - The committee was getting angry . about treatment like this, especially because we had received almost no � documents on the Cyprus affair. So the committee voted to subpoena a memo which Boyatt had written to . Kissinger after the Cyprus affair. Once more we found ourselves in trouble. Among the other accusations that � rained down upon us was a compari- son to .10.e McCarthy. The State De- partment said we were "interfering" with advice given on policy by a subordinate. .But Boyatt, the subordi- nate in question, had said that he 'was � willing to Eve us the information. Under existing law, there was no way the *State Department* could prevent its employees from giving information to Congress. The State Department's claim .that it was protecting Boyatt from "inter- � ference" like ours was somewhat dis- - ingenous. Boyatt had been denied normal reassignment by two =basso- . dors and one assistant secretary, both for his Cyprus dissent and for his activities on behalf of the Foreign Service Association, which lobbies for employee rights. We eventually pres� � sured the State Department to reas, sita him. � A human victory, only we never . learned what the intelligence network had told Henry Kissinger before the Cyprus coUp, nor did we receive all the documents We sought. Bureaucratic Lessons Despite all these obstacles, by De- cember we had acquired a great deal of information the CIA did not want us to have, thereby -meeting one of the tests of a good- investigation. We had data about the intelligence budget which Congress had never obtained � before. We had *learned about every CIA operation the National Security. Council had approved since 1965. We also had original docuMents on an especially vital issue�Soviet compli-. ance with SALT agreements�thanks to committee votes' to cite Henry Kissinger for contempt of Congress when -he first refused to honor . our subpoenas. These were our sucaesses. To a large extent they were achieved be- cause of our reaction to the dismal � failure of those first eight days of hearings, when the administration of- ficials just refused to cooperate. This inspired us to it our teeth. Pike and � Field set a basic rule for the investiga- ttors: be so aggressive you get com- � plained about. There were complaints every week. When the CIA tried to distract us With proposals that we investigate sexy trivia, such as a minor ;official's indiscretions with shellfish.-. ; toxins and other poisons, .we fefusd.�,. We learned one of the timeless � lessons of bureaucratic life�that it is . necessary to talk to people at the � "working levels" of the bureaucracy 13 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 and not just the. leadership. Leaders of huge agencies, responsible for any � � mismanagement, will always resist giv- ing evidence Of 'their own corruption' or incompetence. One senior official' � � close to the CIA's hierarchy told me � privately that he considered the CIA's analytic system "rotten," and. that - Colby's management was ruining :the! agency. "But why should I risk all and! � tell these things to the Pike Commit- tee.?" he asked. "Where were those congressmen when the CIA was not � on the front pages, and where will they be when the Pike Committee's jurisdiction expires?" It was an argu- ment I heard often and could not � really .refute.. It was different one step down. The majority of mid-level officials, . contrary to the conventional wisdom, are competent.. and hard working. Above all, they are concerned with poor tnanagement and will talk about it to anyone who seems interested in improving their codition. And eve;' . when these officials don't give, you any valuable information, the 'simple knowledge that you've talked . with them .makes their superiors more can- did. These interviews helped us pick out some of the' weak points in the intelligence bureaucracy. Pentagon an- alysts would tell us What they thought of their counterparts in the CIA.! Asking one agency about another,. or one office in the same agency about: . another, is a ' simple but effective device. Everyone wants tci. tell his side of the story, and the rivalries among � � the intelligence agencies � are as fierce , as those anywhere in government From analysts in the Defense Intel- ligence Agency, CIA, and State De- partment, I learned that the intelli- � gence studies made on the Soviet Backfire bomber might have been dishonest. The most important ques- tion was whether the Backfire could (or would) be deployed against targets :in the United States. Answering this :question correctly obviously was � ..important for SALT. The accusations about the Backfire ranged all through the intelligence ...4community. The Air Force .was al- leged to have put pressure on a de- � fense contractor, simply because the Air Force disagreed with a study the contractor had done for the CIA. One office of the CIA accused another of deliberately hiring a consultant who was known as a "downgrader" of Soviet aircraft in order to influence � the Backfire study results. Another CIA office was accused of misrepre- senting the plane's performance char- acteristics, because that office had its own policy line to peddle to our ner4otiators. The CIA takes great pride in its intellectual integrity, so, these accusa- tions could hurt. The SALT .negotia- tions were under way even as we car- ried out our investigation, and Pike did not want to risk complicating� them by having a public hearing on the Backfire. But the CIA did not know that. I was able to imply several tin:es, when cleating with the CIA ceitA)r, that this issue could be very, very upple;bant if it were publicized.' When 1 gut far enough into the story to present a threat, the CIA censor decided to call The agency had found some documents I might want to look at, he said. Those documents�which were "secret," but which served the agency's ends�revealed,. among many other things, that the director of the DIA aed a high. CIA official onee thought that Henry Kissinger might be suppressing vital information about SALT. Upset, they had gone to the acting CIA director, Vern on Walters, and asked him to approach President Nixon about the problem. Those doc- uments, which told us a great deal about the bureaucratic politics of SALT, were essentially a damage-limi- tation exercise by the CIA, which was concerned about its Own reputation_ Otherwise, we 'would never have ob- tained them.. A Sorry Picture The intelligence administrators had shown us neat organization charts. outlining their functions. What we, actually found, however, was a veryi. poorly administered intelligence s:y's-i tera The NSCs Intelligence Commit- tee, for example, which looked im-! pressive on the charts, had had only two meetings�one of them to organ- ize itself.., Perhaps .our more important find- ing was that Congress cannot oversee the intelligence agencies without mak- . ing a determined effort to sepitrate. the truth froui lies. Other less zi..iu-essive coiirnittecs had . been over the same ground before-. The House Armed ..ServiCes Jutelligence subcommitte, for example, had been told about II .� official CIA post-mortem study of �the ,intelligence failure before the Middle 'East war. But that subcommittee nev- er saw the actual document; its brief-: ing consisted of reading selected ma- terial from the study displayed on a slide projector.. And it was not told there was a second Middle East post- rno rtt� f f!,. which documented a shock- ing irtetere. .p�rforrnance at. tf.:le time ti:e� corit.ronazion in hate Octo! 1973. Nor did the know the official post- � mortem covered up key weaknesses in the intelligence bureaucracy_ Other official briefincrs I saw, including those related to nua:ar arms matters. were 14 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 always vague, always incompIe.-te. We also found eVidence that the true intellieence budget is several times larger than that which the Con- gress annually approves. The six for- eign episodes we � selected for closer study revealed mismanaged intelli- gence on a large scale. The CIA could offer no major .analytical success. "Current intelligence" reports suf- fered because the leadership kept the analysts busy with meetings, phony deadlines, and "coordinating" policy differences between offices. There was precious little time left to think and write. The CIA's longer-term intelli- gence estimates were also weak, and the bureacratic structure promised lit- tle improvement. We found an alarm- ing number of cases in which 'crucial information had been collected in time, but had not been disseminated until after the war had begun�just like the classic Pearl Harbor failure. We found that Henry Kissinger kept valuable information away from the CIA. We had only to go beyond the official explanations to realize that reform of the analytical side of U. S. intelligence is long overdue and sorely - needed. We also found pressures which ' distorted honest intelligence during the entire Vietnam war. The pressures came from the military, the State Department, and the White House, and had one purpose: to force the CIA to report "facts" about Vietnam which would support the war policy, regardless of truth. Many officials who resisted such pressures found their careers finished; those who kept quiet _ were promoted. Fight Like Hell But it was the question of how well we monitor Soviet adherence to the SALT aueements which 1 found most troublesome. It .shoWed how dangerous bureaucratic rivalry can be-' come for the whole country when the bureaucrats operate in secret . . � On -October 17, 1972, when the agencies established a steering mech- anism to ..monitor ----'Soviet � SAI:71.. compliance with the agreements signed the previous May, a colonel on Kissinger's NSC staff called the CIA's Director of Strategic Research to say: "Dr. ,Kissinger wanted to avoid any written judgments to the effect that the Soviets have violated any of the SALT agreements. If the Director believes that the Soviets may be in violation, this should be the subject of a Me mo ran du m from him to Dr. Kissinger. The judgment that a viola- tion is considered to have occurred is one' that will be made at the highest levet" What this meant, in effect, was that the intelligence service had been deprived of its basic rationale. Henry � Kissinger, the official most responsible for making SALT policy, also con- trolled information about how well the policy was working�an affront not only to the purpose of the CIA but to every prudent- notion about avoiding administrative disasters. To be sure, Kissinger had his prob;- lem with some elements of the intelli- gence community who were leaking to the press inaccurate information about Soviet violations, but the way . to handle that problem was with a rifle aimed at the sinners not a shot- gun blasting away at the entire area of factual reporting of SALT violations.. Even more disturbing than what Kissinger was doing was his passion � for concealing it from Congress. And even. more disturbing than that is the fact that Kissinger and the intelligence chiefs are typical of the executive branch leadership in their determina- tion to protect Congress from know- ledge of their affairs; in their tendency to iDtore the fact that, after all, the -executive and legislative branches work for the same employer. 'I am convinced that Wilson was Wrong in thi--,:;ny, Ce:1:.:-tess cannot, Overcosne t:Indert;:v. (...:iftleses- sional committees can probe the depths of the federal bureaucracy, and provide the infiarroation that we all need to know. But pending the day when irrational adversary attitudes between the branches are replaced by a cooperative spirit of _service, -they had Atter be prepateitfter4i* hell NEWSWEEK 26 JUDI 1976 A day after Jimmy Carter selected him as the Democrats' Vice Presiden.- tial nominee, .Fritz Mondale head- . ed home to Washington. Aboard- a storm-tossed plane, Mondale granted . his first interview ,about himself and, the fall campaign to INIEN;vswEEk's � John 3. Lindsay.. Excerpts' from the � interview: �ill:0101.061jr EXC ER PT ED : - Q. Haven't you gone too far with that In 04 area of the investigative agencies? A. Take the CIA. I never joined - those who wanted to prohibit covert activities. I did say they should be much more limited; put -under respon- sible control and used only .in those � rare instances where it is essential. And I think that is the proper line to .draw.. I never attacked the need for � the best intelligence apparatus in the world. I never attacked the need for . the Federal Bureau of Investigation.. I . attacked the abuse of power. ea 15 WASHINGTON POST 1 0 JUL 1975 Castro Is Linked. To Ruby; Oswald 7.11IAMI, July 9 l'UPD� Cuban Premier Fidel -Cas- tro and Jack Ruby dis- cussed "removal of the President" at a 1963 meet- ing 10 weeks prior to President Kennedy's' as- sassination, according to Watergate burglar and . one-time Central Intelli- � gence Agency agent Frank Sturgis. Sturgis claimed in a telephone interview Thurs- day he had been assigned to investigate possible in- volvement of Cuban exiles 'in the Kennedy assassina- tion. He would not say What agency had ordered the probe. The investigation failed to show any Cuban exile links to Kennedy's death, but produced evidence that Kennedy assassin Lee Harvey Oswald and Ruby, who'. shot Oswald in Dallas, were "involved in the same conspiracy, along with other people," Stur- ,�gis said. He said he and '!other agents" gave infor- - illation of the meeting to -.several government agencies in .1964. Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 SCIENCE 25 June 1976 Glonzar Explorer: CIA's Salvage Ship a Giant Leap in Ocean Engineering NelA information about the CIA's deep sea. recovery vessel.. the Ghana,- Explorer. makes it possible for-the first time to en % isaue roughle how the ship and its associeted eysteme w ere designed to operate in their iechnoloeically tm- precedented mission. According to ac- counts that appeared in larch and April last year. the recover) system w as de- signed to salvage a Russian submarine that sank in 17.000 feet of V. ater some. 750 miles northwest of Oahu. Ha s% au. The new facts. made aveileble as part. of the governments effort to lease the ship. are at variance with man) details of the descriptions reported in the national press last year. They also are hard to reconcile I.:1th the leadine version of � what the mission accomplished. :a:cord- ire: to which the submarine e reisett in one piece. hot during the ascent two thirds of it broke away and pluneed back to the ocean floor, never to be recov- ered. Yet neither the Glomar Explorer's interior well, nor its associated barge. the. HMB-.1 were designed to accommo- . date a full length submarine. The CIA's tleep sea recovery system, despite its unique capabilities, has now been broken up. The submersible barge has been given to the Energy Research and Development Administration for an ocean heat experiment. ERDA also has custody of the "strongback.- which was the main frame of a crucial and still secret component of the system. the grappling machine that enveloped the submarine wreckage. The strongbacke reputedly the largest single piece of steel ever made, was recently saved from the cutlers torch at 24 hours' notice: , The Cilornar Expii.iree itself is ,moored at Lone Beach. California. No govern.: ment agency has an immediate use for it. Unless a civilian User can be found in the next few months the ship. which cost about S250 million to build. will probably go to the scrapyard. Yet the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere described the vessel in a recent letter to the White House as a. "great national asset.- Wit- lion A. Nierenberg. director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanoeraphe and a consultant to the National Security Agency. has compared the achievement of constructing the Glomar Explorer with that of the Manhattan project. And Admiral J. Eilw ard Snyder. until re- centl) the Oceanographer of the Navy. told Science that the system "is prob- able' � the greatest technical achievement in ocean engineet ing in my lifetime.- The chief reason for these plaudits is the considerable leap by w hid) the. Glo- mar Elidorer exceeds the best existing technology. Hitherto the deep sea wi:ight-lifting record has been held by the Alcoa .S'eaprolye. t%hieh can raise 50 tons front 15.000 feet. According to a Global Marine Corporation brochure, the Millar Etplorer can. handle "pay- loads in excess of 1500 tons- to about 17.000 feet. an increase of more than 30- fol d . Itic advantage seems to have been gained by skillful use of existing tech- niques rather than any dramatic break- through. The ship was built with im- pressive speed. The design contract was let in May 1971. the hull delivered in July 1973. and the system completed by May 1974. Designed specifically for salvaging the Russian submarine. the Wenner Er- plorer could also raise manganese nod- ules in accordance with the CIA's cover story that the ship was a mining vessel in the employ of Howard Hughes. Three sources of information about the system are now available. The Gener- al Services Administration., the govern- ment's housekeeping agency. has put � the Glomar Explorer's operating manual 'on public view .as part of its effort to lease the : ship. The GSA has also re- leased a Global Marine brochure which gives a brief description of the strong- hack, and ERDA has released details of the barge. None of these sources de- scribes how the three components oper- ated together as a system, which remains a matter of conjecture. . The key operation of the system .was to raise and lower the grappling machine. With a weight in air of 2130 tons. the ' device was almost as massive as the entire submarine it was to salvage. The machine was equipped with a seawater hydraulic system. presumably to power the attachments that secured the le reek- age. and with thrusters for fine position- ing. A principal purpose of the submersible barge was to transfer the grappling ma- chine into the central tell. or "moon po91.- of the Glamor Explorer. The ma- � chine was too big and 'heavy to come on board front above, so it had to be in- troduced front below water. The barge. hich could dive to and return from a depth of 165 feet w ith a load of 2500 tons. was the solution to this problem. Pre- : sumably the barge carrying the grappling machine was towed out to the rendez- vous point, whereupon it sank to the !bottom and rolled back its roof. The Glamor Explorer would then have maneuvered overhead, flooded its moon pool, and slid back the gates on its bot- tom to open the moon. pool to the see. Visible on either side of the main deo iek (see figure) are two tall towers. w hose purpose. according to one account lest 16 year. was -to deceive observers (Melo el- ing Soviet fishing ships) into believing that the Explorer was deep sea mining.'" In fact the towers are steerable dockin,, legs. Placed at. either end of the moon pool, their purpose is to slide down until they penetrate the barge below and mate with docking pins on the grappling ma- chine. The machine is then drawn up. probably by the docking legs alone, .the gates are closed, and the moon pool de- watered. By the reverse of the same operation. the barge could have been used to transfer the grappling machine or large pieces of submarine from ship to shore. According to bargemaster Harvey � Smith. the only voyage the . barge has ever Made is to Santa Catalina Island. a - few miles off Long Beach. It was presum- ably here that the transfer to and from the ship took place. With the grappling machine on board. its weight still supported by the docking legs. the Glamor Explorer would has e journeyed alone to the mid-Pacific site of the sunken submarine. Equipping the .ship for its task were a.number of unusu- al features. A dynamic positioning sys- tem kept the ship hovering to within an average of 10 feet from its target site. To insulate the. pipestring from strains caused by the buffeting of w ire's and waves, the derrick was mounted on gim- bals which allowed the ship to pitch around while the derrick and its pipe- string kept steady. Transfer of the grappling machine from docking lege to pipestrine would have been a maneuver of some delicacy. since the two would be responding differ- - ently to the movements of the sea. The pipestring was formed of seg- ments 60. feet long and weighing about 13 tons apiece. An automatic system of cranes and elevators selected the 'pipes from .their storage racks and delivered them to the derrick at the rate of one every 10 minutes. Each segment was screwed into the growing string. The string was lowered or raised by a heavy lift system consisting of two yokes. each powered by a pair of hydraulic cylinders. which grasped the pipe alternately in a hand over hand motion. The 17.000 foot string. which had ex- traordinary stresses placed upon it. was no ever) day piece of pipe. It was made of enriched gun tube steel, and tapered in six stages from pipe segments a massive 151/2 inches in diameter through to seg- ments 123/4 inches across. The inner di- ameter of all segments was 6 inches. . To the bottom of the. pipestring was attached a strengthening device know n asn dutchman. and an apex block with a three-legged bridle w hich attached to the grappling machine. Divers fastened an electromechanical cable to the outside a the pipe as the string was let down. According to the Global Marine brochure, the seawater hydraulic devices on .the strongback Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2 01 8/1 0/01 CO2 6 2 3 71 8 can be operated by pumping water do's n the bore of the string. The ship's oper- ating manual also states that the pipe has the capacity for air. injection when rais- ing materials. If both statements are true. possibly seawater was firm pumped down to power the grapples. followed by air injected into chambers in the grap- pling machine, perhaps, so as. to offset. ' some of its weight. The possibility of air injection into the grappling machine makes it hard to as- sess the Glomar Explorer's lifting capac- ity. According to the operating manual_ the heavy lift system -is not intended to oPerate above 14.8 million pounds (6607 . long tons1 static load." although higher loads can be tolerated for short periods. Muchof this capacity would have gone � into lifting the pipesuing and grappling ' � machine. Figures given in the operating manual for. the weight of the various pipe segments indicate that the full string would have weighed about 9 million pounds in air. giving a we; weight of 3525 . tons. The operating manual also gives the wet Weight of the "mining machine" (presumably the grappling machine�the manual is written to accord with the mining vessel cover story) as 1830 tons. � Subtraction of these two figures from that for the capacity of the lift. system gives 1252 tons, which, with the 11/2 safe- ty factor that salvors like to allow for. would suggest a Payload Of 835 tons. (Curiously enough. the figure of 800 tons � turned up in last year's accounts, being_ quoted by the Washington Post as the , lifting Capacity of the barge and by the New York Times as that of the derrick. These quantities are as far out as Time's , figure for the weight of the pipestring. 400.000 pounds. and Newsweek's esti- - Mate of the lift system's capacity as. 12,000 pounds.) � The Global Marine brochure. how-:' ever. mates that payloads in excess of 1500 tons can be deployed, the differ- ence perhaps being due to the capacity for offsetting the weight of the strong- back by air injection. And a figure quot- ed by R. Curtis Crooke. president of the Global Marine Development Corpora- tion. to a recent meeting of the National � Advisory Committee on Oceans and At- mosphere. implies a Payload of just un- der 2000 tons. The Glomar Explorer's exact payload is a figure. of sonic interest beeause of its bearing on whether. the Russian subma- � rine could have been salvaged in one 7 piece. The first press accounts. including � that of the Los Angeles Times. which . broke the Story. had the submarine being picked up in pieces. But the Los Angeles Times in a later story specifically denied earlier information that "the submarine was found in three separate sections" in favor of a version that the vesSel. -.intact but badly damaged, was raised about 5.000 feet . before two thirds of it broke away-- The significance, perhaps, of the latter version is that it provides a neat explana- don for the one piece of information on. which all Press accounts were -agreed� that- the CIA recovered only one third of the submarine. .Yet this. version of the Glamor .Ekplorer's mission. though pos- sible. seems unlikely for several reasons. . First, submarines implode on sinking be- low theirdesign depth. and the crumpled 'wreck may then smash into the bottom at� high speed. an experience which the sub- marine is unlikely - to survive in one piece. Of the two American nuclear sub- marines that have sunk. the Scorpion lies � with its bow and stern broken oft' from ..the midship section, and the Thresher disintegrated .into a larger number of pieces surrounded by a debris field half a mile in radius. � Second even if the Glomat. Explorer had lifted the Russian submarine off the � bottom in one piece, it is hard to see what would have happened next, The obvious way for the ship to recover ob- jects is to bring them, into its flooded Moon pool, then close the gates and de- water the � pool. According to Jane's - Fighting Ships. however the length.of a Golf class submarine is 320 feet, too long by far to fit into the 199 foot moon pool. Alternatively, the Glomar Explorer might have kept the submarine sus- pended just beneath her, sailed for the nearest shallow water, and dumped the . submarine . there within easy reach of divers. But if this were the approach, it would make more sense to dump the submarine into the barge: Yet though the . barge is 324 feet, long,, its interior enve- lope is only 256 feet in length. Since the :whole system was designed, with no ex-. � pense spared, for the specific purpose of salvaging the submarine, it would seem � . reasonable to infet that the largest piece .the CIA � expected to retrieve was . no longer than the moon pool. . . Grappling Machine Sloppily .Designed? As for the submarine breaking free, �� from .the grappling machine, it .seems . Surprising that the designers of the recov- ery system should have been caught .out by so obviouS a contingency. Since the wreck would clearly have been in fragile -condition, it would make sense to design the grappling' machine so that it could , wrap .securely arotlad the entire Object - � being recovered. � -Another reason for doubting that the-. . submarine was raised in one piece is that such a .task. may .have been a little bit � beyond even .the Ghnnar Explorer's ca- pacity... The displacement weight of a Golfelass submarine is given by Jane's as 2350 tons. Soviet publications on sub- marine design suggest that about 8. 0 per- cent of such a vessel would consist of metallic objects. With a factor of .0.87 . to offset the weight of Steel in Water, - the wet weight of the flooded out subma- rine might be estimated' as 1640 tons. Payload capacity to lift .such an object. with a prudent 50 percent safety. factor. . would be some 2500 tons. which Seems 17 more than the Gloomy Explorer probably had. . Assuming for the moment that the sub- marine was not in fact raised in one , piece, why should such a cock-and-bull ' story have worked its way into several" . .circumstantial accounts of the Gkonar Explorer's mission? Speculation can go only so far, but it seems reasonable to expect that the CIA, which had kept the project secret for so long. was in control of most of the information that appeared last year. Intelligence agencies are not on oath in their communications with the press. Remembering the affair of the U-2 spy plane. which the Soviet Union toler-� ated until the first official confirmation by the U.S. government, the CIA would presumably have sought to avoid humili- ating the Russians by admitting that any- thing of much interest had been. recov- ered from the submarine. Yet the agency Might not have wished to pretend that the Gloom,- Explorer's mission was a complete failure at a time when it was under heavy public criticism for activi- ties nearer home. As it happens, the story that emerged � last year Seems almost tailor-made, as it were, to justify the Glomar Explorer's operation without embarrassing the So- viet Union. A third of the submarine was recovered, according to most of the .newspapers briefed by the CIA. but it contained no missiles, no code room. and only the indication of two nuclear tippable torpedoes. The CIA specifically . denied reports that the whole submarine. or two of its nuclear torpedo warheads. had been recovered. Yet most accounts. while agreeing on that. differed with each other and the probable truth in many technical details, of the Glomor Explorer's operation and in most estimates of the system's charac- teristics. That might reflect simply the 'difficulty of acquiring hard to come by inforpation against tight deadlines. It might also reflect a pattern of manipula- tion by the chief source of information. If the latter is the case-,,the actual results of the Glomar Explorer's mission � can only be guessed at. The expedition may. have been a total failure. On the other hand, the ship bears the stamp of . ; such powerful design and superior capa- bilities that a technical failure through. lack of foresight would be more surpris- ing than not. It seems quite possible that the 'Russian submarine was broken into several pieces. For what it is worth, the Glamor Explorer is reported to have spent a month at the recovery site in 1974. From the information now avail- able this would seem to be time enough for the grappling machine to have made perhaps as many as five journeys to the oCean floor and back, retrieving a piece of submarine on each occasion. Just con- ceivably, the Glothar Explorer has been declared surplus because she scooped up almost everything her designers intended her to garner.�Nicuot.As WADE Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 gncreftg Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 � Sat., July 17, 1976 --11 1" '1;":: �4 \ i _ r8utlarie's reaor� Ad its� BY NORMAN KEMPSTER Times Staff Writer WASHINGTON�The CIA has committed burglaries to obtain infor- mation about Americans living or traveling abroad, Director George Bush admitted in court papers Made public Friday. In a sworn affidavit, Bush also said that the CIA had overheard with hid- den microphones or wiretaps the con- versations of Americans in foreign Countries. Bush submitted the statement in response to written questions from lawyers for the Socialist Workers Party, which has filed a $37 million damage suit against the FBI, CIA and other government agencies charging violation of the rights of party mcinbers. � A CIA spokesman said that the agency had never rejected the use of surreptitious entry as a technique for gathering information abroad. But he refused to say whether the CIA still conducted burglaries against Ameri- can citizens overseas. Herbert Jordan, a New York attor- THE CLEVELAND _PRESS 25 June 1976 ney representing the Socialst 'Work ers, said the party would argue th CIA-sponsored break-ins were illeg I if they were directed against Ame cans. The case apparently will be t e first in which a court is asked to cide the legality of such overseas a tivities of :1.5.S. intelligence agencies. "It is our position that surreptitious entries and warrantless surveillance of American citizens violates the Constitution regardless of whether it is done in the United States or, abroad," Jordan said. No date has been set for oral ar- guments in the case, which is being heard in U.S. District Court in New York. In written interrogatories, lawyers of the party asked the CIA if the So- cialist Workers or members of its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance, had been targets of burgla- ries, wiretaps or bugs during the last 13 years. The lawyers also demanded- lAbost here, ks !--15d onleakii,.; � By JULIAN KRAWCHECK George W. Bush, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, today said again that he is willing to testify be- fore congressional probers on. "sensi- tive information" but insisted anew that adequate safe- guards be erected against leaks to the news media. � In remarks prepared for delivery before the City Club Forum, Bush� pledged that the CIA would not em- ploy full-time journalists for intelli- gence purposes but said he reserved the right to make use of data volun- tarily furnished by newsmen. He indicated that all ground rules on these and other CIA procedures are subject to variances based on special conditions involving national security. Bush's � emarks were in response to criticism of the CIA from various sources for alleged non-cooperation with congressional probers and for the reputed use of journalists based in foreign countries for espionage purposes. * . fall details and doctiments from the agendy's files. Bush responded with a detailed affidvait that was clas- sified "top secret" by the CIA. The paper was turned over to the U.S. attorney's office in New York under conciions that make it available to the judge but not to the Socialist Workers or to the public. � . A three-page summary, couched in general terms, was '. Made public. , "Information . . . was aquired and a result of several L.surreptitious entries that were made into premises abroad as to which certain of the named plaintiffs. . . had regu- lar access or may have had proprietary interest," Bush said in the public affidavit: � The intentionally .vague language apparently coven break-ins at apartments, hotel rooms and offices. ' The Socialist Workers Party is a tiny left-wing organ', ; zation that was the target of FBI burglaries as part of the FBI's since-discontinued COINTELPRO (couunterintel- ! ligencd program) effort. Although the party's rhetoric is ; often inflammatory, its members have never been con- victed of political violence. ! Bush's affidavit referred only to burglaries, bugging� and wiretapping against members and officers of the carty ' and its youth affiliate. But in a 29-page brief filed along ,with the affidavit, the government implied that similar ,techniques were used against other targets. . "It is apparent that disclosure of the documents (provid- � ing the details demanded by the party) would reveal CIA sources and methods," U.S. attorney Robert- B. Fiske Jr. said in the accompanying brief. In court papers filed Friday, the Socialist Workers !urged the court to reject the CIA's secrecy plea and make .public the documents and Bush's detailed response to the Iwritten questions. � In addition to pressing the case in court, the party sent copies of Bush's affidavit to the Senate's new permanent iCommittee on Intelligence headed by Sen. Daniel K. In- ouye (D-Hawaii). The party urged the committee, created earlier this year as. a successor to the temporary commit- 'tee headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), to investigate Ithe extent of CIA burglaries. :.. The Church committee disclosed earlier that the CIA ,�-and the National Security Agency had intercepted tele- phone, cable and telex communications of Americans �,when at least one party to the communication was locat- ed in a foreign country. - The committee did not specifically refer to overseas 1 T burglaries by the CIA. , , Te siid he had appeared 28 times before congressional committees and subcommittees, and pledged his readiness to testify further "with proper regards for safeguards against leaks of sensitive information." Bush welcomed the creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelli- gence, headed by Sen. Daniel Inouye, of Hawaii, as a sort of clearinghouse for giving CIA data to Congress. � However, he said he would continue to cooperate with the six other Sen- ate committees interested in the intelligence field. "There has been no problem on the CIA's furnishing of sensitive data to the appropriate committees," Bush said.. "The,only problem has been with regard to leaks of infor- mation the comrnittees agreed should be withheld for security reasons." He conceded the difficulty of seal- ing the lips of all those privy to testi- mony before various committees but insisted that every possible safe- guard be erected and policed. At today's Forum special recognition' was given to 17 mem- bers who joined the club 50 or more years ago. Five of these; H.F. Schneider, Arthur J. Iteinthal, Rob- ert L Snajdr, Suggs Garber and A.H.. Zychick, have maintained member- ship continuously during that time." - 18 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718,, _ Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 HE MART DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio) .26 June 1976 its anger crresszonal ie By Douglas Y. Petirs CIA Director George W. Bush yesterday blamed congressional committees with CIA oversight privileges for the "unprecedented number of leaks in the last year." Bush told the City Club Forume`leaks can hurt American intelligence activities far into the future. The United States must have an intelligence agency second to none." He said a consolidation of congressional investigations would minimize leaks and the CIA is willing to cooperate with Congress in the future. ' "I personally appeared 28 times before congressional committees since becoming direc- tor.The CIA has disclosed its budget in minute detail to several congressional committees." Bush is opposed to the publication of any part of the CIA budget because "subsequent comparisons of the total figure changes" could reveal new intelligence activities. Bush said covert activities, which formerly. accounted for about 50% of the CIA budget, have been reduced to 2%. � � �-, "I believe no president should be' denied PUBLISHERS WEEKLY 28 JUNE 1976 CIA NOT ACTIVE IN THIS "BOOKS ABROAD" EDITORS, PUBLISHERS WEEKLy; We were amused to find in Publishers Weekly for May 17 a headline, "Senate Group Finds CIA Now Active Only in Books Abroad." Our quarterly review of contemporary world literature does in fact have several thousand readers and over 800 contributors scattered � across the globe, and while most of these individuals doubtless possess the artist's and intellectual's usual irasci- bility toward matters political, their activity as far as our journal is con- cerned is limited to short comments of ' a primarily literary-critical nature. As for our modest staff�well, we're eyeing each other suspiciously now but have not as yet uncovered any conneaions ; more nefarious than the MLA. WILLIAM aiGGAN Assistant Editor Books Abroad Norman, Okla. CIA AGAIN: QUIS CUSTOD1E7 I PSOS CU STOD ES? EDITORS, PUDLISHER.s WEEKLY; Upon reading the report (PW. May 17) on Senator Church's committee investi- gating the CIA's "book publishing pro- mai" abroad, one reacts with amaze'pent to the "Question: Did you take. some sort of steps to make sure that things that were published in English.. were kept away from American read- covert capabilities," Bush said. Bush conceded the CIA has used news correspondents as agents in' the past, but. said, "as SOOD as possible" existing relationships with journalists will be ended and no more: newsmen would be employed as agents. � However, Bush defended the practice of ac- cepting information from news correspondents "who voluntarily contact the agency for the purpose of exchanging information with no expectation of monetary Declining to reveal the names of any jour- nalists who have worked. for the CIA; Bush said, "I hope that members of a profession willing to go to jail rather than reveal their sources will understand this." Despite. recent attacks on the CIA, Bush. - said Morale is high-and enrollment has increas- ed. He said he believes time will restore the public's confidence in the CIA. He admonished the audience not to believe all disclosures about CIA activities merely be- cause they are printed. "We have been accused," he-said, "of steal- ing relics from Noah's Ark." EDITOR & PUBLISHER 17 July 1976 CIA says it will not hire news people In a meeting .at Central Intelligence .; Agency headquarters at McLean.- Va. (June 24). CIA director George Bush and ; three of his assistants told representa- tives of the National News Council no ; newsman affiliated in any way with an ; American news Organization would be. hired for any purpose by the agency: . Clarifying Bush's February II policy statenient on CIA employment of jour- nalists, the CIA representatives said the ; agency would. in the future, no longer employ news executives, stringers for American news organizations. foreign 'nationals _working as newsmen for American news oiganintions and free ;lance writers w ho could be interpreted in any manner as being journalists. Any af- ' (Plate now falliac into Cu-se ..atcgories. - they added. has been or svOuld be fermi.- 'tutted as a CA employe. The CIA. they also affirmed, will not use news organization "cover" for its employeis **cover.- in this case. refer- ers?" Indeed, who will protect us from the Senate protectors as they go about protecting us from the CIA protectors? ALVIN SKIPSNA Librarian Skidmore College Saratoga Springs, N.Y. 19 ring to the controversial issue of press � credentials.. as discussed in tf;e U.S. Sen- ate's recent Select Committee on Intel- ligence �Actisitizs report.. (I-41', May 8) - Rush. who attended . only part of the � � meeting. declared. as he has in the past. - .that he would not release the names of any journalists who have been employed � .by the CIA. Ir reference to requests for such Mimes from 'various news organizations,.. he said, "We're not goinc to do any inor..We can't doany more." In addition. the . CIA representatives refused to specify wIlich foreign informa- tion services might be presently affiliated with the intellicence organization. Minimizing the "domestic fallout" from stories placed by the CIA in foreign pub- lications, they indicated that this practice would continue. � The meeting. attended by News.Coon- cil member William Rusher, publisher of the iVationc.1 Rr ea.. and Ned Schrmr- man. NNC assodate �director. was the result of a NIrr; 3 letter from the Council to MAI requesting clarification of his February Ii policy statement. -Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 NEW REPUBLIC JULY 1916 �The Ascendant Pentagon � Freezing Out the CIA by Tad Szulc The Pentagon is emerging as the principal force in the management of US foreign intelligence, gradually displacing the Central Intelligence Agency from its traditional preeminent position, as a result of the. implementation of President Ford's plan to reorganize the intelligence community. This little-noticed power shift may, in the opinion of numerous specialists, have an adverse effect�on the quality of US intelligence. Under Ford's reorganization, based on the Presiden- tial Executive Order of 'February 18, the Director of the CIA (currently George Bush) remains in name the chief intelligence adviser to the President. The law provides that the CIA director act simultaneously. as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), heading the entire civilian and military intelligence community. In practice, however, there are growing indications that Bush, as DCI, is being forced to share his authority with the Pentagon's top intelligence official, the new Deputy Secretary of Defense, Robert Ellsworth. In part this is so because Ford, wishing IQ centralize the control of intelligence in the President's office and the National Security Council after all the abuses of the past, has effectively diminished the DCI's influence in the allocation of resources to the various arms of the intelligence community. It is the power of the purse that counts in operational policy-making, and the Pentagon�running the huge National Security Agen- cy (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) among other. military intelligence operations�holds the lion's share of the total multibillion-dollar in- telligent.e budget. *The other reason is that the Defense Department, interpreting in its own way the presidential Executive Order, has recently streamlined, expanded and strengthened. its intelligence apparatus in a way that many intelligence community officials see as an "end run" by the military, designed ultimately to lessen the CIA's position in policy-making and its impact on the elaboration of fundamental intelligence estimates. New lines of authority were drawn in a manner likely to reduce the DCI7s direct control oversuch agencies as the NSA and the DIA. The Pentagon's internal intelligence reorganization was completed on July 6, when a new organizational chart was circulated internally; there was no publicity about it. In the developing controversy over Ford's � reorganization plan�and, especially, the Pentagon's role in it�at stake is whether civilian control of the US intelligence process, as represented by the CIA, can be maintained or supplanted in practice by the military viewpoint. The picture is still quite blurred; the new system is not yet fully understood in the intelligence community, and it is too ea rly to offer final conclusions. Aside from the CIA's monumental wrongdoing in the past --Sin covert operations abroad and illegal domestic intelligence activities-the agency has a. superior track record to the military in analyzing and interpreting foreign intelligence. US foreign policy decisions are often based on intelligence assessments. Ti - o take two major recent examples, the CIA was basically right and the military agencies wrong in the 1969 controversy over the timing of Soviet MIRVing of its � missiles; likewise the CIA estimates during the Vietnam war, both about conditions in South Vietnam . and the impact of US bombings of North Vietnam, were more realistic than the DIA's gung-ho judgments. Unfortunately neither Johnson nor Nixon listened to ' the CIA. During the preparations for � the 1970 Cambodian invasion, the CIA was hardly consulted (though Richard Helms, then CIA director, made an 'ambiguous presentation at the crucial National Securi- ty Council meeting) and the intelligence community as a whole was not asked to prepare a National In- elligence Estimate on the subject. Instead, Nixon and � , lenry Kissinger depended entirely on the opinions of he DIA, the loint Chiefs of Staff, and the US command n Saigon. The present concern is that the Pentagon's ascenden- cy in the intelligence process may tend to further shut out the CIA's analytical voice and tocompliCate, rather than improve, the method of allocating money for intelligence. Ironically. Ford started out intending to reinforce the DCI's position, which had become considerably eroded when Allen W. Dulles left the agency in 1962. He was the last strong CIA Director. On the one hand, the growth of intelligence technology,- such as the use of "spy-in-the-sky" satellites for observation over the Soviet Union, China and elsewhere, inevitably threw more resOurces�and influence�to*the'Pentagon and its specialized agencies like the NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office. (NRO) although the CIA retained an intelligence coordinating role. At the same time the DCI's working relationship With the rest of the intelligence community was rather . ill-defined although, theoretically, he headed . it. Personality problems aggravated things. (Helms, for example, had virtually no access to Nixon in the last years) What existed, then, was a collection of intelligence fiefdoms, all autonomous in such matters as drawing up their secret budgets for congressional authorization. For the most part; Congress did not know what it was approving because requested intelligence funds were concealed in other budgetary line items. As a power vacuum developed in the intelligence community, . � Henry Kissinger moved in 1970 to become the de facto boss of US intelligence,. - � Nixon tried in 1971 to strengthen the DO ifirt.0j1 on cm:naive order issued on Novi:tither- 5 (i! drafted by James R. l-.;(1-elesireger e.vho tater became- CIA director and. Defen,:e See retary). This order vested in the DCI the power to�pre-..:ent a consolidated budget for the whole intelligence community. Reviewing the CIA's history, this .year, the Senate littelli,;etece Committee applauded this move On the grounds that strong DCI was essential for the cornmonity'lt work. lowever, Helios, when he held the job of pc!, f�ik-,1 to carry out his mandate. The Intelligence Community, .alreatly in disarray because. of the einerging 20 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 _Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 . . has been drifting ever since. Ford's executive order last February abandoned the 1971 concept to divide the budget-making responsibili- ty among Bush as DCI. Ellsworth as the Pentagon's delegate, and William Hyland, the deputy to the White House Assistant for National Security ItffairS;Bush: was described as the top "manager- of this new group known as the Conimi_ttee on Foreign Intelligence, but because Ford did not want an,. -intelligence "czar," Ellsworth and Hyland can appeal Bush's decisions directly to the President. Besides its resource allocation- responsibility, this three-man panel acts as the steering committee for the intelligence community. replacing the former United States Intelligence Board, which was headed by the DCL and on -which all the agencies were _represented. Despite the language in Ford's Executive Order, many intelligence officials see Bursh assimply prinnts.inierpare::, with the Pentagon's Ellsworth sharing equally in the , committee's responsibilities. This is one aspect of the ' Pentagon's upgraded role in the management of intelligence. Below the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, a = larger body was set up undet Bush for operational :coordination. This is the National Foreign Intelligence :Board on which all the intelligence agencies �are � . represented. But it lacks the policy powers of the old US Intelligence Board. i Bush, of course, is helped by his easy access to Ford, ; but the next pa may not. have the same relationship with the next President, and this is where the new system may be damaging to the CIA and advantageous to the military now. that anew institutional structure has been built. The Pentagon also has direct access to . the President through the Secretary of Defense, personally-and through his membership in the National Security Council. The DCI is nota statutory NSC !Member. The Pentagon began restructuring' itself for its new intelligence role last May when Defense Secretary Rumsfeld issued new directives. Accordingly, Ellsworth *was named to the post of a second Deputy Secretary of Defense (William Clements is the other ideputy)-with intelligence as his principal responsibility. - ; This changed the command Structure in the military I intelligence community. Until then, Pentagon in- telligence was coordinated on a daily basis by the I Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, a lower �i post than - Ellsworth's current deputyship. Formerly, NSA and DIA directors *reported directly to the I Defense Secretary although the DIA also responded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rumsfeld and Ellsworth have I I devised new lines of authority; In expanding the military intelligence system, Ellsworth, as the Pentagon's top intelligence manager, created the new, post of Director of Defense In- telligence to be held concurrently by the Assistant . Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (this spot has not yet been permanently filled). The Director of the DIA (Gen. Samuel C. Wilson) now reports to Rumsfeld through Ellsworth and through the new Director of Defense Intelligence (Thomas-K. Lat timer is the acting director in his capacity as Acting Assistant Secretary. For Intelligence). Also created was the Defense Intelligence Board headed by Ellsworth. The board has three specialized subordinate bodies. � More significantly, the Director of the huge National � 'Security Agency henceforth reports to. Rumsfeld through Ellsworth � and the new Director of Defense Intelligence rather than directly. So does the Director of .Air Force Special Programs, which runs the spy -satellite operations. The Defense Intelligence Agency has been .streamlined � and apparently enjoys less � autonomy. � . The Pentagon takes the position that the reorganiza- tion, .which has proceeded virtually unnoticed since May, serves the purpose of centralizing and, therefore, .improving the quality of the Defense Department's intelligence output. In a sense, that's true. Ellsworth's elevation and the creation of the post of Director of .Defense Intelligence, however, are also having � the effect of isolating military intelligence agencies from George. Bush's direct control in his DCI capacity, according to many intelligence officials. In the crucial case of the NSA, for example; Bush has to deal with it on policy matters through Ellsworth, his colleague on the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, and through - the Director of. Defense Intelligence. On operational � mat ters,.Bush can deal with the NSA through the CIA's .. Intelligence Community Staff which is headed by Vice . Adm. Daniel Murphy. But the DCI no longerhasdirect policy -access to NSA's Director Gen. letv Allen. In - Other Words, a series of filters have been established - between Bush and the military agencies. . A senior intelligence official, who believes that the new Pentagon system is more rational and efficient, - recognizes nevertheless that it poses a serious threat to .civilian management of the intelligence community. � "Basically, it will depend on the people involved to see what .the reorganization does. to the intelligence� community," he says. Bush is believed to be satisfied with the existing state of affairs, but that's because he and Ellsworth enjoy an . excellent working relationship: As another intelligence � official remarks, "today it works' because Bush and Ellsworth are reasonable people. But things could get. - Out of hand if there's someone else in Ellsworth's place. . There are built-in problems in this whole netv system� = � and all this . may Well play to the advantage of the- . military who've always wanted to dominate in- telligence." - The contradictions in the Ford reorganization plan . � include the fact that the DCI--Bushhas been spared the responsibility for running the CIA on a day-to-day basis because of the appointment of a new CIA Deputy � Director, 'E. Henry Knoche, who enjoys unprecedented ...authority. The idea was that the DCI should have the . freedom to run the overall intelligence 'community. Yet, at the same time, he has been weakened in the central area, the budgetary power held by the Commit tee on Foreign Intelligence. In addition to Knoche, � a veteran of. 23 years in intelligence onalysis (this is the first time that neither of the CIA's two top jobs are filled by officials from the clandestine services), Bush has named a new high-level � team of men highly regarded in the 'profession. The new Deputy Director for Operations (clandestine � � services) is. William Wells. The Deputy Director *for Intelligence is Sayre Stevens, a specialist in science and technology. So, the- CIA appears to be improving . _professionally; the agency's big problem in the future, - however, is the rise of the Pentagon as the increasingly' powerful voice in US intelligence. � 21 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 NEW HORIZON NIGERIA'S SOCIALIST MONTRLY MAY-JUNE 1976 . Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 lhas adopted. The intelligence services of the two countries maintain close co-operation both in South Africa and in the rest of the African continent. . The United States has. stationed &everal control posts in Ghana. James Dudley Haase, who held this post in - Kampala in 1972, and.Jarrel -Richard- son, the leader of the CIA network in Pretoria in 1974, head the operations in Accra. 'In Nigeria the CIA had a network of . agents even before .the secessionist move. The reasoh for the particular interest. in Nigeria is her specific posi- tion on the continent. Nigeria is a more developed African state politically and 1 intellectually. It has the. strongest army ii Africa. There are two CIA networks in the Country: in Lagos which up to July last year was led by David Zim- merman of the political affairs depart- ' merit of the American Embassy aid in I Kaduna in the north, led by Richard Pities in the consulate. Two big groups of CIA agents work in Kenya and Zaire. This is beeatie of the geccconomic location of these countries. As for Zaire, the United States has been in control since the early � 1960s. .. . The French-speaking countries in Africa do not appeal to the CIA as the above-mentioned countries, though African influence is considerably stong . in Ivory Coast and Senegal. In most African countries American and French intelligence services often compete with each other, whereas in Angola they_are cooperating closely. - CIA operations in Africa � do not ditTer "cry much from these in other -countries. The methods used in Africa are identical to those in other countries: the extension of contacts in the diplo- matic services and mass media particu- larly among numerous American spe- �cialists working within the framework of . the programme of cooperation in Africa. Cooperation and technical aid are often a cover for CIA agents. The main goal of the CIA operation is to �infiltrate governments. In many coun- tries efforts towards this goal have been �successful. For instance, William Mos- by, Jr.; the head of the CIA network in . Bangui, the Central-African Republic, receives copies of all the minutes of the � cabinet Meetings presided by Jean� Bedel Bokassa. _ The CIA mounts extensive operations to discredit students and technicians who studied in the' Soviet Union or other socialist countries, who are placed under constant control and police surveillance. Lastly, African students in the United States arc an ideal target for the CIA. The CIA establishes contacts with them so as to try to make them work for the agency in their own countries. For sonic time now control over CIA operations in Africa has been exercised in Paris. CIA agents who work in Africa regularly pass through Paris in transit to arid from Washington. - "Liberation- then published a lit of CIA agents who hold posts of respon- sibility in Africa: Algeria: Edward Kane, head of the THE CIA NETWORK IN AFRICA Culled from the Magazine Liberation. April 2, 1976, Paris. Since 1969 the implementation of the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine of rappro- chement between tIe United States and the South African white minority regime has greatly damaged America's prestige in Africa. American influence in Africa has further diminished after the. %.var in Angola which is why the American intelligence services are mobi- lised to remedy the situation and .strengthen American standing in Africa once again. American influence which Was 'very . strong, for instance, in Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, has noticeably declined after' the coming to power of the military. The change in the political scene in Ethiopia compelled the United , States to move around the greater part of its intelligence institutions formerly sta- tioned in Ethiopia. Till recently the � . backbone of the CIA network in Africa had been concentrated in Addis Ababa, which happens to be the headquarters of the Organisation of African Unity. � regular procedure for American agents operating in Africa was to work for some time, in Addis Ababa after which they . are assigned to other African countries. Addis Ababa had been used as the �base of CIA's Telecommunications. I etwork in Africa which has now been moved to Liberia, considered a more reliable, country politically. , The centralised tcicornrunivatOfl centre in Liberia has been 'reinforced. It is in this centre that all informatiUn obtained by associates and agents of the CIA in Africa is collected, processed and then sent over to CIA headquarters in Langley Virgina Seventy:-four ex- perts are in charge of the operation. With the exception of the 'Maghreb _countries which � gravitate rather to- wards the mediterranean, CIA agents Ire concentrated in big numbers- also in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Zaire. In view of the special relations between Pretoria and Washington South Africa has been upgraded to a privileged posi- tion after the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine 22 network of political affairs, telecom- niunications: ',Richard. Ilaythorn -and Terrence Rods; Burundi: David Harper, head of 'political affairs and economic ques- tions, Richard Green and Joseph Pearce telecommunications. Cameroun: Jega Corridon, .11;nd of .political affairs and economic ques- tions, Michael Beraer, an associate in political affairs and economic qt.estions, Gerald Branson and David Levandovs- kie, telecommunications. 1 he Central-Africao Republic:. Wit-. ham Mosby Jr., head of political affairs:. Ivory Coast: Martin Bergin, head of political affairs, and Gordon Hcpman. 3p associate in political affairs. Pressly East and Andrew Turko Jr.. telecom- munications; Dahomey: Monteornery Rogers. head of the consulate office, and Robert telecommunications, Ethiopia: Eugene Jeffers Jr., head of political- affairs, Mathew Monezewski, an associate in political affairs, Sheldon Benz, Roy Bigler, Felix Matadoskie, Carl � Moss, Raymond Strahm and ,Kenneth Walters all in telecommunica- tions. Ghana: Jarrel Richardson, James Dudley Haase and William Stanley in political affairs, Clyde Brown, Earl lson and Paul Pena in telecommunica- tions. Guinea (Conahry) Dwight Burgess, head of consulate office with Charles Chowning and Anthony Malesic in � telecommunications,. Kenya: William Clair of political affairs, Frank Durfey in. administrative services with James Mcgilvray and � David Grottenthaler, in telecommuni- cations. Liberia: Edward Carrol of political affairs and seventy-four men in tele- communications. Mali: Terrence Kanffers and Gerald Lindsay in telecommunications. Mauritius: Vasia Gmirk in, head of � the consulate office. Morocco: Gohn Beam former bead of tht. network in Burundi, Lyle Dinner - in Tangier, and Ronald Gagat, Gilbert Gi14..s, Michael Grandy and Edward Urquhart in telecommunications, Nigeria: David Zimmermana, head, Richard Plues, an associate based in Kaduna with Alfred Capelii and Charles - Jones in telecommunications. Somalia: David Hunt, bead of economic questions with Peter Kerstra, Jr., Frederic Sharbrough ant! Gerald Zapoli in telecommunications. Sudan: Ralph Brown, and William M CC; utcheon Tanzania: Sheldon Seltzer, telecom- munications, Chad: Philip Ringdald, head of poli- tical affairs and economic questions, South Africa: see Liberation, Janu- ary 30, 1976, Zaire: Samuel Martin, Peter Hanson, Nancy Buss, Mrs. Vickie Vigier, Stuart /Arthwen; Jeffrey Panitt, Robert Bene- detti and' Bruce Brett, all political affairs, with Peter Cornar, Mart in McFarlane, William I turner, Richatil Harrison, David Markey, and others in telecommunications. Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 nv.�- Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 GENIEIVAIL WASHINGTON POST 18 JUL 1976 o � By Bruce Howard SOON a diplomatic plague will be visited on Rosslyn, Virginia. Dozens of Boeing 707's will crash into the tropical-rain forests along the Potomac, their holds ex- ploded by terrorist bombs. Top secret diplomatic pouches will disappear, bodies will be identified, be notified. The hypothetical disasters are part of a new training program at the Foreign Service Institute in Rosslyn to prepare foreign service officers for terrorism abroad. Starting Oct. 1, junior foreign service officers will be assigned for several weeks at a time to the "Consulate- General of Rosslyn," there to attempt to cope with the town's never-ending'destruction.. " in the past three years State has spent more than $100 �million to protect its personnel abroad from terror. But the dramatic rise in security expenditures � from $14.6 � 1972 to more than $40 million this year � has . been matched by an increase in terror attacks. In 1969 there were four major attacks against U.S. embassies and/or their employees; last year there were 19. � U.S. ambassadors have been killed in Guatemala (1968), _Sudan (1973), Cyprus (1974) and Lebanon (1976); kidnaped and released in Brazil (1969) and Haiti (1973). Terrorists have attacked American embassies and employees in ; more than 30 countries� above and beyond war zones such as Indochina. !_ Although most of the incidents occurred in relatively - unstable countries in South and Central America, Africa � and Asia, attacks have also taken place in Japan, France, Italy, Spain, New Zealand and other relatively stable na- tions. On the average, according to department. studies, an International terrorist involved in one of the kidnaping ; � Incidents of the past eight years had an 80 per cent chance of escaping death or imprisoriment.'lf captured,':: most terrorists quickly obtained freedom, - either, ; through prisoner swaps or light sentencing. The average � "sentence for the few who were brought to trial was 18 months. "In a word," says Robert Fearey, special assistant to the secretary of state and coordinator for combating ter- rorism, "outside the hijacking area, our efforts to make. terrorism unprofitable for the terrorists have made little headway?' The Real Target � 1 ERRORISM is aimed at the people watching, notat the actual victims," Brian Jenkins of the Rand Cor- poration has written. "Terrorism is theater." The audience is world-wide, but those in a specialized part of it, the foreign service officers, suffer the addi- tional pressure of knowing they are potential victims. For ..nost of them, psychological adaptation to terror- ism has only begun. Until recentaears, the diplomat in a foreign country was sacrosanct � he came under a white flag. One of the first American diplomats kidnaped by the "new" terrorists was C. Burke Elbrick, U.S. ambassador to Brazil, seized in Rio de Janeiro in 1969."! remember it seemed outrageous at the time," Eibriek said in an inter- Howard, a Harvard Law School student, is working this summer on the national staff of The Pgst. err i rism view. "There had been incidents before, but we in the department had thought they were flukes. "I said to my captors, 'You guys changed the rules.' And they said, 'Yes, we have. But the government is our enemy and you are part of the government." ' Much of the new anxiety in the for- eign service has surfaced in the form of resentment against the State Depart- ment itself. "Terrorism has hurt morale In the service," one officer said. "But not as much as the department's poli- cies on terrorism.". � State's Hard Line 23 i ONE OF of the department's most controversial policies is its refusal to negotiate for the release of kidnaped _ipreign service officers. Secretary Kissinger defends the poi- fey as a long-term deterrent � while to- day's hostage may be sacrificed, the thinking is, tomorrow's terrorist will .see that America won't be black- Mailed; yielding only encourages more terror. But some staffers question whether .terrorists really are deterred, especially :when some host countries and/or hos- _Op' families go on to meet terrorists' �',den-lands. an 1973, the wife of a kid- . naped U.S. consul general in Mexico .raised $80,000 to ransom her husband :after State refused to yield.) .':.The critics argue that the depait-, 'znent should. comply with most de- mands, especially those involving mon- etary ransoms, and make efforts to re- cover the money and capture the kid- napers after the hostage is released. 'This policy, placing top priority on the pafety of the immediate hostage, is :usually advised by police and the FBI jli domestic kidnapings. 2-' Foreign service personnel stress that the policy, whether it works in an Indi- vidual case or not, is inhumane and de- "moralizing. "It's hard to see people you " ' know just written off," said Margaret Dean, a newly enrolled foreign service officer and the wife of an officer. "It makes you feel like a pawn," she added. "We make morbid jokes about It, but It's horrible to know that the people behind you aren't worried about wetting you out. That Kissinger isn't concerned about you. The attitude we hive is, Kissinger doesn't know our nathes; he cares about the world view." E.ven Fearey noted in a speech de- fending the policy that it sounds "some- what cold and unfeeling." Some officers rationalize the depart- ment's policy by saying that the threat Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 of, death by terrorism is part of the job, a hazard that officers have to accept, much like the military. . But a former soldier who has studied terrorism challenged the military com- � parison. "Soldiers may get killed in combat, but they don't get written off," he said. "When a soldier gets trapped, the military makes every effort to get him out, even if it means risking greater resources, such as flying in a helicopter. And they do it because it's the only way to maintain organiza- tional loyalty. You can't expect a man to go out there knowing that, if he gets In a jam, he will be abandoned." Fatal Test � rp HE FIRST firm enunciation of the no negotiations, no concessions policy came in 1973 when two popular , foreign service officers, Cleo Noel, am- bassador to Sudan, and his deputy, George C. Moore, were held hostage by Arab terrorists in the Saudi ambassa- dor's residence in Khartoum along with three other diplomats � from Belgium, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Sudanese officials were in contact with the terrorists when President Nixon made a tough no-compromise statement. A few hours later the two Americans and the Belgian were.mur- dered. The Saudi and Jordanian diplo- mats Were released unharmed when the.terrorists surrendered. Afterwards, one of the terrorists was quoted as saying, . "We had no choice btit to execute the three hostages . . . after. the categorical U.S. rejection of our demand was confirmed by Nixon's state'- ant." . The incident is often cited bitterly by foieign service personnel. William Broderick, acting director of the For- eign. Service Institute, said it was "an � outrage for Nixon to go public with that statement." � The controversy has a variety of com- plexities. "Publicly we say we will not negotiate and even some of our own .people think that's that," said one offi- cer who was himself a kidnap victim. "But privately the practice is more flex- ible or, at least, more confused." In the Sudanese incident, for exam- ple, a high level official, William Ma- comber, now ambassador to Turkey, Was en route to the Sudan when Nixon made his public statement. "Since then," one official said, "the department's policy has been a patch- work of hard-line rhetoric, more flexi- ble practice, and confusion." � In 1973 the department commis-- sioned the Rand Corporation to pre- pare a series of reports on terrorism. Rand's report on hostages stated: "The present [department] policy is an accre- tion of public statements and preced- ents established in previous hostage in- cidents which are themselves some- times contradictory." The officer who had been a hostage Approved for Release: 201 8/1 0/01 CO262371 8 commented: "The really delicate nego- tiation � and most of the confusion � surrounds what we tell the host govern- ment we want them to do. Publicly we say 'no deals,' and then privately we tell the host government that we're holding it responsible for the well- being of our diplomat. This can lead to chaos." The official cited the 1973 kidnaping of Terrance Leonhardy, U.S. consul general in Guadalajara, Mexico. "There the kidnapers wanted money, and the Mexicans asked us if we wanted them to pay," the officer said. "Publicly we were saying we would make no deals. Our embassy got con- fused and was about to tell the Mexi- cans we didn't want a deal made when they got an urgent message from the department saying, 'Shut up, don't say anything.' The Mexicans got so con- fused they almost blew it." Finally, the Mexicans allowed Leon- thardy's wife to pay the ransom and, ap- parently, provided her with the money, the officer said. "Much of our public policy," One offi- cer said, "is written after an event, when we're trying to explain to the American people what went wrong." He pointed to the 1975 kidnaping and murder of John Egan, U.S. consular agent in the Argentine city of Cordova. The account of the incident in a de- partment "public information" docu- ment says, "The kidnapers demanded the release of four imprisoned com- rades. The Argentine government ref- used to negotiate. Egan was murdered 48 hours later." But department. officials now con- firm reports � which appeared in the media at the time � that the terrorists actually demanded only that the Ar- gentine government produce the pris- oners on TV to demonstrate that they had not been tortured or killed: A bitter department source said, "The Argentines refused because their embalming fluid wasn't good enough to show the prisoners on TV, not because they were hard line." "The next week, the same terrorist group kidnaped an Argentine judge, and demanded the release of a com- rade who happened to be still alive. The government made the deal, and the pri- soners were swapped." The Aftermath ryi HERE IS angry debate, too, over the department's treatment of hostages after their release. One Rand study reported that hostages returning to the department may be stigmatized. Their careers suffer through no fault of their own, according to the report, and they and their families sometimes develop severe psychological problems. "The top officials deny the stigma phenomenom," one department expert said, "but then they talk about the 'con- tagion of the kidnapee.' It's very similar to the social pariah feelings focused on 24 the rape victim." � The Rand report said, "Many former hostages complained that they were treated like 'social pariahs, as if they were lepers.' These are their own words. Initially, we thought that this might be a reflection of some kind of oversensitivity but, in talking to col- leagues of former hostages other officials concerned with the incidents, we heard comments such as. 'We had to get him out. He would have destroyed morale." "There's no question that the inci- dent harms the career of the victim, even though it's not his fault," Elbrick said. "There's a feeling In the depart- ment that they don't like to go with a loser, that somehow you're accident- prone." Sean Holly was kidnaped in Guate- mala in 1970 while serving as U.S. labor attache there. He now works in Foggy. Bottom. "As far as treatment by the de- partment is concerned," he said, "I'd have been better off shot. At least then my wife would have gotten a pension or. maybe a job." "But because I survived they treated me like a damn nuisance, a living re- minder to the rest of the department. They gave me a Superior Honor medal, which you get for typing fast, and said, 'Forget it.' They even sent me a bill for .$189 because I left Guatemala before they thought I did and I had gotten paid for a few extra days. "That's why there's no more real loy- alty to the department." Department spokesmen deny the stigma charge. "I know .one [former hostage] who is doing a lot better than I am," an official said. Former hostages also charge that the department has yet to address squarely the psychological traumas that affect terrorist victims and their families. They pointed to these symptoms � psy- chosomatic illness, so-called "anniver- sary reactions" involving ulcer and anxiety attacks on the exact anniver- sary of the kidnaping, guilt complexes. for surviving and for being an "embat - rassment" to the service, severe prob- lems within the family. A department spokesman insisted that specially trained psychiatrists are made availa- ble to the kidnap victims and their fam- ilies. Broderick remembers the pressures on his family during a 1964 coup at- tempt in Bolivia. The most anguishing moment, he said, was "when terrorists gained control of the radio station and our children heard them urging the people to kill the Americans." Diplomats are concerned about a new development � the separate kid- na pings in Mexico last month of an American businessman's 8-year-old daughter and the Belgian ambassador's 16-year-old daughter. One expert said that, except for the Middle East, these were the first terror incidents ever di- rected at foreign children. "We're praying," he added, "they _Approved for Release: 201 8/1 0/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 were isolated, non-political events be� � if terrorists start going after school buses with American children. you couldn't calculate the impact. Of� � will take risks, but not those risks." Except in the most hazardous situa- tions, the foreign service expects the Individual family to decide whether to leave a difficult ' foreign post. "It is heart-rending to see a woman break down in tears in My office asking me how she can decide between exposing -her children to terrorists or depriving them of a father," said Joan Wilson, the coordinator of the department's work- shop for foreign service families. The department discourages officers from asking for transfer or refusing to go to hazardous countries. "The unwrit- ten rule .is three 'no's," said one offi- cer's wife. "After each 'no' you get a - worse offer, and after the third 'no' � you're out." One method used to maintain morale in high-risk posts is to grant "differenti- als," or percentage salary increases, after a terrorist incident. The diff� erential is also used to compensate for service in disease-ridden or otherwise unattractive countries. Even the differential has been , viewed cynically. "After our ambassa- dor got shot," said one 'officer, "we got a 10 per cent differential. Then a year later the troupe from the department came back to readjust the percentage. It was clear that the message was, `No- body's been killed for a while, so you'll lose the differential.' Just before they decided, though, one of our attaches got kidnaped and we went up to 15 per cent." , Oddly, the increasing hazards of the diplomatic job have not stemmed the recent rush of applicants. Interest in foreign policy, sparked by the Vietnam war and the tight job market, has pushed the number of applications to the foreign service from 6;700 in 1969 to more than 20,000 this year. - But the applicants and new officers are often poorly informed about the terrorist risks to the low and middle- level service personnel. For the news media focus on the incidents involving ambassadors and largely ignore the others, while the service itself delays most terrorism briefings until the off i-. cer accepts an assignment and reaches � his post. "We don't get into it too much," said � Joan Wilson of the Foreign Service In- stitute, which trains the new officers, "because there's a danger of paranoia." Another officer noted that FSI's "Consulate General of Rosslyn" will in- clude hypothetical violence against American citizens, but not against members of the foreign service. For these who do accept the high risk posts, the general attitude is "It can't happen to me." "It's the classic defense mechanism � denial," a terrorism expert said. "People say, It won't happen to me, and if it does, there's nothing I can do about it." "It's impossible to even think about it," said Claude Ross, former ambassa- dor to Haiti and Tunisia. "If you thought about it, you wouldn't be able to get your job done." Help Shortage Tr1 HE UNITED STATES has had lit- tle success in efforts fo get other nations to cooperate in the fight against international terror. Some countries, particularly in the Arab East and Africa, provide asylum, weapons and operating funds to terror group-S. Some even provide pensions. At the 1972 U.N. General Assembly the Ameri- can delegation proposed a convention which would have obliged signatgrx�.. states to prosecute or extraditihiternai tional terrorists; only six other coun- tries supported the treaty. The next year the U.N. did adopt an anti-terror convention, but it had no enforcement provisions and it hafitot vitt beeniati-r . lied by enough countries to become op- .� erative. The American Foreign Service Asso- ciation, representing some 9,000 diplo- , matte .employees, contends that the United States itself, for diplomatic rea- sons, has not done enough to bring ter- rorists to justice. The association points to the aftermath. of the killing of Rodger P. Davies, U.S. ambassador to Cyprus, during a Greek Cypriot demon- stration outside the embassy in Nicosia In August, 1974. Last January, during preparation of the House intelligence committee re- ' port, word leaked that U.S. intelligence � officials had learned the identity of Davies' killers within an hour after the shooting and later confirmed the infor- mation through ABC News film taken at the scene Although the killers were serving in the Greek Cypriot govern- ment security forces, angry State De- partment employees charged, the ad- ministration did nothing beyond filing a quiet imotet with the Nicosia-authori- ties. The recent Israeli raid into Uganda to rescue hijacked hostages was, ob- � viousiy, the talk of the foreign service. AFSA's Harry Blaney said: � "None of us really feel that the United States can afford to use force like the Israelis, if only because we are a great power. We play a different dip- lomatic role in the world and we have more to lose. "But at the same time; our role gives us more leverage in areas like eco- nomic aid. The lesson was � the Isra- elis fight courageously to save their people. We have to ask, 'Why does the United States do so little?" Foreign service officers realize that dramatic rescue operations, particu- larly when they involve not one hundred hijacked passengers under guard in an international airport but a single diplomat hidden away, in some obscure apartment, may be impracti- cal. AFSA is pressing for modest re- ' forms: � An increase in protection for- middle and low-level officers overseas. "There's a lot of resentment out there about the ambassadors in their armor-plated cars," one specialist said. "In Argentina, where the ambassador sleeps in an explosion-proof bedroom with walls lined with steel and plays tennis guarded by a Marine who "changes sides of the court when ne does, most embassy personnel travel the city stieets unprotected." � A reduction of staffs in high-risk areas to a bare minimum. The embassy staff in Beirut, one offi- cer noted, was increased from 42 to 53 shortly before the recent assassinations there. The U.S. Information Service continued to operate a printing press in the city for months after two of its em- ployees were kidnaped. � An increased use of American mili- tary personnel, rather than local police, to provide protection. State has always preferred local pol- ice because of the obvious complica- tions in a clash between U.S. marines - and local demonstrators. But there is a growing feeling within the service that in many sensitive situations local police . cannot be relied upon. There are also some foreign service officers who argue that an increase in the assigned number of guards, whether local or American, will weaken their effectiveness is diplo- mats. "How," one officer asked,"can you meet with groups outside the gov- ernment with guards and local police following you around? The damage will really show in the future, when the out groups get in." Foreign service people charge that there is a high-level failure of imagina- tion or will to search for formulas prov- iding for their safety. At the same time, they recognize that the total isolation of the diplomatic community in secure bastions would spell victory for terror- ism. � pproved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718.,,_ MIAMI NEWS 5 July 1976 , Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 isarrn the terrorists On . the� theory that to be forewarned is to be better pre- pared,, the CIA has made pub- lic a siii-d37-5Y-Thr�it�df its re- search analysts, David Mil- bank of the Office cirPolitical .12,, on the subject of terrorism. Milbank's findings are most -disquieting. They will . not comfort .those persons who WObrd like to believe that the bombings, kidnapings; hijack- ings and other terrorist acts are an outgrowth of special problems in specific countries and that they will subside as those problems are reduced. To the contrary, Milbank THE ECONOMIST JULY 10, 1976 Nuclear arms found that there is "good rea- son to believe that at least a few foreign terrorist groups are planning to step-up their � attacks on Americn targets - abroad in the near.. future.".; Also,. "it seems likely that, Washington will, be targeted by terrorist demands some.; it/hat more frequentl:A, in the future." A "no concessions" policy will not- alter that pre-* diction, he adds. Seepage Perhaps- his 'most alarming conclusion is ,that 'sooner or later some terrorist group is bound to take the plunge' into Using weapons of mass de-- The United States, which claims it is anxious to curb the spread of nuclear weaponry around the world, is about to supply nine tons of uranium to India and a big nuclear reactor to Spain. Its Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) voted 3-1 for both decisions against the unprecedentedly open dissent of a senior Rand corporation physicist, Mr Victor Gilinsky. Neither India nor Spain has accepted the 1968 non-proliferation treaty, with its obligatory safe,guards. India has already used its reactor-produced pluto- nium to carry out a nuclear explosion, and its refusal to give adequate as- surances about its future intentions has led the Canadians (but not the Ameri- WASHINGTON POST 19 JUL 1976 struction. Nuclear weapons are not difficult to obtain. he_ warns, but' "a more pressing' threat would seem to lie in the field of chemical, biological; and radiological weapons." Like most such studies, this one is long on problems and short on specific solutions. Ob- viously, however, the Milbank study calls for better security that now exists at nuclear and military installations. No. real 'solution to the exotic weapon _problem will be found. howev- er,-.until the nations that pro.--- -2duce them finally realize that ,whatever advantages are-at7: tached to them cannot possibly; outweigh the risks. cans) to decide that they will not supply it with any .more nuclear material. Spain has retained the right to use non- American fuel in its new reactor (which will annually produce enough pluto- nium for more than 30 bombs), and can thus use it to build up a stockpile 'Of plutonium over which the Americans will have no control. .Mr Gilinsky, it seems, has a point. Or two.. - On the Spain:his most pointed point was the revelation that Spain had not even been asked whether it would agree to fuel the reactor Only with American material. On the sale to he did get -.11d' other NRC members to say that it "would be desirable" to find out if �India would let the Americans buy the plutonium which its Tarapur reactor will produce from. the American fuel. But the answer to.such an inquiry seems to be available already, and it Aid la 710st By Don Oberdorfer Stiashin2ton Past Stair Wr!ter U.S. engineering assist- ance, training and Possibly a crucial U.S. chemical ingre- dient contributed to India's. 1974 atomic explosion, ac- cording to data filed for an on public hear- ing this week on future U.S.- India nucleeir cooperation. Government documents obtained under a freedom of information action by law- yers in the ease show that the United States received clear signs Over many years of ilndia's growing capability and interest in exploding a nuclear device, but did little to stop it. The newly released doeu- looks pretty negative. Ten. days before the NRC vote on July 2nd, India's news agency had confirmed reports that a reprocessing plant was already being built at Tarapur to extract plutonium from used reactor fuel. , Not that the -British are in a position to act holier-than-thou to the Americans. Under the deal which the British and French are now jointly making with Japan. 4,000 tons of used fuel . from Japan's reactors are to be reproceSsed in Britain (at the new site near Windscale) and France. Good, in that it is better to use plutonium separation -plants- in' countries w.hich already possess the bomb than to build them in states which would be close to getting the bomb if they possessed these plants. Less good. in that the plutonium extracted from the Japanese used fuel is to be Sent back to Japan. ments and other sources re- veal-that late in 1970, more than three years before the epochal atomic blast under the Rajasthan desert, India rebuffed .a written U.S. warning against the use of American-supplied "heavy water" (deuterium) in manu- facturing a nuclear explo- sive device. Despite earlier statements to the contrary, there .are growing indica- lions that this ingredient was used in making the ma- terials for the Indian blast. The May 18, 1974, explo- sion brought India into the. "nuclear club" and set off powerful shock waves in the capitals of other underdevel- oped nations. The Indian ex- plosion is blamed for a con- certed drive by Pakistan to obtain the means for nu� clear explosions and, io a lesser degiee. for ,similar drives in Brazil and Iran. 26 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 The history of U.S. in- volvement is of major im-. portance to a Nuclear Regu- latory Commission hearing scheduled for Tuesday on whether to continue ship- ping enriched uranium fuel. for India's atomic. program. Canada has permanently cut off nuclear supplies to India because Canadian equip- ment and technology were used in the 1974 explosion, but the United 'States con- -tinues to sell India nuclear fuel. � The controversy marks. the first time that U.S. ex- port of nuclear materials has been publicly contested . and the first time that a public hearing has been held on such an issue. The outcome is expected to have serious repercussions here and overseas. The Natural Resource Defense Council, Sierra Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 � Club and Union of Con- certml Scientists are seek- ing to block the sale of more urariium to -under present conditions. They � said-fn a brief submitted for the-hearing- that in the most critical areas of hpalicy to- '-.ward India "United- States � action (and inaction.) disas- trously ',sets the stage for further weapons prelifera-, tion." � Join/leg the opposition groups in writtask h state- � merits have been a nuniber of well-known former offi- � cials, including former Un- der Secretary of State. George W. Ball, former Am- bassador to the United Na- tions Charles W. Yost and former presidential science adviser George B. Kistia- kowekl: The State Departrtent in a written response, said fail- ure to approve the fuel ship- � ments would cause "severe economic and social dam- age" to 80 million Indians in areas dependent on nuclear . power and would be "a ma- jor setback in our relations with India." � . . The ' , department main- tained that the United ..States is committed to. con- tinue the sale of enriched uranium under longstanding contractual agreements, and � that U.S.-Indian arrange- � ments preclude its use for atomic bombs. Ta produce its 1974 explot !don, India used a Canadian- � . supplied research reactor known as CIRUS to make ir- radiated atc mic fuel. Then 1 this material was treated by an Indian-built "reprocess. I lug plant" to make weapons- ' grade .plutonium. Though there was no indication of this at the time of the ex- plosion, the new evidence indicates that the United States played a role in both processes. In 1956 the U. S. Atomic. Energy Commission agreed lb sell 21 tons of "heavy Water" to India for use in � the Canadian-supplied re- search reactor, which re- quires this rare and expen- sive substance for its opera- titan. The contract provided 1 .that the "heavy water" . could be used only for "research into and the use. of atomic energy for peace- ful purposes." Recently disclosed 'files in- dicate that some AEC corn- niissioners were concerned about this matter as early as Oct. 8, 1956, when "problems with respect to the safe- guard provisions" on the In- dian "heavy water" were raised at an AEC meeting. A memorandum says that this was the first time for the commissioners to dis- cuss "safeguards"�which induce strict measurement and inspection requirements �in connection with a sale of "heavy water" abroad. The staff was instructed to work on a "safeguards" pol- icy which was applied to fu- ture sales, but this action was considered too late to affect the deal that had just been made. - From 1939-61 India con- structed a "heavy water" manufacturing plant using Italian, French and West German equipment, with the aid of two American firms, Vitro Corp. and Na- tional Research Corp, At that time, U.S. companies were authorized to provide many types of nuclear engi- neering services, including those connected with "heavy water" plants, without spe- cial government permission. Later they had to get special permission, which would be difficult for a company wanting to assist a country without nuclear weapons to obtain today. In the late 1950s.India also began building a "reprocessing" facility capa- ble of making weapons. grade material from fuel rods that had been sub- jected to radiation in a nu-. clear reactor. An American official familiar with .the matter said the United States was "well aware" of the Indian plan to build the facility and offered "some training assistance to Indian nationals" and help in using information on reprocessing , that had been declassified by the U.S. government At the time, reprocessing facilities�which _also have civilian uses--were not seen by the United States as a major bomb proliferation problem. AEC correspondence indi- cates that the LT.S. firm of Vitro International, a subsid- iary of Vitro Corp., partici- pated in the design of this plutonium reprocessing evidently without any requirement for special U.S. permission. But when the AEC asked Vitro about the facility during the final stages of construction in January, 1963, India directed the firm to say nothing. The United States was ' told that any information to come directly from In- about the plant would have dian atomic authorities, but AEC files do not show any follow-up. "Apparently there was no follow-up because the AEC wasn't that inter- ested." said Jerry Helfrick, director of international program implementation of the Energy Research and Development Administra- tion, successor to some AEC functions. An AEC memorandum of Sept. 21, 1966, said U.S. agencies agreed to sponsor and finance training for In- dian officials at the AEC production works at Han- ford, Wash., in "plutonium 27 recycle." Weapons-grade ma- terial as well as reusable fuel can be made hi such a process. Hanford records show that at least two Indian sci- entists studied there in the late 1960s or early IG70s. Ac- cording to an AEC compila- tion, 939 Indians were trained in various skills in AEC facilities from 1949 to the time of the 1974 explo- sion. The Chinese explosion of a nuclear device in October, 1964, sharply increased In- dian anxiety and interest in bomb manufacture. Nearly 100 members of the Indian parliament signed a petition urging nuclear weapons de- velopment, and Ti.S. agen- cies received many press re- Ports�and no doubt diplo- matic and intelligence re- ports�of the growing In- dian interest and capabili- ties. In January. 1970, by far the largest U.S. atomic proj- ect in India�the Tarapur nuclear power station�was dedicated by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Late that summer, Gandhi and her atomic energy chairman be- gan speaking publicly of their interest in under- ground nuclear explosions "for peaceful purposes." Seriously concerned U.S. officials secretly notified In- dia in writing in November, 1970, that a nuclear explo- sion�no matter how it was labeled�did not qualify in U.S. eyes as a "peaceful pur- pose" under the agreements to supply "heavy water" and other materials. Although the United States had promoted the idea of "peaceful nuclear ex- plosions" in earlier times, officials realized by 1970 that an Indian blast of any description would be consid- ered a military threat by neighbors and might spyr worldwide atomic bomb pro- liferation. India rejected the U.S. in- terpretation and a similar approach by Canada, declar- ing itself free to use nuclear energy for any ;purpose that it considered peace- ful. An AEC memorandum of January, 1971, reported that Indian atomic research chief Homi Sethna�who eventually had charge of the Indian � explosion�was "disturbed" over the 1.1.S. approach and insistent that India was far away from a "dean" explosive capability. "They [India] asserted a position which made us wor- ried," said a participant in Washington discussions of the time. "But they had not actually violated anything and so we didn't take any action." In May, 1971, Prof. Lin- coln Bloornfieid of the Mas- sachusetts Institute of Tech- Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718_ nology passed along to Washington the diselosure by Svinivasa Khrishnas- warnl, joint secretary of the Indian Defense Ministry, that Gandhi would be mak- ing the decision "in the next few months" on whether to proceed with an atomic bomb. The U.S. embassy in New. Delhi estimated in April, 1973, that India probably would not be in a position to make an atomic bomb until 1976 or later. But in May, 1973, a Malaysian official, in a letter to the AEC, re- ported that the Indian at- omic research chairman had spoken of India's "own nu- clear explosive, which � has been painfully accumulated over the years." No report has been made public showing any U.S. at: tempt to dissuade India in the months preceding the May, 1974 underground blast Immediately following the explosion, the United States expressed displeasure, though in mild terms considering the worldwide alarm. For a - short time the- United States held up regularly scheduled shipments of enriched' ura- nium fuel for the Tarapur reactor in an effort to ob- tain explicit Indian assur- ances that it would not be used for any sort of nuclear device. When India refused, the United States agreed to a much vaguer statement in an exchange of letters and resumed fuel shipments. Shortly after the 1974 blast the AEC said there was "no reason to believe" that U.S.-supplied material was involved. Secretary of State 'Henry A. Kissinger ; subsequently said India's ex- plosion did not violate U.S. supply agreements and thus "we had no specific lever- age on which to bring our objections to bear." Kissinger's "no violation" statement was . evidently based on a July, 1974, letter from Indian Ambassador T. N. Kaul saying that "100 per cent Indian material" had� been used in the-atomic ex- , plosion. However, American officials now concede that Kaul's words did not rule out the possibility the U.S.- supplied "heavy water" in the Canadian reactor was ut- ilized to make "Indian mate- rial for the blast. Sen. Abraham A. Ribicoff (D-Conn.), who publicly raised the, 'U.S. "heavy water" issue' .last month, said, "There now are strong and disturbing indications that India did use it to pro- duce plutonium for its nu- clear explosion in 1974 and is still using it for its nu- clear explosion program." At the heart of the discus- sion of the past is the ques- tion of current American policy. Those who intervened in the NRC case say they see no reason why the United States should withhold for- eign aid from India�as it currently does�but con- WASHINGTON or Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 tinue sales of potentially dangerous nuclear fuel. They also maintain that "business-as-usual" U.S. nu- clear sales ..are a clear en- couragement to other na- tions contemplating atomic weapons programs. 3b,rid,coyin/y 0.1975 Those on the opposite side maintain that the practical- effect of a US. cutoff might he to send India to the So- viet Union (the only other worldwide supplier) for thefl necessary enriched uranium. They also say the United States can exercise greater influence on India and other potential atomic weapons nations by a continuing role as a nuclear supplier. f7�0 ,1_)(0171b-Pedditng ,� HAT IS SO rare as a day in. June? An American - public of.lcial Who professes to think that the spread of nuclear weapons would be a good thing. And yet, if we may mix our authors a little, everyone talks about the danger of nuclear proliferation, but nobody does anything about it. That last formulation may he a little harsh, but it is manifestly true that both Congress and the executive branch�never mind their noble professions�seem incapable at this point of designing and acting on any coherent policy to curb the spread Of a nuclear weapons potential to countries all aroUnd the world. Yes, at U.S. initiative the siipplier-nations of peaceThl nuclear technology have organized themselves into a group and drawn up some guidelines and standards intended to dimin- ish the dangers that flow from their exports. And, yes, the bills being introduced in Congress-to curb _ the outward flow of weapons material have begun to take on the aspect of a good confetti-fling. But none of this begins to come to grips with the choices and problems facing this country in respect to-our prolif- eration policy at the moment. Let us name the parts. It is a well known fact that nuclear suppliers in other nations, principally the French and Germans, have been entering into nego- tiations and deals with non-nuclear countries for the � export of technology and plant that have a very high bomb-making potential�and that the United States, by contrast, has been much more cautious over the years in both supplying and safeguarding nuclear . materials it sends abroad. It is not so .well-known, however, that this country has some 30 agreements with other countries concerning our provision of peaceful nuclear technology and that many of these have failed to keep step with changing circumstance and expanded knowledge. The point is that what seemed safe and airtight, say, 20 years ago when some of these deals were made, no longer can be said - to be sufficient. Can we renegotiate these deals upward, so to speak, tightening their terms and Sharpening their 'precautions? That is where a second big problem e comes in: Neither formally and officially on paper, nofinformally and unofficially in the practical world of real-life Washington, does the government have ei- ther the focus or instrumentality or (evidently) the will to produce a plausible and consistent policy. The Department of State has some of the action; so does the Arms Control Agency;-so do the Nuclear Regula- tory Commir.sion, the Office of Management and Budget, ERDA and the Congress. Thus when these things are argued out, a multiplicity of competing in- stitutional interests is likely to come into play, along with a certain heavy fatalism. Your average country desk at the Department of State can understandably almost always find a diplomatic reason why it would be harmful to our relations with country X to put.. new limits on the materials we are sending; the long- term prospect of country X's bomb-making potential hardly seems worth exacerbating the current crisis 28 or snarl we are otherwise experiencing with its lead- ers. And besides, what would be the point of tighten- ing the rules on this reactor or that when we don't have complete control over its other reactors? And,. anyway, if we deny them what they want, isn't it pos- sible that they will shop elsewhere and that we will lose whatever limited control we might have had if we closed the deal? And, when yeti get right down to it. isn't it already too late to halt the inevitable devel- � opment around the world of nuclear arsenals? To hear these arguments repeatedly -stated you could get the idea that the United States has as little leverage in these matters as it apparently has policy. But that is not the case. We remain the preferred sup- plier of technology and the best-stocked supplier of fuel (although to maintain the latter position much more is- going to have to be done to increase this country's capacity to produce enricheds uranium). What is needed is some focus and decision and mus- cle at the top. It is even conceivably possible that a policy review and examination would lead to the con- � elusion that we might as well toss in the towel on our fitful antiproliteration efforts. But if that is not going to be the case, then a whole lot of tough questions are . _ going to have to be addressed: If we cannot prevent the spread of these weapons, can we not at least re- ta.rd or better control that spread? Is it possible or even credible for this country to complain about French and german sales of enriching and reprocess- ing equipment if we ourselves do not act to make our own contracts more consistent with such a position? And if we are to pull ourselves together on this ques- tion, will not our very doing so require that we also consider ways to meet the legitimate concerns of cli- ent countries that: 1) we will be a reliable producer of � the materials they need for their nuclear energy plants and 2) by depriving them of a nuclear weapons capability we are not diminishing their security. Other commitments, in other words, might have to accompany such a policy. If you want an example of how the thing is work- ing now in the absence of a coherent, consistent gov- ernment point of view, you need only consider the di- lemma of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which must license nuclear exports, but which has no au- thority to impose conditions on the importing coun- tries. themselves. That must be done by other agen- cies of. the executive branch. At the moment the question before the NRC is whether it should grant approval for new fuel supplies for two American- built reactors at Tarapur in India�yes, India, ex- ploder of that famous "peaceful" bomb in 1974, which we now know was made with the help of heavy water supplied by the United States for other (peaceful) purposes. Given that record, it would seem undenia- ble that the United States is not just entitled, but ac- tually obliged to impose some very strict conditions on what may and may not be done with any further fuel we supply. Yet since the only practical way to do? this is to deny the Indians permission to .extract plu- Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 � Unlit= from that fuel, the actual imposition of prop- � er terms lies outside the NBC's jurisdiction.. � The NRC, however, can impose terms on the U.S. government by refusing to approve the Indian li- cense until the appropriate executive branch agen- cies have imposed the required terms on India. There seems to be anything but a disposition to do so in cer- tain important reaches of the State Department. In- deed, the State Department's July 8 submission to the � NRC on the question reads as if it had been written in � New Delhi. But we think the NRC can and must hang � tough until it has been given the proper assurances , by the people in charge at State and in the White Howe that the Indians will be denied the opportunity to reprocess any fuel that is licensed and that this condition has been made a part of our arrangement , with them. THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JUNE 25, 1976 � The point is simple: If the United States does not act in the Indian case to ensure that our nuclear ex- ports will not be misused or contribute even indi- rectly to enlarging the Indians' nuclear arsenal, then the game will more or less be over. What credibility will we possibly have in urging the French to aban- don their plan to sell dangerous reprocessing equip- ment to the Pakistanis? What authority will we bring to our efforts to negotiate strict safeguards on the. nu- clear reactors we have offered to provide to coun- tries in the Middle East? What license in the future will we ever be able to question or curb�at least with a straight face? We can only hope the NRC will insist on the proper commitment from the administration before it releases this fuel�and that the rest.of gov- ernment will get off the dime and start thinking about and acting on its obligations in this dangerous and supremely important field., By Richard Burt L9ND0fi�F0rd .A.elministrationOffi- sials, led by Henry.-A. . Xissinger, have reiterated their belief that the strategic arms limitation talks must continue to serve as the foundation for a less antagonistic superpower relationship. For more than a year, Leonid I. Brezhnev and his colleagues have Voiced a similar view.' After signing the United States-Soviet agree- ment on peaceful nuclear tests re- cently in Moscow, Mr. Brezlinev stressed that the Soviet Union' was doing "all that it could do" to achieve an accord limiting strategic weapon's. Why, then, have negotiators failed to iron out the details of a new strategic-aims agreement 'that were'. outlined at the 1974 summit talks at Vladivostok? �The popular answer is that the steam has gone out of superpower atente and that the growth of Soviet military power, coupled with the United States Presidential primaries', has made President Ford reticent to enter into a new strategic arms accord. These are plausible explanations, but they tend to obscure what is probably � a more important 'obstacle to' arms control in the longer term�a grawing class of United States, Soviet and :European weapons that these aiegcr; -tiations are not currently suited to. control nor organized to accommodate. :these weapons constitute a ."gray �area" of, military technology: systems that by' virtue of their range, deploy- ment or national Ownership are not riow. _covered by the strategic arms talks but possess the capability, in theory, to deliver nuclear warheads on the superpowers or their allies. The most celebrated category of gray- area systems is the fleet of United States fighter4bombers deployed in Western Europe. While these aircraft � are assigned tactical strike missions, some possess the range and payload , to deliver nuclear weapons on the Soviet homeland. Accordingly, Moscow _ . . Richard Burt is assistant to the director of the International Institute for Strate- gic Studies, , : has argued that they should be limited by an accord, an argument that the United States rejects. Another gray area includes the hundreds of Soviet medium-range bombers and missiles targeted on Western Europe. Because these weap- ons cannot be used against the United States, they have been left out of strategic-arms deliberations, but .they pose a continuing danger to United States allies, and their use could trig- ger a United States, Soviet nuclear exchange. Western European nuclear forces comprise a third, gray area. As a bilateral dialogue, the strategic-arms � discussions do not attempt to con- strain the nuclear capabilities of other countries, but from the Soviet perspec- tive, British and French forces (and China's) must be- added to the United States nuclear threat. As the gray area grows in military significance, superpower-arms control becomes immeasurably more difficult; Despite Soviet concern over United States aircraft in Europe, they re- ; mained outside of the 1972 strategic- arms agreement, a precedent that was continued in the search for a second accord at Vladivostok. But ne,gotia- tions since 1974 have bogged down over a new group of gray-area weap- ons, the Soviet bomber designated the Backfire by the West and the United States long-range cruise missile. In the case of the Backfire, United States negotiators have refused to ac- cept the notion that it Is not intended for use against the United States. The cruise missile raises even more dif- ficult problems, because it is to be built in strategic and shorter-range 29 � tactical versions. While it might theo- retically be possible to distinguish be- tween them, in practice this conld prove. impossible.. � - Whether the deadlock over cruise missiles and the Backfire will be finally resolved remains to be seen: But even if it is, the gray-area problem is likelY to grow 'worse. The'Beckfire is only part of a more wide-scale Soviet effort to, upgrade medium-range nuclear forces for use against Europe.:M these � forces expand,' their exclusion frOM East-West arms control Will be seen � as a growing anomaly. � Diagnosing the 'gray-area iiroblerd, however, is far easier than devising solution. One- suestion is- that these systems be relegated the ether .rnajor East West arias control forum� the : Atlantic -alliance Warsaw- Pact talks over troop, reductions in central Europe. Unfortunately,' most of the gray-area weapons are deployed out- Side of. this region. - A more imaginative idea is the con; vening- of & "third" arms-control con- ference� that would deal specifically with the nuclear systems that continue to elude coverage in the strategic arms limitation talks. Another passible solu-' tion would be to incorporate those talks and the talks on the reduction of forces into a single forum, where a larger number of participants would focus on a wider array of weapons. , Whether either of these two ap- proaches is workable is 'unclear, but both: should be examined. What is clear is that the implications of the gray area are ominous�not only for the future of arms control, but East- West relations in general, Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 . � �.! Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 .;� LONDON TIMES 5 July 1976 TWO HUNDRED YEARS ON Those with a taste for. the . romantic in politics. will no doubt regret that the United States did not celebrate its bicentennial when President Kennedy Was proclaiming his countrymen's readiness to " pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any . foe, in order. to secure the sur- vival and success of liberty ". That was the apogee of American idealism and of their perception of their power. Much has changed since then. The price of global responsibility has be- come higher and there is no longer the old confidence that American involvement guaran- tees either the survival or suc- cess of liberty. At home the United States has been rent by assassination, racial conflict and corruption. The dominant mood of the moment is of anti-Wash- ington sentiment, which repre- sents the disillusionment of the American people with both their institutions and their political processes. But it is when things are going badly that one can best assess the enduring strength of a nation. One should never underestimate either .the speed with which atti- tudes- can change in the United States or the differing facets of American life. It was only a few years before Kennedy was cap- turing the imagination with his � rhetoric that the country was going through the era of McCar- thyism. There were-two factors of par- ticular interest throughout the years of American travail. The first was that there' were many Americans who were as dis- gusted .as anybody by. the activi- ties of their own Government. Whatever politicians and offi- cials may have been doing, the voice of pretest was never stilled. That is the first test of the poli- tical. health of a country. It is the evident dissatisfaction of Americans with sordid gov- ernment that offers the best hope of political renewal now. Mr Jimmy Carter's meteoric rise can largely be attributed to his per- ception of this yearning for decency in high places. That is the context within which Ameri- can politicians of all parties are now having to operate, even if they are not all likely to undergo a spiritual Conversion overnight. � - The second factor was that, bitterly though the United States was criticized by international opinion for its role in Vietnam, the worst fear of many countries was that in-reaction there might be a new phase bf American isolationism. The point was never reached where the :with- drawal of America from an active part in internati,onal. affairs. 'would have been regarded as a blessing.. American authority and moral standing were sadly diminished, but nobody else was able or .willing to take on the task of creative international leadership. That is 'still the. American role today. But it does not follow that with an appro- priate pause for breath the 'United States will shortly be able to resume the position it held in Kennedy's day. The world, as well as the United States, has changed since then. Power has become more fragmented. Neither the Nato nor � the Warsaw Pact countries are such cohesive groupings as they were. China has become more active in . international affairs. With ,the greater importance of commodity prices in international economics the third world has acquired a potential bargaining strength it did not possess before. Less tangibly,. but no less signi.- ficantly, there has. been a change in the international atmosphere which imposes restraints on whoever may wield power, whether economic or military. This means that American power can be exercised effec- tively only with the approval of other countries, which depends in turn partly upon the United States being a source of creative ideas and partly upon that spark that touches the imagination. That is needed now abroad as well as at home because the active involvement of the United States is as necessary as it ever was. Most obviously, it is essen- tial to preserving the military balance with the Soviet Union, without which the whole inter- national order would be trans- formed. Secondly, while one of the' most constructive acts of statesmanship in the past thirty years has been the positive American encouragement to the establishment of the EEC, inter- national economic and political stability *still requires active cooperation across the Atlantic. Then the chances of achieving a better understanding with the primary producers would be much -poorer without vigorous American participation in � the search for a solution. As the United States celebrates its bi- centennial it should know that other countries are looking. not just to its romantic past but also to the role of international leadership it still has to. play. The context of that leadership has changed, but without it the world would be a yet more-dan- gerous and uncertain place. . THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Thursday, July 15, 1976 Gunboat mplonz ey The United States has sent the frigate Beery tel Mombasa. Kenya, to help Jomo Kenyatta face down Uganda's Idi Amin in a spat deriv- ing from the Israeli raid on Ugan- da's Entebbe Airport. The U.S.S. Beary's "courtesy call" is a classic example of gunboat diplomacy, and we think it's fine. In fact, when we contrast such old-fashioned inter- ventions with modern innovations like the current Security Council debate on the Entebbe incident, we have to admit the moral superiority of the 19th Century methods. As Ambassador Scranton re- minded the UN. international law clearly allows for states to use lim- ited force to rescue their own citi- zens from mortal danger on foreign soil. Precedents are numerous. If there is a country where this inter- vention is justified, it must be Uganda. The one hijacking hostage entirely in Ugandan hands, Mrs. Dora Bloch, apparently has been dragged from her hospital bed and murdered, Kenyan nationals in Uganda have been .slaughtered and now, Idi Amin is threatening the safety of 500 British residents be- cause of the British role in the Secu- rity Council debate. Through all this, UN Secretary-General Wald- heim seems mainly concerned about Uganda's "sovereignty." The U.S. is taking entirely appro- priate steps to support our friends in Kenya. The question is why Brit- ain, which in the 19th Century was willing to defend British citizens anywhere in the world, new feels so powerless to protect its own peo- ple. 30 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Monday, July 19, 1976 The Washington Star By Henry S. Bradsher Washington Scar StAft Writer There were sunny smiles, polished politeness and lots of luscious Fin- nish strawberries last summer in Helsinki. Everybody seemed to agree that peace, friendship hnd greater contact between nations was a good idea. And so the leaders of 32 European nations, plus the United States, Canada and the Vatican, signed the Final Act of the Conference on Se- curity and Cooperation in Europe. It talked about "promoting better rela- tions among themselves and ensur- ing conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace." . It sounded fine, but the agreement had been hammered out in contro- versy between East and West. For every soaring hope expressed in Hel- sinki of a new era of international understanding, there were Western warnings of pitfalls ahead in turning the agreement into a working blue- print for cooperation and a Commu- nist qualification to the written terms. Now, a year later, the Helsinki agreement is still controversial. � IT IS NOT JUST the expectable � argument about whether it is proving to be a half-full bottle, containing some progress in East-West rela- tions, or a half-empty one notable � mainly for its unfulfilled provisions. The very delineation of the bottle is in dispute between a Western under- standing of it as a simple, straight- sided thing and a Communist at? � ' tempt to define it as decidedly curv- ed. � Two years of tough negotiations, � basically pitting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations against the Moscow-led Warsaw Pact, pro- duced a very qualified and yet out- � wardly encouraging document. The Soviets wanted a European statement that would have the effect of ratifying the borders it grabbed during World War II and might create an illusion of peaceful har� mony which would lull the Western defense effort. Using the leverage of Moscow's eagerness, the West was able to insist on humanitarian provi- sions despite marked Soviet reluc- tance to accept some of them. Some families separated by the Communist minefields that run down central Europe have been reunited since the agreement was signed. A few more Western newspapers are available under the counters of tour- ist' hotels in Eastern Europe, if not yet accessible to local people. Visa rules have eased a bit for journalists. And, under the heading of "confidence-building measures," SES Cr ir07 advance notifications have been given of some military maneuvers. But there has not been very much more, and even the limited number of family reunifications is of doubtful attribution to the Helsinki agree- ment. Some provisions of the Final Act have been unilaterally redefined by Communist leaders from straight Western interpretations to curved conformity with their usual desire to isolate their people from foreign influences. Some other provisions have been virtually ignored. THIS HAS RILED. many in the West who have paid attention to hu- manitarian problems in Communist countries. One is a cultured lady. from New Jersey with a social con- science and a seat in the House of Representatives, Millicent H. Fen- wick, a Republican. Largely as a result of her initia- tive, and the help of Sen. Clifford P. Case, R-N.J., and many other inter- ested members of Congress, a commission of 12 members of Con- gress and three representatives of the administration has been voted into existence "to monitor the acts of the. Helsinki signatories . . . with _ _ particular regard to the provisions relating to coop- - eration in humanitarian fields." It has not yet start- ed work. The Kremlin has been mightily angered by this American attempt to check up on what it does. And signs point to Henry A. Kissinger's State Depart- ment not being too happy, either, with what it appar- ently sees as congressional interference with its man- agement of Soviet affairs. The Soviet Union began in 1151, in the chilliest part of the Cold War, to seek a ,European security confer- :ence. Waxing and waning over the years. the idea be- came a massive propagan- da ploy intended as a sub- stitute for a World War II peace conference and a way of promoting "Europe for the Europeans" � meaning "Yankee go home," an .unpopular idea with mili- tarily vulnerable West Europeans. Only when the principles of American participation ,and of humanitarian provi- :sions were generally ac- cepted did negotiations *begin. The tough talks fell ._under three subject head- ings. which negotiators 'called "baskets'' of ideas. BASKET ONE COVERS 31. security and "confidence. building measures" like giving warnings of large- scale military maneuvers close to borders and invit- ing observers. Soldiers from neighboring countries have watched maneuvers near both ends of the Soviet Union's European border. The Warsaw Pact did not accept a U.S. invitation to maneuvers in West Germa- ny, however. No significant progress has been made toward disarmament, which was advocated in Basket One. But in general the first sec- tion, which contains sweep- ing statements on peace �and similar lofty senti- ments, has not been a prob- lem so far. Basket Two covers "cooperation in the field of economics, of science and technology, and of the envi- ronment." There has been movement in these fields in the past year, but it is hard to single out of on-going trends toward European coordination of this type ' any specific action at- tributable to the Final Act. No problem here, either, if also no verifiable claims of success. It is in "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields," Basket Three, that the trouble has arisen. Soviet bloc nations never wanted the third basket. They wanted to restrict dis- cussion to relations between governments on security and scientific-economic matters that could be easily contrr(1 from Communist party central committee secretariats. It was only because the West would not play ball on those terms that the Soviets agreed to negotiate on the freer movement of people and ideas. In accepting such negoti- ations, General-Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev of the Soviet Communist Party added the significant quali- fication that humanitarian provisions must respect "the sovereignty, laws, and customs of each country" � and serve "the mutual en- richment of peoples, in- crease the trust betwen them and promote the ideas of peace, freedom and good-neighborliness." WHAT THAT CLEARLY Approved for Release: 2018/10/01CO2623718 meant was that Warsaw Pact nations were reserv- ing the right to interpret for themselves whether any- thing they signed was ap- plicable to their rigid systems of controlling information and the move- ment of people. In the negotiations the West managed t6 defeat most Communist attempts to insert qualifying phrases to dilute the value of Basket Three. NATO. countries were supported on most key issues by neutral nations, who rejected loaded Communist definitions of human rights. So the Final Act was signed by Brezhnev, Presi- dent Ford and other leaders last Aug. 1 in Helsinki's magnificent Finlandia Hall. But addressing the confer- ence on the hot summer day before, Brezhnev reiterated his qualifications just as if � his negotiators had never given up their points in trade for border ratification and the lulling illusion of peace in Europe. Since the signing, this Soviet attitude has been re- peatedly demonstrated by an insistence that it is an interference in Soviet bloc internal affairs for the West to push for easier contact , among people or a more Iliberal exchange of ideas and information. What , democracies consider the I free flow of information would mean opening Communist doors to "anti- Soviet, subversive propa- ganda, materials preaching violence or stirring up na;. � tional and racial strife, and pornography," one Soviet commentator said. �-41* Helsinki signatories "make it their aim to facili- tate freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether pri-, vately or officially, among persons, institutions and or- ganizations of participating states." But when some Soviet dissidents began to quote this to authorities in Moscow, they quickly found . all sorts of limiting reasons being offered � or they were simply silenced. THE COMBINATION of foreign pressure to open up their ,Iloors a crack to the fresh air of non-Communist __�miacts and of internal of- forts to cir,,! the Final Act against Soviet officials soured Moscow's attitude toward the agreement. Within a tew months' Moscow had become defen- sive about it. There began a campaign, which still con- tinues, to claim that the Soviet bloc has adhered to it faithfully but the West has not. � For instance, the control- led Communist press pub- Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 fished all 30,000 Words ot the. Final Act but Western gov- ernments were allegedly afraid to let their people read its terms. �The fact that the document is no more tedious and boring than the usual stuff in Communist newspapers, but no commercial paper in the West would be able to sell it, was blithely ignored. Brezhnev continued this campaign last month in his speech �to the East Berlin meeting of European Communist parties. He contended that the Soviet Union is willing to ex- change ideas but the West is not. ,"In � Britain and France," he said, "they publish six-seven times less books by Soviet authors than we in the Soviet Union publish works by English and French writers," and the West shows only a a small fraction as many Soviet movies as Western movies are shown in his country. � Aside from the unread- ability of Soviet books � neither Tolstoy nor Solz- henitsyn qualify, only "so- cialist realism" � and the boredom of officially ap- proved movies, there is a larger principle involved. The Final Act clearly opens the way to unofficial ex- changes of the kind of things people want. The Soviet Union makes the revisionist argument that exchanges should be under governmental auspices, meaning that they can be controlled in accordance with Communist ideology. This is. actually an exten- sion of what has been hap- pening for many years. By exploiting the free enter- prise system in the West, the -Soviets have been able to distribute books and other materials carrying their message, but Western material is severely re- stricted if not entirely banned in the East. Brezhnev went on in his June 29 speech to deny that Communist countries are closed societies. "We are open to everything truthful and honest," he said. It's all a matter of definitions, and signatures on the Final Act have not changed the defi- nitions used by Soviet bloc leaders. The defensive Soviet atti- tude on application of the Helsinki agreement has taken the form of "tryii.g to divert attention from the real issues," according to one U.S. official v ho has followed th subject closely. "They use the rc rccity issue to try to cover up t.tcir refasal to let people choose for themselves." On one aspect, the Sovi- ets have moved from the defense to an offensive. It is radio broadcasting. The Final Act notes "the expan- sion in the dissemination of information broadcast by radio, and express(es) the hope for the continuation of this process." But foreign broadcasts break the Communist monopoly on what people are allowed to know. BREZHNEV CHARGED that the two American-fi- nanced stations in West Germany broadcasting to the Soviet bloc, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Eu- rope, "poison the interna- tional atmosphere and (are) a direct challenge to the spirit and letter of the Helsinki accords." The West considers wording of , the Final Act to say the opposite. The section on freer movement and contacts also mentions facilitating "the solution of humanitar- ian problems," particularly reuniting divided families. This has attracted the par- ticular attention of people like Rep. Fenwick. "There isn't any govern- ment department charged with looking out for human rights," she said in an interview. "No one's telling us what's happening on Basket Three." A govern- mental commission was needed to bring together information from federal government branches and from private agencies here and in Europe. � Fenwick said it is neces- sary to focus public atten- tion on humanitarian prob- lems in the Soviet bloc in order to get any action. "The only thing that gets somebody out" is publicity, she said, although with some smaller East Euro- pean countries quiet pres- sure is sometimes preferra- ble. � k She added that a second purpose of the commission is to help members of Con- gress judge how well Communist countries are living up to their Helsinki commitments so that this can be used to judge wheth- er they deserve to be voted "most favored nation" privileges intrade. Some officials see a third reason as preparing a record for the conference scheduled to be heleby the 35 signatory nations to re- view the way the Final Act has worked out after two years. The act says prepa- rations for the review will begin in Belgrade next June 15, with the confer- ence to be held by the end of 1977. Considering the dif- ferences so far over the shape of the bottle as Well Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 as its contents, some ob- servers are skeptical that the preparations will ever be completed. SOVIET SENSITIVITY about the way the Helsinki agreement is working out was shown by a protest from Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. Bypassing Kissinger, with whom he virtually always deals, Dobrynin told the assistant secretary of state for European affairs, Arthur A. Hartman, that the new commission was an illegal American assump- tion of the right to interpret the Final Act arbitrarily and unilaterally. Hartman rejected this. � But, while defending the commission against the Soviets, the State Depart- ment has appeared from Capitol Hill to be displeased with it. One muttering has been that maybe a joint congressional-executive group is unconstitutional. Hill experts deny this, since the commission is purely investigative rather than operational. The man named by House Speaker Carl Albert as commission chairman, Dante B. Fasdell, D-Fla., wants to get it to work by the end of July. So far the Departments of State, De- fense and Commerce have not designated the mem- bers which the law requires them to provide, however. Hartman will probably be named to represent State, since Fascell wants people of assistant secretary rank from the three executive departments. Kissinger's; record of defending the Helsinki agreement against critics of detente makes it a delicate job for a State De- partment representative to- have the-job of giving the commission information on Soviet failures to abide by the Final Act. .32 ,611������ Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 THE WASHINGTON POST Joseph Kraft Tuesday, Jur.i.e 29,1976. Setting the Stage for a Communist Split Simultaneous summit meetings�one of European Communist Party bosses In East Berlin, the other grouping lead- ers of the advanced industrial coun- . tries in Puerto Rico�show how, far the world has moved past the cold war con- frontation of yore. Inner weaknesses, not confrontation, determined the agenda of both confer- ences. But while the Communists are clearly in bad trouble, the United States and its allies can mend their own problems and�with a little more flexi- bility�foster a second major split in the Communist world. 1 "It makes sense for the governments of North America, Western Europe and Japan to show a .more flexible attitude toward local communism to drop barriers and open dialogues." Italian Communists in the elections last some special help for Italy, the United week rammed the point home. The States and its allies ought to he able to Russians decided to call off the debate and proceed to an immediate confer- ence in East Berlin. According to the Italian Communists whom I saw in The Russians began talking up the Rome last week, it will offer precious meeting now under way in East Berlin little satisfaction to the Russians. three or four years ago in tones of am- The document issuing from the East bition run riot. According to Moscow . Berlin conference will not condemn the meeting was to condemn the the Chinese, nor acknowledge Soviet Chinese Communists as heretics. It was supremacy with the formula "pro- also to accept the principle of letarian internationalism." It will reas- sert the principle that the party of ev- ery country is entitled to find its own But virtually all the other Commun- national way to socialism. What the 1st parties of Europe resisted these So- Russians get is an acknowledgement Viet aims. The Yugoslays and Rumani- " that all the Communist parties are axis, having already divorced them- heading toward the same goal�a fig- selves from Moscow, outspokenly op- leaf for diplomatic defeat. posed condemnation of Peking and ac- As to Puerto Rico, the advanced ceptance of Soviet supremacy. The Ital- countries talked about their No. I prob- Jana and less independent west Euro- lem�economics or, more precisely, pean parties followed suit more cau- maintaining prosperity without setting tiously. Except for East Germany, the off another inflationary wave. No ma- ' other East European countries used the., jor decisions have been taken�in large - occasion to wriggle a little further out - part because the US., Japan and West from under the Russian thumb. . Germany all face early elections. As the debate wore on at meeting But there was widespread agreement ' after meeting, it became an obvious" that a general recovery from last year's loser for the Russians. Not only did recession is now under way. Equally they make no headway themselves. But that measures should be taken to hold the Italian Communists, in particular, down inflation�among them limits on deliberately stood up to the Russians government spending, on wage rises, �the better to win support at home. and on barriers to the free exchange of The stunning gains achieved by the goods including fiddling with currency the Soviet Union. 1Lognarlr5 imr5 Sun., July18, 1976 rates. With a little give and take and c 1978. Field Enterprises. Inc. Drug Agency Failing to Curb Traffic It said that "although DEA has presented sta- tistics to demonstrate considerable numbers of arrests of violators and seizures of illicit drugs, the ability of higher-echelon dealers and finan- ciers to ring illicit drugs into the United States has not been effective] deterred." The subcommittee said the agency had con- centrated too much on pursuing low-level drug dealers and addicts and not enough on con- spiracy cases targeted against high-level nar- cotics traffickers. It also complained of a lack of cooperation in exchanging inforthation between the agency and the U.S. Customs Service, which is respon- sible for protecting the nation's borders and 7 ports of entry against smugglers. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), acting chairman of the subcommittee, said in a statement accom- panying the report that the agency and the Customs Service had "declared war on each other�not on the big-time, international nar- cotics smugglers and dealers." The dm.,b agency was established in the De- partment of Justice on July 1, 1973, under an executive order of President Richard M. Nixon consolidating the enforcement functions of a number of agencies. "proletarian internationalism"�a code- word for loyalty to Russia. achieve sustained non-inflationary prosperity for several years to come. But in their preoccupation with their own problems, the advanced industrial countries are missing an opportunity. It is the opportunity to end the knee-jerk . hostility to local Communist parties in Western Europe and Japan. These parties are now showing stead- ily growing opposition to dictation from Moscow. They have acquired, es- pecially with the U.S. and Russia nego- tiating under the aegis of detente, a kind of legitimacy. They cannot be fobbed off much longer by the old Red- menace argument that they are mere tools of Moscow. Moreover, some of them at least can play a constructive role in fighting inflation by holding the line on wages. So it makes sense for the govern- ments of North America, Western Eu- rope and Japan to show a more flexible attitude toward local communism�to drop barriers and 'open dialogues. The Communists will thus have some new Incentives to cooperate, and pull fur- ther from Moscow. As they take their distances from Russia, the stage is set for the next logical blow to Moscow's pretensions to world leadership�the' development of a Euro-communism split off, like Communist China, from WASHINGTON reorganization in- tended to strengthen federal efforts to combat illicit drug traffic has failed, Senate investiga- tors said Saturday. In the'three years since the Drug Enforce- ment Administration was established, the na- tion's illicit drug traffic has increased, a report of dte permanent investigations subcommittee, a 'unit of the Senate Government Operations Committee, said. "The number of drug addicts continues to in- ..crease at a rapid rate, brown heroin from Mexi- co continues to come into this country in mas- sive amounts, and drug abuse continues to spread into rural and suburban areas," it said. In comments on the report. Peter Bensinger, DEA administrator, said that although the agency welcomed and needed the interest of the committee, "the findings of this report, simply put, arc dated." . � "They may represent the committee findings on past DEA operations. but do not portray DEA's mission or strategies in July, 1976," he said in a statement. The subcommittee's report was based on an investigation and hearings conducted last year. Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 33 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 THE ECONOMIST JULY 3 1978 Between Erezhnev9 s toes The Polish workers who ripped up the railway line outside Warsaw on June 25th to stop their government putting up the price of food may have given the signal for a change of western policy towards the Soviet empire. It is no longer necessary to assume that any change for the better in Russia's dependencies in eastern Europe can be brought �about only through the approval of Mr- Brezhnev; maybe it can be done despite Mr Brezhnev. On the same day as Polish strikers were vetoing their � government's price policy, Mr Henry Kissinger was saying in London that the Americans "recognise no spheres of influence and no pretensions to hegemony" in eastern Europe. That is not quite how his assistant Mr Helmut Sonnenfeldt put it last December: Mr Sonnenfeldt said that the smaller east European countries ought to become more independent of Russia, but then he ruffled the hawks' feathers by adding "within the-context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence.' Mr Kissinger has deleted that complaisant phrase. What is the connection between the Soviet Union's relationship with the governments of eastern Europe and the problems those governments face in dealing with their own peoples? It is that, for the past 10 years, the west has acted as if the key to change in eastern Europe lay exclusively in Moscow: as if nothing could be done to improve the lot of Poles and Czechoslovaks and the rest without the blessing of the Soviet government. For three reasons, it is time to ask whether that western policy is still the right one. The policy that ran into the stops First, the policy of concentrating on Moscow has achieved just about as much as it was ever likely to achieve, which was not very much. Back in the late 1960s it made sense to think that the road to change in eastern Europe would have to rim through Mr Brezhnev's office. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 appeared to confirm the. lesson of the Soviet interventions in East Germany in 1953 and Hungary in 1956: nothing could happen in Russia's dominions, it then seemed, that Russia did not like. And indeed, in Russia itself, the west's decision to focus its efforts on influencing Russian policy did produce some modest benefits. It was western pressure that helped to get exit permits for quite a lot of Soviet Jews, and some other dissidents as well; it is the scrutiny of the western media that has kept some of the other dissidents who remain in Russia out of prison. This willingness by Mr Brezhnev to let a few hornets go on buzzing has spread into the more liberal .east European countries, such as Poland and Hungary. But in what matters most to Mr Brezhnev----the preservation by communist governments of all the rest of their apparatus of political and economic control�the Soviet Union's leader has made it quite plain that there will be no change if he can help it. � � Second, however, it has begun to look as if he may not be able *.o help it, at. least as much as he originally thought. The long delayed conference of all Europe's communist parties which was eventually held in East Berlin this week confirms that Mr Brezhnev's power to give orders to other communists is much more limited than it used to be. The slogan of "proletarian internationalism"�meaning do as Moscow tells you�made no appearance at the conference; and Mr Brezhnev was obliged to listen to Rumanian and Spanish communists telling him that each communist party should do what it thinks is in its own best interests. In the short run, this may not do much for the east Europeans who have Soviet divisions squatting on their territory. But in the longer run the sight of Italian and Spanish communists insisting on going their own way�and, which is the heart of the matter, winning public support by doing so�is unlikely to go unnoticed by the governments in Warsaw and Budapest, and even in Prague and East Berlin. - - - - Third, therefore, it is important to note this past week's evidence that eastern Europe is by no means the docile and quiescent place the Russians have spent the past few years trying to make it seem. The Economist had better make it clear that, on the econOrnics of the issue which blew up in Poland last week, we think the Polish government was right and its worker-opponents wrong. Food prices in Poland have been kept artificially static, partly by holding down the real incomes of farmers while the real wages of industrial workers have risen quite fast, but mainly by subsidies which now take up almost 8% of the national income. These are nonsenses, and will have to be stopped some time. But the real point of the Poles' protests on June 25th. is a lesson for the communist world's politicians, not its economists. The Polish explosion shows that even in the most economically successful of all the communist states�Poland claims that its real gross national product has been going up on average by over 10% a year in the past four years�a largeriumber of industrial workers still feel disgruntled enough to resort to violence rather than accept a modest, temporary and economically"rational check in the improvement of their living standards. It also shows that they can make their protest Stick: the people, when they feel strongly enough, have a veto on the party's will. But it can hardly have escaped the attention of the Polish government, and of the other east European. governments, that a system which jerks between the party's yea and the urban population's nay is a peculiar way to run a country. The isolation of Poland's communist party from the public opinion it claims to represent has not been cured by Mr Gierek's perfectly genuine attempt in recent years to meet more people, and explain his policies better, than most other communist leaders do. The moral of the Polish affair is a radical one. le communist parties are not to keep on losing contact with public opinion, they will have to change the way they -organise themselves; which means introducing the principle of pluralism; which means abandoning Lenin's idea of a monolithic and all-powerful party, which is the basis oft he way all communist parties except (perhaps) a few west European ones now organise themselves., What the west can do Al] this suggests that there is more possibility of change in the smaller east European countries than there is in the ironclad rigidity of the Soviet Union itself; and that the western democracies should look to these countries, rather than to Russia, as the focus of their eastern policy. Can the west do anything to help a gradual and controlled liberalisation of eastern Europe? Yes. For instance: * It can make it clear to these countries that they have rather more scope for runging their affairs in ways Mr Brezhnev may not enjoy than some of them perhaps realise. Hungary runs a looser (and therefore more efficient) economic planning system than Russia does. Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Poland 'allows its rriiddle crasi a bit more freedom of sTeech and travel, and has a decollectivised peasantry. Rumania runs a markedly non-Brezhnev-type foreign policy. If an east European country tried to combine, say, two of these measures of independence, it is unlikely that the Russia of the second half.of the 1970s would intervene to prevent it by force�because such behaviour would cost Russia dear in its hopes of western economic assistance, and in its already fragile influence over the communists of western Europe. � The west could shape its credit policy, including helping to finance the movement of western technology into parts of the communist world, so that more of its economic help goes to those east European countries which show most signs of liberalising themselves. This year's West German deal with Poland gave the Poles a large, cheap loan in return for their release of more ethnic Germans who want to go and live in Germany. It would make even better sense for future help to be steered towards countries that seem to be loosening the Leninist system�because such countries' economies are likely to work more efficiently. . . , * The EEC might-offer to include more east European WASHINGTON POST 15 JUL 1976 countries in its system of generalised preferences. So far only Rumania enjoys this advantage, because only Rumania has decided to, brush aside Russian disapproval; but others might risk it later. And helping 'eastern Europe is another argument for reforming the EEC's common agricultural policy; if the CAP were changed to put less reliance on the common price system which helps rich farmers and poor alike, and more on direct subsidies for the poorer ones, there might be room for the east Europeans to sell more of their (very good) farm produce to west Europeans. None of this, it should be clear, is within a mile of the "rollback" policy that John Foster Dulles talked about in 'the early 1950s. It would not re-establish a pre- communist system in eastern Europe. Its aim would be to encourage those communist parties in the region which see the advantage of trying to move in the direction in which Mr Berlinguer's Italian Communists claim to be pointing. The west's reply to "proletarian internationalism" is self-determination; and it should help the people of eastern Europe who wart to try to struggle out from under Mr Brezhnev's toes. Defending the Penkovsky Papers' Authenticity Some weeks ago Stephen Rosenfeld � stated in an article that the Church committee had proved the Penkovsky � 'Papers to have been fabricated or falsi- fied by the CIA. This has since been as.� as fact in your editorial columns. May I, as one much involved in the orig- inal controversy on the subject, point out that this is not so? The Church committee merely said, "the book was prepared by witting � Agency assets who drew on actual case �materials." It said this in passing in a I section of its report criticizing the CIA ' on the different matter�and one far less grave than falsification�of con- cealing the source of the material from the publisher. lit is surely far from - being a principle of American journal- ism that the rather perfunctory con- cealment of a source should be thought � to invalidate a document.) The commit- tee's phrase as it stands could perhaps at a pinch be construed to mean for- gery. But if it had meant to charge the CIA with this serious crime, it would NEW YORK TIMES Z 6 JUN 1976 r -- IA Soviet Scientist Is Critical of Ford On Human Rights Special to Thlk New York Thee MOSCOW, June 25 � The highest-ranking Soviet scientist to apply for emigration accusedl President Ford today of indif- ference to \ iolations of human: rights in the Soviet Union and! elsewhere. In an open letter to the Presi- dent, Veniamin G. Levich, a physical chemist and corre- sponding member of the Acade- my. of Sciences, stressed that he was not making an appeal for help in his case but a more general call for a reassessment', 1 of, American policy. 4 We want a President whol is for ddterte," he said in an 1 certainly have made it a major point in the indictment and would have as- serted it flatly and unambiguously. The natural interpretation of the sentence. is that those sections of Col. Penkov- sky's reports which were not of intelli- gence interest -fwere edited and ar- ranged by a friendly intermediary. The book as it appeared in fact contained a good deal of commentary quite explic- itly written not by Penkovsky but by the editor. This has never been at issue and Is not relevant to the present charges. Mr. Rosenfeld cited Victor Zorza as having, at the time, thrown doubt on the authenticity.of the book on internal textual grounds. True, but his objec- tions were almost unanimously re- jected by students as eccentric and without. substance. We are now told, solely on the basis of the Church com- mittee's remark, that the inauthentic- ity is established. Mr. Rosenfeld found It possible to quote with approval a So- viet description of the papers as a . interview; "but who will not forget the humanitarian prob- lems." In his letter, Mr. Levich asked: "Why have those who have been waiting for long ago- nizing years in this country for their legitimate rights to be im- plemented never sensed any moral support either from you, Mr. President, or from any one of your Administration?" Noting Administration con- tentions that "one should trust in the efficiency of quiet diplo-' inacy," especially on the ques-i tion of Jewish emigration, Mr. Levich declared: "No one sensible can deny 1 that there is certainly plenty of' 'scope for this sort of diploma- cy. In this case, however, the voice of quiet diplomacy was so quiet that hardly anyone could hear it." After a surge in the number of Jews permitted to leave for "coarse fraud, a mixture of provocative invention and anti-Soviet slander." And he specified as false the accounts of "high-livers" and "first-strikers" among . the Soviet elite. (The papers do not, as he implied, say that this was universal.) All evidence, including public evi- dence, shows that both these rather dif- ferent types are indeed not uncommon in Soviet political and military circles. It will be plain that the Church corn- ' mittee provided no new information at all�and its very absence tends to con- . firm the official story. There is, in fact,. no evidence whatever that the papers _ were in any sense faked, or that the material attributed to Col. Penkovsky was in any way fabricated. Proof posi- tive of their authenticity is a matter for the CIA. The agency has been accused of procuring a falsification. I hope it will now settle the question once and for all. Washington Israel, a flow that reached an estimated 35,000 people in 1973, the number dropped last year to 11,700, according to of- ficial statistics. The drop occurred after Mos- cow had rejected an arrange- ment linking favorable United States regulations for trade with the Soviet Union to progress on the relaxation of Soviet restrictions on emigra- tion. The linkage, known as the Jackson amendment after its author, Senator Henry M. Jack- son. Democrat of Washington, was opposed by both the Nixon and Ford Administrations as counterproductive. Mr. Levich said he could not be sure how far the Soviet Gov- ernment would yield to Ameri- can pressure on human rights. But he said that emigration, or as he put it, "one of the funda- mental human freedoms, the free choice of country of resi- Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 'ROBERT CONQUEST ldence," could be caialyst for !broader liberalization within Soviet political and social life. "If those who want to emi- grate can do so freely, that has a great significance for those who stay behind," he said in �an interview with Western cor- respondents. "Each state with free emigration must address itself to its internal problems, and this promotes the liberal- ization of the whole socie:y." 35 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 DAILY TELEGRAPH, London 25 June 1976 Ital 9S�st ay f execution- - SUPPOSE that a condemned man who is told, on the morn-ROBERT MOSS on a oniniums ing he was to be hanged, that . . , he has been granted a stay of execution feels a certain sense of threat that will not go 'away relief. But this is the only kind � of satisfaction that can be derived from the results of Italy's elec- tions. This might seem a curious way to sum up the outcome of elec- tions in which the Italian voters did not do either of the two things that had most been feared. 'They did not give more votes to the Communists than to .Christian, Democrats, and they did not give an overall majority to Utz Left. So the entry of the Communists into -the --Government is -not yet inevitable. But it is very much in doubt whether Italy is govern- able without them........ The The Communists have gained a considerable V moral victory, increasing their vote in the polls for the Lower House by over 7 per cent. They are confident, dis- ciplined, and ready to bide their time�especially since they want to avoid shouldering any of the blame for the country's economic crisis and have built up a formid- able power base through the regional governments they control. A t further reason why Signor. Berlinguer is in no great hurry is that he knows that the arrival of, the Communists in power (eitcept as part of a coalition including Christian Democrats) is the one thing that might finally bring the confused and fractious anti-Marxist forces together and. produce a vigorous public reaction. In contrast, the democratic parties- are -left floundering -with- � out any. apparent sense of direc- tion. Fear of the Communist danger did move a third "of the people who voted for' the. Neo- Fascist MST In 1972' to switch their votes to the Christian Demo-, crats�Lbut they were only- just enough to make Up for the Chris- tian Democrat voters who defected to' the Left. 'The smaller parties of the' Centre' that might, united, have supplied a '. viable alternative 'for voters. who . are fed up with the corruption and . economic incompetence of the , Christian Democrat establishment , were virtually wiped 'off the slate. So the creation of a new Govern- ment depends on a renewed court- ship between those aged divorcees, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. The Socialists swore blind during the elections that they would not go hack into government without the Communists. But if the Christian Democrats offer them rich enough rewards � including �.the .Presidency of the Republic-7, they will no doubt remember that promises are only promises. L Which could lead only to, another ' rudderless Government. after an interlude of rudderless non-govern- ment. . Given ,the near-total dis- I array of the non-Marxist forces, L. the: lira:in ._art._..e:ven. sorrier state.: than the pound and major strikes looming, it is hardly surprising that many people who are far from being Marxists have turned wist- fully towards the Communists. Maybe they can govern, the argu- ment:goes.---s-Anyway, it would-force= the Lather lot to get rid of the crooks and tired old Men so a decent anti-Communist Govern- . ment could emerge later. This- -is, a :seductive argument, :.but .it must be resisted�and also., publicly resisted by Italy's friends,, abroad�not just because a Cork, munist is a.COmtnunist is a Corn-:. munist, (and not just a soCial. re; ' .forrner or a liberal in a hurry) but, 'because Italy is 'too crucial' to the' precarious strategic balance in the Mediterranean for the West to tolerate a Chilean-style " experi; --Whet Fer� Signor Berlinguer is What he says he Italian tommunists,; ''have succeeded in convincing surprising number of People that , their entry into government would--:- not jeopardise the country's rela, tions with Nato,. the EEC or the�. Western bankers. and !this- helped-, them in the elections. � The Italian Communists were. compared in the Guardian the other day to the British Labour � party. Now, I would hot dispute for a moment that there are a: fair number of people �in the�; Labour party who would not feet: at all ill-at-ease in: Signor Berlin- guer's party, so long as they could learn to eat pasta iinstead of , - potatoes. But the; point is that 1 Signor Berlinguer's party is a Marxist-Leninist party in which .1 each member7is , subjected to that 'system of ' democratic centralism " � Which is about as ,far away from i , genuine democracy as you can get. � For instance the editors of L'Unitci- censor Signor Berlinguer's .own . speeches when he says something overly revisionist in order to woo � the middle-class !voter. In an interview stiithiCorrierd �della Sera ! shortly before the elections he expressed qualified-enthusiasm for Nato: from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint there'was no tontradic- ', tion involved in publishing some- ;thing in a national paper and then � in the party organ. By talking that way to Corriere, he was making another tactical move towards the peaceful 'assumption of �power; the editors 'of I.' U ni t a were-reassuring the party faithful that if the Communists:do- come to power, they will behave exactly as they in-the-past � � Nato at risk . Berlinguer and his friends, it remains irrefutable that their entry into government would put _ at riskNato's .,entire southern flank. This is why it stillis " now than it was before June 20 for Western leadefs 'Make it clear .that an Italian Government that in- cluded Communists would,. 'be viewed rather ..differen.tly.;.than a Government that did not Dr -_-:KiSsingerlv_as-2widelymritifisedslon his pre-election talk about how a Communist victory in Italy would be "unacceptable." It may well be that it is not much good talking., this way unless you are clear about what sanctions the West would apply if sudict-stli-ing---actualiy came about. But-71'.-:helieve that, on !balance, it ,w-a7s' better to have " Spoken he 'did rather than to. 3 have, kept. silent 'or, worse still, to have; made complacent or sympa- j'theile,noisei la la Old Palme or ."c' 'The , overnment main- .a SilenCe that was punetua-- 4ed only by.,a remarkable leak. On June ..15 the prosCommunist paper in Paese' Sera published a lengthy-- article based on a summary of an off-the-record briefing that Mr Crosland had .given to diplomatic., 7-correspondents. Mr Crosland was quoted � as saying that the Italian! Communist party had evolved in , a European direction" and that he , did not consider that its entry into government would pose a serious . threat to Nato. - Mr Winston 'Churchill, M P, has now tabled a question to Mr Crosland. But whether or not the Crosland quotations were accurate, there is no doubt that the resound- ing silence of the British Govern- ment was interpreted by Berlin- guer as a blessing. , The same thing must not happen again. It should be made clear that not all would be sweetness and light between Italy and Nato (or between Italy and the Western bankers) if the Communists gain 36 power. I am not calling for the ostra- cism of Italy in such an event, still less for a total break with Nato. I am calling, instead, for a system of " incentives arid penalties "�to use the now somewhat tarnished phrase that was initially applied by Dr Kissinger to the manage- ment of d�nte with the Russians. Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Under such a system, the aid and credits that are currently going to bolster the sagging Italian economy would be granted (if granted at all) only if the Italian Government respected certain clearly defined conditions, with full guarantees for the free Press and the security of the Nato bases rating high on the list. Communist or pro-Communist officials would be ruthlessly kept out of Nato counsels. Despite its status as one gngthg rintet of the four permanent members of Nato's Nuclear Planning Group, Italy would have to be excluded from many sensitive discussions. But such a system of controls could not �removp the strategic dangers that 'Tho "new situation would present. America's nuclear stockpile and naval and air bases would �be in jeopardy, as would Nato's system of air surveillance and communications. Israel's vul- nerability would �be increased in Mon., July 12, 1976 the event of a new Middle East war. These are sufficient reasons for Western leaders to sound a note 'of:. Warning to the Italian public. Such warnings sometimes backfire. But it is better tO risk that than to tolerate a situation in which the �Communists have succeeded in reasturing at least a part of the Italian electorate that Italy's rela- tionships with the �West wOuld remain fundamentally unchanged if they took office. Berufsverbot Gone Berserk � Vireit 'Germany is concerned about protecting its � flowering, but still shallow-rooted, democratic insti- tutions that grew out of the shambles of World War IL But it seems to have overreacted in the ap- plication of a policy popularly known as "berufs: � verbot"�a ban on performing a job or following one's profession. � � � The:policy is designed to prevent extremists of the right and left from joining the civil service of federal_ -and state agencies�a device to protect democracy from those who would destroy it. But-some see in it the specter of totalitarian con- formity, and former Chancellor Willy. Brandt, a champion of German democracy, is having second thoughts about it. Brandt's government, in 1972, urgectvigorous application of the policy as part of a postwar program to prevent a resurgence of totali- tariani,sm. Critics, say the policy is invoked against leftists and Communists while leaving rightists and former Nazis untouched. Berufsverbot is determined through' a security check, -which supporters say is little different from that of other West European countries, on whether a civil service applicant's a supporter or opponent of democracy. Such applicants, like those in other-. parts of-Western Europe, are also required to take a loyalty oath�a requirement that predates beruf- 6verbot. � . 'Theii are conflicting claims on the impact of the. �policy. One anti-berufsverbot group says that 750,- '000 pegsons have been investigated, and that 1,200 of Ahem have been turned down because of their � political views or past activities, such as taking part in antiwar demonstrations. � . ; But Wore there is a rush to judgment over such 'Statistics, it is important to bear in mind the peculi- arities of West Germany. :Besides having the fragility of a young democra-. icy; the 'ftation is especially vulnerable to antidemo- cratic forces. It is continuously under assault from -the: Communist north and east by spies and subver- sive groups. There...are an estimated 15,000 espionage agents at work against the government at any one time, an affliction that is far worse than that affecting THE ECONOMIST 17 July 1976 Norway The little hut FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT Kithenes A pale yellow wooden summerhouse is up for sale outside Kirkenes, 150 miles north of the Arctic circle. It is just like thousands of others in northern Norway, although it commands a tine view to the east and overlooks a tirst dotted with occasional watchtowers 37 other Western governments. These agents have infiltrated the highest reaches of government, and even the inner sanctums of Bonn's security services. Brandt resigned the chan- � cellorship in 1974 because of thefl discovery of an East German spy among his aides. � Because of the postwar split of Germany into east and west portions, most of the spies are East Ger- mans who enjoy a unique advantage in undermin- ing democratic institutions. They share a common language and cultural tradition with West Germans that enables them to infiltrate such institutions with relative ease. Then there is the determined antidemocratic movement among non- and anti-Communists like the notorious Baader-Meinhof gang, which has as- � saulted West Germany with bombings, kidnapings and assassinations. � From the west and south of the nation there are suspicion and jealousy, which do little to fertilize West German democracy. The suspicion is based on history. The jealousy is based on West Germany's emergence as a world power that has brought unprecedented freedom and prosperity to its people. Through self-discipline and hard work, the nation has made the most of Marshall Plan dollars in achieving a largely suc- cessful mix of social democracy and enlightened capitalism. As such, West Germany stands as an affront to the totalitarian right and left. Antidemocratic forces cannot point to West Germany, as they might to Italy, and say the days of enlightened free enterprise are doomed. Thus, to provide credibility: to their claims, such forces must attack West Ger- many with special vigor. This is no doubt a factor in the opposition to berufsverbot. There is also no doubt that there have been abuses in the policy, just as there have been abuses by the FBI and CIA in attempting to protect the in- stitutions of this country. � Like the United States, West Germany must do - all in its power to eliminate�through democratic means�those abuses, and if need be abandon or amend its berufsverbot policy to conform with its postwar ideals. rate salmon river. Yet the government has decided to buy it and destroy it, because it stands just 10 yards from the border line with the Soviet Union. The Norwegians fear that the house might be taken over by the CIA or at least by somebody with unfriendly intentions towards the Russians. They do not want any awkward incidents. :The border is marked by two rows of striped posts and a wire fence to stop reindeer straying across. The skyline is raised above the forest, but no troops - are in sight. Relations between the Norwegian and 'Russian border com- missioners. have never been better. The two men meetA4egularly to 'share .a vodka and sort out 'routine problems. In .between meetings:, they are linked by a "hot line"; said to be the world's second because it was installed after the Washington-Moscow link. The tele- phone at the Norwegian end. is an ancient crank-handle model, hut is painted bright red. � Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718- Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 The Kirkenes locals still remember that northern Norway was one of the few regions of Europe which the Russians liberated during the second world war and then withdrew from. Here at any rate, it seems, detente is alive and well. Yet the nominal border line is deceptive. The border where the Soviet Union actually begins lies several miles away, beyond the Pasvik river and shrouded by pine trees. It is marked by a high barbed-wire fence .and is patrolled by border guards. Their efficiency is simply measured: no refugees have succeeded in escaping into Norway in recent years. Behind the line, the Russians keep a tight check on all movement in the area, so that most would-be escapers cannot get anywhere near the frontier. The military importance of this Arctic area is greater than it seems. In the Kola peninsula Russia maintains a large part of its strategic nuclear capacity: Its population has increased from 360,000 in 194Q to 1m today. Murmansk and the adjacent ports are the only Soviet ones with direct and ite-free NEW YORK TIMES 9- July 1976 S. NATO FORCE CALLED 'UNREADY' G.A.O.ReportonGermanUnit Cites Personnel Shortages, Equipment Problems By JOHN W. FINNEY SPeal to The New York Times WASHINGTON, July .8--A General Accounting Office in- vestigation has established that the readiness of United States Army armored units in Western Europe is "woefully deficient," Senator Hubert H.. Humphrey said today. . The Minnesota Democrat made the statement in making public a digest of a classified report by the G.A.O. on the readiness of frontline armored units stationed in West Ger- many. The G.A.O., the investigative arm of Congress, found that the units suffered personnel shortages, ammunition supply problems and deficiencies in their equipment. Despite these , shortcomings, the report said, the units "continued to report that they were substantially ready with minor deficiences." Part of the problem, the digest of the report suggested, is that army standards for com- puting and reporting on readi- ness "have been relaxed to the point where units could almost always be reported as combat- ready." Not Fully Manned The office, which undertook' its investigation at the request of Senator Humphrey, found that because of serious person- access to the Atlantic, and some 180 submarines are based there. There are also, in round figures, 110,000 military and civilian personnel stationed there (i-ncl uding two army d ivisions and a naval infantry brigade), 200 combat ships. 200 naval patrol aircraft and 300 fighter-bombers. See no evil The naval and military build-up in the Kola peninsula is still going on, and the defence ministers of Scandinavian countries have been voicing under- standable anxiety about it. The three Norwegian observers who were recently allowed to attend a Soviet exercise north of Leningrad under the terms of the Helsinki agreement did not see much, and Nato experts do not expect the agreement to make any practical difference. Indeed, General Sir John Sharp, the British commander-in-chief of Nato's northern forces, recently claimed that the build-up in the Kola peninsula represented. "the most im- portant strategic threat to the western alliance at present". This is one reason why.. Nato � chiefs have been pressing net shortages, particularly among skilled enlisted men, not all of the armored vehicles were fully manned. -Without giving specific fig- ures, the digest said that many of the vehicles were not com- bat-ready, largely because of problems with their radio equip- ment. Among the ammunition prob- lem cited in the rePort were lack of adequate storage areas, insufficient information on serviceable ammunition, inade- quate access roads to stock- piles, not enough tools to 'cut the banding around ammunition ,boxes and a lack of conveyors to expedite loading. ' In one instance, Senator Humphrey said, drawing from the classified portion of the re- port, a unit of the First Ar- mored Division did not have a set of keys to the ammunition bunkers and would have to travel about an hour to obtain one. 'Serious Mismanagement' "There is, in my judgment," Senator Humphrey said, "seri- ous mismanagement and ineffi- ciency in our European forces and in the program that is sup- posed to assure the combat- readiness of those forces. "It should be emphasized that these problems are the result of management inadequacies within the- army. They have not been caused by inadequate sup- port from Congress or the tax- payer." The Defense Department had no immediate comment on Senator Humphrey's statement. In the past, however, army offi- cials have emphasized that the readiness of the forces had suf- fered because of Congressional cuts in the defense budget, par- ticularly in the operations and maintenance accounts. At the same time, army lead- ers have emphasized that the combat-readiness, which a few, years ago was acknowledged to be low, has been improving as; Norway and Denmark to increase their - defence budgets. Nato has asked the Norwegians for a 4rA', annual growth in real defence spending. Norway is unlikely to agree to such a big rise, despite its new oil wealth, but a defence commission set up by the government is likely to recom- mend some rise when it reports later this year.- - Nato is also trying to improve its ability to resist a Soviet invasion of Norway. It is thinking about preparine a stockpile of equipment, including tanks and trucks, for use by other Nato troops, like the., British and Canadians, if troops had to be airlifted in a hurry. .At present, however, the Norwegians will not allow any foreign troops or nuclear weapons to be bas-ed in Norway. They fear that the Russians would see this as a Cuba-like threat. This is the dilemma for. Norway: it wants to improve its defences, but also to avoid doing anything which the Russians could interpret as a provo- _ cation. That is why a yellow summer- house on the border will shortly be only a pile of firewood. the divisions in Europe, stripped of their skilled person- nel for the Vietnam War, were rebuilt. The G.A.O. said that many of the problems cietd in its re- port were recognized by the United States Army command in Europe, which it said was moving "actively and positive- moving "actively and positive- ly" to eliminate the deficien- cies. Indirectly, the readiness of the four and a half army divis- ions stationed in West Germany bears on the military balance between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and War- saw Pact forces on the Central European front.. Despite some increase in the size of the War- saw Pact forces, it remains the judgment of Pentagon officials that a satisfactory balance now exists, with the NATO forces providing an effective deterrent to a Soviet attack. NEW YORK TIMES 16 July 1976 RED BID TO SUBVERT ALLIED TROOPS SEEN LONDON, July 15 (UPI)7� Communist and other extreme left-wing -groups are stepping up efforts to subvert allied forces in Europe, with Amer- ican soldiers "a particularly tempting target," the Foreign Affairs Research Institute said today. An institute study said sub- versive, campaigns against United States servicemen in Europe were directed in large part against blacks and Puerto Ricans. � "The threat to the loyalty of armed forces in Western Eu- rope must be taken serionsly," lit said, describing American forces in the Western alliance 38 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 as "a particularly tempOng target for the professional agi- tator." According to the study. "Servicemen and women who are away from theit home en- virorunent and carrying out a deterrent role with its attend- ant dangers of boredom - can become disaffected relatively easily. This applies particularly to ethnic minority groups such as blacks and Puerto Ricans." The study for the privuely! financed body was written by Anthony Burton, described as a lecturer and writer, who served 16 years in the British Army. Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 NY4431}"" eami ait � WASHINGTON POST 2 1 JUL 1976 their links, both Israel and Israel Apparent y to Syria that they are deter- the Maronites have signaled � mined to help one another to resist any attempt to es- Aiding efrut light� tablish Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. � In the Lebanese war's ini- � tial stages, Christian leaders By Joseph Fitchett procured a range of weapo- 'Special to The Washington Post nry, mostly automatic arms, BEIRUT�Lebanon.. Mar- onite Christian forces, dis- playing new military muscle, are apparently receiving di- rect but 'covert military aid from Israel. Evidence in the field, calculated indiscretions by Christian politicians, the street mood on the Christian S id e and unattributable statements by Western diplomats in Arab capitals all tend to confirm it. An ambassador who is closely involved called it an "objective concurrence of Interests" among the Lelia- ' nese Christians, Syria and Israel. The United States has not lodged any com- plaints to anyone about the practical steps by the three in furtherance of their mu- � tuality of interest, -U.S. offi- cials confirm privately. A key factor lit-the recent- strengthening of Christian forces is the supplies of new, heavier materiel pour- ing into their arsenals. The main Christian port, jounieh, was closed last week for days, and Palestin- ian intelligence reports say that during that period, two large shiploads of heavy-ap- pearing armored Vehicles were landed. This weaponry- is expected to appear in a new drive in which the Christian militias attempt to follow up their recent vic- tories and expand the zone under their control to in- clude the hills above Beirut. New, equipment is only par!, of the explanation of bolstered� Christian bold- nes.s. Equally important is the-manifest confidence of Christian commanders that more materiel can be ob- tained promptly and in quantity. This has convinced military observers that Christian arms procurers, whO initially had to shop aroluid from arms dealers all over the world, now can obtain their supplies di- , rectly from the military in- ventories of a government thatitself has good delivery facilities to the Christian en- Christian commanders say their forces now have all the weaponry which their troops can absorb � a marked change from the earlier phases of the 15-month-old war. Christian fighters brand- ish. their weapons, claiming that the NATO-style assault rifles come from Israel and pointing to the serial num- bers and insignia scraped off the gun and leather sling. On conquered build- ings, Christians scrawl a Star of David as readily as a Cedar tree, the symbol of Lebanon. Part of this reaction is natural defiance of an Arab enemy, perceived as the Pal- estinians. Part reflects the Maronite Christians' desire, as a minority people, to view themselves as "Israelis"�Western-minded, capable achievers beating back a numerically superior Moslem tide. It also reflects a common sense conviction among the Christian rank-., and-file that Israel is provid- ing help on the theory that my enemy's enemy is my. friend. At a deeper level, the - Christian mood stems from nervousness about relying on the regime of Syrian strongman, President Hafez Assad. While the Chfistians believe they fit Assad's strategy of weakening the Palestinians to facilitate an Arab-Israeli settlement, they realize that a eoup or an as- sassin's bullet could change Syrian policy. In that .case, they see Is- rael as the only potential savior�a Jewish state which would be happy to have a Maronite Christian partner as an allied island in a Mos- lem Arab sea. While recent Maronite military successes have . de- pened heavily on Syrian support, many Maronite leaders expect Syria eventu- ally to tip the balance in the other direction, once the Palestinians have been hum- bled. Such divide-and-con- quer tactics were used to rule this region by the colo- . alai French.-By tightening clave. from a �wide variety of sources from dealers in Western Europe to the hard currency-hungry state agen- cies of Czecholovakia and Bulgaria. Then, Israeli-supplied arms, suitably untraceable, were also reaching the Leba- nese Christians via Cyprus. Turkish radio has charged that the EOICA-B Greek Cy- priot underground, which' sympathizes with Lebanese Christians fighting Moslems, was also Useful in this con- nection. This system was costly, Unreliable and rarely able to furnish heavy arms of the kind the Christian forces needed after war escalated last spring, when the regu- lar army dissolved and took various sides with stolen tanks and artillery. When the. Maronites were combing the arms markets last year, Israeli agents were able to provide value- - ble help. Israel is known to 'have strong contacts in par- allel arms markets because of the Jewish state's concern to have alternate arms sources in case weapons de- liveries from an ally were to lie halted, as France did in The/ Israeli government apparently decided to go over to direct assistance to- the Chritians this spring. The results began to show in June. Commercial skippers in the eastern Mediterranean report dense traffic at night off the Christian-controlled coast. The information in the region's. ports is that the traffic is coming from Israel to Jounieh. The Christian-held coast teems now with barges of the type that could unload armored cars from a tramp steamer in international water and carry them to the small jetties, recently built in tiny coves. By getting weapons di- rectly from Israel. the Mar- unite forces enjoy may ad- vantages over their previous method of shopping around. Heavier weapons are in- volved, deliveries are fast- er. resupply is more reli- able and there is a degree of standardization. 39 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 The Palestinians so far have been unable to identify positively the Christians' equipment or its source since nothing significant has been captured. It is de-' ployed on fronts where the- Palestinians are relatively weak and unlikely to cap- ture it. � But the Israelis hove large stocks of Soviet-made weap- ons captured from Egypt and Syria in two Middle East wars. These could be� used, as "sanitized" arms, for an operation of this kind. Israel helped previous minority revolts such as those of Iraq' S Kurds and Sudan's southerners which challenged the hegemony of Arab nationalism repre- � sented today by the Pales- tinian guerrilas. The "Israeli connection" is widely said to be former- Lebanese President Camille Chamoun, leader of the sec- ond largest Christian mili- tia. A hawk in the Maronite camp, Chamoun, whose own house was looted by Pales- tinians, has said publically that he will never lay down arms until the Palestinians are eliminated as a military threat in Lebanon. Repeatedly there have been public allusions. from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and others, to recent arms deals between Cha- moun and the Israelis. Another hawkish Chris- tian leader, Charbel Cassis, a monk, visits Israel regu- larly to perform pastoral a duties for Maronite Arab Christian monks there. Recent Western visitors to Israel report aowidespread general assumption and ac- ceptance there that Israel is supplying military aid to Lebanon's Maronite light- er. . , This support is implictly j'ustified in Israeli propa- ganda, heard here on Israeli overseas broadcasts, which argues that Israel is the only government ready to help Lebanon's Christian minority, who have been abandoned, this argument runs, by Western govern- ments intimidated by thier humiliations in Southeast Asia and by the growing power of oil-rich Moslem States. Maronite Christian politi- cians share the tacit assump- tion behind this Israeli anal- ysis that Arab oil power will peak within the decade and then states with strong W este r n connectio ns�1 ike Israel has already and like a Maronite-dominated Leba- non would seek avidly�will come back into their own. The timing of the Israeli- Lebanese Christian effort to step up their covert coopera- tion stemmed apparently* - from several considerations. Militarily. '� Lebanese Christians were being roiled back last spring. making *them psychologicaliy ready to take help from the de' ii himi�ielf.- as one spe.;.esman Put it. The Christians' alliance with Syria against. the PLO WASHINGTON POST - Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 gave Israel an extra incen- tive and also insured that Arab � regimes implicitly against the PLO would be .less likely to bublicize and criticize the Christians' new Early in the Lebanese war, the Lebanese Christi-, .ans received substantial fi- nancial help from conserva- tive Arab states including Saudi Arabia. Payments or- dered by Saudi intermediar- ies totalling more than $200 million. were reported ear- 7T 713-737 gg- C al le lier by American bankers here familiar with the trans- actions. But Saudi Arabian help apparently ceased early this year, shortly after newspa- per photographs circulated in the Arab world showing cross-wearing Christian fighters mistreating and hu- miliating � Moslems in Kar- antina. a Moslem slum here razed by the Christians. The ready willingness of American and European dip- lomats here and elsewhere d at s Eeoi � By Thomas W. .Lippman wasinaatoa ra:t ForeIgn Sezvice CAIRO�A Marxist mem- ber of the original group Of offices who helped Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in 1932 , has � retuined to � political prominence as the leader of � *a new . leftist organization that 'opposes many of the policies of the current gov- ernment. He is Khaled Mohieddin, 55, a former .cavalry officer who was recently selected ,to -head the National Prog- ressive Unionists, one of three political groupings . whose creation was author- ized in Marey by President . Anwar Sadat.- � In his new role he exerts � � little if any direct influence on the course of Egyptian affairs, but_ he -hopes to change that by leading his - group to a strong showing against government � candi- dates in this fall's parlia- mentary elections. The Peoples Assembly, thoroughly dominated by supporters of Sadat, "will move left this year," Mohi- eddin predicted in an inter- View. The Egyptian people. he said, are disillusioned with the results of Sadat's economic open-door policy, - which has benefited only the "parasite classes and land speculators" and will show their feelings in .their . votes this October. _ That .kind of talk is unu- sual in contemporary Egypt, but it mold become more common as the country moves into the new political phase opened by Sadat when he authorized the cre- ation of the new political grouping's. Egypt abolished political parties after the revolution and the new groups are not 'officially classified as par- ties. During the national de- bate that preceded their es- tablishment, many Egyp- tians who remember the misdeeds of the old prerevo- lutionary parties warned that a return to the party � system could be a disservice. to the country. Sadat, who has been grad- ually liberalizing the politi- cal climate, decided instead to authorize the creation of three - "forums" or "platforms" within the Arab � Socialist Union, � the coun- try's, sole legal political � body since it Was created by Nasser. � Beneath their cumber-- some official � names, the three. forums are commonly . referred to as right, center andleft,, and the full weight of the pro-Sadat political es- tablishment has come down heavily in the center group. -Its leader is Sadat's Prime Minister, Mamdouh Salem, and its secretary general is Mahmoud Abu 1Vafia, Sa- dat's brother-in-law. The government - con- trolled press supports the center and Mohieddin is reg- .ularly criticized on front pages. The sheikhs of Mos- ques all over �Egypt are re- portedly urging the faithful in their Friday sermons not to join the leftist forum. Under the circumstances, Mohieddin said, the creation � of. the forums is hardly true democracy but -it's a start. It's not bad. I have the right to come down into the street and present my program, which I didn't have before. .And after. the elections, we will be, a. political party, whether they call it that or not. We will make our views known and we will have our supporters in the assembly." He said his group has no hope of winning a majority of the 35(1 alysts say 10 per cent would be too high a goal�but that he is aiming less for short- run political gains than for long-term changes in atti- tude among. the Egyptian people. Mohieddin._ and Sadat were both members of the "Free Officers" who joined Nasser in ousting King- Far- ouk, but they had a political falling out shortly afterward 'and have usually been. at odds since then.. 'Mohieddin has retained his membership in the cen- tral committee of the Arab Socialist Union, however, which made him eligible for selection' to head the leftist forum. It is taken for granted that Sadat person- ally approved this choice. One theory is that Sadat consented because Mohied- din, despite his devout ad- herence to Islam, is known throughout Egypt as a Com- munist, which makes it int-.. possible for him to win any widespread political sup- port. � "Ours is a leftist program but not a 'Marxist program," Mohieddin said. "We have 30,000 members and we are aiming � for 100,000. About 600 of them are Marxists, a very small percentage." . He said 70 per. cent were Nasserites, whom he defined as those who "believe that the laws of 1961 were the proper starting point for Egypt." Those were the laws on 40 mmilinimmoimmwomimimmimmi�.�....pproved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 in the Middle East to con- firm the Israeli connection has aroused some suspicion that the � prominent Israeli role might actually be a cover for assistance from American and European countries. CIA sources here have confirmed that the agency � assisted a Christian militia with a program of stockpil- ing light arms in the 1950s . as part of the agency's use of minorities to stop any Communist advance, land reform, nationalization .� and confiscation of private. fortunes that set the Course of Egypt's state socialist economy under President Nasser. Sadat, who has been encouraging the inflow of foreign capital, reopened foreign banks and lifted many restrictions on luxury imports, has changed the ec- onomic atmosphere .here in ways that Mohieddin and his allies do not like. "This is now a. society where you .can't find beans or lentils in the shops but you can find- Gruyere . cheese. The people are as: tonished. They were against - the old policy and thought they were going to cat bet- - ter when the American money flowed in, but now they see it's not happening," he .said. On foreign policy, the left- ist forum ' emphasizes Egypt's ties to the socialist countries. Mohieddin's was one of the very few voices in Egypt raised to protest Sadat's ab- rogation of the friendship' treaty with the Soviet Un- ion. After that, the country's biggest newspaper printed a. series Of letters td the editor' and man-in-the-street inter- views telling him he was out -of tune with the Egyptian majority. , Mohieddin said he knows exactly how far he is permit- ted to go in espousing leftist positions and opposing the government, although he did not say, how far that was. "We have to work within the system," he said. "There are points beyond which we cannot go. They can finish us off any time. But what would be the results of that?" Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 *11:SIONGTON.,:The Zgrletliokto and the ;United State's... no*r fees eact cc hmeiglamerragatfite in aCbaCkerett belt- 30-t414114 6:!301 t'''Afkitai.i.X.O***olla to Etl*; � Of4.;1.1.,Ilmnie. ICer.'1,- Zaire is the *Woo of � .tiOn that it. nint .:traiet intended nor willed: -this rt officialt talk. IiittileILTitit*1 States now -hen; etre eheice.but tci maintaindte � ' *ugh envie shipments foam East and West are rising - ly azat; AdmilliAraticm efficialo acknowledge , tnneeerintes diplomatic effortnare ifenderway thr9vet. the .-Otgeniention fan African Unity or with the Soviet Onion to �edisousaiestntiztn arid oessequenoann;n: " � - pieces cmcitinnie.ra-thn prospect of fettsn'elttegotiei4vesi Their tomineti#,Iti interviews are laden with :Cantrot and' sense of. driff;' lent they --.aSotikiect more : 4.,.Ticsjefalr4sa ituaslan, =Veda vi,e*.s. � -ostataD4artatiot- eCake.disonssions:., � within -the AdintaistratioreerWhenever 'one. of .these etatene. 7. asks for military-ald, the Willttittg argument is 'We've got a � telationabip with that State, its neighbors ' are being armed by: Russia, they're asking for help and. we Can't turn them �- � - e �' � -�� interae:Weitd miaconcerned about the; risk of a direct Soviet-American confrontation or even a war .African states; The troubling factor is that continu- ing tensiess in the wee would divert resources from eco;. � teerelopteene to military hardware and continue to. )iiteisott SonteteLmerican relationsinas did Angola. . � 7. Russia hes wiped hundreds of =Aliens of dollard in amen litta Sonmaliar Ugitn- -and 'ititigigti:-00.7fitd"didMinistratiett,:. :hes been maidng up foe lost tinne by trying to fdl with dipkei ' ' :natio sipals the interval before Its new arms. arrive 'in Kenya, Etivopia, and Zaire.,71, the last few days, theenta gon dispatched a frigaze andpattel aircraft to Kenya.. The Vr .eintsit happens,--o-iite Administration official asked, -"If t 'after thin synibolic show of American supPort, Uganda were. .� to attack Kewea? What would we do then? Not much.- Anda: e then ,what would liappeo to our credibility?' ' � � � "Crelity," -the Amexicant watchword in Vietnam and � Aviv*, Is creeping into the Ad:ab-nation's vocabulary on . Central Afelca, The officials. traced the isteleetu about med.-. - ibility hack to early 1975 as the Angolan Civil war began to . � build'ti venarel a -victory for the Sreiletbatked forces. - At that time, the Administeation's lirrnediate 'focus was an Xaire...riseident Mobutu SgA14. Seko. of Zaire, trying tee' govern a neinerelerich underdeveloped coinitay and helpful to the Atimi istmtiouki NortleSouth economic nnOtiatkins.--; of pm-thug= interes e SeeretarY of State Senn' A; -Kissingez, � - , � - � Zeire Baindiocked arid ite primary river arid nil routes to 2the sea rim through Angola. Mr. Mobutu feared that a Came munistecordrolled government in -Luanda Valid cut, those. � links. Re has also faoaci Internal security problems. � � - Russia, according to Administration intelligence, delivered NEW YQRK TIDIES ' .119_ -.July 1976 POOR NATIVATS FEAK achievements."' The met of this- fear' is "the NYEAERE sAys'USO to Whirl America's 'great power is often puteand the e us 4- Xy,q,r,r# tent to which American 4. 1,0tTaTIZO)OttkjA pilippOireeehiltie;,-�4petquivii been flouted in the. e Air nee- est IMO Of Time inagatme as "interne" treertdiniletrof Amen- saying thet tko � pinions can porn." the black African :of the "fear AV:erica and leader said � We struggle against Ameriea. . Mx. �niitYeitertea comments . even while vie admire the great here Made in n 'Message to principles ofeinieelca, and her AnieriWiiiibernegazine's Cot. , � $290_ million in arms to Angola in the hist two years. To . eciiinitart. this, Atitainis-tration 'arms t*risfers to Zaire :rose � trona itbair beiliken in 1975 M 5191aillion in 1976, and there are refeortxdf a $50 reilkiti irradit sale far 1977. Franco recently sold Zaire 15 _Mirage fee figliters. Belgium also sells . isms to Zaire. � ' As the Angolan situation . quieted down, itlfrilnistratiart attention centered on Kenre. Somalia and Uganda.. There, is *bed blood� between the Kenyan Preeidene, Jaen� Kenerattae : and the Ugandan leader, Idi Anon Vida. '� , American arms sales to Kenya went from zero in 1971 to 1. oboist $7 million in 3976 to a peopesed $74 million deal for a citizen F-SE jet fighters in 1977. Administrations officials also said that Britain WtS about to conclude a major arms trans- action with Kenya. A resolution of disapproval is expected to be introduced in Congress to the proposed sale to Kenya, . not so much to prevent the sale as to compel the Administra- tion to present :a long-term policy' - The Situation. in Ethiopia is more confused, complex and volatile African experts and high policymakers alike seem to believe actual war is both likely and pessible between Ethiopia and Somalia. - � � The military Government of Ethiopia is fighting rebels in Eritrea and faces the prospect of war with Somalia over the French territory of the Afars and the Issue The French erill.` leave this last of their African colonies in about a Year. Its , port city of Djibouti is the main trade outlet for Ethiopia, but its people are overwhelmingly Somali. � � -- According to Administration ofrecials; Ethiopia ;has ban trying to establish its socialist credentials and a new rela- tionship arith Moscow. In recent months, State'. Department , .officials�eakUdesornirrejecteel Ethiopian requests for arras, but now Moscoenand Ethiopia have concluded an economic aid agreement. Ethiopia continues to Make large aims purchases from the .United States. Since last October, official estimates pittethe beta at 6109 million, including more than a dozen F-5E'4.7 :United States economic aid to the states in-the region has kept steady At about 4IP rellUrfn Per year. significantly mete , , than Soviet economic aid. But aid is nundh less Importent to � the development of the African states than the ma-Veers now being negotiated in North-South meetings such as those on the stabilization of export earnings. This belt of states does not constitute an entity. The sitta. ' ,c on there is complicated heethe pre,sence of Cuban =Mite* n!" advisers and because Libya provides arms and money to left- , wing Moslem friends and opposes-American interests. Fur- ther complications arise from the internal instahlriey comitriee.such;ss Sudan andeiChad where coups and veep .. attempts frequently are threatened. nt � ' Arms requests from all of the African states are expected �� to iincrease. Administration officials are not eagres3 to . :Bid for the time being, they see no alternative to the evolv- .bg American Me as supporter-of the regimes in Keriya, Zaire and Ethiopia and as maintainer-of the resit:Um! bale:noes of military power. � - � YrIbas,21.1911XIIII7011.� � � 6:idle if: Gelb is a diiiiiniatioenirrespondent for The New York Times. � emit" Won . It .oni of a! the plea that it Fighting' series Series of atatemente bk *odd cernmunism," " leaders being published to mark' He alsci said that the United the United States Bicentenrdal.� States was offering "direct and Mr: leyeitre, a socialist who indirect" support to the "rac- is generally,regardedA8 a mod- ist and colonialist" forces o elate said that in its 15 years ,Southern Africa. � of -independence Tanzania had e- Mr. Nyerere unsuccessfully �seen American military and eco- attempted to Mediate an agree. Inninic power "time .arid again meat between the white au-lacing , prernaCist awl black natiorralist , . freedom OR; Used to fight freed forcaiiii itittocosis; 41 . _Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 TI-E CI-PSTIAN SCENE MONITOR � Wednesday, July 2.1..1 06- . . Communist . campaign.. against ** By Russell Brines * The show trial Of 12 foreign soldiers cap- tured during Angola's civil war has set off a worldwide campaign by communists and their "revolutionary" supporters to build the word, "Mercenary" into a knee-jerk anti-Western symbol, like "iiiiperialisni" and -racism." � Their immediate purpose *is to biock the fur- r ther. use of mercenaries or foreign volunteers � in Africa's upcoming wars. This would give , .?.Moscow .and: its 'Cuban allies the stile con- cession for: foreign meddling in troubled south- ern Africa. � � The Luanda trial of three American and nine British soldiers of fortune was staged for the . explicit :purpose of condemning the United , States for financing the noncommunist merce- � naries who showed up in the Angolan civil war.. � "The Americans -(mercenaries). they are nothing. . said the Angolan prosecutor, . Manuel Rui Alves 1VIonteiro. "We are not out to : get them, only the people who sent them in." � *. President Agostinho Neto added that the United States is an "international recruiter of - mercenaries and agents of subversion. . ." Angolans made no attempt to prove these charges. Instead, they Merely tried to hammer them into the world's psyche, as part of the continual *conditioning by the multibillion dollar communist propaganda apparatus. Years of manipulating "imperialism" and -racism" have made it virtually impossible for Washing- ton or any other Western capital to send troops * in support of any threatened country outSid-eruf- .;: Europe and a few other spots, however worthy the cause. If the same opprobrium can be at-* tached to mercenaries � or' "Mercenary prosti- ".:tutes," -as the Luanda prosecutor called them the Western capacity. to help a threatened friend, particularly in Africa; will be blocked. � The Angolan civil war was not a *struggle for freedom, but a- ruthless and � successful "communist effort to -steal the anti-Portuguese . :revolution which already had been' won by An-. golan factions supported by the majority of the people. The Soviet-backed Movement for the .Liberation of Angola (MPLA) won power and established the present government when a Cu- . ban expeditionary force of perhaps 15,000 men defeated noncommunist rivals with tanks and . other modern arms. . Cuban, forces remain in Africa, despite pious , propaganda gestures toward withdrawal, be- cause their modern arms and fighting morale be vital if -Moscow sets off the race war against Rhodesia and South Africa that it is � working overtime to detonate: The Cubans al- Western mercenaries ready put-gun such black nations .as Zaire which cornmilnist propagandists virtually have called their enemies. Moscow has established the-capacity and credibility :to flood 'the region with arms. In fact, the Soviets and their allies have- cre- ated the strongest strategic position in the his- tory of 'liberation wars" to Win a region by hi- jacking revolution. The last link in this trap is to prevent the infusion of trained Western' . fighting technicians capable of Matching the:' Cubans' Cubans' military sophistication. They are:to be condemned as "mercenaries," whether they - fight for money or idealism. To set off this campaign. the Angolans . mounted a non-case 'against their 12 hapless foreign captives: They had no charges that would have stood up under any realistic defini- tion of international law. So they staged a sad bit of Gilbert and Sullivan in Leninist dress. � The American, Daniel Gearhart, was given the death sentence, for example, for allegedly ad- vertising his military prowess in a magazine. He claimed he had not fired a shot during his four days in Angola, and the point was not dis- Ptited- Instead of ridiculing or condemning this per- fect example of "socialist justice." as the An- golan8 term it, the -noncommunist world ac- cepted it with general indifference. Therefore. it endorsed -the fact that the real ----crime" of the mercenaries was in fighting or preparing to right against communist. usurpation of the Angolan revolution. - The Organization Of African Unity con-, sequently was emboldened to begin a drive to formally label all foreign mercenaries as crim- inals and to treat them accordingly. In the United States, .the National Conference of Black.Lawyers (NCBL) has initiated a cam- paign to use American neutrality laws to pre:: * vent any possible infusion of American experts into African battlefields, and has struck a re-- spouse in Congress. The NCBL was repro-, sented at the Luanda "trial" and was also rep- resented at a special Moscow-Cuban-Angolan propaganda conference on. Africa held last' February in Havana.. Such is the process by which the word "mer- cenary" is being singled out for criticism: Mr. Brines is a free-lance writer on for. 7 eign affairs. Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 -17 WASIII.NG"I 20q It etInp,olity. It41, 1976 - _ Navy Seane '4) -lii llailEa � By Bernard Wideman s Special to The Watihing:ou Pz.$: MANILA. July 20�Presi- dent Ferdinand E. Marcos' martial law government ap- parently has used the recent � reports of four Filipino fish- ermen's deaths by U.S. Navy ''bombs to stir up sentiment ; against the United. States during the current negotia- tions on U.S.: bases here. �Although 'Philippine offi- cials have exonerated the ,U.S. Navy of responsibility .� � 'in the incident, the govern- ment-controlled press has gi- ven little coverage to the of- � liCial findings. � By contrast, the original reports of the deaths re- ceived headlines and ,prompted harsh anti-Ameri- an commentary in the press. For example, a columnist An- the Daily Express, wrote: � "First they killed four and Wbtinded two. As if that were not enough, they killed two more. These U.S. Navy NEW YORK TIMES 16 July 1976 M.I.T. Help for Taiwanese Halted After U.S. Objection CAMBRIDGE, Mass., July 14 (AP)�Massachusetts Institute of Technology said today that it had cut off a training pro- gram for engineers from Tai- wan because of State Depart- merit objections. Informed sources said the Government feared the Taiwan technicians could use technolo- gy gained at M.I.T. to build mis- siles to attack China. The S917,000 program, paid for by the National Taiwan Uni- versity, began in January 1975 to teach 15 engineers to design and produce aircraft-navigation systems. The program ended last month, six months early. air exercises are too realis- tic for our purposes. They're posing the most telling argu- ment againA having foreign bases in this country. We can't afford visitors who use us for target practice with live shells." - The original story distrib- uted by the government's Philippine News Agency on July 8 said four Filipino fishermen were killed June 1?. by a bomb dropped by- a U.S. Navy plane. � . -The press here also gave prominent display to a re- port a few days later of an alleged incident June 14 in which two fishermen were -machine gunned and ser- iously. wounded by U.S. Navy planes. ; - The government-con- .trolled press campaign must --be viewed in light of the base negotiations, in which Marcos is not trying to get rid of the bases but to ob- tain more control over them and more money. - [Marcos told reporters to .7 .hat he hoped the nego- tiations. would be completed by December "notwithstand- ing the fact that the United States faces an election sear," UPI reported.] � A week ago, the constabu; - Lary commander of Zam- bales Province, where the -PSubic Bay U.S. Naval Base located',--cpmpleted an � LONDON.TIMES 17 July. 1976 estigatiorr �"f the bombing' incident and cleared the U.S. Navy of blame. �A. government. report, by Lt. Col. Ernesto Venturina, . said four men from a village 90 minutes by boat from the bombing range had been killed by a bomb but that the explosion had happened when the four tried to tow an unexploded dud from the - restricted target area. Venturina's report said that the U.S. forces had complied with all required procedures before conduct- ing the live ammunition � bombing exercise and that Philippine authorities had warned, villagers to stay clear of the area. Collecting munitions frag- ments from U.S. exercises, however, is a pmfitable cot-, tage industry for the inhab- itants of ,a half dozen nearby � villages, including Pundakit. 'where the four victims 'lived. ' ' :."Some of 'them when they learn of a scheduled bom- bing exercfge go to the area and watch for duds and race against one another to recover dud bombs," Ventu. .rina's report said. ' � A bomb with explosive _charge and primer intact can bring up to $666. A; On a recent visit to San 'Miguel, the village of the two men allegedly wounded on June 14, most villagers said they knew of no one who had been injured, but rater two men said they had been shot by a U.S. Navy plane. Both were recovering :from wounds. The attending physician at the hospital where the two were treated said the bullets, which caused leg wand arm woulds, were small Caliber, unlike those fired from aircraft, and had been fired from close range. -The medical findings in the case of the two men, al- though known to the mili- tary, have not been released .to.the press. � ' The day the report exon- eating the U.S. Navy in the' bomb deaths was released,: :Philippines Foreign Minis- ten Carlos P. Romulo sent a note to the U.S. embassy' re- , questing that the United ; States stop all bombing ; .�lorthwith" pending "more . . effective measures of safety." The U.S. Navy, in the ;midst of the sensitive base negotiations. has suspended . ' live ammunition exercises, , and stepped up its own in- . vestigation, which is not yet eoinpleted. In an apparent'. good will move, it has of- :fered to compensate thc0 involved . and treating the two wounded men in the U.S. Navy dis- pensary. Police called in over leak of) secret papers in Australia Canberra. July 16.�Mr Mal- colm Fraser, the Australian Prime Minister, has called in police to find out how 15 secret government documents have been leaked to the press since be assumed office in December. These have, included defence reports, foreign affairs docu- ments, and papers from Mr Fraser's Department as well as from the Departments of Busi- ness and Consumer Affairs and Employment. The latest leak, a letter to the Prime Minister from Mr Tony Street,. Employment Min- ister, occurred shortly after a 43 secret transcript Of .port �Of �Mr. Fraser's talks � in Peking with, Mr Hua Kuo-Feug, 'the Chinese Pcinie Minister,, fell into. foreign'...:correspondenti'. hands. . . Mr WilliOm`. Macmalion,: former .Liberai Prime Minister; today called 'for an Official Secrets Act in Australia to pre- vent politically motivated civil, servants giving material to the press. At present, Civil servants who reveal government secrets can be � dealt with under' the Public Services Act - The. Crimes Act .can: be invoked' in some cases.�Reuter. Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718 THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JULY 16, 1976 Jamaica's Emergency Rule Cuts Political By RALPH BLUMENTHAL Special to The New York Times KINGSTON, Jamaica�Strin- gent emergency rule by the leftist Government here has kept the peace between violent political factions for a month now, but disorders still threaten this Caribbean island 90 miles south of Cuba. The Government of Prime Minister Michael Manley has charged that Jamaica is being "destabilized" by foreign and domestic conspirators. The op- position Labor Party counters that the Government is using its sweeping police powers to intimidate critics as national elections approach. The turmoil is ruining the once flourishing tourist indus- try and is aggravating the already high 25 per cent un- employment rate. Businessmen, fearful of an anticapitalist trend, have been smuggling out their assets, draining Jamaica of its monetary reserves. 1,000 Are in Custody � According to official figures, about 1,000 Jamaicans have. been taken into custody with- out charges since the Manley Government had the Governor General invoke the emergency on June 19 for 30 days. Most detainees were released after several days of question- ing in a former British military camp in central Kingston. But more than 200 have been held on vs rious charges and at any given moment more than 50 remain under detention. To the relief of many Jamai- cans, the emergency rule has sharply reduced the political shootings and firebombings that have focused on Kingston slum-dwellers and plunged the island into the worst crisia of its 14 years of independence from Britain. Serious Crimes Down Serious crimes � murders, rapes, robberies� which were running as high as 160 a week before the emergency were down to 54 after several weeks, according to security officials. once before, under a Labor Party government, from Oct. 3 to Nov. 2, 1966. It applied, however, only to a particular region around Kingston where partisan violence had erupted. Manley Explains Measures According to Prime Minister Manley, the state of emergency ,was precipitated by information , that 'a new wave of violence lwas planned" to coincide with Carifesta, the festival set to start here later this month. "We became aware of a specific development that could only be described as strange in the extreme," he said, alluding to a report that an informant was prepared to denounce a Government agency for alleged- ly distributing guns, presumably from Cuba. , Then, Mr. Manley said, the man retracted his allegations and said he had been forced into trying to embarrass the Government. Smokescreen Is Charged But the opposition calls this a smokescreen. "From the day we saw what happened in India we said this is going to happen here," con- tended Edward Seaga, Labor Party leader. -Mr. Seaga, a financial con- sultant of Lebanese ancestry and finance minister in the �Labor Party Government before 1972, maintained that his party had been gaining support. Mr. Manley, to frustrate this, di- rected the emergency powers "to set the stage for immediate manipulated bogus elections," Mr. Seaga said. � From the beginning, more members of the Labor Party than the People's National Party were � picked up for detention. While maintaining that only security considerations and not politics were the grounds for detention, the Prime Minister in effect acknowledged the im- balance when he told Parlia- ment that "both as a matter of evidence and common sense" the governing party was not planning to overthrow itself. But the crackdown has pro- Hysteria Is Charged yoked a. counterreaction from The 51-year-old Prime Minis- the Labor Party, which has ter, son of a former Prime charged Mr. Manley with using Minister and leading Jamaican the emergency to advance the patriot, Norman Washington prospects of his People's Na- Manley, in turn charged his tional Party, whose five-year mandate expires by next March. conservative opposition with embracing violence in despair of winning power constitu- The emergency, which has tonally and seeking "to spread curtailed civil libertiesand a wave of hysteria throughout banned utterances and printed the country based on the oft- articles "likely to be prcj- repeated allegation that the udicial to the public safety," Government was Communist." came in response to what Prime Minister Manley described as a bizarre plot to smear the Gov- ernment and provoke a new economic involvement but also wave of violence. An emergency was invoked Mr. Manley calls his Govern- ment "democratic socialist." He has said he favors state private enterprise and democ- racy. The' elections will take place as required in, corning months, Mr. Manley said. Mr. Manley and his ministers have also suggested that the � Central Intelligence Agency has a hand in the "destabilization" of Jamaica. The allegations have been protested by the American am- bassador, Sumner Gerard, who has transmitted to Mr. Manley assurances from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and William E. Colby, then Director of Central Intelligence, that no United States clandestine opera- tions are under way or con- templated in Jamaica. . Approached. by C.I.A. Jamaican Government of- ficials have retorted that Such assurances were also given Chile while the C.I.A. was undermining the late President Salvador Allende Gossens. Investigation and interviews here this month produced no substantiation for the charge of United States-sponsored ac- tivities, although' the C.I.A. is understood to maintain what is called an "acknowledged pres- ence"� here, as in many coun- tries overseas, to collect in- telligence. For example, one longtime American businessman recalled an occasion about a -year and a half ago when he was ap- proached by a C.I.A. man for help in obtaining the plans for a newly built extension to the Chinese Embassy. The American passed the request on to an architect he knew. The architect checked Into it, turned the information over to the American who, in turn, reported back to the C.I.A. man: "The room is 30 by 80 feet. They eat on one side. Then they play Ping Pong on the other side." Close Ties With Cuba ' At the same time, there does not appear to be any significant intrusion by the Cubans with whom Mr. Manley, an advocate of third world solidarity, has been building a closer relation- ship. . Western diplomats who have been watching the situation closely say that while the grow- ing exchanges are bringing Violence over more Cubans, Havana seems to be taking a cautious approach toward any entangle- ment in Jamaica. In fact, apart from the tragic violence that has claimed so many dead and injured, there is a kind of opera-bouffe quality to events on this island of blue mountains, white beaches and throbbing reggae music. . Some nights ago, for example, a few sleepy lovers were linger- ing under the palms around the Sheraton Kingston pool when a soldier in battle gear stepped out of the shadows. He was followed by several other sol- diers and suddenly the garden' was aswarm with soldiers carrying rifles and submachine guns. As 50 soldiers ringed the hotel and about 25 covered the garden, 15 burst into the Jun- kanoo Lolinge to seize a suspected gunman nicknamed "Sicully," who was talking with two women. He went quietly. But two days later, released, he showed up back in the bar. Dollar Drain Serious , One of Jamaica's gravest problems cannot be resolved by police action. It is the dollar drain. Although the outflow has been impossible to gauge accurately, the Minister of Mining put the amount of re- cently illegally exported cur- rency at more than $225 million, a huge loss for a nation the size of Connecticut with a $1 billion annual budget. Jamaica recently. borrowed $90 million from Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Guyana, but this is expected to see the nation through only to October. Bauxite production, the is- land's leading money earner, is running at 70 percent of last year's output, which earned the Government $170 million. Tour- ism, which brought in $135 million in foreign exchange last year, will, from all indications, suffer a disastrous blow when the winter season arrives. As en indication of what tourist promoters are up against, the Tourism and In- dustry Minister, P. J. Patterson, recently assure pros- pective visitors that any tourists caught in curfews or cordons "would be treated with courtesy and understanding by the se- curity forces." 44 Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 CO2623718