Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
April 3, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 12, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 12, 1976
Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 CO� NTIAL INTERNAL USE ONLY This publication contains clippings from the domestic and foreign press for YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. Further use of selected items would rarely be advisable. 17 NO. 17 SEPTEMBER 1976 PAGE GOVEMIENT AFFAIRS 1 GENERAL 25 EASTERN EUROPE WEST EUROPE 34 NEAR EAST 36 AFRICA 39 - EAST ASIA 41 LATIN AMERICA 44 CLASSIFIED BY: 3.5(c) DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS C4)NftnE Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 The New York Times Magazine/September 12, 1976 Not all its covert actions have succeeded, but the agency did manage to outfox Congressional investigators. 217 'YawIlen. E3EME2(gi'a There have been enough revelations about the Central Intelligence Agency over the past two years to keep diplomats, prosecutors, reporters and philosophers busy for entire careers. Three separate investigations not only stretched the imagination with show-biz material about cobra venom and deadly skindiving suits but twisted the lens on the American self-image in foreign affairs. The investigations rewrote history�the history, for example, . of the relationship between the United States and the Castro Government in Cuba. They showed that the C.I.A., in some 900 foreign interventions over the past two decades, has run secret wars around the globe and has clandestinely dominated foreign governments so thoroughly as to make them virtual client states. In contrast to Watergate, the C.I.A. investiga- tions proved that abuses of power have not been limited to one particular Administration or one political party. They also established facts that few people were prepared to believe�such as that distinguished gentlemen from the C.I.A. hatched assassination plots with Mafia gangsters. � With all these surprises percolating, the most interesting surprise has been largely ignored. And that is how the C.I.A. investigations ceased. The topic faded away so quickly as to make the whole episode look like a fad. Unlike the F.B.I. issue, which has moved to the prosecutors' offices and stayed on the front page, the vaunted trial of the C.I.A. has already become a memory. And the agency itself has survived the scandals .with its covert operations intact, if not strengthened. The collapse of the C.I.A. investigations has been due largely to in- eptitude, poor judgment and lack of will on the part of the Congressional committees. But the agency also played a role. Its strategy was flawless. "Those guys really knew what they were doing," says a staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by Frank Church. "I think they defended themselves just like any other agency would, except they're better. They had a whole office set up to deal with us, and I some- tunas had the feeling that they ran operations against us like they run them against foreign governments. It was like the C.I.A.' station for the Congress instead of for Greece or Vietnam." The story of how they came out ahead of their investigators says a great deal about both the Congress and the agency, and about the problem of reconciling the demands of the superspy with the democracy he is supposed to protect. In the spring -of 1975, the Church committee had been spinning its , wheels for several months without much success. Charged with the task of investigating more than a dozen intelligence agencies, any one of which was an enormous challenge, the Senators became ensnarled in debate over how to proceed. The agencies were stalling, hoping to deflect attention else- where. Then the committee got a break. The Presidential commissdon set up Tayfor.BronclApproved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 under Vice President Rockefeller that January, to inquire into charges of illegal domestic spying by the C.I.A., announced that it had received evidence of. C.I.A. involvement in attempts to kill foreign leaders. The news created an instant sensation. Rockefeller said his commission, which was completing its work, had neither the time nor the mandate to pursue the matter, and he turned the evidence over to President Ford, who quickly passed it along to the Church committee. Suddenly, the Senators found themselves with a large batch of classified documents and with responsi- bility for the hottest issue since Watergate. For five months last year, the Church committee focused its energy on assassinations. Other investigations lapsed. Staff members were pulled from other projects. While it is no mean feat in the Senate to obtain sus- tained, personal effort from Senators on any single subject, the members of the Church committee went to C.I.A. briefings day after day to be intro- duced to the agency's arcane methods. In November 1975, �the committee published an interim report on this one aspect, and Senators and staff alike were proud of it. As an exploration of the Machiavellian underside of American foreign policy, it was, in fact, a tour de force. Yet it failed to build public support for investigating or controlling the C.I.A. Press and TV coverage was intense but shortlived, focusing on certain salacious details: the gangster plots, the titillating reports of an affair between President Kennedy and the mistress of one of the gangsters, and a few exotic spy plans worthy of a television serial. In this last category, the report featured a C.I.A. plan to treat Prime Minister Fidel Castro's boots with a chemical that would make his beard fall out and thereby destroy his charisma. The rest of the material was extremely complicated, conclusions were tentative, and the assassination plans fell short of the dramatic expec- tations that had grown up. The committee did not claim to have found a "smoking gun," in the form of a kill order ringing down from the Oval Office, through the C.I.A. chain of command and out to some mysterious trigger man in a foreign capital. Quite the contrary. Where the American efforts to kill were most direct and persistent�in the case of Castro�they were unsuccessful. And where the foreign leaders were actually killed�Lumumba in the Congo, Tru- jillo in the Dominican Republic, Diem in South Vietnam, Schneider in Chile �there was no hard proof that C.I.A. operatives actually took part in the murders. In some cases, the agency seemed to withdraw at the last moment. In other cases, someone else got there first. Of the Diem assassination the -committee could only say that the C.I.A. had sanctioned and encouraged a . coup against his Government when there was a reasonable chance the plot- ters would kill him. But no direct _orders to assassinate. Everything was a � little blurred. Even the moit�direct written communications, as in the Lurnumba case, were couched in opaque C.I.A. language:- "Hunting good here when lights right." Smoking guns are considered thoroughly unprofessional in clandestine operations, where secrecy is paramount and it is a mark � of skill to channel existing forces subtly. The assassination report, on the other hand, was ' publicly judged by standards built for palpable and exotic murders. Because no foreign leaders were killed outright by American, initiative, planning and ex- ecution, the C.I.A. benefited. from a general impression that it came out of the assassination inquiry with clean hands. This impression is false. Certainly many thousands of people have died as a result of secret C.I.A. paramilitary interventions in countries ranging from Laos to Cuba to the Congo. (The Church com- mittee obtained some casualty figures but did not publish them at the agency's request.) And, in the case of selected killings detailed in the report, the line between involvement and actual murder is often shadowy. For example, the Church committee reported extensively on the maneuver- ing that preceded the assassi- nation of Rafael Trujillo in 1961. It showed �low Ameri- can policy turned against the Dominican strongman, how' the agency provided assur- ances of support to those who plotted against him, how C.I.A. officials smuggled weapons into the country and exchanged cryptic messages � on the likelihood of a success- ful assassination. In keeping with its courtroom definition � of assassination, however, the committee exonerated the agency of Trujillo's murder on the ground that the weapons it smuggled in were probably not the ones used in the kill- ing. "By the time we finished the assassination report," re- calls the leader of one of the committee's task forces, "we had lost three things�the public's attention, much of our own energy and will power, and our leadership. Quite candidly, we had lost Frank Church," The Senator, according to this investigator, had given up hope of achiev- ing major reforms in the pre- 'Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 terest was down. Assassina- tions proved peripheral to the main business of C.I.A. covert action, and the investigation of that unknown realm had scarcely begun. With in- vestigations of the other intel- ligence agencies, including the F.B.I., still ahead of them, five crucial months had been lost �along with much of the committee's momentum. The Senate's February 1976 dead- line for the completion of all work loomed large. And Church wanted to wrap up his investigative chores in. order to begin his own Presi- dential campaign. The Church committee had gambled heavily on the assas- sination report. And lost. ccording to Mitchell Rogovin, the C.I.A.'s special counsel dur- ing the investiga- tion, the crux of the inquiry from the agency's point of view was ,covert abtion�secret in- terventions abroad by means of propaganda, bribes, manip- ulation of foreign agents and, in some cases, paramilitary force � as distinct from gath- ering and analyzing intelli- gence. The promotion system for C.I.A. case officers has been built around operations, and C.I.A. leadership has been drawn from the operators� Allen Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby�instead of in- telligence analysts. Veteran agency operatives often say that without covert action the C.I.A. would be nothing but a collection of sophisticated professors with mounds of in- telligence, and the agency it- self would be only a more spe- cialized version of the State Department. The C.I.A. approached the Congressional investigations .2with one central objective: to. protect the means and prac- tice of covert action. It was in line with this strategy that Colby and Rogovin gave ground on the marginal issue of assassination, cooperating with the Church committee, turning over more informa- tion than the committee could digest, helping the committee use itself up. Then, when the assassination report was com- pleted, Rogovin became tough, about information to be grant- ed for the 'remainder of the investigation � especially in regard to covert action. The committee was floundering; Rogovin pressed his advan- tage. "We agreed with the committee that they could have access to information for six case studies in covert ac- tion," he says, "provided they would go public with only one of them. They swore all kinds CO2623720 of secrecy oaths that they would not even let the names of the other five countries leak." The case study he chose was Chile�a selection favora- ble to the agency, since a lot of material on the C.I.A.'s in- tervention in Chile had al- ready leaked to the press; "It was a bad deal," says F.A.O. Schwarz, the commit- tee's chief counsel. Many of the principal staff members opposed the settlement. What little they had learned about covert action in the course of the assassination investiga- tion had made them realize it was one of the hardest but also one of the most important issues to deal with. "That is why we went so heavily into Mongoose in the assassina- tion report," Schwarz ex- plains. Operation Mongoose was a covert action designed to weaken and destroy the Cas- tro regime through an orches- trated program of economic sabotage, commando raids and paramilitary harassment.. It was the heart of the agen- cy's effort to overthrow Cas- tro; simultaneous assassina- tion attempts complemented Mongoose rather than vice versa, Although the campaign failed, it was kept so secret that the American public was left with a fundamentally dis- torted view- of United States- Cuba relations for more than a decade. Before the committee's re- port, it was generally accepted that the Kennedy Administra- tion ceased hostilities against Castro after the Bay of Pigs, until forced to act defensively by the unprovoked introduc- tion of Russian missiles on Cuban soil. The Church corn- ' mittee revealed that not only were there repeated attempts on Castro's life before and after the missile crisis but covert Mongoose raids were being intensified throughout the period. The assassination report quotes the minutes of high-level meetings, less than two weeks before the missile crisis, at which Attorney General Robert Kennedy spurred the C.I.A. on to hit Castro harder. The assassination report, outside sources generally agree, was the high point of the committee's investigation. After that, the staff divided into two groups, one known informally as "the lawyers"�. a group of attorneys drawn together largely by Schwarz �and the other as "the professors," who were gener- ally foreign - policy experts with academic roots or Capi- tol Hill experience. Under task - force leader William Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Bader, the "professors" be- came responsible for the C.I.A. investigation, while the "law- yers" went off after, the F.B.I. Frictions developed be- tween the two groups, the Bader group tending to criti- cize the lawyers as too prosecutorial and "Watergate- minded," and the Schwarz team hinting that the Bader group was too soft in its handling of the C.I.A.'s pros. In any event, discouraged by the covert-action compromise, the "professors" never recov- ered the initiative. n the House, the Select Committee on Intelli- gence chaired by Otis Pike�the counterpart of the Church committee� pursued an arduous and in- dependent course. Created only after a long internecine squabble over its leadership, its mandate weakened by con- tinuing- feuds in the House, the committee struggled through the summer of 1975 to breathe life into itself� seeking, on one occasion, to justify US existence- by leak- ing the sensational but un- verified story that Nixon aide Alexander Butterfield had been a C.I.A. "plant" in thea White House. The story was refuted, leaving the committee with less credibility than ever. By fall, the traditional jealousy between the House and the Senate had flared up behind the scenes, and Mitchell Ro- govin, negotiating with .both committees, was finding them competitive. "Church," says Rogovin, "held his 'toxin hear- ings' because he was afraid Pike would do it if he didn't." By December, the House and ,Senate committees were set on opposite courses. Pike wanted to impale the C.I.A. for its abuses. Church wanted to show that a Senate committee could handle national secrets responsibly. The Ford Admini- stration played the commit- tees against each other. When Pike demanded information and denounced "delaying tac- tics," Administration spokes- men would point to the ex. emplary behavior of the Church committee and appeal for a more cooperative spirit. When the Church committee cooper-. ated, the Administration tended to see it as a sign of weakness and feel freer to hold back on information. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and C.I.A. director William E. Colby simply boycotted all the covert-action hearings, and the committee accepted the rebuff instead of subpoe- naing them. � "The object of the exercise," says a Church committee staff trionther, "was to prove that we were not Pike. We were not going to move the Con- gress or the public by more expos�What was going to 'carry us was the kind of edi- torial we finally got in The Washington Post: 'An Intelli- gent Approach to Intelli- gence.' The committee evi- denced an increasing aware- ness of its public image, of its ability to keep secrets. avoid leaks and work in some semblance of public harmony � with the C.I.A. Many on the committee staff endorsed this approach as the path toward "establishing a relationship" that would serve the Congres- sional committee that was to be set up to exercise over- sight�supervision of the in- telligence agencies. Some of these investigators have, in fact, moved on to jobs with the oversight committee, now in business. Their attitude was infectious: Even today, many former Church committee staff members are more reti- cent in discussing C.I.A. mat- ters than C.I.A. officials them- selves. n Dec. 24, a band of unknown terrorists 'iiassassinated Rich- ard Welch, the C.I.A. chief of . station in. Greece. Welch had been identified as a C.I.A. official by a small .anti-C.I.A. magazine, and a furor immediately arose over whether the revelation had � anything to do with his death. The -Senators on the Church committee received a flood of letters denouncing its work on �the grounds that exposure of C.I.A. secrets is an invitation to the killing of C.I.A. offi- cials. Sources on both sides of the C.I.A. investigation now agree that neither the magazine nor the Church committee is .likely to have 'caused Welch's death. He was a relatively well-known figure in Athens, certainly to the kind of organ- ized political groups likely to have killed him. These proba- bilities were overwhelmed, however, by the emotional power of the tragedy, and the C.I.A. encouraged the idea that C.1-4,. critics might have contributed indirectly to the murder, Rogovin would only tell the Church committee that its own investigations' were not "directly" responsi- ble. Colby lashed out in public' at those who revealed C.I.A. secrets as being more sinister than the secrets themselves. Ford made public statements to the effect that inquiries into C.I.A. methods were unpatriotic. No single event did more to turn public opinion against the investigations than the Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Welch affair. As 1975 ended, the press was shying away from the C.I.A. issue, and hos.. tility toward the inquiry was building Congress itself. As to the C.I.A.'s private thoughts on whether naming � senior officials makes them more vulnerable to "the other . side," a move that escaped public attention may provide some insight: Welch was re- placed in Athens by a man who had been identified as a C.I.A. official ,by Greek news- papers and an American ,magazine. On Jan. 29, 1976, Represent- ative John Young, Democrat of Texas, offered a motion on the House floor to suppress the final report of the Pike committee. The ensuing de- bate was not distinguished. Some speakers argued that the report�which they admit- ted they had not read -- would endanger national . se- . . curtty and align the House with the murderers of Richard Welch. Others, like Wayne .Hays, argued for suppression on the grounds that the report would be boring: "I suspect . that when this report comes opt it is going to be the biggest nonevent since Brigitte Barclot, after 40 years and four husbands and numer- ous lovers, held a press con- ference to arrnounce that she was no longer a virgin." Views like these prevailed, and the House,, by a vote of 246 to 124, ordered its own report to be locked away in the clerk's safe. The document did not re- main suppressed very long. It was leaked to CBS corres- pondent Daniel Schorr, who in turn leaked it to The Vilage Voice through a series of inter- mediaries. When The Voice published the report in two special supplements under ban- ner headlines, it became the most spectacular leak of the C.I.A. investigations. Pike developed two themat- ic criticisms of the C.I.A. First, he amassed evidence of � repeated intelligence failures, showing how the agency -had failed to anticipate such major world events as the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam, the Rus- sian invasion of Czechoslova- kia the same year, and the 1973 Yom Kippur war in the Middle East. Citing various bureaucratic entanglements and preoccupations as the cause of poor performance, Pike took the agency to task for bungling the one function � gathering intolligence � against which there is no nu clihle dissent. Pike's second line of cnticisni was more substantive: ffe attackcd cov- ert ac:tion hy. revealing a few of the more startling case studies. His most poignant ex- ample involved the Kurdish minority in Iraq. Like many of the world's mountain peoples�the Tibe- tans, the Meo in Laos, the .Montagnards of Vietnam, the Indians of South America� the Kurds have always seemed destined for a hard time. They have been strug- gling against the Iraqi Gov- ernment for years. For years they have been losing. In 1972, when the Kurdish cam- paign for autonomy was in a brief period of dormancy, the. Shah of Iran asked the United States to help him in one of his perpetual feuds with neighboring Iraq. This time it was a border dispute. The Shah wanted the United States to channel clandestine military aid to the Kurds, rea- soning that American support would inspire the Kurds for another military offensive against the Iraqi Government, thus weakening Iraq and aid- ing the Shah. Secretary of' the Treasury John- Connally, acting on be- half of Henry Kissinger and President Nixon, informed the Shah that the United States would go along. A $16 million covert- action project went into effect. According to Pike's documents, the deal was made in a convivial spirit �a favor to the Shah as one of the fellows. (He himself had been returned to power � �by the C.I.A. in a 1953 coup.) Even the C.I.A. opposed the scheme, but was overruled. The agency funneled arms and money to the Kurds for more than two years, and the Kurds once again rose up in rebellion. Their leader was so moved by American support for the Kurdish cause that he sent Kissinger a gold and pearl necklace for his new bride. He ;also sent word, to Kissinger that the Kurds were .ready "to become the 51st state" after achieving libera- tion. In March 1975, the bloodied Iraqi Government came to terms with the Shah. The Very next day, Iran and he United States cut off all aid to , the Kurds, and the Iraqi Army mounted a full-scale offensive against them. The Kurdish leader, who could not bring himself to believe the United States had reversed itself so cynically, wrote desperate, pitiful appeals for help to Kissinger. Kissinger did not reply. An estimated 5,000 Kurdish refugees died fleeing the Iraqi crisiaught. The Shah, prag- matic to tho last, forcibly Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 repatriated 40,000 Kurdish refugees to Iraq, where their fate, while unknown, has presumably been sad. The United States declined to pro- vide any relief assistance to the remaining refugees and refused to accept a single Kurdish application for asy- lum. This covert action remained secret, of course, until the Pike committee learned about it and leaked it to the press. To say the very least, the dis- closure raised large questions about the compatibility of such covert actions with principles of any kind, as well as questions about how such decisions should be made. Yet no public debate arose, and except for a one-man crusade by The New York Times's columnist William Safire, -the Kurdish undertaking was widely ignored in the press.. The reason is Simple: The sub- stance of the Pike report was completely overshadowed by the controversy over how it was leaked. Daniel Schorr first denied, and then admitted, being the intermediary source. His behavior helped draw atten- tion to his own conduct and away from the conduct of �the C.I.A. Leaks became the issue. President Ford pledged the full resources of the executive branch to the search for the culprit on the Pike committee. The House of Representatives rose up mightily against the leak and authorized a $150,000 investigation by its ethics committee. A team of investigators began grilling the Pike committee staff, many of whose members left Washington in Mar. Schorr, three other journalists and 18 committee staff members have been subpoenaed to ap- pear before the ethics commit- tee this Wednesday. 0 As the Pike committee sput- tered to disaster, the Church committee released its report on Chile�the one case study on covert action it was, per- mitted to make public ender the terms of its deal with the - C.I.A." "We negotiated with the agency people on the wording of that report, line by line." says one of, the Prin- cipal authors. The agency, for instance, permitted publica- tion of the fact that the I.T.T. had funneled $350,000 into the 1S70 Chilean. elections, but refused to allow identi- fication of other companies that, among them, had fur- nished art equivalent sum. Still, while abstract and in- complete, the r-eport. is the most comprehensive account � of a C.I.A. covert action yet written. From 1963 to 1973, the re- port reveals, the C.I.A. spent more than $13 million to � in- fluence Chilean politics, apart from what it spent On gather- ing intelligence in that coun- try. It lavished about $3 lion on the 1964 Chilean elec- tions alone; on a per capita basis, this was twice as much as Lyndon Johnson and Barry _Goldwater together spent on :their Presidential campaigns :that year. In 1970, President Nixon ordered the C.I.A. to encourage the Chilean Mili- tary to stage a coup rather than let President Salvador Allende take power, and the agency tried unsuccessfully to do so through its agents in the military. When the com- mander in chief of the Chilean :Army, Ren�chneider, op- . posed a coup, C.I.A. officials entered into talks with groups planning to kill him. General Schneider was as- sassinated by one of these ; groups, but the elected Marxist President took - of- fice, and during the three years of his regime, the C.I.A. channelled $7 million in covert-action. funds to a vari- ety of Chilean unions, busi- ness groups and political parties opposed to Allende. It also spent $1.5 million sup- porting El Mercurio, Chile's largest newspaper, in its cam- paign against Allende's poli- cies. Several of the news- paper's key employees were paid C.I.A. agents, committing espionage. The agency ,pro- duced several national maga- zines and "a large number of books," according to the re- port. It had agents in most of the important sectors Of . Chilean -society, including, at times, the Chilean Cabinet. This covert activity, plus con- firmed liaison with the mili- tary, supplemented a slightly more overt program of con- stricting Chile's position in the international credit mar- ket. Whether or not this covert action "caused" Allende's downfall and death�and offi- cial American spokesmen had been denying as late as 1973 that there had been any United States attempts to in- terfere with the Chilean elec- tions�the Chile report did not make much news, noi spark much debate. C.I.A. spokesmen studiously avoided comment. They had the upper hand, and did, not cant to say anything that could somehow rekindle interest in covert action, That, early in 1976, could have raisect thc sensitive' question of whether the 'United States 4 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Was, or should be, intervening in the Italian election cam- paign. The issue did not come to the fore. Press reports that the agency was channeling $6 million to ;anti - Communist parties in Italy died out with- out resolution amidst the Welch and Schorr controver- sies. By the time the Church committee drafted its recom- mendations 'on covert action, the political base for referm- ing the C.I.A. had disintegrat- ed. The committee itself was badly divided on the issue. 'Accordingly, the Senators decided not to take a firm position for or against covert action, or even to push for a national political debate over its proper use. In its con- cluding recommendations, the committee declared that coy- ' ert action "must be seen as an exceptional act," which "must in no case be a vehicle for clandestinely undertaking 'actions incompatible with American principles." To these vague mandates, the committee added some rather foamy standards in keeping with the professorial tenor of the staff approach: "Covert operations must be based on a careful and systematic anal- ysis of a given situation, pos- sible alternative outcomes, the threat to American inter- ests of these possible out- comes, and, above all, the likely consequences of an at- tempt .to intervene." These major conclusions were sup- plemented by the customary demand for more effective oversight by the Congress.. "We tended to say that most of the hard questions should be studied," observed a task- force leader. . These recommendations amounted to a clear, though tortured, endorsement of the C.I.A.'s covert-action program. Moreover, they gave the agen- cy enormous bargaining lever- age in its efforts to keep infor- mation secret. "The problem with the C.I.A.," says F.A.O. � Schwarz, "is that once you ac- cept the kinds of things they do, it's hard to argue that they shouldn't disguise it bet- ter." Once the need for some form of covert action is con- ceded, it follows that the nec- essary apparatus should be maintained and exercised. And once it is accepted that the ap- paratus cannot possibly func- tion solely under the mantle of the C.I.A., as Colby argued Ir. a recent interview, then something else follows: Pri- vote American institutions should be enlisted in the cause. This chain reasoning matches the historical process by which the C.I.A. enlarged itself over the past three dec- ades. At its creation in 1947, the C.I.A. was strictly an intel- ligence agency, with no au- thority or capability for covert action. The need for secret feats of derring-do and manip- ulation arose in the cold war, and quickly became the vehi- cle for the agency's spectacu- lar growth. By the late 1950's, security requirements were so pressing that the C.I.A. was spinning off thousands of � front companies at home and abroad. Inevitably, this led to � a rationale for. intrusion into domestic institutions. Even though the agency's legal charter expressly forbids it from engaging in domestic ac- tivities, the C.I.A. began mak- ing arrangements for cover with American groups, rang- ing from missionaries to pub- lishing houses to some of the best-known corporations., In pressing secrecy on the Church committee, C.I.A. offi- cials developed the argument from the basic logic of covert acticn, until it applied even to justifying continuation of do- mestic activities. The commit- tee gave �in on point after point. Thus, the C.I.A. escaped not only serious challenge to the practice of covert action but also the� risk of scandal from exposure of operations attendant to covert actions. No one knows just how much ma- terial remains buried in the Church committee files or how much the agency held back, but a brief investigation revealed an impressive list of subjects which the committee either deleted or consciously failed to explore. The numer- ous sources within the coma mittee staff and the C.I.A. who described these subjects requested anonymity. (1) Two draft sections of the report �"Techniques of Covert Action" and "Covert Action Projects: Initiation, Re- view, and Approval" �remain classified. (2) So do the five covert-ac- tion case studies the commit- 'tee agreed to keep secret. Ac- cording to committee sources, the five countries are the Congo (now Zaire), Greece, Indonesia, Laos and Vietnam. The committee report says these studies show a pattern of covert action and penetra- tion not unlike the one in Chile, In the Congo, covert ac- tions began before the at- tempts to assassinate Patrice Leanumba and continued through the chaotic period following independence in 1960. The agency, according to C.T.A. swarms, helped estab- Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 fish Gen. Joseph Mobutu (now President Mobutu Sese Seko) and has maintained a covert relationship with him and other key officials ever since. The relationship illustrates a C.I.A. pattern of developing ties to promising foreign poli- ticians early in their careers and then "sponsoring" them. In Greece, covert actions spanned some of the agency's proudest achievements in helping to prevent Communist domination after World War II. Today, the agency's ties to the Greek Army and secret police remain pervasive � so much so that both Colby and Rogovin, interviewed sepa- rately, expressed fears for the stability of the present Greek Government if those ties were revealed. In Indonesia, covert action against the regime of President Sukarno persisted through the 1965 coup, hi which more than one million civilians died. 0) The committee's investi- gation into the use of classical espionage�obtaining informa- tion and using it to influence foreign governments�remains classified. (4) The committee broke no new ground on the agency's use of American corporations for intelligence- work, cover, or covert action. Staff direc- tor William Miller terms this a "failure." There was no ex- ploration, for example, of the agency's work with the corpo- rate interests of the late How- ard Hughes�in spite of con- firmed reports of the $300 Glomar Explorer project for raising a sunken Soviet submarine. Senator Barry Goldwater, a member of the Church committee, states that corporations "are the third most important source of foreign intelligence, after foreign agents and satel- lites." Committee sources say the agency was particularly reticent about corporation's because the issue opens the door to questions of domestic impact. � (5) The committee is silent on the issue of the C.I.A.'s use of American labor unions abroad, even though former agency employees, such as columnist Tom Braden, have written on the subject. One committee source says "no committee in a Democratic Congress is going after labor unions in an election year." Other sources say it was more a question of time and re- sources, or an unwillingness to investigate labor after deciding not to look into cor- porations. (6) The committee learned of, but did not investigate, the extensive network of Ameri- can professionals who have secretly assisted the C.I.A. Lawyers, for example, per- form functions ranging from liaison work with other Gov- ernment agencies to legal rep- resentation of C.I.A. proprie- taries, or "front" organiza- tions. One 'of former White House counsel John Dean's lawyers worked for a C.I.A. front, as did the chief counsel for Jeb Stuart Magruder. Paul O'Brien, attorney for the 1972 Committee to Re-elect the President, was a former C.I.A. case officer and, according to John Dean, offered the services of a C.I.A. front, a law firm in Greece, to help launder money for the Watergate cover-up. These C.I.A. ties to the Water- gate case alone suggeSt that C.I.A. relationships, with all their political and profession- al implications, are not unusual among prominent Washington lawyers. (7) The committee agreed to a C.LA. request that it clas- sify the details of a report on the clandestine use of Ameri- can academic institutions. After noting that C.I.A. assets are employed by more than 100 colleges and universities, the report states only that its purpose is "to alert these in- stitutions that there is it prob- lem." (8) After the C.I.A. issued new, restrictive guidelines for the use of American news per- sonnel, the committee submit- ted to a request that it classi- fy the details of a report on the question. Moreover, the agency refused to supply the committee with the titles of several hundred books�many of them published abroad, in English, to be sold in the United States � that it has subsidized. "We couldi have held hearings on the C.I.A.'s relationship to the press that would have_blown the lid off," blurted a task-force leader who worked on the media study. The Church committee's C.I.A. reports are impressive on the surface�full of bu- reaucratic history and weighty essays on subjects like "command and control." But the tepid conclusions and the omissions cited render the work incomplete, if not irre- sponsible. The contrast with the thoroughgoing investiga- tion of the F.B.I. is striking. The main reason for this is that F.B.I. wrongdoing in- volved deviation from gener- ally accepted standards for the bureau, whereas the CIA.'s covert actions ore in- tegral to the agency's prac- tices. The C.I.A. investigation Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 arias more difficult because it cut much closer to the bone. "The alternative to covert action," declares Senator Goldwater, "is war." Argu- ments about covert action resemble arguments about war. If the Senator's interpre- tation is correct, the United States has engaged in some 900 alternatives to war in the last generation, and the Con- gressional committees have partially unveiled a much harsher international reality than most citizens know about. The CIA. operates in a world that is, in fact, hostile and cynical. The agency's environment is full of plots, betrayals and people who are less noble than they seem, and the agency is built around the notion that it can only operate under cover. Secrecy makes it more effective against ruth- less enemies. Secrecy masks an element of hypocrisy necessary in a Machiavellian world. It also protects the American people from grisly facts at variance with their self-image. In this sense, the. C.I.A. veterans consider them- selves a true professional elite, capable of immersing themselves in a ruthless envi- ronment without -losing their bearings, and of shouldering burdens for the American peo- ple that the people would not want to bear or even hear about. A combination of events enabled the C.I.A. to prevent a debate on whether covert -action�secret wars and se- cret alternatives to war---is justified or necessary. The C.I.A. bowled over the Pike committee and seduced the Church committee. Several sources on the Church com- mittee assert that the out- come was the result of a strategic decision--to duck the issue, under the adverse political conditions that de- veloped this year, so as to be able to take it up again uns1.,�!r the authority of the new over- sight committee, and perh7n!, with the assistance of a new Democratic Administra tien. There is also the hope in some quarters that these last two years of investigation and rev- elation have bad some effect on the political climate, once so congenial to the unre- strained use of covert action, and even on the way the C.I.A. itself thinks of its role. The record thus far, how- ever, is not one to make for much optimism. No oversight committee is likely to have a better opportunity to control the C.I.A. than the Church and Pike committees, whose rec- ords speak for themselves, and Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 WASHINGTON POST '1-7 SEP 1976 Stephen S. Rosenfeld Covey Sperati In claiming that the CIA's covert op- erations have survived scandal and in- vestigation "intact, if not strength- ened," journalist Taylor Branch, writ- ing in last Sunday's New York Times Magazine, dignifies a -gathering Wash- ington myth. Citizens worried about the official abuse of. secret power should know it's not so. The myth, not simply his article, needs to be knocked down. � , Now, it's true that dirty tricks, pre- viously conducted without statutory or explicit legislative sanction, have now gotten official congressional license. To those who believe that there should be no dirty tricks, or that the Congress by sanctioning them legitimizes an illegiti- mate practice, this may be enough to damn the whole process. It's true, too, that not all the CIA'S myriad operations were investigated by the Senate or House intelligence com- mittees and that, of those investigated, not all the findings were released or leaked. Again, to those who look at this matter just in terms of investigation and disclosure, there's little more to say. r I find it inadequate, however, to ac- cept either of these propositions. As authentic and extensive a national debate as can be imagined was waged On the question of whether the U.S. ought to be ready to conduct certain operations under certain conditions. Plainly, the national answer was yes. Congress, which reflects the full spec- trum of public opinion on this issue, is moving to implement that public ver- dict. It is not by the CIA's self-serving manipulations or by the Congress being "outfoxed" that this is happening, but by popular demand. Personally, I buy it. � Further, the purposes and limitations of investigation and disclosure must be understood. These can build care into a rampant bureaucracy and a negligent executive, and they can fuel a demand for reform in the Congress and public. But is it necessary or wise to investigate or disclose everything? Apart from the deference due endangered persons and apart from the limits of time and staff; there is the real and valid political lim- it, which the Senate observed and the House did not, of acting in a way to build a political consensus. As Frank Church, chairman of the Senate inquiry, puts it, "We did not want to end up on the cutting room floor. We wanted to keep the confi- dence of the Senate and write our rec- ommendations into law." the C.I.A. has shown itself to , be quite adept at managing the political climate. The agency began these searching Investigations banging on the ropes, and clearly emerged the winner. Its powers, so unique and still largely hidden, re- main essentially unchallenged. - �-- ings The Church committee achieved this �it forced the President into reforms meant to be preemptive, and launched the Senate on its own referms. These are "institutional" rather than "jour-� nalistic," and it is instructive to run down the list. A permanent intelligence oversight committee, of representative member- ship, was set up in place of the old sys- tem of informal review by CIA-co-opted legislators. Its chairman, Daniel Inouye, says he's proceeding with all deliberate speed, building staff, and savvy, and gaining executive cooperation: "Ii' they. lie to us, there'll be hell to pay." A charter, or statement of missions and prohibitions, is being drafted by this panel to cover the whole intelli- gence community. It will go on top of the charter decreed by President Ford last February; Previously a broad range of secret intelligence activities had no legislative sanction and, in some cases, not even recorded executive sanction. An overall budget for the entire in- telligence community is being drafted (for fiscal 1978) to replace the frag- mented and concealed agency budgets of the past. The budget will be author- ized line by line for content as well as money in the regular fashion, not just appropriated without authorization re- view by a few congressional pals of the intelligence agencies. , The Ford executive order gave po- tential substance to the old form of an intelligence "community," a concept that the Senate is recognizing, too. The necessary difficult internal exercise to rationalize missions and assets and divvy up a single budget pie is said to be moving ahead. A procedure is being worked out by which the Senate accepts no prior re- straints on what information it can re- quest from the executive branch or re- lease to the public, and by which it can bargain out differences over the disclo- re Not the sure�even the disclosure of "covert" operations. The Senate's new requirement that the President certify in writing the need for each covert operation has forced accountability upon the Presi- dent�no more mumbles in the Rose Garden. This assures the Congress of. notification early enough to raise meaningful objections, Inouye insists. The procedure appears to improve upon the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amend- ment under which the executive could. wait until late in the day to notify, in a cursory way, six congressional commit- tees, none of them with fixed responsi- bility or readily available staff. One should add that, institutional considerations aside, the public climate imposes its own restrictions on covert operations. Look at how congressional and public reaction aborted the admin- istration's Angola operation, once the shape of it became clear. Fear of leaks is bound to further slow any adminis- tration's covert hand. My main point, though, lies here: You can say that CIA dirty tricks survived "intact if not strengthened" only by overlooking the institutional innova- tions�oversight committee, charter, budget, intelligence community forma- tion, information rules, notification of operations, presidential accountability, plus ' executive reorganization�by which covert operations are now guid- ed. These innovations do not make ab- sorbing reading, as do tales of-the poli- tics and "bureaucratics" of the intelli- gence inquiries. But they do seem a lot more important. And although no final verdict can yet be rendered, they make it reasonable for citizens to hope that, in so far as the conduct and control of covert operations is concerned, things have indeed changed. NEW YORK DAILY NEWS 10 SEPTEMBER 1976 EXCEDRIN HEADACIIVS:: 1... The CIA requested a print "General. fdi Amin Dada" sent down to Washington for their personnel to �view. Intelligence doesn't like to � have to go around to the box office and dig up $:;�50 The producers. of the� extraordinary documentary on � �t�he African big mouth dictator naturilly obliged. - . ,� 6 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 RADIO TV REPORTS, INC. 4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 244-3540 PROGRAM DATE The Tomorrow Show STATION WRC TV NBC Network. CITY September 16, 1976 1:00 AM Washington, D. C. SUBJECT Full Text TOM SNYDER: - Best seat in the house, and not a packed house at that in Studio 6 in New York .City. Good morning, every body. We're on the air tonight with Mr. George Bush, .who at the present time is the Director of the CIA, the Central Intelligence Agency, George Bush has done all kinds of things during the past five years. He has been the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. He has been Chairman of the Republican National Committee. He has been the chief representative of the United States to the People's Republic of China, and he has been, and is now, the Director of the. CIA. And he'll join us here in just a couple of seconds. SNYDER: But as I say, tonight we have the Director. of the CIA, Dr. George -- or Mr. George Bush with us. .And we'll begin with Mr. Bush after these announcements, and I hope all Of you will stay tuned. .SNYDER: And now here is George Bush, the Director of the CIA, which I want to talk about tonight. But I would like to ask you about the importance of the death of Chairman Mao and the effect your think it might have on relations between this country and Mainland China, based upon the fact that you were our repre- sentative there until just recently. DIRECTOR GEORGE BUSH,: I would say that nobody is going to replace Chairman Mao. You really have Lobe in China for a while to see the pervasive nature of his presence and of his impact on China. He gave the 'People's Republic -- well, he gave birth to the People's Republic of China and he gave China a certain unity and destiny, sense.of destiny that it hadn't had in many, many decades. And so I think it's fair to say, certainly it's my judg- ment, and I guess what's more important to your many listeners, Tom, the judgment of many in the intelligence community that Chairman Mao is so special that we don't look for a single re- placement to him. And I think it's going to take time to sort out what China does in terms of leadership. Hua Kuo-feng, who is now the number one man there, is a strong leader, but he lacks the following .that the Chairman had. He's kind of moderating be- tween extremes, or two factions, you might say. And I think that China will move forward in terms of kind of a collegial government for a while, sort out Its new direction as it goes along. I don't see anything in the death of Chairman Mao, who indeed, along with President Nixon, made the opening: I don't see anything to reverse that. And I don't -- I don't think, and it's not my judgment, that China will move precipitously towards a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. So.... Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 SNYDER: Excuse me.... DIRECTOR BUSH: No, go ahead. SNYDER: ...Is there another faction within China which . Would sooner have China not become too friendly with the United States? DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure. There're people there that feel that way. There're probably some there that would like to see them closer to the Soviet Union. But their line has been established, and we don't see any radical shifts either towards the Soviet Union or away from the United States. Now, there're some -- are relationships, the United States and China. I don't want to get into policy, because I'm in the intelligence business now, although I was involved, as you pointed out, in the highest levels of our China policy. SNYDER: .And you were the first person that we have sent there at that level in some time. DIRECTOR BUSH: Second. David Bruce.... SNYDER: Oh, excuse me DIRECTOR BUSH: most illustrious predecessor.... SNYDER: Correct. Correct. DIRECTOR BUSH: ...opened the thing. And I was just honored to follow in his distinguished footsteps. But neverthe- less, I should stay away from policy considerations in our chatting here tonight. But I would say that we don't look for anything drastic ,on all this. And I think that there will be a difficulty before the United States can establish full relations with China. But we seek to fulfill the Shanghai Communique, which was the basic doctrine between our countries. We aspire to that. China, in my opinion, aspires to that. So the death of Chairman Mao, traumatic, enormously im- portant, not only in terms of China, but in terms of the world, in my view will not adversely affect the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China. SNYDER: You've said twice in the preceding paragraph or two that now that you're in the intelligence business, you shouldn't talk about policy. Why not? You're a man with some political experience.... DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure. SNYDER: ...some policy experience, foreign policy as DIRECTOR BUSH: That's right. SNYDER: Ambassador to the United Nations. Why now must iyou switch that off? DIRECTOR BUSH: I've 'got to not only stay out of policy. Now if you say to me, how would you handle whether we ought to formalize our relations with China, I'd duck the question. And if you said to me, you know, who are you for for President, I'd duck that question. Because the Director of Central Intelligence must, one,. stay out of partisan politics, clearly. And secondly, he must present to the President intelligence, finished intelligence Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 002623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 his judgment. Under the law it's my judgment that goes to the President, fortunately for the country, tempered and seasoned by enormous professional competence. But in the final analysis, under the law, it's my judgment. And that judgment has to go forward unfettered by policy considerations. Sowe . . . . SNYDER: But can you not still speculate, based upon your. .broad experience;... DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I could.... SNYDER: a private citizen? DIRECTOR BUSH: I mean I have the liberty of doing it. Well, certainly if you turn those red lights off, I'll do it with you. But I'm not going to do it because the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA must not get into politics. on.. SNYDER: Turn the red lights off, but leave the camera DIRECTOR BUSH: All of them are on. fLaughter.1 � DIRECTOR BUSH: No, but we -- we've got to -- we've got to -- we've got to let the policymakers set policy and let the intelligence go forward unfettered by policy constraints. . Say there's a policy that says country "a" and country we must improve relations with them. And then the President embarks on a course of action that says let's go forward and give aid and improve it. And then we find certain intelligence that indicates that if we do, it'll cost us the support of countries "c" and "d.' We shouldn't be saying., whoops, the President's committed to this policy that's going to support "a" and "b"; therefore don't you people bring me that bad news about "c" and. "d." We've got to go forward with the way we see it. Call them as you see them, you know. And-so if I start speculating about what I would d9 � . to formalize relations between China and the United States, that's not my job. And I couldn't separate out George Bush from the i-ole of the Director of Central Intelligence or the head of the CIA, both of which hats I wear, you see. SNYDER: Not with the foreign policy for the United States. DIRECTOR BUSH: Yeah, you can't do it. And I sit in on the National Security Council meetings. I go to the cabinet meetings that are related to :foreign affairs. I have direct ac� cess to the President. My access should be used to give finished intelligence, and let the policymakers, whoever is President, set the policy. And that's the way it should be, and that's the way it will be as long as I'm Director. SNYDER: Can you tell me the difference between the Rind of arrangement we now have with the People's Republic and how that differs from what will be when we have diplomatic relations DIRECTOR BUSH: Formal? SNYDER: ...established with them formally? *41 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 DIRECTOR BUSH: You know, that's a tough and very fair question, and I will try to answer it. Right now we are less than --.I was less than a full ambassador. SNYDER: Well, okay. That really is the question.' What .was the difference between yourself and a full ambassador? DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, we didn't go to the airport to greet foreign dignitaries. We didn't go to the Great Hall of the People on state occasions when a visiting foreign chief of state would come. There are certain protocolary differences that made our rank, our status something less than full. Until we have full diplomatic relations, our trade will not be -- not be en- hanced. We won't have the best levels of trade, because certain problems that could accompany, could go along with full relations, such as the claims and assets question -- it could be solved before we have full relations; it might not be. But full relations kind of imply a solution to tough problems like that, you see. . . So we -- but beyond that and beyond the protocol ques- .tion, there are not too many substantive things. SNYDER: Very subtle differences. DIRECTOR BUSH: They're subtle differences. And yet formal relations -- there're certain consular things that go with it. And it would be better. I mean the United States seeks friendly relations with almost all countries. And certainly we seek friendly relations with the People's Republic of China. Now you're getting me into policy. But I say this in confidence because of our adherence to the Shanghai Communique.' But there are certain very difficult problems that remain before full relations can be established. SNYDER: Without asking you about the policy problems, how long a period of time would you estimate, again based upon the work that you did there and the work that you did to make more peaceful, I guess is the word I'm looking for, or more quiet, the entrance of Mainland China into the United Nations when you were there? How long would it take for this to come about where we would have full, formal relations with the People's Republic? DIRECTOR BUSH: I couldn't speculate. I can't, because. there are certain major problems that exist that the President and the chief of state in China must wrestle with and that the secretary of State, in our instance, and the foreign minister; in theirs, must wrestle with. And so really speculation -- even if you asked me on a pure intelligence basis, not leaving out my judgment as the former chief of the U. S. liaison office in Peking, any answer I gave you would be pure speculation. And I really want to duck that one because I can't give you an honest, useful answer. SNYDER: I understand that, sir. Now when that time comes, though, would we expect the President of the United States to make that announcement in concert, probably, with the Chinese Premier at that time? DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I think if full diplomatic rela- tions were established with the country that has a fourth of the world's population, you would look for both chefs of states.... SNYDER: Major. Major. Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 DIRECTOR BUSH: That's right, Tom. I mean this would be a major step forward. It would be a major thing, and it would � be considered -- certainly considered and probably announced at the highest level. .SNYDER: All right, sir. I must pause for these words from our sponsors. We'll continue after these messages. a. SNYDER: Why do you think it is that Richard Nixon was liked so apparently by Chairman Mao, to the point where he would invite him to come back even after Mr. Nixon left the White House? DIRECTOR BUSH: President Nixon went to China, and he said, "Look, I'm here in the self-interest of the United States." There was no phoniness. The differences that he had articulated all his political life were still very much in his mind. He laid them right out on the table. Chairman Mao understood that. The reason the Chairman wanted to talk to President Nixon, in my view is that he felt it was in the national interest of China, just as Nixon felt it was in the national interest of the United States. And there was a certain directness. There was h certain mutal respect. I think Chairman Mao thought President Nixon knew a lot about world affairs, and I think -- I know that President Nixon felt that Chairman Mao did. And so there was this kind of prag- matic understanding and self-respect -- mutal respect that gave. President Nixon this special standing. And when President Nixon went back, there was all this kind of hogwash in the United States that the Chinese were trying to intervene in the New Hampshire Primary. I don't know if you . remember that... SNYDER: Surely. Yes, I do. DIRECTOR BUSH: And it couldn't have been further from ,the truth. This was the fourth anniversary of the Shanghai Com- munique. There was this mutual respect, even though they have very vigorous differences. And the Chinese understood that :President Nixon had kind of taken a gamble and had opened this 'relationehip, ad they were honoring him for that, not to inter- ;vene in some primary. So I really think that's the reason that the President was there and what he said was the national interest of the United States -- "I'm here in our own self-interest." And the Chairman sat down and said "I'm here in the self-interest of China; now let's talk. And they seemed to get along and understand each other. SNYDER: Do you think that the meetings could have gone a different direction in 1972 between Nixon and Mao Tse-tung, that it could not have come off as well as it did with the Communique of Shanghai at the end? DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I.... SNYDER: You know, you label it as a gamble, that Nixon and Mao both took a gamble. DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure. And I think when they -- I think obviously Dr. Kissinger and others 7- well, Dr. Kissinger did a lot of preliminary work. And I'm sure that they ironed out some of the more obvious hurdles, or smoothed those things out before 11 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 the meeting took place, the meetings � in Peking took place. But, yes, I think up till the last minute there were some difficult negotiations and some problems that were unre- solved before our then President went there. And so, yes, there was. a gamble involved. But I .think once they decided to meet, there, was enough at stake on both sides that some kind of agreement was destined to be forthcoming. And sure enough, it was. SNYDER: Uh-huh. The papers quoted you back in the- 1960s.when you were, I believe, in political life as saying that You. felt that the admission of Mainland China to the United" Nations would destroy that organization. Yet ironically, you were the United ,States Ambassador to the United Nations when Mainland China was .coming in.. And though you fought long and well for Nationalist China to re- main with Mainland China, it didn't work out that way. What changed your mind? Was it -- was it.... DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, there were changed circumstances. You see, in the early '60s -- and that was a rather accurate quote -- there were some demands on the part of the People's Republic of China for admission to the U. N. that were unaccep- table and remained unacceptable, not only to the United States, but to the majority. For example, they wanted to go back -- and just one of the ones -- go back and say that the U. S. was the aggressor in Korea. Now that was a quid pro quo or .a sine qua non; without that we won't come to the United Nations. That was the early '60s. Now that was unacceptable. To me, politi- cian or fledgling interested individual in foreign affairs, I was saying to myself and to my potential constituents, "Look, I don't think that that should bp, that the United States ought to go back.... SNYDER:-That we ought to take a rap for that. DIRECTOR BUSH: ...and take that kind of rap." And we didn't. And so there were changed circumstances. And then when I was at the United Nations, why, we had the policy of dual representation, because we felt at that particglar juncture in history -- and we articulated it as best we could, and we fought for it -- that though there's one China, there is indeed two governments at this juncture, that each claimed to be China. And we didn't feel that the Republic of China, or TaiWan, should be thrown out of the United Nations, The United Nations voted differently. And I was Ambassador at the time. I worked that side of the question. The People's Republic of China representatives that I later got to. know very well'in Peking and at the V. N. ass well understood this. And we were on opposite sides of that. The decision was made. And then I determined,- as U. S. Ambassador, to work as compatibly as possible with the will of the majority. And we did. And I think that's the proper way to conduct oneself. And I fought for what I believed, but people don't always do it the way the United States wants. SNYDER: If we leave aside the glamour names in China, Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and others, can you tell me something about the kind of people that are running that country at the bureaucratic level, people that might correspond to our cabinet officers in this country or to heads of intelligence, such as your- self? What kind of men nod women are running that country in terms of their competence and their understanding of the world and China's place? 12 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 DIRECTOR BUSH: Oh, Tom, that's a tough one, because I mean it would be like saying what kind of men and women are running this country. I mean some people would say dedicated. Others would say too bureaucratic. Some would say aggressive, self- seeking. Others would say lazy and not -- not stimulated by their surroundings. So I think -- I think it's pretty much the way it is the whole world over. But there is a dedication to Maoism. There is a central -- with the people in these government posi- tions, a strong adherence to central doctrine. In fact, there's very little deviation, if any, from doctrine, particularly in foreign affairs. And I think there's a certain lack of individual freedom to move away from a line in foreign affairs. We have it; not too much, but we have some of that, of course. But really, when you get down to the individuals, charm- ing, able, well versed in languages.... SNYDER: Competent. DIRECTOR BUSH: ...competent, good grasp of history. Their Foreign Minister, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, educated in Germany, philosopher, tremendously capable. If you can get him on your show, you'll be doing very well. Now you and he probably would come at it from different philosophical points of view. But capable. You're saying, "Are they able? �Are they good?" Yes, .they're strong. SNYDER: The reason I ask that question is that there are many people in this country who so abhor all kinds of communist governments that they believe that the people running them are really wild-eyed revolutionaries who used to be in guerrilla armies and now, all of a sudden, are occupying places of power -- well, not all of a sudden any more in the instance of China -- .who really are not competent politically, and who really are not competent in terms of administering to a country that has one- quarter of -the world's population. Yet I would just have to think that they must have some very bright people. there and some very able people who are more than foot soldiers who came out of the mountains in 1949 to govern a country. DIRECTOR BUSH: If a guy was a foot soldier who came out of the mountains in 1949 to govern a country, that doesn't mean he's a dumb-dumb.. But they get dumb guys; they get bright guys. They get fat ones; they get thin ones. They've got happy ones; they've got sour guys. They've got forthcoming people, and they've got recalcitrant, withdrawn people. And it's kind of like Washington, D. C. or Disneyland East. I mean it's the same the whole world over. [Laughter.] SNYDER: It's no secret that if China wanted to, it could reclaim Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa tomorrow *morning, mili- tarily, if they wished to do that. DIRECTOR BUSH: Tom, you're going to get me in a lot of policy. Go on; what's your question? ahead. SNYDER: ..No, I'm not. No, it's not going to be.... DIRECTOR BUSH: That's your statement; not mine. Co � SNYDER: I think they could if they wanted to. And I 17: Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 think that if they wished, for example, in 1999 or whenever the treaties on the new territories, the leases run out in Hong Kong, they could reclaim those.militarily with absolutely no problem. The question is, will they? Now, if that's a policy question, then you can duck it. But I just have to think to my- self that if they really were a vengeful nation bent upon gaining revenge for all of the wrongs they believe have been committed against them over the last twenty-five or thirty years, they would go after Formosa, and they would go after Hong Kong and seize that rich port and its economic treasures. But they don't do that. � DIRECTOR BUSH: You make a good point. But I would only add, because it will get me closer to policy than I want to get, they would be contemplating how will others respond. And we have a mutual defense treaty at this point in our history with the Republic of China. And anybody in Peking making that kind Of decision will obviously be thinking about that. Beyond that, I don't want to go. But it certainly would be an inhibition to adventure. And I think that the people in Peking dnderstand this. On the other hand, that doesn't mean -- I'm not trying to predict what they will or won't do. SNYDER: Yes, sir. We will continue And get into the business of how Bush runs the CIA.. That we are allowed to talk about, I assume. we? DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes, fully. .SNYDER: We can talk about intelligence policy, can't DIRECTOR BUSH: Fully. SNYDER: Fully. Right after these announcements from .our sponsors. ��� SNYDER: What kind of a job is being the Director of ithe CIA? Is that. a political. job? You were appointed to that � lby the President. You are a Republican. You have run for office. ;You have worked for the Republican presidency for some time. DIRECTOR BUSH: No, it's not a political job in the isense of partisan. In fact, when -I went into the job,. I properly :forswore all partisan political activity. Now when I was nominated for the job by President Ford, there was some debate, rather heated Aebate. in the United 'States Senate as to whether I should be in. �ithe job because I'd been Chairman of,the Republican National Com- mittee, I'd been a Republican member of the United States Congress. I convinced the senators, an overwhelming majority of 'them, that an American citizen can participate in partisan politics with partisanship and with fervor, and when out of that can do a nonpartisan job, as I think I did as Ambassador to the United - Nations, as chief of the liaison office in China in nonpartisan fashion. And so I went down there and said, "Look, I -- I think I can do this job. It's an administrative job; it's a coordina- tive job; it's a job where the Director must have the confidence of the President and he must have some confidence in the Congress, and I'm not going to be involved in partisan politics. And if I did, I ought to be thrown out, because the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community must be free of partisanship." And I hope I've conducted myself in that manner. And I think I have. And certainly I've tried to: And fortunately for me, 14 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 because I like the job and I am enthralled with the mission and I'm impressed with the people I work with in terms of their dedica� tion and their competence -- fortunately the United States Senate agreed and I was confirmed. And there were some doubters, and I understand that. SNYDER: I was going to ask you, do you think the debate over your nomination and your qualifications was a proper debate ifor the representatives of the people...? DIRECTOR BUSH: Of course it was. Of course it was !proper. And, you know, I'm human, and I didn't like it, and Isome of the senators said things that I wish they hadn't said. ;But my goal the minute I was confirmed is not to go back and show a vendetta, but to try to earn the confidence and the respect of those who voted against me for understandable reasons. And only history will tell if I can do that. SNYDER: .How effective have you been in at least gaining some kind of rapprochement with those senadors who did not want you to have the job? Did you actively seek them out on a. 'personal 'basis afterwards or just let your work speak for itself? DIRECTOR BUSH: No. .I tried to ,say, look, from this moment on I'm going to do what I said I'd do; butt out of partisan politics, lay aside -- saying to myself, lay aside the debate; bury my own strong feelings about "Why wasn't this guy for me or not,' and earn his confidence. And I don't know how it's working. You should ask some of those senators. But you know, I'm kind of goal oriented. And I'm going to convince them � through performance, not through a lot of PR, that the majority was, correct., But much more important than any personal thing is, you know, how is the intelligence community running? Good God, these people were. subjected. to some excessive abuse. not saying everything was perfect in the past; and I'll be glad to discuss that with you.. But there has been a piling on.... SNYDER: Well, I want, you to know. I might as well say this for the benefit of the people who are watching too. I don't think the purpose of this hour should be to go over all of the charges, proved and disproved, of the last five or ten years and try to hold you accountable for you [sic] and say "Now, what are you going to do about that?" I think that.... -DIRECTOR BUSH: Thank God. SNYDER: Well, I think committees of the Congress have done their job properly. I think that the reports have all come out. The record is there for people to see. And obviously you were appointed or chosen by President Ford as Director of the CIA to go forward from the bad old days, if that's.... DIRECTOR BUSH: That's what .1 want todo._ SNYDER: Which I'm sure My detractors will say, I'm letting you off easy. But I don't think.... DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, but -- yes, some will say that. The sensationalists will say that. But look, intelligence, foreign intelligence is Vital to the national security in these troubled times. We know what we up against. We don't know all about it, but we know enough about it to have just totally convinced me, not only when I was a consumer of intelligence in China, in the United Nations, but now when we produce it and I'm responsible for this -- to absolutely convince me that an intelligence capability second to 15 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 none is vital to legitimate national security. So I do want to look ahead. And yet I continually have to look over my shoulder. And I'm delighted. You know, if you get some flak out of it, too bad, and you probably will, because there're people who want to still criticize us. SNYDER: Well, we'll refer those people back to about five programs we've done on this series with, for example, Mr. Hirsch of the New York Times and other reporters and writers and members of organizations which are anti-CIA. They've all had their say on many occasions, and we've heard it all before. I would like to see what's coming tomorrow rather than worry about what's going on -- or what went on yesterday. But just one question in that area. When � you say you yant,an intelligence establiShment second to none, fine. But � �there is a feeling I think created by. the investigations and the probings of Congress that we have far too many people working in intelligence in. this country, that almost every other person might be a CIA agent or might be an FBI undercover man, or might be with the local police department in plain clothes, and that we have too many people checking on those of us who are not doing any investigating.. DIRECTOR BUSH: Yes, that's a myth. I'm absolutely convinced it's a myth. Our personnel levels are subject to Minute scrutiny by the proper oversight committees in the Con- gress. And if they felt that -- and believe me, they go over every budget figure, personnel ceilings that you mention, now, with a fine tooth comb. And if they thought there was excessive staffing, that would have come out in these Senate -- in the Senate report or in the House committee report, or in one of the thirty-seven appearances, official appearances before Congress that I've made in nine months of being Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. ,And so I'm not saying we can't be more efficient. .I'm not,saying we can't cUt. back here or .there. But this concept that you accurately portray that Americans feel the CIA has excessive ?people spying is nonsense. It's wrong. SNYDER: I had a man on this program who said that there's a very good probability that there could be an employee or two some- where at RCA or NBC. I don't know how many people this company employs; too many in some areas. That this man might also be working for the CIA. 'Well, now, if I found out that there was a co-worker of mine here who was working for your company and was ' taking notes on what me and my colleagues did or people who ca-me on this show or any other and sent them down to your office in Langley, Virginia, I'd be highly upset about that.... DIRECTOR BUSH: Sure you would. SNYDER: I don't think your agency has any business in this building. DIRECTOR SYNDER: And we're not in it. And the very fact that he gets credibility by saying that on this show, with no proof, not being compelled to come forward with the facts, gets me -- I can't use the phrase I used to use in the Navy. I'm upset about it, because it's not true. And it's been investigated. SNYDER: It starts with "T" and it rhymes with teed- off. Okay? 16 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 DIRECTOR BUSH: .No, it starts -- yes. I've got to be careful. I don't want to get people calling in. But no, it's 1:ot right. And were true, it'd be all over every headline. And yet we are living with that kind of myth. Movies come out.. Robert Redford and "Seven Days of the Condor," with CIA guys gunning down each other in the United States. Nobody ever alleged that. The sensationalism, the excesses of the investi� gation. We're kind of propelled into this kind of nonsense, and we have to live with it. But we're professionals. We're patient. We know our mission is important. We know we're living within � -- properly now within the constitutional constraints, and we're determined so to do. We're subjected to proper oversight by the President on the executive side, by seven committees of the Congress And I am very comfortable, as one who prides himself on some sen� sitivity for the rights of American citizens, with the way the intelligence community is conducting itself. SNYDER: And isn't it just too bad that the former President really bastardized the CIA throughthe whole Watergate thing, or it was alleged that he did that to the CIA? DIRECTOR BUSH: There have been allegations against several former Presidents. People look back at the Bay of Pigs an say, using ninety/ninety hindsight, this was wrong. But my v5ew -- and I do appreciate your not dwelling on the past, though I'll glad to respond to any question �you ask about it to the best of my ability.... SNYDER: I believe it. DIRECTOR BUSH: But there have been errors, and there have been, using 1976 moral judgments, some condemnations of things in the past. But Tom, we're in a tough ball game, and we better be prepared, we better produce the best intelligence we can; we better have the best analysts, Ph. D.s, MAs; we better' have the best security for the premises here and aboard; we better have dedicated people willing to sacrifice. And .we've got these things. SNYDER: And still people who have a tittle humaneness, a little compassion, a little sensitivity.... DIRECTOR BUSH: We need that, sure. SNYDER: ...and a little romance in their approach to DIRECTOR BUSH: That's right. It's not a James Bond life that we're in. And yet covert action is a small percentrge.... SNYDER: Don't you have a car that shoots -- don't you have a car that shoots noxious gases out the back? life. either. DIRECTOR BUSH: No. And I've not yet met Fussy Galore � [Laughter.] SNYDER: I can help you there.. DIRECTOR BUSH: I don't want any ef that. Listen, I've got enough problems running the CIA nn4 the intelligence community. SNYDER: We will continue with Director Bush after these announcements. I hope you'll stay tunel. '* 17 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 SNYDER: ...nonpOlitical'nature of your job for a second here. � If somebody from the Committee to Re-Elect President Ford were to call and say the President would like you to make a cam- paign speech, you would say no. � DIRECTOR BUSH: Not only would I say no. I'm a former Chairman of the Republican National Committee. I didn't go to the convention, didn't go near it; stay away from any political gathering; feel constrained to not even support the candidate of my choice as an American citizen; insist that we -- upon presiden- tial instruction, but that we fully and properly, as we should, brief Governor Carter, the contender, the major contender to the President for the presidency. And if you or anyone else point to anything that I do that smacks of partisanship, I shouldn't be in it. The agency's been under enough fire. And the process -- much more important, the impartiality from politics of the process is so'important that a Director ought not to be political. Now, I think I a-good Director of CIA. SNYDER: If JerryFord called you on the phone tomorrow, 'which I'm sure he would not do, but if he did and he said "George, .�I'd like you to go out to Oswego, Michigan and .make ,a little talk," you would say "Mr. President, I'm not going." DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I wouldn't, and II1-1 make.... SNYDER: .What would you say? DIRECTOR BUSH: ...the differentiation for you. I'll make the differentiation for you. He's the President. I'm the head of one of many executive agencies. I serve at the pleasure of the President. Now if he said -- I'd say, "Mr. President, what is the purpose, or what do you want me to do in Oswego; Michigan?" If he says "I want you to go out and make me look good politically:" I'd say "I won't do it." But if he said "There's a group out there � that's long been interested in intelligence,..and as the President of the United States, they're interested in the executive order that's reformed the intelligence community, and each year the Director of CIA has done this and I'd like you to do it," I'm going to do it. SNYDER: Such as at the University of Michigan.. Okay. - -I understand. DIRECTOR BUSH: And so we've got to draw the line between, you know, the concern people have that a President might ell the CIA Director to do something iriproper, and the other line is that there's one President, and he deserves the loyalty and the best judgment of his Director of CIA, just as he does of Interior, HUD, Defense, or whatever it is. So I don't want to be a free-floating spirit. The CIA must be under the control of the President. And the President should be able to fire the Director of CIA or tell him what to do. But he shouldn't be able to tell him to do something that's improper. Your question connoted political impropriety, and that I woutdn't do and, without injecting a partisan note in it, this President wouldn't ask me to do, you see. And so I -- I -- I don't think we've got a conflict on this one, Tom. � SNYDER: What if Jimmy Carter is elected in November? What happens to your job? ; DIRECTOR BUSH: I serve at the pleasure of the President. And I would not make it difficult for a new President to get rid 18 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 of me. And I'll tell you why. I don't believe the agency or the Director of CIA, Director of Central Intelligence or the head of CIA should be partisan. But I do believe strongly that. whoever heads the intelligence community, the Director of Central Intelli- gence, must have the confidence of the President. He can't serve intelligence well if he doesn't. And the President is ill-served if he can't have confidence in what the Director is telling him. And so there is a certain compatibility separate and apart from politics that is in the national interest. And so-what happens, I don't know. And I really think it's far less important than whether this community stays strong, the intelligence community. And so I would say "Mr. President, any time you want to get a new man in here-, please proceed so to do." And I don't think that is� making partisan a nonpartisan job. It's simply my conception of how government ought to operate. SNYDER: I don't have historicity in my head as to what happens when a President of a different party comes into office. Do you remember what happened.,.. DIRECTOR BUSH: Vis-a-vis CIA? - SNYDER: Yes. When Johnson came in, or when Johnson left and Nixon came in. DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dulles -- Dulles was eventually replaced by Kennedy. There was a little period of time. I mean President Kennedy replaced..,. SNYDER:, Replaced Allen Dulles. DIRECTOR BUSH: ...Allen Dulles. I can't 7- be honest; I haven't looked beck. SNYDER: Who was in when -- does anybody in the room know when Johnson and Nixon.... DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, Dick Helms. SNYDER: Well, he remained. DIRECTOR BUSH: But I don't remember. I thought you were talking about turnovers. I.can't.... SNYDER: No, I'm just wondering. The minute Kennedy took office from a Republican, Eisenhower, did you fire the CIA Director? DIRECTOR BUSH: No, no. SNYDER: I don't think so. DIRECTOR BUSH: No, no, no, no. SNYDER: And when Nixon took it from the Democrat, Mr. Johnson, did he fire the CIA Director? DIRECTOR BUSH: No. But in fairness.... SNYDER: And I'm not trying to dictate.... DIRECTOR BUSH: NO, but in fairness, Tom, there has never been a Director who has had as active a political past as I have. And so just as I understood the debate on my nomination before the Senate, I would understand a review of my position, if. for no other reason than because I had been actively involved on the 19 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 other side of the political spectrum, you know, should your hypothesis work out. But again I come back, not trying to sound holier than thou, but that's inconsequential. What really is essential is that the proper relationship be established. And we've-got it . now. It's working well. The Director of Central Intelligence' is given access to a President that supports the concept of a strong foreign intelligence community. And that's what's essen� tial, whoever is President. And my future, my getting.a job really is coincidental. SNYDER: We will continue after these announcements,: hope you'll stay tuned. SNYDER: You mentioned that you feel it's proper that ,Carter, the Democratic nominee, be briefed on certain,items. Who decides how much he will be told? DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, in the final analysis, the President. The President's instructions to me, as head of the'intelligence com� munity, is the determining factor. But the Presiaent took a very broad view. He said I think that it's most important that the �7 that Governor Carter be given intelligence briefings. But then I worked out, as the designee of the President, with Governor Carter the parameters of the briefings. And we decided that they should be on intelligence, that they should stay away from policy and that - they should stay away from sources and methods, which is a certain code for the things I am to protect under the law. Governor Carter recognized that he didn't need to know at this juncture .the sources and methods of the intelligence. And so our briefings-have consisted of finished intelligence. I've attended the two briefings on intel� ligence, and fortunately for him with me went some of our experts in the areas that he was interested in. And we're not holding back. The President has made clear to me he wants Governor Carter fully briefed, and this is what we're doing. And the bene� ficiary is the United States of America. SNYDER: Now in the briefings -- and if you can't say, you will just say "I can't say." I understand because I'm a neo� phyte and I don't want to get into areas of great sensitivity. But do You brief, the opposition candidate on methodology, per� sonnel, location, or do you brief him on things that are happening currently in countries where we operate intelligence installations? DIRECTOR BUSH: It's'the latter. We don't go into thetho� Sources and methods of intelligence we don't go into.- SNYDER: Like in country "X," Mr. "A" is doing such and such to make sure that political Mr. "B" will not advance. That ' kind of thing? DIRECTOR BUSH: No. We don't go into the source or method. What we go into is here's the way one conceives the istrength of the Soviet Union, for example, where it's up against NATO, you know.' Or, here's what we think that might happen in China after Chairman Mao passes on. Or, here's a current intel� ligence briefing. Here's the status of what might be going on in come area, maybe the Middle'East or Africa, or wherever it is. SNYDER: I understand. DIRECTOR BUSH: We stay out of policy. We give him intelligence. We respond to questions. And I hope it's working 21) Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 002623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 to.his satisfaction. The people at the .CIA, the professionals with whom I work, feel that the briefings have gone reasonably well. SNYDER: Will there be more before the election? DIRECTOR BUSH: That depends on what Governor Carter feels he requires. SNYDER: I see. Now what.... DIRECTOR BUSH: The President has authorized me to give him what he needs in terms of intelligence briefings. SNYDER: Has he asked for anything you wouldn't tell him? DIRECTOR BUSH: Now, Tom, you're getting into.... SNYDER: I understand. DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I don't think so. I don't think he has. No. And I don't think we had any differences with the Governor. SNYDER: What arrangement is there, though, and I'm cer� tain there must be some, between the President and Governor Carter in terms of using information supplied by yourself and your associates as campaign issue or campaign speechmaking source? DIRECTOR BUSH: Well, I don't -- I don't -- if there is some arrangement that they've discussed, something between them of that nature -- certainly I've not been any intermediary on that kind of an arrangement. I don't expect that kind of an arrangement exists. I think that any recipient of highly classified intelligence in the position of Governor and certainly the President recognizes he's dealing with sensitive information. And I don't expect there will be an abuse of this information. But should that have been discussed, it hasn't been dis� cussed with me, nor should it be. That would be an arrangement, a policy kind of a thing that would be worked out elsewhere. But I don't believe there's such an arrangement. ::,SNYDER you..know how good you are. at _doing thiS kind 'Of� ee16,i-sion?- � :DIRECTOR BUSH: No, I'm trying t SNYDER: But you really are good. I'm out of time. But you really are good at this, and you should do it more oftene It would help you, and it would help your company. Thank you for being here this morning. DIRECTOR BUSH: Thank you, Tom. PIIILADLFHIA INVIR1,13 16 SP.PTEMDER 1 976 ; Quotable: A matter of choice "1 don't lie; I just choose what I say." .7 7... � �Former CIA director William Colby, speaking to students , � � �� � .at the 'University of Pennsylvania Tuesday night Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 WASHINGTON POST 1 6 SEP 1976 iiigPL,ne By Laurence 'Stern Washingioti Post Staff Writer Leo Cherne, one of President Ford's chief intelligence advisers, .is a cen- tral figure in a Justice Department national security investigation that NI ,being described by federal officials as "the green book affair." � The green book is a. government Mite pad in :which a staff aide to - Cherne recorded briefings with diplo- matic and intelligence officers during a trip to Europe in March, 1975. Cherne is chairman of the Presi- dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and a member of the newly ;formed three-member Intelligence' 'Oversight Board.- � The notebook, officially described �.as having contained "classified infor- mation. . . injurious � to. the national security of the United States," disap- peared immediately after Cherne and his aide, Cmdr. Lionel H: Olmer, re- turned from the European trip. Here the plot thickens. �liner, an intelligence officer during his entire '19-Year naval ;career, says he has no idea how the little green notebook got � out of his pessession. He 'is described by associates as an extremely meticu- lous professional experienced in the '�handling of classified material. -Within several hours after his ar- rival at his Rockville,: Md.. home; he called.Wheaton.Byers, executive see- 'retary,of the Foreign ,Intelligence Ad- visory Board and advised. him .of the notebook's disapPearance,�he said yes- terday. � An. investigation. was con- dueted and the notebook waspre- sumed lost when � the aircraft cabin was cleaned. � :The mystery was solved�to' the greater consternation of :Cherne and. Olmer�on July 24, 1975, when the in- 'telligence adviser received a tele- phone call from Michael James Casey of Los Angeles. "He said, 'I have your notebook,'_" .Cherne recounted yesterday in de- scribing what he called a "14-month ordeal." � � It was during this and subsequent telephone conversations that Cherne learned. that Casey had served two years at �Soledad Prison near San � Francisco., Casey. further . explained that he had recovered the notebook' from sympathizers of Patricia Hearst, who was then at large. Casey contended that the finders of the notebook had hoped that It "might be 'exchanged for considerations in their behalf and I -told him that I wouldn't do it even if I could," Cherne said. Casey, in a relephont int erview 'from Omaha, wil:ire he was acquitted yesterday of a "felonious entry" charge, insisted: "I was,not trying to burn Chernc.1 told him hoW ;1 got the. Iniok and the interest of the people who had found it." Casey is a �32.year-old Californian who prides himself on his work in re- setlhIneni. of Vietnamese l'eljigees, who sought to appear as a witness in behalf of Hearst at her trial on Li Qer -charges of. bank robbery, and who wound up, in an ironic turn of the story, working briefly for the Interna- kional Rescue Committee of which '-Cherne was chairman of the board. es ..Early last year Casey persuaded the :Los Angeles Times to send him and :two staff reporters to Hong Kong at a � reported cost Of $15,000 for a prom- ised rendezvous with Hearst. The newspaper subsequently described the episode as a hoax. Casey- acknowl- edged that ,the Hearst trip "bummed out." � Casey's career also encompassed a Ifine-month period as director of spe- ':;eial projects for Boys Town, the Ne- hraska community started by Father. �-Flanigan, from which he was fired in. a dispute with the administration over. ; the alleged theft of 31 files for an MGM television production. ("One of my jobs," he said, "was to get them publicity.") When Cherne found out who had turned up with his notebook, lie noti- fied the intelligence staff arid was advised "to play it down and not make it appear to lie important.", The initial judgment was that the loss was not of great security significance. Cherne maintains . that he first learned that Casey was employed in , the Los Angeles' office. of the Inter- national Rescue Committee as a con- sultant during an Aug. 22, 1975,' phone conversation with him. "I said, 'I don't think terribly much about your' 'association with IRC and when 1: �de- .cide finally, I'll ask. for your. resigna- ham' " The green notebook was returned on Aug. 26, 1975, and �Cherne turned it over to. the intelligence, staff. Three weeks later he called Casey and asked for his resignation. "He submitted cheerfully, always cheerfully," Cherne 'reminisced. On Sept.. 72 Casey sent a Mailgram to the paesiding judge in the Herst case, Oliver J. Carter, in the name of the IRC. "We prayfully requeSt; that Patricia Hearst be admitted to bail." the tele- gram' read. "Please consider that Patty Hearst was directly and indi- rectly esponsible for the safe eVaella- ti on oi' 390 mon, women and childran wit hat4 regard to lice own safety (lul-- ing last. week 1975,- at Seieon, South Vietnam." Ttic telegram was immediately re- Imitafed by the MC on Cherne's in- structiona. ; In Echeuary of this year Cherne was appointed to the Intelligence -,Oversi Board by' 'President. Ford and also named chairman of the For- eign Intelligence Advisory Board, of which he was a member at the time of ' his European trip. His offices here arc in' Pie Executive Office Building, � and he commutes from New V irk an averace of twice a week. in March, a rental or for the San Di- ego 1.4:veiling Trilume, Robert Dietrich, coti-d Chortle: e:snla'ning that (;asey hart showed him the contents of the notebook. 22 Of CA" ; The notebook, according to in- formed saurces, contained notes on briefings with embassy and Central Intelligence Agency officials about a number of issues, including reactions 'to news steries about the CIA, the im- pact of the massive flow of petrodol- lars .`roin th.e. West. to the Arab states, as well as "unprecedented unemploy- meet and. catastrophic inflation" in ' European countries.. . . ; There was an-early reference-in the notebook, both Cherne and Casey. ac- knowledge, to New York Times re- porter Terry Robards. Casey located 'Bollards in New York, he said, and it was the Times reporter who specu- lated that the initials "L.C." in the ; notebook must have referred to Cherne. This, said Casey, IS: how he � concluded that the notebook belonged to cherne., Dietrich wrote a story in the Trib- une last April 14 charging that he had tried to alert the FBI to :his discovery 'of clecutrents "containing the names of 100 or more :CIA agents" and that the details "were in the hands of an ex-'convict with ties to the Ameri- can underground." . Dietrich also charged lie had been intimidated by 1/13iSt'tiOUS phone calls ; and an armed visitor who "asked 'about Cherne and about copies of Ca-, !sey's" papers in this reporter's posses-, !siOn." ' ! Dietrich's :story raised more ques- tions at the time than it answered. Word of the report alSo leaked to New ; Times magazine and was the subject :of a column by its West Coast editor, 1Ro.bert Scheer. Cherne said that reports were being circulated that the -.otcbook had been !found "in a 'Paris whorehouse�an 'outrageous lic. visited no whore- houses in any European city or else- In the churse of these events the se- � curity priority of the notebook was substantially upgraded by the CLA's Office of Security, and a Justice De- partment investigation was launched to determine how it was lost and who :found it. The CIA declined comment � on the inquiry and the Justice Depart- ment only confirThed that an investi- gatien was under way. ; Cherne said he initiated the request for an investigation of the entire epi- sode. In the course of yesterday's in- terview his desk was covered with documents that detailed the develop- ments in the extraordinary case. One of the curiosities is that ()liner, who took the notes in '"cryptic short- hand," was never asked to help de- code them by 'CIA security officials. He is still baffled at. the disappear- ance. "Even when I went to the inen'st room derity the trip I took the note- book out of my attache case and car- ried it with me." in" said. , Cherne, who lamented that he had. allettessrullY stoimed smoking for sev. � eral years. had three packs of ciga- rettes on his desk yesterday, which he .shared with a� reporter,: Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 WASHINGTON POST 1 5 SEp 1976 FU Inquiry n Leftist Party ahed Long Probe Finds '�No Wrongdoing by Socialist Workers By John M. Goshko Washington Post Staff Writer The Justice Department reveal- ed yesterday that it has ordered the FBI to halt its 38-year investi- gation of the . Socialist Workers. Party�a small left-wing political group whose counterattack helped , to plunge the FBI into crisis: � ! The bureau had been pursuing the SWP � since 1938 without producing any evidence of wrongdoing by the party or its members. The FBI's activities caused the SWP � In 1973 to file what has become a $40 Million lawsuit against the bureau and other federal law enforcement agenc- ies, charging them With illegal harass- ment and intimidation. lAs a result of evidence uncovered by the lawsuit, the Justice Department has been conducting a seven-month Investigation into allegations that the FBI carried out widespread illegal burglaries against suspected "extrem- ists" during the past five years. Justice Department spokesmen con- firmed that the FBI had been ordered to stop investigating the SWP after it was learned yesterday that the depart- ment had sent letters to the SWP and to judge Thomas P. Griesa, who is hearing the suit in U.S. District Court �in New York, notifying them of the action. The spokesmen said Attorney Gen- . eral Edward H. Levi had issued the order following a "systematic review". . of how recently issued guidelines cov- ering domestic security investigations apply to the SWP and its youth affili- ate, the Young Socialist Alliance. The spokesmen insisted that Levi's decision came in the course of review- ing the cases of all political groups under investigation by the FBI and had no connection with the still pend- ing lawsuit. � ./ Levi's guidelines stipulate that' the� FBI can investigate an organization or individual only if it has evidence that they have been engaged in some spe- cific Illegal act. The guidelines bar the FBI from maintaining surveillance of a group solely for the purposes of gathering intelligence or because it suspects that the members might do something illegal. TBI Director Clarence M. Kelley also released a statement last night, saying that the bureau had partici- pated with Levi in the review. Kelley added. "We ;agree it is now neceL;sary to discontinue such investigations." . In New York, Cathy Perkus. ' a spokeswoman for the Political Rip.hts Defense Pend, which is financing the SWP suit, said: "We don't believe that this was dii.'n';` routinely. It's 'no Coincidence that they picked the one organization that has been laying bare all the FBI's 'abuses and illegalities. We think they did it in hopes that we would end our lawsuit and put a stop to the revela- tions about what the FBI has done." .Perkus said the SWP plans to con- tinue prosecuting its suit. She added that the SWP will ask Judge Griesa to issue a permanent injunction barring any further FBI activity against the SWP and to order the bureau to turn over immediately the names of all- present and past informers infiltrated into the party. The SWP, whose national member- ship is believed net to exceed 2,000, has its ideological roots in Trotsky- ism, a revisionist Marxist ideology based on the theory that permanent, worldwide revolution is needed to maintain economic systems beneficial to the working classes. The party has insisted for years that it has no connection with the Communist Party or movement and does not advocate violence as a means of overthrowing the U. S. capitalist system. ' In its suit, which originally asked damages of $37 million, the SWP charged that its pursuit of legitimate ' political activities had been seriously undermined by an FBI "dirty tricks" campaign. The FBI activities included the use Of paid informers, wiretap- ping, interception and opening of mail and burglaries of SWP offices and the homes of its'members, the party al- leged. ' Also named as defendants in the suit ;were other federal agencies, in- cluding the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Internal Revenue Service. The suit is still a long way from res- olution. But it already has triggered'a number-of sensational disclosures that. Include: " � An unprecedented admission by an FBI agent, George P. Baxtrum Jr., that, prior to 1965, he participated in at least 50 burglaries of SWP offices in New York at the direction of his sti- .periors. -� Use ,by another FBI agent, Joseph Furrer, of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination � the first known instance 'of an FBI of-' ficial taking the Fifth � when ques- BA LT IMORE SUN 11 'Sept. 1976 Ex-chief Colby defends CIA's worth to nation by DAVID ZIELENZIGER Speaking dispassionately and almost as if he had never been fired as director of the Central Intelligence Agency 10 months ago, William E. Colby last night defended the intelligence community's ability to cope with threats to national security in the future. While he spent most of his 35-minute lecture at Towson State University de- scribing the rationale for intelligence op- erations, Mr. Colby also admitted "we did do things wrong in the past, but now we have corrected them." The former CIA executive refused to. comment, however, on the merits of a . , tioned about � his knowledge . of 'bur- glaries against the SWP. .� Disclosure that an FBI informer, Timothy J. Redfearn, committed three burglaries against the SWP � .the most recent in July � and turned doc- uments taken in these break:ins over to the bureau's Denver field office. " .� A charge by a Portland. Oreg., man, Alan 11._Selling, that the FBI had paid him to join the SWP and act as an informer against the party. Sell- ing' also contended that he was 'in- duced by FBI officials to commit an illegal burglary, but he said that was .directed against an organization not .connected with the SW?. � � Revelation that the bureau, over 'the years, had used approximately 1,4 600 persons as informers against the .SWP and still retains 66 informers posing as members of the party. The lawsuit also has had repercus- � .�sions that go far beyond the FBI's in , eolvement with the SW?. Earlier this year, Judge Griesa nrdered the bu- reau to search the files in all its of- :flees and turn over to the SWP all documents relating to the party. : The resulting documents search turned up a previously secret file in the New York field .office indicating that the FBI had committed bqrglar- ies in the course of domestic security investigations during 1972 and 1973. .Previously, the bureau had said it . ceased such so-called !`black bag jobs" in 1966. - This information prompted tire Jus- Ake Department to launch an investi- igation, that has spread across the ;country .to a number of cities. It has :resulted in the empaneling of a fed- eral grand .iiiry .cew York to.probe ithe break-ins there '-and consider 'whether the FBI officials involved- should be indicted on criminal :charges. � . Sources familiar with this investiga- tion said yesterday that the grand jury should complete the first phase of its inquiry by the end of.this week or early next week. In this initial Wiese, the sources added, Justice Department lawyers have concentrated on presenting to . the grand .jury testimony or informa- tion from FBI agents who, during 1972 and 1973, were assigned to the New �York field office's squad investigating the radical Weather Underground. gal ease initiated by the Socialist Workers' party over government spying on domes- tic dissidents and insisted, in the face of a hostile questioner, "The em. does not train people to torture." Mr. Colby, under whose direction the intelligence community made public many of its past controversial activities, insisted that under new presidential direc- tives and with adeouate congressional oversight previous abuses will not have a chance to be repeated. "It may be again necessary for the CIA to assist decent local people suffering un- der a racist despot," Mr. Colby said, "but from our mistakes in Vietnam we have learned that we don't use military assist- ance. to solve a political problem." "One doesn't discuss disbanding the ar- my or the police because of mistakes that were made in handling a case," asserted the 56-year-old attorney, "and that same lesson must be applied to intelligence." About 500 persons attended the lecture. Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 WASHINGTON POST 12 SEP 1976 Alton Frye The Jr Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 , . � K Ass sinati in: Curiosity in .. An inquisitive American learns many things on a visit to Cuba. One of the most surprising is that high officials in Havana seem genuinely hopeful that the investigation of the Kennedy assassination will be re- opened. They are convinced that there was a Cuban �factor in the murder. � Conversations with senior officials of the Cuban government, including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, make clear that they have followed closely the disclosures by the Senate Intelligence Committee casting doubt upon the Warren Commis- sion investigation The Cubans are well aware that the doubts center on the failure of the CIA and the FBI to inform the Warren Commission of the several plots mounted by the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. Knowledge of these plots appears to have been withheld even from the FBI and CIA officials who were responsible for investigating the President's murder and for sup- porting the work of the Warren Commission. As a re- sult, there was no special effort to explore the possi- ble Involvement of either the Cuban government or. Cuban exiles in the assassination. Evidence developed by. the Senate committee makes both hypotheses plau- sible�and a new inquiry imperative. :The situation is murkier and more perplexing than ever. Those who are resistant to conspiracy theories And who have been prepared�even eager �to be- lieve that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone can no longer rely on the Warren Commission report as an �� :The writer is a senior fellow of the Council on For- eign Relations. adequate prop for their predilections. The commis- sion did not know that on Nov. 22, 1963, at. about the very hour Oswald struck in Dallas, an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency was meeting with a rank- ing Cuban official (code-named AMLASH and re- cently identified as Rolando Cubela) to plan the mur- der -of Castro. Simultaneously. in Cuba, a French re- porter. Jean Daniel� was spending the day with Cas- �trt2, conveying to the ,Cuban leader views expressed by Presidentits.7.4,-:nedy in a brief interview at the White House-nn Oct. 'V.:, persuading Castro that Ken- nedy wanted to explore ways to normalize relations. Thus, .at the. moment. the President was killed, U.S. policy toward Cuba appeared to be moving not only On two tracks but in opposite directions, and ?novo- ment oneithertrack could have provoked violent re- sponse by one or another Cuban faction. - Perceptions inside the Cpban government re- sponded to 'both tendencies. in U.S. policy. There is good reason to suspect that the AMLASH operation involved a double agent, or at least a singularly inept one. Castro almost certainly knew of it. The CIA even- ' � tually concluded that the AMLASH activity was "inse- cure" and terminated it. Among other discoveries, within two days of the assassination it was known (but not, to the Warren Commission) that AMLASH had been in contact, with Soviet personnel in Mexico City, where Oswald had gone in September 1963 to visit both the Cliban atid Soviet consolatos. Whether these facts are significaLt or merely coincidental, one can- not tell. In retrospect, Cuban authorities � note with some relief that Oswald was denied permission to visit Cuba, implying that, had his request been granted, the finger of suspicion would surely have pointed at Havana. Perhaps more suggestive of a direct leak from AM- LASH to Castro was the sequence of events on Sept. 7, 1983, when the CIA re-established contact with the Cu- ban conspirator for the first time since the preceding year. Late that evening, Prime Minister Castro called in Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker for an un- expected interview. Only three Western reporters were based in Havana at the time and their contact with Castro was quite limited. Evidently, the Cuban leader had a message he wished to get on the record through Harker. He charged that the United States was aiding terrorist plots in Cuba and warned U.S. leaders that "if they are aiding terrorist plans to elimi- nate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe." This threat of reprisals seems less inflammatory and more understandable now that we know what Castro knew at the time, namely, that the United States was in fact stepping up its covert operations against Cuba during the summer and fall of 1963. Yet it seems an exception to the main lines of Cuban pol- icy as it was then evolving. For months afer the missile crisis of 1962, Castro had been displeased with the Soviets, and there are signs that he" was interested in an opening to Wash- ington. On Sept. 5, the Cubans quietly proposed talks with the Americans at the United Nations, and Ken- nedy soon responded with interest. Also, in early Sep- tember the Time magazine bureau chief in Buenos Aires, Gavin Scott, travelling on a Canadian passport, spent two weeks in, Cuba. Although key U.S. officials have no recollection of consulting with Scott on that occasion, the Cubans recall his questions and com- ments as hinting of American interest in a possible ac- commodation, much as they were later to interpret. the discussions between Jean Daniel and Castro. Then and now the Cubans' attitude toward Ken- nedy has been a compound of political antipathy and. personaladmiration. While critical of Kennedy's role in various counter-revolutionary efforts, Castro and, his associates voice a warm, almost affectionate re- gard for the President's courage and realism. They profess to have seen his death as a grave setback to more hopeful relations between the two countries. The John Kennedy of 1963 was not, in their judgment, the same man who was inaugurated in 1961, but a more mature, poised and forward-looking leader with. whom they could have done business. With this frame of reference, Cuban officials specu- late that the real origin of the assassination lies in an- ti-Castro circles, with which Oswald also was in touch.' They emphasize that assassination is incompatible with their own revolutionary doctrine and that they never contemplated it even against Batista, the pre- vious Cuban ruler. And they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli, the Mafia figures who consorted with the CIA to kill Castro, surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder. Castro has said publicly that he has no proof "count-, er-revolutionary elements" planned the assassination, but that is clearly the consensus in Havana. Further investigation may still be inconclusive, but, far from seeing it as an impediment to Cuban-American rela- tions. the Castro regime welcomes such an inquiry. Their curiosity seems greater than their complicity. U. S. NF3 WOnD 1?7,PORT 5FTTP.MTVER One . result of widespread attacks on the Central Intelligence Agency: Co- vert operations by the Agency, insiders say, now account for only 2 per cent of the CIA's work. 24 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Havana r.41,51-1ENGTON STAR IJ SEP 1976 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 By Henry S. Bradsher Washington Star Staff Writer The Ford administration has be- come concerned about the extensive Soviet program for civil defense and � the lack of any comparable effort to protect the American people in case of intercontinental nuclear war. The first comprehensive official study of the large Soviet civil defense program to be made in many years is now under way at the CIA and elsewhere around town. A National Security Study Memorandum is being coordinated at the Pentagon � examining U.S. civil defense needs. The NSSM pulling together differ- ent agencies" views in order to arrive at a top-level recommendation to the President, is due to be completed by � Sept. 30. It will provide the basis for a presidential decision whether to fit ' an expansion of civil defense work into the 1978 fiscal year budget. But so far the interagency materi- al focused on CIA work has not pro- ' duced a clear picture of the Soviet program. There is disagreement on : whether the preparations to protect the Soviet people from nuclear war by shelters or evacuation to the countryside which are described in Russian manuals are being carried out. THE SOVIET PROGRAM and U.S. � needs are connected by apprehen- sions of some American military � analysts that an imbalance in civil defense programs would make this , country vulnerable. In a crisis situa- tion, the Kremlin could threaten the American people with destruction � while sheltering its own people, thus reducing the U.S. ability to negotiate from equal strength, these analysts , warn. , But this contention that the mutual ' deterrence "balance of terror" has been eroded is questioned by other analysts on two grounds. One is that a protected population could not long survive if its cities were destroyed and its air-and crops poisoned by fallout, so that protection from nuclear explosions might be meaningless in the medium or long term. The other involves whether the Soviet Union really can, or on the basis of present intentions will be- come able to, protect its people from nuclear attack. U.S. policy during the 1950s was to try to protect cities against bomber attack, and the advent of interconti- nental missiles led to the backyard air raid shelter boom in the early 1960s. But by the middle '60s official doctrine switched under Secretary of ' Defense Robert S. McNamara to an assumption that cities were indefen- sible in the missile era, and therefore the best defense was the assured ability to retaliate. , THIS ADOPTION -of the mutual deterrence doctrine led to the 1972 Soviet-American treaty banning antiballistic missile systems for the defense of cities. Populations were to be left exposed, hostages to the other side's retaliatory power. � Although the treaty permits re- search, the United States has cut back on ABM efforts. There are indi- cations that the Soviet Union is con- tinuing an extensive, expensive re- search program seeking a technical breakthrough to a reliable ABM sys- tem. This causes worries in some official quarters here that the Krem- lin might some day suddenly face this country with an ability to shield Soviet cities from missile attack which the United States could not quickly match. "If that happens, they can pick up - all the marbles and go home, be- cause we would be at their mercy," one defense expert commented. The more immediate concern, which the administration has come to, feel might be more real, however, is over civil defense. The United States has virtually abandoned any effort. But since the 1972 ABM treaty the Soviets have vastly expanded theirs � on paper, definitely, and possibly in shelters, evacuation schemes and training, too. A LEADING AMERICAN EX- . PERT on the Soviet "war-survival program," Dr. Leon Goure of the University of Miami, says that "the Soviet leadership has come to view civil defense as a critical 'strategic factor' which, in a large measure, can determine the course and out- ,come of a nuclear war." Goure sees in recent years "a new sense of ur- gency and of realism" in the Soviet program, as well as an awareness of U.S. vulnerability to attack. A special panel of the House Armed Services Committee held hearings in February and March on the two superpowers' civil defense efforts. Goure and other specialists described a very real Soviet pro- gram. The hearings resulted in a token increase in money for the standby .Defense Civil Preparedness Agency in the Pentagon. The evidence that Goure and others have amassed of Soviet preparations has contributed to warnings of a dangerous imbalance. One, administration critic, Paul H. Nitze, a former deputy secretary of defense, thinks these preparations have had the same destabilizing ef- fects as ABMs would have. BUT SOME ANALYSTS QUES- TION the findings of people like Goure on which such warnings are based. A recent study by John M. Collins of the Library of Congress's Congressional Research Service said Soviet plans "are impressive on paper (but) how practical they would be in practice is problematical." Col- lins thought "no U.S. authority as yet has satisfactorily answered hard questions" about the Soviet program. One senior administration official handling arms control negotiations says U. S. Embassy personnel in the Soviet Union and travelers have fail- ed to see the kind of evidence that would be expectable if the paper pro- gram really existed as workable civil defense protection. A government expert on Soviet affairs reports a widespread suspicion that little more has been done than earmark re- sources. The main realization which had de- veloped in the administration by last spring as a result of publicity like the House hearings was that not enough was known about Soviet civil defense efforts. The CIA had not taken a seri- ous look at the subject for more than five years � since before the post- ABM treaty program expansion that Goure detected. SO A MULTIAGENCY STUDY was commissioned. It should have been finished two months ago. In- 'stead, each draft report had pro- duced new doubts about the reliabil- ity of available material. ."The basic problem is that we just haven't been putting enough re- sources on this," an informed observer commented. "It should be possible for the U.S. intelligence community to determine whether. Soviet shelters and evacuation plant and all that really do exist, but the subject hav't been getting enough attention so Tar." The National Security Study Memorandum was ordered by the White House after the study of Soviet efforts had begun. It is being coordi- nated in the office of Donald R. Cot- ter, an assistant to Secretary of De- fense Donald Rumsfeld for atomic energy affairs. An administration official said the NSSM was the result of accumulat- ing concern about the U.S. civil defense posture rather than any specific alarm over what the Soviets might be doing. But even if a gap is found and a threatening imbalance discerned, the chances of organizing an effective civil defense program in this country in anything less than an all-out war situation are considered small by some informed officials. Therefore, the realistic options open to Cotter's study team stop somewhere short of the kind of program which Soviet lit- erature describes. gEnea=l911004 1�14.101�16010001.01������0 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 .0.1�����01������� pproved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONLiAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1976' The United States, contrary to pop- ular mythology, has never been an isolationist country. Almost as soon as � we became a nation we became inter- ventionist. The United States used its armed forces abroad 159 times between 1798 and 1945; of these, 73 were initiated under prior legislative authority, without a declaration of war. Even between World Wars I and II�said to be the heyday of isolationism�we engaged in 19 military actions outside the Western Hemisphere. Since World War II we have used military forces in Korea, Indochina, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and the Congo. What all this ledicates is that since -its inception the United States has been unafraid to exercise power in world affairs. There is every reason to believe that military intervention will continue, -and, indeed, that it may even intensify. �There are a number of indications that 'we may find ourselves committed to policies that go beyond the diplomatic, �economic or covert forms of interven- tion we have practiced in the distant and near past. One indicator is a poll recently taken by Potomac Associates that points to a growing tendency for Americans to think in unilateral terms. The very fact that United States con- trol the Panama Canal should have been a major issue in the Presidential primaries this year demonstrates that ' nationalistic impulses have by no -:means been quelled. Thus, if there is a disposition to intervene, the reasons are not likely to be those we are most 'familiar with, such as a desire to con- tain the expansion of Communism on a global scale. In this respect, Vietnam may well have proved an end game-:- the cold war is already history. Our responses will be different because the international system is different. What we appear to be entering is a period of relative disorder, with a greater degree _ of interdependence among nations; s this could lead to greater tensions and more, rather than less, interference by one nation into the affairs of another. From an American perspective, mili- tary intervention might be most readily occasioned by our fears of resource , scarcity. As regards our dependence on foreign oil, for example, in 1975 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL � Tuesday, Sept. 7, 1976 erican Intervention By James Chace net petroleum imports for the United States were 36 percent of its total consumption. In 1970 they were 22 percent and by 1980, according to esti- mates of the United States Bureau of Mines, the United States will probably be buying up to 41 percent of its petro- leum abroad. In a situation of per- ceived resource scarcity, intervention could easily become a demand by the Congress rather than an assertion of executive will. - Another reason for intervention could be to preserve America's sphere of influence in the Caribbean. Cuba remains resistant to United States dominance, as was most recently evi- dent in the Cuban military presence in Angola directed against� the United States-backed liberation movements. Mexico has already demonstrated its solidarity with third-world blocs un- sympathetic to United States policy. Panama will not be satisfied with the status quo. In the Caribbean and Central America � deemed by most Americans as essential to United States security � the possibiilty of intervention is never far from mind. A third reason for American inter- vention would be to affect regional balances of power. In Northeast Asia, for example, an embryonic regional balance comprising Japan, China, the Soviet Union, the two Koreas and the United States is already in place. The very concept of regional balances of power also demands a willingness of the great powers to intervene to pre- vent the balance from being upset. It is for this reason among others that any outbreak in hostilities between the two Koreas is threatening. There are also at least hints of a balance in South Asia. Unwilling to put itself in the position of being a Soviet client, India wants recognition as a power in its own right. Moscow and Peking seem disposed to grant India its wish. And the United States, far from abandoning the region, is planning an increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In other areas no such balances as yet exist. 'However, nations such as Brazil and Iran have already shown a drive for dominance in their regions. Should such nations embark on an aggressive course, the very fabric of interdependencies being created both in the region and globally could be ripped apart. In sueh a situation, the United States might find intervention �either alone or in concert with others--desirable in order to tame the dangerously expanding power. � Finally, there is often a felt need for great powers to demonstrate their global concerns. For the United States, these would probably include a con- cern for human rights and the espousal of liberal, pluralistic democracies. Realizing that the United States is a worldwide power with social, eco- nomic and ideological interests, Ameri- cans may accept intervention in the manner of other great powers of the past by -pursuing activist policies. The evidence is on the side of the activists. A recent Harris poll showed that � support for an activist foreign policy has hardly changed since 1947. Does global power, then, lead to intervention? History suggests that it does. An anarchic world with shifting coalitions and overlapping alliances certainly does not diminish the likeli- hood. And if wars of attrition and massive nuclear exchanges are im- probable, the so-called decisive stroke of intervention could seem most ap- pealing. Such interventionism will often be wrong and almost always will be dangerous. Yet there seems to be a certain inevitability to it. The 17th- century philosopher Thomas Hobbes was -right when he perceived as "a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire of Power after power that ceaseth only in death." James Chace is' managing editor of the journal Foreign Affairs and author of "A World Elsewhere: The New American Foreign Policy." Americ By B. BRUCE�BRIGGS The charge that America has imperi� allstic ambitions is hard to believe these days, but the truth of the matter is that the U.S. does have a colonial problem, and not just in Panama and Puerto Rico either. ' We don't like to think of ourselves as a colonial power and since we led the way by granting independence to the Philippines in (1946 we have actively promoted decoloni- zation. But as the tide of European empire has receded, the American empire has re- mained intact. With the exception of the ending of U.S. occupation of the Japanese Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the Stars and Stripes are planted as widely now as they were lin years ago. Most of the inhabitants of our overseas s Col ial possessions share our dislike for the term "colony,' so the official designation is "outlying territory." But euphemism can- not modify the fact that three million peo- ple live on 5.000 square miles of American territory, governed by U.S. laws and with no say in the making of these laws either through voting for the President or mem- bers of Congress. What to do with these people Is a continuing annoyance both to Congress and the Executive Branch. Not that the colonies want to be free. Far from it, Most of then, wish to retain the status and rights of American national- ity, hot to mention the protection of the U.S. military. They want U.S. government programs but don't want to pay U.S. taxes. In short, they share the great American 26 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 ches dream of something for nothing. Take our largest and most important colony -Puerto Rico, the only one which could conceivably be a real independent country. It has a minuscule independent movement, so lacking In popular support that it must resort to terrorism to be no- ticed. The principal issue on the island is whether to join the union or to continue the "Free Associated State" status evolved over the years. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citi- zens, the island is internally self-governing (by an act of the U.S. Congress), islanders pay no U.S. income taxes )"no taxation without representation") but are subject to U.S. laws. The U.S. denies that Puerto Rico is a colony and refuses to let the United Na- tions Select Committee on Decolonization Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 meddle in its affairs. But it is continually harassed on the issue by Cuba, backed by � the socialist dictatorships of Syria, Iraq, Mali and Congo (Brazzaville). Several times Puerto Rico has voted overwhelm- ingly in plebiscites to continue the existing status. Presidents and Congressmen have indicated American willingness to let the island go any time it so desires, yet techni- cally the Cubans are right: Puerto Rico is not a self-governing nation. The Economic Benefits Not that the Puerto Ricans particularly care. The recent Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Status of Puerto Rico slighted con- stitutional issues and decided to concen- trate on preparing a menu of economic benefits for approval by the U.S. Congress. Two of the status revisions �changing the nominal designation an Spanish) of Puerto Rico from a "Commonwealth" to a "Free Associated State" and the admission of a non-voting resident commissioner to the U.S.� Senate �seem reasonable, but the suggestion that federal courts use the Spanish language is impFactical. Puerto Rico's desire to have some say in control- ling immigration�to keep out those ag- gressive, successful Cuban refugees, for one thing�hasn't a chance of approval by Congress. And even Puerto Rico's staun- chest friends are appalled by the recom- mendations that the island be exempt from U.S. minimum wage and labor relations laws, not to mention the idea that the is- land government have the right to decide which federal legislation will apply to Puerto Rico. Of course, the Puerto Ricans want full I, federal welfare benefits. Although the commonwealth is one of the richest coun- tries in the Western Hemisphere, its per, capita income is less than half that of the mainland, so federal eligibility standards entitle much of the population to benefits. Fifty-five percent are on food stamps. . Guam, Samoa and the Virgin Islands are held by the U.S. to be "non self-govern- ing territories" liable to supervision by the UN. Each is evolving in the Puerto Rican direction, but not without considerable pother. Guam and the Virgins have re- cently obtained the privilege of electing' � their governors and non-voting delegates to the House. Samoa also was apparently pressured by the Interior Department into electing its own governor. Bills are before Congress to allow Guam and the Virgins to have conventions to write territorial consti- tutions. Because of the collapse of Virgin Islands tourism, its only major business, during the recent recession, that territory " is asking for an outright grant of $8.5 mil- lion and the pledge of the "full faith and credit" of the U.S. in support of a $60 mil- lion bond issue. Apart from the tourism in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, none of the above colonies is of much economic benefit to the U.S. But the Panama Canal Zone is an- other matter. The economic value of the canal, especially with a toll schedule un- changed since 1914, is enormous. But we are more accustomed to think of the canal in military terms. Even though it cannot handle super-car- riers, the strategic utility of the canal con- tinues to be so immense that the United States is understandably loath to knuckle under to demands by the Panamanian Re- public for the liquidation of the Canal Zone and eventual transfer of the U.S. govern- ment-owned Panama Canal Co. to Pana- manian ownership. The Hay-Varilla Treaty 0( 11103 provided that the U.S. shall hold "in perpetuity the use, occupancy and control" of the 'zone "as if it were sovereign," The U.S. is not sovereign, but how its rights dif- fer from sovereignty is a matter perhaps better lett to theologians. As the tide of European empire has receded, the American ern* has re- mained intact. But not without a continuous stream of problems. The present Panamanian regime Is rela- tively responsible and pro-American by Central American standards, but given the vagaries of Caribbean politics, we would be foolish to take continued stability and friendship for granted. The Panama Canal is precious and we have every right in law to possess it forever, so what's the prob- lem? First, continued occupation of the zone hurts our relations with Latin Ameri- can nations who see it as evidence of Yan- kee imperialism. For example, the presi- dent of Venezuela took the occasion of an otherwise affectionate Bicentennial mes- sage to knock our "colonial enclave." Complaints by Latin American coun- tries we can easily bear, but advocates of substantial concessions to Panarna have an uglier scenario in mind --that the present Panamanian regime will be replacsd with one that will tolerate or promote terrorism or guerrilla warfare against the zone. So the Panama issue boils down to these ques- tions: Is continued possession of the zone worth the risk of "another Vietnam"? Can the U.S. stand up to such a threat? The reader is as qualified to answer as any- body. Our other colonial enclave in the Carib- bean is quiet. The Naval base at Cuba's Guantanamo Bay is nice to have, but hardly necessary to national defense. But giving-it up would be seen as knuckling un- der to Castro. Fortunately, Cuba is making no effort to pressure us out, perhaps be- cause of the rumored secret treaty which ended the missile crisis of 1962. No foreign nations are meddling with our Pacific possessions. Our oldest colonies are a miscellaneous collection of islands gathered in consequence of the Guano Act of 1856; the miners scooped up the guano faster than the birds could lay it down and now these islands are unoccupied and worthless. Midway and Wake are military bases with no indigenous population and are no problem. Guam is also primarily a military base and its inhabitants are firmly connected to the U.S. But there is turmoil elsewhere in the Central Pacific, The U.S. controls something called "Micro- nesia," the last remaining United Nations trust territory. Its 100,000 inhabitants are 'not U.S. nationals and are subject to direct U.S. rule, supervised by the UN. We have been trying to develop Micro- nesia as a unit, but the natives who live on 100 islands scattered over an expanse of ocean larger than the United States have nothing in common save a history of being ruled successively by Spain, Germany, Japan and the U.S. Micronesia is coming apart. The Northern Marianhs have al- ready indicated their intention of becoming a "commonwealth." with U.S. citizenship. but separatist movements against contin- ued membership in Micronesia are afoot in other island groups. For the U.S. it's hardly worth the bother. We have a missile station at Kwajalein; Japanese interests are Investigating possibilities of an oil port at Palau, and there is a little copra produc- tion and fishing -and that's all. The Pentagon's Attitude Obviously, very few Americans are, aware of the extent of our possessions. The Pentagon is concerned with those few spots that are of strategic importance, taking the position that the interests of the indigenous peoples are to be subordinated. to the mili- tary requirements of the U.S. Where the military rules directly �as on Wake, Mid- way, Guantanamo and the Canal Zone �the milieu is that of a military base, benign but total control. The cavalier attitude to- ward the natives is .best 'exemplified by Guam where the Navy grabbed'up much of the best land on the eve of the granting of U.S. citizenship and rights to the islanders. This is a continuing, grievance to the Guamians. Surprisingly. the major civilian players in the colonial game are a tiny band of old- style liberals. Micronesia has been repre- sented by Clark Clifford's law firm and for- mer Supreme Court Justice- Abe Fortas has a continuing involvement with Puerto Rico. The maritime lobby is also active. Its principal interest is maintenance of the Jones Act, requiring that shipping between U.S. ports be in U.S. registry bottoms. This is very costly for our overseas possessions, especially Guam, which has one of the high- est costs of living in the world. ' Also on the scene is a tiny band of anti-' colonialists whose views are shaped by the "new politics" of the 1960s, They dislike the military and strategic arguments mean nothing to them. In every overseas com- mitment they see another potential Viet- nam. And they are hostile, to the indigenous peoples who wish to be Americans, charac- terizing them as suckers or tools of U.S. in- terests. Apparently this small group of re- searchers, politicians and editorial writers is unable to comprehend what a precious boon U.S. citizenship is to the ordinary peo- ple of the world. Should the rest of us care about our col- onies?. Excepting the Panama Canal, they are of little economic value and require a continual drain on the U.S. Treasury to provide them with government services.. But the shuffle of history has dealt these poor and weak peoples into our hands. We are responsible for them. The optimum policy probably should be to accede to any reasonable demand they make on us. If they wish to be independent, god- :speed. If Puerto Rico desires statehood, welcome. For the rest, we will have to con- tinue to work toward some intermediate status of internal self-government under U.S. national law that unfriendly critics will always be able to label "colonialism." Mr. Bruce-Briggs is a member of flu' Journal's editorial page staff. Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 27 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 NEW YORK TIMES 7 Sept. 1976 Taiwan's A-bomb..,. �, The American intelligence report that Taiwan clan- destinely has built a reprocessing facility that is ex- Iracting weapons-grade plutonium explosive from spent nuclear reactor fuel rods demands immediate investiga- tion by the appropriate Congressional committees. Tai- wan's denials have not impressed Washington insiders. If the Chinese Nationalists have set out to make atomic bombs in the first known violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)�and have succeeded in deceiving the inspection system of the International Atomic Energy Agency�a profound reappraisal will be needed for Washington's China policy, its nonprolifera- tion strategy and its nuclear export controls. . Under the 100-nation NPT, Taiwan and other non- nuclear weapons states renounced atomic explosives and committed themselves to place all their nuclear facilities and materials under I.A.E.A. "safeguards"---a system of international inspection. The main supplier countries, in addition, later agreed that the export of fissionable materials or key nuclear facility components would be indicated to the I.A.E.A. to trigger safeguards. If this system has been circumvented by Taiwan or .ignOred by some supplier countries, may not other NPT parties �be evading controls as well? Speedy action to beef up �and improve I.A.E.A. inspection and supplier controls clearly is vital. The effort to avoid nuclear spread has focused recently on tightened up export controls by the main supplier countries, but the United States has failed in the most important task: to obtain the agreement of West Ger- many and France to an embargo on export of reprocess- ing plants in the wake of their sales of such plants to Brazil and Pakistan last year, claiming that I.A.E.A. safe- guards make such sales "safe." The Taiwan fiasco blows up that French-German thesis. It reinforces Congressional arguments for legis- lation that would call on the President to deny American nuclear materials ultimately to supplier as well as re- cipient nations that could not be prevailed upon to coop- erate in halting the spread of plutonium reprocessing. That vital legislation is currently bogged down in the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. A belated White House study Of the problem, due for release this week, will be an exercise in futility unless it helps break this log-jam. THE WASHINGTON POST 2 September 1976 Chinese Denial � , � Recent press allegations that the Re- public of China has been secretly repro- . cessing spent nuclear fuel for wea- ponry are totally groundless. � 1. The Republic of China is a faithful party to the non-proliferation treaty guarding against the spread of nuclear . weapons. Besides, Premier � Chiang Xhing-Kuo has repeatedly made it known that the Republic of China de- velops nuclear energy and conducts nu- Meanwhile, the Congress ought to find out why the Administration, after refusing since 1969 to sell Taiwan a reprocessing plant, did not react more vigorously against Taiwan's open importation and assembly of the components for a "hot cell" for small-scale plutonium reprocessing. That so-called "laboratory project," which Taipei put under I.A.E.A. inspection, may simply have been a cover for the assembly of a clandestine facility. . American Guarantee Taiwan's presumed nuclear violation brings into ques- tion the American security guarantee. That guarantee, as in the case of Japan and South Korea, is designed to provide an American nuclear umbrella in place of na- tional acquisition of atomic weapons. ' The United States unfortunately has undermined its security guarantee by talk in Washington and among , China experts of "normalization" of relations with , Peking�without first solving the problem of the secur- ity of Taiwan. Normalization, Peking insists, requires the United States to terminate its security treaty as well as its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But normalization of relations with Peking is incon- ceivable without stabilization of the Taiwan situation by, at the least, a replacement of the mutual security treaty with a unilateral American guarantee of Taiwan's auton- omy and continued supply of arms for Taiwan's defense forces. Renunciation of nuclear weapons is the irreduc- ible condition for that guarantee. This Taiwan-American transaction is in Peking's in- terest. Although Communist China has denounced the Nonproliferation Treaty as an imperialist device, Peking's interest in a nonnuclear Taiwan is great. Taiwan has continued to remain a legal party to the � Nonproliferation Treaty and to accept I.A.E.A. inspection, despite its unfortunate expulsion by third world ven- detta from the I.A.E.A. in 1972. That expulsion does not justify Taiwan's clandestine evasion of its commitments �to the I.A.E.A., to the United States and to 98 other NPT countries�to refrain from nuclear explosives. But the partial responsibility of Peking and the third world for the present situation should give Washington some moral leverage in working out a reasonable solution, one that makes the security of an autonomous non-nuclear Taiwan the inescapable condition for normalization of relations with Peking. clear researches solely for peaceful us-. es. -. � � - . � 2. The Republic of China's nuclear re.. actors and all related facilities and ma- . terials are subject to regular inspection and surveillance of the International Atomic Energy. Agency for safeguard. � In addition to the semi-annual reports submitted to the IAEA in which every bit of imported uranium, including tiny scraps, is accounted for, on-the-spot in- spects are frequently made_ by IAEA experts. As lately as mid-July this year, an inspection team consisting of IAEA experts from Great Britain, France, � . Portugal, Italy and Norway came to the country to take a thorough inventory and found everything in good order. They even brought along a gama-spec- troscope - to measure the radiation of � spent fuel. 3 There � are surveillance, cameras _taking pictures. of the reactor top and � � .the surface of the storage pool which reveal all operations taking place and �make records on a log book. . . All operations of the reactors are.... �computerized..; , '� :.:;� In view of Vie aforementioned hard ..facts, such. allegations simply do ' hold water. ' .;,, DING NIOU-SHIH, � � DIrector-fleneral, :.:'.0overnment Information Office, �' � 'Republic of Chine. 2B Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 =IJ Washington, : � :-.�t � -.Editor's. note:' the Post stands by its story. Which was reported ovin-severo.t � weeks and confirmed by a �number of authoritative sources.: "��� Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 NEW YORK TIMES 4 SEP :1976 'Hard Line' and Hijackings State Department Altering Long-Held Policy, ' Possibly to Defer Criticism of Government Role . By RICHARD WITKIN The weekend hijacking to Paris of a ' happy? . .. , ... New York-to-Chicago airliner has accel- As for the French, were authorities in erated a process of official rethinking on Paris too quick to incapacitate the Trans how to deal with terrorits while the lives World Airlines plane? Did they cause of hostages are regarded to be in jeopardy. what, under different circumstances - The State Department is expressing its (armed hijackers with different inotiva- long-held "hard line" policy tions), might have been fatal delays in in altered terms, contending facilitating communications with the ter- News that the old way of stating rorists? � Analysis the policy was often misun- What Degree of Handling? derstood. In the past, the policY has widely been pub- In short, what degree of tough govern- licized as: "We will not negotiate with mental handling was called for if the only terrorists." remaining requirement of the hijackers ! � A department official involved in anti- was to verify that their demand had been 'terrorist planning said yesterday that the met for dissemination of their message preferred way of stating the policy was: in deopped leaflets and news columns? "Do everything to effect the safe release The captain of the plane, Richard Carey, of hostages without making any conces_ put it very succinctly when he asked dur- sions." mg tower-to-cockpit radio exchanges in There was speculation in the ,aviation Paris: "Tell me, please, what are we being community that the public change in killed for?" A tape of the exchanges was emphasis might have been designed to obtained by the National Broadcasting head off possible criticism about the Company. role of governments in the maneuvering At another point, the captain told the that ended the melodrama with no deaths United States Ambassador, Kenneth or injuries to any one aboard the plane. Rush, who was in the control tower: "All we know is that these people had a riles- Only the Hijackers Knew sage that they wanted to put in the , It must be considered that, while the papers and wanted to drop leaflets on events were being played out at the cities, and for this you are asking that! Paris airport, no one but the hijackers this whole ship full of innocent people! could know whether they had the devices can be killed to prove that you can take' to make good on threats to blow up a stand against terrorists." the plane if their demands had not been The hard-line approach to the overall Met. '., Several questions were toeing asked ..about the role of both the United States And French Governments. '.- Was the response of the State Depart- ment as rapid and realistic as it might have been? Or did a misunderstood view of the "we will not negotiate" stance cause unnecessary delays that might have led to tragedy if the hijackers had had lethal devices and had been trigger- problem of airline hijacking had received its greatest public acclaim after the Israe- li commando raid that freed hostages at Uganda's Entebbe Airport earlier this year. Demands Were Limited � � , But was any comparable governmental toughness called for in Paris? In the end, it was decided it was not, since the de- mands of the 'terrorists were limited. The Washington Star Thursday, September 16, 197 U.S. Vi lated Poky For Cro San Terrorists By Henry S. Bradsher "t) Washington Star Staff Writer In the aftermath of last week's Croatian nation- alist hijacking, the State Department has reiterat- ed administration policy of not making any con- cessions to terrorists but conceded that the FBI : violated that policy. The State Department has in turn been identi- � fled by another agency involved in the weekend :drama, the Federal' Aviation Administration, as 'having been involved in making concessions. The FBI urged some American newspapers to satisfy the five terrorists' demands for publicity for their cause. The five, who sought independence of Croatia from Yugoslavia, released their 92 hos- tages and surrendered in Paris and are now . awaiting trial in New York. � The FAA played a role in the dropping of terror- ists' leaflets from an American plane on London and Paris to publicize the Croatian cause. It also :cleared a flight to drop leaflets over Chicago in � They were not *asking the release off lel- -low terrorists in Israeli and in other jails. What then can officialdom, here and 7 abroad, learn from the latest episode in the complex, constantly changing, and too frequently tragic history of aerial hi- jacking? �The dominant view among aviation ex., pests at the moment is that there is noth- ing wrong in an officially proclaimed and normally implemented policy of tough- ness with hijackers. Anything less would only encourage other criminals. But it is counterproductive to adopt too rigid a stand, many believe. A rigid "we will not negotiate" stand can be misinterpreted by middle-level officials to mean "we will not talk." Even a policy of "we will not make concessions" should not be absolute�how do you define "con- cessions"? Is the dropping of leaflets the kind of concession that warrants risking dozens of lives? Each on Own Merits In short, the majority view is that the government should talk and usually act though but, at the same time, should treat each case on its own merits at the time. That is the way, in the final analysis, that the weekend T.W.A. hijacking was handled. Even while a strict reading of Secretary of State Kissinger's "we will not negitiate" posture was slowing steps overseas -to gain the release of the plane's passengers and crew, other branches of the government were experi- encing no such rigidities. Both the Federal Aviation Administra- tion and the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation, for instance, were urging news- papers to comply with the hijackers' de-; mands for printing the text of their mani- festo for Croatian Independence from Yugoslavia. The policy favoring toughness with flexibility was endorsed by a spokesman for the West German United Nations delegation, which plans to propose new measures against taking hostages when the General Assembly meets later this month. "In general, you should take a hard line," he said. "But don't say 'never.' You can always make room for special cases." � answer to theierroriste-demands. ASKED WHETHER the FBI role had violated the government ban on concessions to terrorists, ,the bureau issued this statement on Tuesday: "The decision to release this material (to the � newspapers) was made solely by the FBI in view of the circumstances which existed at the time, but does not represent any change in the U.S. govern- � ment's policy regarding acceding to demands of � terrorists." In reiterating that policy yesterday, a State De- partment spokesman agreed with a questioner . that the FBI "as much as said that" it had broken the policy. The spokesman said that "the policy, which in- volves a refusal on the part of the United States government to negotiate with terrorists, to comply with monetary or in kind ransom demands or to accede to any terrorist demands, has not changed and will not change. "The maintenance of this no-negotiations, no- concessions policy is based on our firm belief that future incidents can be deterred only when it is widely understood and recognized that such acts cannot succeed and will not further the cause of the individual ,terrorist or international terrorist organization." 29 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Tuesday, September 14, .1 976. Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 � THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR ugozi]aw[is Usa By Eric Bourne Special correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Vienna Yugoslav relations with the United States have taken a nosedive as a result of the hijack of an American airliner by Croatian extremists. It is difficult to recall any time since the early 1950s when official Yugoslav � attitudes have adopted so harsh a line- against the U.S. � There have been periodic mutual up- sets since Belgrade's break with Stalin opened the door to increasingly friendly relations with the U.S. and the West in general, but these were rarely long-last- ing, and they did not approach the level of the current sharp reaction. Now Yugoslavia has gone so far as to accuse the U.S. of tacit support for the 1. hijackers, a charge that a U.S. Embassy spokesman in Belgrade rejected as to- tally without foundation. Surpise voiced Western diplomats who have sympa- thized with Yugoslav feelings about the ' apparently unrestricted activities of ex- treme emigre groups in Western coun- tries, were surprised by the� uncompro- mising nature of Belgrade's protest. It is not .the first time the Yugoslav Government has accused "influential re- actionary circles" in America of hostil- ity to Yugoslavia because ol its nonalign- ment. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 16 Sept. 1976 Japan's saleony SuAsa fea d&erds By David K. Willis Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor Moscow A new setback for detente between Moscow '.and � Washington ... the worst diplomatic clash between Moscow and Tokyo for years ... and an indication of how deeply the Soviets have been upset by three highly publicized defec.' tions in recent months. This is how Western analysts in Moscow sum up the Soviet Union's long, angry blast of criti- cism at both Tokyo and Washington over the supersecret MIG-25 jet fighter-bomber still in Japanese hands: The criticism intensified Sept. 15. A Tass commentator, noting reports from Tokyo that the MIG-25 was to be flown by a C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft to a military base where it is to be "carefully studied," said that Japan's po- sition continued to be "unfriendly" toward the Soviet Union. This attitude, commentator Viktor Zatsepin said, was "clearly undertaken with the in- stigation and support of a third side," and showed that Japan was disregarding inter- national law and worsening Soviet-Japanese re- lations. (This follows on the heels of a Sept. 14 warn- Six weeks ago, President Tito com- plaining of outside "pressures,"' named U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade Laurence H. Silberman as the "initiator" of an anti-Yugoslav campaign. The charge arose from the imprisonment of an American citizen and the Embassy's successful efforts to secure his release. Escalation In this atmosphere, angry Yugoslav reactions to the Croat hijack were pre- dictable. The present protest, however, goes well beyond the Yugoslav leader's criticisms of an ambassador involved in a single individual case. The indictment leveled at the U.S. in- cluded a scarcely veiled threat that "normal relations" are incompatible with the circumstances surrounding the Sept. 16 hijacking. But, before judgment is passed on the affair and positions harden, the Yugos- lav reaction needs to be seen against the current political background in that country. Yugoslav leaders and people generally are only too well aware that the end of an era of assured stability is nearing. Rivalries ease The leaders who will take over when President Tito is no longer at the helm express confidence that the transition has been secured by establishment of a collective presidency. 30 ver Uaddng Talks this correspondent had in all the Yugoslav republics this summer, with lo- cal leaders as well as ordinary folk, re- vealed that -the rivalries and tensions that flared between various national groups in the early 1970s have abated. Republican equality has become a sub- stantive thing. Nonetheless, anxiety for the post-Tito future helps to make Belgrade doubly sensitive to anything smacking of "inter- ference" or hostility, or tolerance of its. extreme adversaries abroad. Extremist activity Extremist Croatian emigre groups have, in recent years: � Infiltrated a band of' 19 terrorists into Yugoslavia. They killed 13 security troops before being slain or captured themselves. � Murdered Yugoslav diplomats in West Germany and Sweden. - Bombed a Yugoslav train. � Blew up a Yugoslav airliner over Czechoslovakia. � Made a bomb attempt against Pres- ident Tito only a few months-ago. These groups are largely remnants, or sons, of the notorious Ustasha who headed a Croat puppet regime under Nazi occupation in World War II and carried out widespread massacres of the Serb minority there. In the Yugoslav view they are not or- dinary political dissidents and should not be regarded as such. ing to Japan that if Tokyo 'pursued its claim to four Soviet-held Pacific islands it could only "poison the spirit of good-neighborliness" be- tween the two countries. (Soviet authorities seized a Japanese fishing boat with a crew of six Sept. 12 just a few hours before then Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa made an inspection trip of the four islands from a patrol boat.) Soviet pilot Viktor Belenko flew the jet, said be the fastest of its type in the world, to _Hakodate in northern Japan Sept. 6. The Japa- nese press reported that he told authorities he had wanted to fly directly to the United States, but lacked the fuel. President Ford decided that the pilot could have political asylum in the U.S. if he wanted. Lieutenant Belenko asked for it and is now thought to be in California. Moscow does not want its prize aircraft on Japanese soil a moment longer. It knows that U.S. and other Western military intelligence experts have long wanted to take a close look at it � a point raised by Tass. Analysts here say tnat Moscow's. latest harsh criticism is in- tended to hector Tokyo into giving the jet back before this Can happen. Judging by the reaction of the Japanese For- eign Ministry in Tokyo, the Soviet gambit might fail. A ministry spokesman said Lieuten- ant Belenko sought asylum of his own free will. Previously Japanese officials had said that Ja- pan would return the jet, but only after it had made an inspection to determine if Leutenant Belenko had broken any laws in entering Japa- nese air space. Privately, Japanese officials reject the Soviet version. �Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 The Soviets have been using strong language in private exchanges since the plane landed. On the night of Sept. 14 Tass distributed a lengthy statement that gave the Soviet version of the affair, said the plane had become lost, condemned Japan for allowing the U.S. to en- ter the picture, blamed the White House for of- fering asylum before it had been sought, and suggested that "electoral considerations" had been to blame. � The Belenko defection was the third to make world headlines in recent months. The first was that of diver Sergei Nemtsanov at. the Montreal Olympics. Next was chess grand- master Viktor Korchnoi in the Netherlands N" 1E6 SYeOpRtIC 1119"71 ES DIM'S PENETR6ATION WORRYING TO JAPAN Ability of Soviet Aircraft to Fly - Under Radar Is Said to Show Country's Weak Defenses By DREW MIDDLETON . � The undetected final approach of the vagrant Soviet MIG-25 to Japan has brought home to Government circles in Tokyo the loopholes in the country's air 'defense, according to United States de- :tense sources. The first analysis on the high-speed, high-altitude aircraft, known to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the Fox- hal; has heightened Western concern over the regular reconnaissance flights by other MIG-25's over West Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway. According to NATO intelligence reports, there are 45 Foxbats in East Ger- many and Poland employed on such pa- trols. The landing of the MIG-25 at the corn- mer airport of Hakodate, on Hokkaido Island on Sept. 6, supported the American �argument, hitherto rejected by the Japa- nese, that their radar system was obso- lete. The detection of hostile aircraft ap- proaching the Japanese islands rests on 28 warning and control units of a base defense system. Successive Japanese Gov- ernments have considered modernization of the system in view of regular Soviet 'reconnaissance flights over the archipela- go by MIG-25s and other aircraft. � Jets Ordered to Intercept I Air defense radars picked up the Saviet 'aircraft short! after 1 P M j July 27. In each case Moscow has reacted in strong statements, and with each defection its irritation has grown. The MIG-25 statement says Lieutenant Be- lenko lost his bearings and landed in Japan be- cause�he lacked the fuel to get home.. Tokyo then isolated hiM, "which gives grounds for be- lieving that various methods were used to in- fluence him." The Soviets say Tokyo refused permission for Soviet officials to see the flyer for almost four days. The Japanese spokesman in Tokyo said Japanese officials had, in fact, persuaded. Lieutenant Belenko to see Soviet officials al- though he had not wanted to. time and �two Japanese Air Force F-4's were ordered to intercept. The Foxbat, flown by Lieut. Victor I. Belenko, did net 'answer 'Japanese requests for identifica- tion. Shortly aftet the MIG-25 entered Japa- ;nese air space it dropped from 13,000 .feet to a low altitude and -disappeared from Japanese radar screens.. In conse- quence, the ground control stations were unable to direct the two F-4's toward their target. Hakodate was Lieutenant Belenko's second choice. His first was the Japanese Air Force base at Chitose, which was cov- eted by clouds. He, then flew to Hakodate. According to Japanese information reaching this country, Soviet aircraft ap- peared in the area of Hakodate five hours after the MIG-25 had touched down. Since then, the Soviet Union's Far East air force has maintained regular patrols in the area. And Soviet -diplomats in Tokyo have demanded the immediate return of the aircraft. 'Lieutenant Belenko left the Soviet air base at Sakharovka in Siberia on the morning Of Sept. 6 in a flight of three MIG-25. Shortly after takeoff he broke away from the squadron and dropped to about 150 feet to escape Soviet radar. After he was out Of the rauge of the Soviet radar, Lieutenant Belenko took his plane up to 18,000 feet. and headed for 'Japan. � ; It was a near thing. The MIG-25 landed with about 95 percent of its fuel exhaust- ed. The plane, according to British intelli- gence cources, has a normal range of about 610 nautical miles but this can be increased by reducing use of Tumansky. R-266 eligines' aterburners. : The initial analysis of the MIG-25 by Japanese and United States experts con- centrated on the avionics system, the lookdown radar and the metals used to sheath the high-speed aircraft. American, aeronautical sources believe that either titanium or boron are used for the fuse- lage and wings. It is not now known whether the air-, craft carried electronic countermeasures. against hostile radar and surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, which have be- come sucli an important element in aerial warfare. P.M. Japanese WASHINGTON POST 1 7 SEP 1975 31 By George C. Wilson Washington Post Staff Writer Navy leaders were preparing last . night to retrieve the highly-secret F-14 Tomcat fighter .that rolled off the deck of the U.S. carrier John F. Ken- nedy on Tuesday�sinking intact in in- � ternational waters about 75 miles northwest of Scapa Flow, Scotland. A Soviet. cruiser kept circling the area where the Navy's F-14 sank; rais- ing fears in the Pentagon that the Russians are marking the spot until they can haul the fighter out of the North 'Atlantic. This would be a diplo- matic counter-punch to the current examination by the United States and Japan of the Alig-25 Foxhat that a de- fecting Soviet pilot flew to japan last week. The Navy F-14�which settled in 1,-. 890 feet of water�would yield the Russians more secrets if they recover it. than Americans expect to get from their examination of the Soviet Mig. 25. Not only did the F-14 have a lop-se- crct,. $500,000 Phoenix missile aboard when it Plunged into the Atlantic, sources said last night, hut the tighter was also equipped with devices so sensitive that a friendly nation would not get them if it bought the plane. Equipment. the U.S. government is determined to keep from the hussians includes devieet; in the F-14 kw, coding Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 'voice communications and -foiling enemy jamming attempts; a computer . system to put the F-14 in the best pos- ition to shoot down an enemy plane; and a data link system so sophisti- cated that someone on a ship could �1 control the F-14's flight. "We're going to get that plane be- fore they do," .said one Navy officer last night. "Or. _else," he added in an , � � obvious bit of overstatement, "it's go- ing to be World War 111." Sources said the recovery plan had been put together Wednesday and, yes- terday but still required a last bit of coordination with one Navy command. .; before being implemented. The water is not deep enough to re-- quire pressing the Hughes Glomar lx- Iorer into service, sources said. That - ship recovered pieces of a Soviet die- sel submarine in 1974. in water almost . � 10 times as deep as that now covering the F-14. Although Navy divers have been called to participate in the P-14 re- � eovery effort, it could not .be learned � I --last night exactly how they will be used.. One source predicted a simple �. seagoing crane and cable system � would be able to go down the re- quired 1,890 feet to reach the F-14. . The Navy could use a seagoing ,� barge with, a so-called "moon poor= an opening within the barge leading directly into the sea. A hook and ea- , ble Can be lowered from a .crane on the deck through this opening�called a moon' pool because it reflects the ..mOon at night. S� Although F-14s have crashed into the sea� before, none has ever fallen ',into it so gently that the plane has re- mained intact. Navy leaders fear the , plane may still be in one piece on the ocean bottom, adding to their determi- nation to recover the plane. Another option would be to blow it to bits on. the bottom, but sources said this was not contemplated at present: The reason the F-14 went out of con- trol on the deck of the Kennedy on Tuesday as the pilot was preparing to take � off, .sourtes said last night, was - that one of its two jet engines mal- functioned. The pilot could not throt- ' tie down its thrust because of what was , termed "a fuel control problem." With one engine - idling, but the other putting out a lot of thrust, sources said. the F-14 went out of con- trol on the deck and' rolled over- board�hitting three deck hands as it , skidded over the side. The Navy said the three sailors were injured but did not describe how seriously. The t wo-man crew of the F-14 a plane that costs $14 million a copy and about $18 million if the cost of de- . vekMing it is including--ejected from the plane and landed on the deck of the carrier. They suffered only minor � injuries, the Navy said. Iran has ordered 80 F-1.4's but will', not receive into.11 of IIre lop-secret equipment, that the Navy fears the, Missions ;night gel. H. ihe is not hauled out of the depths soon. The went erhoard during a :NATO exereisc eallod Temnworlc 76. A (}� spy ship. sh:olowing the rici� Kennedy (Itiriih; exereiw ap- parently saw tin' 1,'.1.1 ovepho;ii'd. T,A.-0 Soviet 1,:rcs'ia crtih,er., wore iii the area, oet, oi Ham !itw, oil near spot who re ;he F�14 WASHINGTON STAR L..1_3 .SEP 1975 u. a Ask t afp (IJismantIeIG � TOKYO (UPI).� Japan will ask American mili- tary experts to help dismantle and examine a Soviet MIG25 fighter plane flown here by a defect- log Russian pilot a week ago, according to Michita Sakata, defense administrator. Sakata, director-general of the defense agency, I told reporters yesterday it would be difficult for '- Japanese experts alone to make a thorough study of the plane, one of the world's most advanced air- craft. Technical assistance from the United States is necessary to dismantle the MIG25 and examine ,secret equipment on board, Sakata said. Defense agency officials added, however, that U.S. help would be sought on an "unofficial basis" , to avoid further straining of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. THE PLANE, REGARDED by Western military � experts as an intelligence windfall, was flown to Japan last Monday by Soviet Air Force Lt. Viktor Belenko. Belenko, 29, who said he wanted to defect to the United States, was flown to California last Thursday after the U.S. government granted him asylum. The high-flying fighter � known by the NATO code name of Foxbat � was described in 1973 by � then U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Robert Sea- mans as "probably the best interceptor in produc- tion in the world today." BALTIMORE SUN 16 Sept. 1976 Tanadia ce' blamed for defectio Moscow (AP) � A Soviet journal ac- cused "Canadian intelligence" yesterday of engineering the defection in Montreal of Sergei Nemtsanov, the 17-year-old di- ver who left his Olympic team during the 'Summer Games. In linking a Canadian government agency with the case, Literary Gazette thus expanded earlier Soviet accusations ,that the young diver was forced against his will to defect July 29. Nemtsanov later announced he wanted to return to his homeland, and was sent -back to the Soviet Union. According to a �newspaper article here last week, he had -resumed training in Kazakhstan. and is- sued a statement saying he had never twanted to defect. Literary Gazette, the weekly organ of the Soviet Writer's Union, said Skip Phoe- .;, nix, the Canadian diver who befriended the young Soviet, "participated at the Montreal Olympics not only in the capaci- ty of a sportsman but also as an agent for Canadian intelligence, being paid 'per soul' for each he recruited." Phoenix has denied he helped engineer the defection. The latest article on the case portrayed Nemtsanov as a total captive of Canadian officials, and said the diver was suffering from "brain paralyzing drugs" when he first met with Soviet officials in Montreal. In his remarks published last week, Nem- tsanov claimed he was in asonstant "fog" during the affair. . Canadian officials said Nemtsanov had asked for asylum, but reconsidered be- cause of concern,over his grandmother's fate back home. � Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE) 16 SEPTI1MER 1 976 The Greer/Kandel Report t7,491r1""0" - - By Philip Greer. and Myron Kandel Sprxial to The Washington Star . Terrorist groups are shifting their focus from the U.S. government to American companies in this country as well as overseas, according to our sources in private security organizations, who have become increasingly worried about the devel- opment.. , . . . Security at government installations has been tightened, and as a result, our sources say, terror- ists are looking for easier targets. The murder of three North American Rockwell technicians in Iran last month confirmed. their fears that U.S. businesses and their employes are becoming sym- bolic stand-ins for the U.S. government :World- wide, 40 percent of all terrorist attacks have been alined at Americans. . . � ALTHOUGH Americans overseas still are more vulnerable than those at home.� and those in arms-related indestries run the greatest risk � the experts tell us the danger is spreading to the U.S. The fire bombs recently placed in New York de- partment stores underline the vulnerability of ordinary business establishments � and ordinary citizens �to terrorist activity. . , Security officials also fear that parts of the huge � ransom payments received by Latin American ter- rorists holding kidnapped businessmen may make their way to U.S. terrorist groups, enabling them to step up their activities in this country. A report � on' terrorism by the Central Intelligence Agency which has received only limited distribution says it is likely that terrorist activity "will be more sharp- , ly felt in the U.S.*in the years just ahead." The CIA also raises the possibility of "growing contact and cooperation" between foreign and U.S.. terrorist organizations. The threat of terrorism is so real to American , companies that representatives of several dozen of them are meeting in New York this week with sen- ior officials from. the State Department. CIA. FBI .. 1. and other agencies at a private seminar organized:. : under tight security. . . . . . BENJAMIN WEINER, a former foreign service.. officer who heads the meeting, says the attacks on. I� defense-related technicians are a first step in the shift of terrorism away from/U.S. military and diplomatic personnel. "Such an attack," he says,',I .. .. "is symbolically equivalent to an attack on the government itself." CIA officials are also worried about the Security- of such major installations as offshore drilling. rigs,- nuclear reactor sites, the computer that runs the Bay, Area Rapid Transit system in San Frame cisco. and pipelines (including the Alaska pipe*, line). They fear that as terrorist incidents multie ply, headline-hunting groups � such as the. Croation nationalists who hijacked a TWA jet last - weekend � will resort to more spectacular acts of terrorism to give them the publicity they crave. � Concern is further heightened by the fact theta! for the most partaAmericans don't take precau- tions � and, in fact, often play into the hands of: would-be attackers. One offical tells of an eeecuai tive of a multinational corporation who, on moving to a new location in the U.S., was interviewed by- his local newspaper. The gory told of his practice: - of jogging every morning and gave the exact time he left his house,- when he returned (at least partly'e. fatigued), where he parked his car. at the railroad.. station, and other details that would make him an': easy target of an aspiring kidnapper or assassin. t For_good measure, he also described, the club his. children regularly visited. .� � :a' � UP.TO NOW, the federal government hasn't- made any strong efforts to alert the public to the'a dangers of terrorism at home. Therefore, the ex**-: perts say, it's pretty much Up to you to watch out. for yourself, and they pass along some tips. � Weiner .says that business executives shou'tda keep a low profile and not draw any unnecessary.. attention to themselves or their families. For example, he asks, why drive a car with a distinc- tive license plate that makes you easy to spot? It's also advisable to vary personal schedules, instead of strictly adhering to the same routine- � day after day. Advice along these lines that the. State Department gives to Americans working in.,. troubled areas overseas can also apply to those at - home. . "Try to avoid keening to the same routine in the', routes and times of your movements to and from; work and around town," the department recome- mends. : ��' ' "Past kidnappings indicate that the Icidnappers keep the victim under surveillance for a substaraa tial period to discover travel patterns. Unpredict7:; ability is one of your best weapons." . , . 33 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 WASHINGTON POST 15 SEP 1976 Secret Swede Funds Buy Spy Ileviees \ By. Bernard'D., Nossiter Washington Post Foreign Service STOCKHOLM, Swede Sept. 14� Secret payments -� channeled by Sweden to U.S. .Air Force intelligence :for a number of 'years are - being used to purchase elec- tronic devices that enable Stockholm to listen 'in on. military communications in , the Soviet bloc, it was learned � today. According to informed. sources here, the payments were hidden because of neu7 . tral Sweden's delicate rela- tions with its Baltic neigh- bors and because some Swe- dish opinion would be hor- rified by any classified deal �with the 'Pentagon. �� Diplomats here are con- � vinced that at least some of . � � what Sweden learns through its monitoring devices is fil- tered back to the Pentagon. Swedish officials decline, however, to confirm this, � presumably because that would be too naked 'a breach of neutrality. The effectiveness of .the American-supported system, ' was demonstrated last No-� � vember, when the Defense 'Radio Authority, the user agency here, picked up Ines- sages sent, by Moscow" to THE GUARDIAN (MANCHESTER) 2 SEPTEMBER 1976 Soviet- bombers pursuing a runaway Soviet frigate. � With an election here Sunday, the government is making no apologies for the affair, although it is obviously embarrassed that it came to light. Stig Synnergren, the widely respected and blunt-speaking 'supreme commander of the Swedish armed forces, was or- dered into action today to field hostile questions from Swedish reporters. At this press conference, the gen- eral referred only to the purchase of "electronic material for the gathering of intelligence." He and other military men maintained a discreet silence on precisely what the device was used for, nor was anything said at the press conference about the target area. It is; he said of the deal, "a per- fectly legitimate business transaction, a payment for delivered goods, and not, as has been insinuated, payment for services." "Deliveries are still going on," the general said. "And we use the same method of payment. . . no mat- ter what you write today." The secret payments were disclosed In Folket i Bild, a Maoist fortnightly magazine that � has cracked intelli- gence secrets here before. The maga- zine detailed four payments of more than $250,000 from 1970 to 1973. They were made by Sweden's then-defense minister, Sven Andersson, now for- eign minister, through commercial banks, with the biggest slice going. to Maj. Gen. Rockly Triantafellu, then chief of U.S. Air Force intelligence. The technique bypassed Sweden's Defense Material Administration, which normally does the purchasing. Gen. Synnergren readily acknowl- edged that the money came from se- cret Defense Ministry funds. Because the payments from Sweden went to Air Force intelligence, the U.S. producer of the electronic device was kept in the dark about his ulti- mate customer. He would know only that he received an order from the Pentagon, not Sweden, an arrange- ment that apparently suited both Washington and Stockholm. Sidestepping the Defense Material Administration kept the Swedish Par- liament and public in the dark,' a dis- closure that may also hurt the govern- ment party at the polls. The reasons for all this secrecy, it was explained here, were these: 0 Stockholm- did not want. its Baltic neighbors�the Soviet Union, Poland le a, 'ea Andreotti..fp,u From CHRISTOPHER MATTHEWS : Rome, September 1 The month-old government of Signor Andreotti is being threatened by a sir near campa Material Witieli is extremely damaging, and if true, politically fatal, to Signor A ndreutti has recently heen published in the Italian press. The source has been the Dalian two-Fast:1st flight, whose past links with the CIA are reasonably well document ed� and the Lockheed 34, and East Germany�to know that it had the capability to monitor their air, sea and ground force transmis- sions. Nor does it want them to know that this capability is being used. � Even, though Synnergren ac- knowledged in an interview with The Washington Post that secrecy in these matters is short-lived, there is an im- Portant diplomatic difference between covert monitoring and a blatant an- nouncement that it is going on. * Public disclosure of the deal would have offended many in Sweden. As early .as 1968, Washington's rela- tions with Stockholm were already strained. Olof Palme, who became prime minister a year later, had marched in an antiwar parade ,had the North Vietnamese ambassador and, in time, Washington recalled its envoy. The government here would have had trouble explaining how it could deal with the Pentagon for a sensitive device and damn the United States at the same time. � AS part of an arrangement of this sort, almost inevitably the using coun- try passes on to \ its supplier some of the fruits of its labors. To give a NATO leader military information about the Soviets appears to be an ob- vious violation of Sweden's neutrality. The story has been a bombshell for the media here, headlined on front pages in three of .the four big dailies and dominating radio and television , newscasts. But its political fallout is : uncertain. Palme is fighting a come-from-be- hind campaign to maintain the 44- .year-old rule of Social Democrats. Pol-. Iticians in all camps agree that Sun- day's parliamentary election will be extremely close, much like the one three years ago when the government forces and their opposition ended in a tie. 'The secret-payments affair has bro- , ken only five days before the voters go to the polls. If it influences enough wavering Social Demoerats to stay at home, it could turn their party out of office. , [At the Pentagon, chief spokesman Alan Woods said yesterday that Air " Force Secretary Thomas C. Reed had ordered an inquiry into ,'any money sent from the Swedish government to the Air Force. Woods said he did 'not know when the inquiry would be com- pleted. He declined to comment further.] toi-poration in the US. Some � Western diplomatic sources say there can be little doubt that a campaign is afoot to discredit or even sabotage Signor Audreotti in his precarious attempt to govern Italy on the basis of a tacit alliance betwetn the Christian Democrats and Communists. If successful such a campaign would have ext remely grave repercussions, for there is cur- rently no alternative to the Andreotti coalition. This partly Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 explains why diplomats think the events of the last few days arc none of the state Department's doing. The US government's view is that Signor Andreutti's government repre- sents the lesser of a number of much worse evils as it sees Communists holding key parliamentary posts as prefer- able to Communists holding Cabinet portfolios, There is no apparent reason why the Stale Department should he trying to make life bard for Si.gnor Andreotti. On Sunday, Mr Ernest:Hauser, the former. Lockheed executive 'told Turin's La Stanma that Signor Andreotti was the mys- terious "antelope cobbler" who has so, far managed to elude investigators looking into .the corporation's Italian activities.' Antelope cobbler, according to documents made available by the Church committee, was Lockheed's code for an Italian Piime Minister � who had a key part in easing the sale .of 14 C130 transports to the Italian Air Force. � Stampa ran the Hauser �story, without naming names, 'merely recording that the antelope was, according to Hauser, none of the people including President Leone � himself � on whom suspicion had pre- viously rested. Today's issue of the political weekly, L'Espresso, runs a Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 cover picture of . Signor Andreotti with the caption " it was him." Inside, 'it pub- lishes � photocopies of three documents, two. of them on Lockheed 'notepaper,. recording the payment of a total of $43,000 to Signor �Andreotti in 1968 and 1970 to ensure, his '"valuable assistance" and that of the Christian Democrat Party. LeEspresso itself does not rule out that the documents, are , clever forgeries aimed at nipping �the compromise between Catholics and Marxists in the bud. Signor Andreotti denied the allegations at length , in an interview published today, although � it can hardly be said he confounded his accusers. His defence basically rested .on his unimpeachable record and on the f a c t. that he would never be .seen dead ' THE WASHINGTON POST liiednesday, September 8, 1976 in Via Veneto's Excelsior NAO. � named by . one of the documents as a meeting .e!ace between the Prime Minister and a Lockheed executive. Qeje....theory is that it is ,alt_ Pentagon:CIA:NATO-1.;fot hatched by rightists who oppeise tlfe7�lideofee-any TeTSiire" of compromise � with Communists. Another is that the manoeuvring is aimed at making it hard for the-. Communist leadership, rather than Andreotti himself. The Prime Mieister h clever and . strong eneagh to survive � the. mud-barrage being thrown at him, but it coule serve to prise apart the pre cerious alliance between the Cern- munists, already under aressure I from inside their own piny, and the Christian Democraie Again, it could be argued . that the revelations are aimed at slowing down the work of the parliamentary committee � By Mary Anne Weaver Special to The Washington Post 'e'ATHENS�The long-simmering dis- pute between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean Sea now runs the risk of worsening already shaky Greek-Amer- ican relations as negotiations on U.S. bases here enter their final phase. Ranking diplomatic sources here say that some Greek officials are pri- vately blaming the United States for the lack of resolution to conflicting Greek and Turkish claims on the po- tentially oil-rich seabed of .the Ae- gean: , Since referring the seven-month dis- pute to the U.N. Security Council in August, Greece has suffered a number of diplomatic defeats and Turkey and Greece, nominally 'partners as NATO-- allies, are still at loggerheads. "Omission is as deadly as commis- ion," said a source close to Premier Constantine Karamanlis. "Though the Americans finally came around and gave us an assist in the Security Council, they have refused to exert their maximum diplomatic leverage on Turkey to date. On both a long- and a short-term basis, this could prove a catastrophic mistake." Athens is disgruntled by a compro- mise resolution 'Ai the council, which neither chastized Turkey nor urged it to discontinue exploration in the dis- puted sea. "Turkish policy appears mere and more to be that of expanding their own territory," a ranking Cabinet offi- cial said in an interview. -The Ameri- cans have got to make it: very clear that this would be catastrophic for NATO." American sources here feel that the Greek criticism is no and II ey say that: Washington's influence is limited. Despite the growing tension, how- ever, the last leg of the protracted Greek-American base negotiations be- gan last. week. The Karamanlis. gov- ernment has already agreed in princi- ple to a four-year accord governing the six major U.S. military installa- tions in exchange for $700 million in aid. Athens denies that it is using the negotiations on U.S. bases as a bar- gaining lever with Washington for stepped-up support on the Aegean . Sea. "We heSitate to use cards which would be construed as blackmail," said a government source. "We think. it unnecessary to engage in such prac- tices with an ally, as we firmly believe in the logic, legality and morality of our case." But the Americans, he continued, "must realize that we cannot be brought to our knees by a dilemma: a dilemma of humiliation or war." An American observer here de- scribes the whole sphere of Greek- Turkish relations as "Kissinger's most glaring foreign policy failure to date. "It endangers the position of the Karmanlis government. if Karamanlis becomes the victim of the crisis, America will have Lost her only hope for a Greece totally 'Western-oriented, and the strongest foundation for her policy in the eastern Mediterranean," he said. , If Greece is lost to the Western alli- ance, he continued, the position of Turkey might become greater, but it would no longer be linked to Europe, which he said would make it impotent in the eastern 'Mediterranean. 'Thus, by hesitating, vacillating neglecting to act, washingt on is fiiir nine the flames of anti-Americanism in this country�end this could prove .3S investigating the existing Lock- heed dossier here.. The group suspended its activities on the eve of the elections just � as formal charges were about to be brought against two former Defence Ministers, and just. as � . the then Foreign Minister, Mr � Mariano Rumor, was coming under increasing suspicion. It could all turn out to be true, in which case the conspiracy .theiry is part of a major whitewash attempt. Things have never been simple in Italian politics, perhaps never less simple than now. O Lockheed approached two Dtuch MPs to promote sales of its Orion anti-submarine aircraft to the Dutch navy, according to 'Lockheed deee- ments submitted to the Dun Parliament. by Prime Minister. Mr den Del today- een ek les a powerful, future threat." Anti-Americanism in Greece hos subsided markedly on the surface dur- ing the past two. years, but there re- mains a latent feeling of bitterness to- ward the United States. Bitter that the continuing dispute with Turkey has. damaged � the econ- omy, impeded social and economic programs, and drained much of the government's time, Karmanlis is re- portedly willing to compromise with Turkey, even at the risk of diminish- ing his own domestic popularity and prestige. "But," said one of his ranking aides, "he cermet negotiate and make com- promises from a position of weakness. it's got to be from a position of strength. "If the Americans permit the crisis to deteriorate to the point of hostility, if the Turks become unreasonable in their demands, even -Karmanalis will not have the force on prestige to im, pose a solution." A ranking Western diplA at how- ever, dismissed such criticism as naive. "The Greeks just expect too much from the Americans." There is vi it oal chasm between Athens and �Vashington on how Turkey should be handled. In essence, the Greek posi- tion is that Washington's got to get tough . to resort to very 'forceful measures ranging from military and economic embagoes. to threatening a lith Fleet intervention in the Aegean to give the Greeks iron-clad goat-an- tees. You might say Greek-American relations have gone through a number of rhythmic changes during the ores ent crisis. At the moment, they multi go. either way," Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 THE WASHINGTON POST y, Sept, 15,1976 , ��. , . "By Patrick Seale London Observer TRIPOLI�With the prodigal hospi-� iality of an oil billionaire, Col. Muam- lhar Qaddafi of Libya, the enfant ter- rible of Arab politics, recently flew .in 2,000 guests to help him celebrate ihe seventh anniversary of his seizure _ of power: � .. �;:'. The party included French women from a splinter group well to the left lof French Socialist leader Francois f.Mitterand, a priest from Dublin, black ',.Militants from South Africa and Rho- desia, phalanxes of unconvivial East :Europeans, uniformed Soviet top ...brass, a special envoy of Fidel Castro, And the massive brooding :figure of ;President-for-life Jean-Bedel Bokassa .�f the Central African Republic, the only head :of state to. accept the Lib- *an invitation. Gargantuan_ meals -.were. -accompa- nied by limitless supplies of a deli- � cious nonalcoholic cocktail. � The sky ':�itas flawless and, after sunset, a cool -breeze blew in from the sea. Oleander .and jasmine were in bloom. Could this be the center of world.. :terrorism of which President Gerald l'ord spoke' the other week? The So: ; viet . Union's new Middle Eastern (Springboard? The fief of the "madman ,of .as President Anwar Sadat now describes: the young Libyan leader? t There were two high points of the i.festivities: a midnight tea party given by Prime Minister Abdul Salam Jai- i.loud in the gardens of the former !royal palace, and Col. Qaddafi's own appearance at the anniversary parade, where he was mobbed by an adoring crowd. The two then could be brothers: They share an unaffected manner, a . Plain-speaking candor that has he- � come the hallmark of the Libyan revo- � lution. It is striking how little they . are encumbered by protocol, pomp, or even security .precautions. His trouble-making reputation abroad has perhaps blinded outsiders �, to what. Qaddaft has achieved at - home. In seven years, and at a cost of $20 billion, he has created one of the world's most lavish welfare states, scattered schools and universities, ,across the land and begun to turn : WASHINGTON POST 3 SEP 1976 some of Libya's limitless desert into an oasis.. Qaddafi has put his country- men on a seemingly endless escalator toward a -bigger, better and richer fu- ture, and they love him for it. Perhaps because Qaddafi lives rela- tively austerely himself and sets, the tone, Libyan society Seems- almost � classless. It is also humane; since the, bloodless coup in 1969, no one has been executed. - The real puzzle about Libya today is how to equate this good-natured, _be- nevolent regime with the undoubted evidence of its machinations abroad, or with Qaddafi's political messianism. He thinks he is a man of destiny, the trustee of three essential values for the future of the Arab community at -large: unity, Islam as the regulatory principle of society, and the military defeat of Zionism. As such he is a po- litical fundamentalist if not a fanatic. The trouble is that these ideas, to which Arabs often pay lip service, are somewhat � unfashionable.. Individual state-building has displaced the search for unity of-the 1950s and 1960s, secu- larism in public life has made' sweep- ing gains, and most Arab leaders have come to believe that the Arab-Israeli � conflict should be-,settled by political negotiation... , . Some argue that the moral and ma- terial support that .Qadelafi gives to his cherished causes around the world is no more than proverbial bedouin hospitality run riot. It is said that someone with the right ideological coloring has only to seek his help to be �directed to the jihad (holy war) fund, a sort of vast petty-cash box un- der religious control. Libya's population is little' more than 2 million and the country is far from the heartlands of the Middle East, but Qaddafi's ideas, underpin- ned by an annual oil revenue of around $8 billion, have made him the . main pole of opposition to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's Pax Amer- ica. Qaddafris out te destroy, by every possible means, the American-spon- sored peace process, which he be- lieves is a betrayal of Arab and Pales- tinian interests. Sadat's �Egypt, the linchpin of Kissinger's step-by-step, di- criL iI1flaIe ttJ 61.47 , TT .0 6,,..C4-1 36 plomacy, is thus cast in the 'role of an' 7 agent .of -Zionism and imperialism. Qaddafi could indeed. undermine America's new-found influence over. the area. With eacIrpassing day it be-. comes more obvious. that American:: peace-making . has ';� run aground,' leaving Sadat dangerously exposed.. Moreover; Egypt has not received the vast financial .aid she needs and the fires of social unrest burning , there ,could well be fanned by .Libyan propaganda and subversion. � The open support for Qaddafi � against Sadat expressed - in Pravda last week highlights the Soviet Un- ion's. recognition of the Libyan leader�.. as a valuable anti-American instru- ment and sets a public seal on the . growing coincidence. of-Soviet and yan interests. . � �� � Qaddafi is,. no puppet of the Soviet . Union, and his hostility to commu- . nisrrr is as firm as ever; if not . so openly expressed. But the Soviet Un- ion has provided him with a first-class 'Modern arsenal of more than 2,000. tanks, Migs, surface-to-air missiles, and � even the dreaded SCUD�a. 'ground-to-ground missile with a range of 190 miles. The Soviet Union may see Libya only as a sort of supply dump, where weapons may. be stored for future use, an intermediary to � arm the. "progressive�. side. Soviet arms have found their way via Libya to Lebanon, and they may also he reaching the Polisario in the Western Sahara. For Qaddafi, 'however, the mere presence of his vast armory provides clout. The truth is that the achieve- merits that are realistically open to him are not Sadat's overthrow, nor a. great blow struck for .distant Moslems. .or frustrated Palestinians, .-but rather. the extension of Libya's influence in the-central Mediterranean. . He has Malta in his pocket,- and has guaranteed its security after Britain's �planned withdrawal in 1979. He is eti-�� couraging Sicilian separatists and is meddling in Corsica, Crete and Cy- '� prus. He has patched up his quarrel - with Tunis and stayed friends�with Al- geria. Libya is already a Mediterra- nean power, if not yet decisively an - Arab one. � By H. D. S. Greenway Washington Post Pot-chin tier VICO ' TEHRAN, Iran Sept. 2�SAVAK is worried about its image. SAVAK stands for Sazemani Etlaat Va Ammniat Iceshrar--thc information and security organization of ,Iran. It is the Iranian CIA and Flit rolled into one and as such it enjoys a fearful reputation as an all-pervasive and all-powerful secret police that rules by torture and terror, and crushes all diss,eat. Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 pproved for Release: 201 8/10/05 CO2623720 . The weekly Economist of London has estimated the number of political prisoners languishing in :SAVAK jails at 20,000 to 40,000, Other estimates have put. the number as high as 100,000. SAVAK officials grant interviews relatively infre- , quently. But its deputy director, Parviz Sabeti, is Worried about all the bad press his organization has ..been receiving and,, in a rIcent interview, said it is. unfair. "These torture charges are pure fabrication and not at all true," Sabeti said. SAVAK should. get credit from the Western press for fighting commu- nism, he contended, hut instead "they are sticking it tons. "In 'all Iran there are only 3,200 political prison- ers. We don't have enough jails to house 100,000 prisoners," Sabeti said at SAVAK headquarters, on the eastern edge of Tehran. "Put this in. your newspaper," Sabeti said: "Article 131 of the criminal code states that any government official caught torturing anybody will get six years in prison," he said. &heti castigated the FBI for not keeping closer watch on Iranian exile and student. groups in Amer- THE BALTIMORE SUN 3 September 1976 Indian Par! /7 ant.hi foe New Delhi (AP)�The Indi- an Parliament voted yesterday i to investigate one of Prime I Minister Indira Gandhi's most 1 outspoken eritics�Subraman- Ian Swarny, a .right-wing oppo- sition leader � and .a former member of the Harvard Uni- versity economics faculty. .� � : � The vote came amid accuse- tions from Mrs. Gandhi's ruling Congress party � and pro-Mos- cow Communists that the Unit- ed States Central Intelligence .Agency is aiding the 36-year- old Mr. Swamy. � * Political sources said the un- 'precedented investigation could !cost Mr. Swamy his seat in the eupper house even though he has i four years remaining in his i term. .. �.:* , . - - According to the govern- ment, Mr. Swamy fled to the i West in January after evading e : arrest during the 14 months ,since the � government pro- claimed a national emergency and detained many opposition leaders. . � � � -: � " Ile returned briefly to India early this month to sign the at- tendance roster in Parliament to keep his membership active, but then escaped abroad again, opposition sources said. .. . Om Mehta,..the 'minister of home affairs, accused Mr. Swa- my of carrying out "anti-Indian propaganda calculated to bring , tea. The CIA, he said, was "no heir) at all." SAVAK has been "quite successful" in rounding UI) terrorists in the past, Sabeti said. He expressed , confidence that the persons respensible for the mur- der of three American civilian technicians in Teh- ran last Saturday would eventually be caught. SAVAK believes the group responsible for the killings is the Mujahidden E Khalq which began 'as curious mixture of Marxism and Moslem con- servatism. The number of active 'terrorists at large in Iran may not exceed 100, Sabeti said. The Americans were involved in "Project IBEX," a secret electronic intelligence gathering system which the U.S. firm of Rockwell International is in. stalling for the Iranian government. Sabeti said although there had been anti-state ac- tivity in the past, political assassinations by killers trained abroad and supplied with the latest Soviet weapons was a comparatively new phenomenon for 'Iran. Before 1970, Iran had not felt it necessary to exec- ute people for anti-state activities, he said. But the new wave of terrorism has "caused us to get a bit rougher," he said, and now terrorists frequently .-ar,e executed. arnen.t votes to probe ex-ilarvard econornisl the Parliament,' Its members, the government and the nation as a whole into disrepute and contempt." - In a referenee to an earlier warrant for Mr. Swatny's ar- rest, Mr. Mehta said the econo- mist was guilty of "evasion of law and fleeing from justice and legal processes, flouting lawful orders and generally be- having in a manner unworthy of a member of this house." � . Mr. � Swamy... has reportedly traveled in the United States and Canada since leaving India, often addressing meetings , and giving press interviews to de- nounce Mrs. Gandhi's emergen- cy rule. Mr.. Swamy taught econom- ics at Harvard from 1962 to 1969 and was a visiting profes- sor of economics there in 1971 and 1973 before being elected to the Indian upper house in 1974,' � With Mr. Swamy's own col- leagues in the right-wing Jana Sangh party absent from the chamber because of a continu- ing boycott by the nee-Com- munist oppesition, a leader of the Marxist Communist party was the only person to oppose the government's motion to start the investigation. "When the democratic sys- tem is being broken down by the ruling party, we in the op- '�� � � 37 position have every right to say in and out of this house what we want," said Vishwanatha Men- on, a Marxist Communist mem- ber. "He {Mr. Swarnyl must he allowed to say what he wants. We need not spare the ruling party." . . Yogendra Sharma of the pro-Moscow Communists de- nounced Mr. Swamy for having said, according to an interview published in the Toronto Star in February, that the_ Commu- nists in India might try to as- sassinate Mrs. Gandhi. "We Communists will save the prime minister at the cost of our lives," Mr. Sharma said. "It is the fascist elements in the country who want to kill de- mocracy, playing into the hands of the CIA, while putting all the blame on the Communists." � ' Haresh Malviya, � member of the Congress party, accused the CIA of helping .Mr. Swamy operate abroad.. e . . � "I see the invisible hand of the CIA," he said. "It is the poli- cy of the CIA to destabilize gov- ernments not in their favor, and -their hostility to India is. well known. "I definitely feel Mr: Sub- ramanian Swami is an agent of the CIA who has infiltrated into this house. We should expell him, the earlier the 1,etter." . ' Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Tuesday, September 7, 1976 The Washington Star ryTi Indian One of the storied traits of tyrants is that, no matter how impregnable they might seem to be, they never feel safe. Is this one of the explana- tions for Indira Gandhi's current bid to bury In- dian democracy under further layers of parlia- mentary and constitutional assent to her one- woman rule? Otherwise, the Gandhi government's demand for substantial new powers would seem to he un- necessary. Under the "emergency" authority she already claims to have, Mrs. Gandhi over the last 14 months has proven herself completely capable of jailing thousands of opponents, in- cluding three dozen legislators, imposing a sweeping censorship that suppresses news even of parliamentary debate and cowing a once proudly independent judiciary. With her major critics locked up, resistance to her dictatorial course has been pathetically weak, and the world's most populous democracy lies dormant. And since Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party enjoys commanding parliamentary control, there is no . question about the government getting whatever legislative backing it wants � including support for changing the constitution. It is by the constitutional amendment route that Mrs. Gandhi seeks new legal embellish- ament of her bosshood as prime minister. Powers of the judiciary to review legislation and en- force civil liberties would be curtailed. Parlia- ment would be permitted to ban "anti-national activities and associations." And the prime minister, acting through the figurehead presi- dent, could simply order further changes in the THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Sept. 17. 19 76 :Lfj_..1: Anderson and Les Whitten SEll les 'usT eet an Iran- () ern�erer-ey constitution without even the need for a parlia- mentary rubber stamp. Some members of the parliamentary opposi- tion still at large were scathing in their denunciations of the Gandhi regime's constitu- tional proposals. "All the pillars of parliamentary democracy are being converted into pliant tools of an all-powerful executive," said H.M. Patel. "The main thrust of the bill is to establish a totalitarian rule of one-party dictatorship," said a Marxist member. Mr. Patel and his supporters walked out in a boycott of the parliamentary proceeding to avoid giving "a semblance of constitutional legitimacy to the move to throttle democracy and impose authori- tarian rule." � The parliamentary give-and-take seems to have a democratic ring until you realize that only foreigners like us can read about it, and even our correspondents are hampered. Censor- ship prevents the Indian people from learning the substance of the criticism voiced against the Gandhi program. The opposition also accuses the government of going back on a promise to permit public debate of the changes. As for editorial critiques Of the constitutional plan by India's once-lively press, we regret to report virtually nothing along that line. The nearest an editorialist came to questioning the proposals was with reference to the plan for executive amendment of the constitution. An editorial in The Statesman called this "extraor- dinary indeed." That may be the most pregnant "indeed" ever written. In blunt, blistering language, Saudi ..�Arabian officials have accused the. United States of building up the shah - of Iran for an armed invasion of Ara- bian oil fields. : The respected Saudi oil minister, 'Ahmed Zaki Yamani, warned that the shah was "highly unstable mentally." if the U.S. authorities failed to recog- nize this, added Yamani, they must be losing their "powers of observation." The Saudis confided their fears last year to James E. Aldus, then the U. S. � ambassador, who relayed the message to Washington in startling secret let- ters and memos. � One "memorandum for the file" dated Aug. al, 1975, describes the ex- plosive conversation with Yamani. The � oil minister, according to the secret memo, said "the conclusion the Saudis were reaching was that we had an agreement with Iran to let it take over the entire Arabian littoral of the Per- sian Gulf." Yemeni believed he United States "had urged the shah to make peace with Iraq," Aldus added, "so Iran would have a freer hand in the lower Gulf." The Saudi oil minister was con- vinced that the United States was de- liberately bolstering the shah's mili- tary power and that "Iran's extraordi- nary military buildup was quite clearly aimed at occupying the Arab states across the gulf, the emirates, Qatar, Bahrain,. Kuwait and even Saudi Ar able itself." The Saudis had become persuaded, Akins noted, that "in the next Arab-Is- raeli war, Israel. . . would be encour- aged to occupy Tobuk in northern Saudi Arabia, and Iran would be told to occupy the Arabian littoral." If such a situation developed, Ya. maul warned Akins: "Iraq would be in- volved immediately and so would he the Soviet Union. But if Iran should succeed in occupying part of the Ara- bian coast., it would find only smoking ruins, and the Western oil consumers would face catastrophe." Akins responded, according to Ids secret memo, that "such a plan would be sheer madness." Yaloani agreed that Akins "was quite right" but add- ed: "We think you may have � gone mad." Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 38 NEW YORK TIMES 17 SEP 1976 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Challenge to the Shuttle4 Kissinger's Tested Style of Negotiating Faces A Very Different Range of Problems in Africa � Special to Tee New York Times DAR ES SALAAM, Tanzania, Sept. 16-- Secretary said, referring to both whites I ,g4 far, Secretary of State Henry A. Kis- and blacks, is "the reluctance of anybody I singer's mission to bring peace to south- fo admit that negotiations are possible i em n Africa has shown only the delicacy, before they know that negotiations will; Complexity and immensity of the job in- succeed." vplvede His point as far as black Africa is con- By JOHN DARNTON � Following his talks with President Julius K. Nyerere . News yesterday,. two dramatically Analyses contrasting news conferences . were held. In one, President � Nyerere, sitting on the back� porch of.his state house, passionately ex- plained his mixed feelings toward the American intiative and said, in effect, that he was less hopeful than ever. In the other, Mr. Kissinger, braced be- hinda lectern at the Kilimanjaro Hotel, suggested that President Nyerere's re- marks were the kind of thing that accom- panies negotiations and sought to portray himself as nothing more than a cOnduit for relaying views between black-ruled and white-ruled- countries. But the fact remains that so far the Kissinger trip has drawn a good deal of suspicion and doube from black Africa, some obviously for appearance sake but much of it real. Those who traveled with Mr. Kissinger during his Middle East negotiations note that gloom is a perfect curtain-raiser for his style of diplomacy. With it, even a relatively. minor advance�in this case, an agreement for a constitutional confer- ence on South-West Africa embracing all sides�takes on the appearance of a mira- cle and can generate momentum Some Call Gloom Justified, But those who have followed events in Africa feel the gloom justified and point out the vast differences between the Middle East and southern Africa in terms of issues, multiplicity of factions and personalities. Mr. Kissinger has said privately that President Nyerere, whom he greatly re- spects, is not "another Sadat." The impli- cation is that unlike the Egyptian Presi- dent, whom Mr. Kissinger has praised for courage in negotiating with, the Israelis despite Arab criticism, there is no African leader willing to run the risk of appearing moderate on the question of "liberation." � "The basic underlying obstacle," the WASHINGTON POST 0 SEP '075 cerned, is not quite valid. The African leaders could retort that long before Mr. Kissinger entered the scene, at the Victo- ria Falls conference last year, they tried negotiating for majority rule with the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian D. Smith, using Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa as an intermediary. The fact that the venture failed�because Mr. ..Vorster was reluctant to apply sufficient pressure on Mr. Smith, according to the Africans�has left a sense of pessimism and even betrayal. �The repuations of moderates, such as .President Kenneth D. Kanda of Zambia, suffered in the growing nationalist fervor of Organization of African Community gatherings, and they have changed from doves to hawks. In the Middle East, Mr. Kissinger worked for a peace settlement -after the fighting had stopped. In southern Africa, the fighting is continuing and, indeed, growing. There is a constituency � among the blacks that says the fighting should go on. It stems from the conviction that the military advantage has swung to the blacks and that negotiations undertaken later, when territory is actually won, are, bound to be more advantageous. That conviction is running especially strong now that the rainy season, which will shift the tactical advantage to the guerril- las, is about to begin in Rhodesia. To negotiate, some feel, wauld be seen as a sign of weakness. There is also an element of pride and a sentiment for winning the war. Of all the African nations that have won inde- pendence, only two, Algeria and Guinea- Bissau, can honestly sax they have de- feated colonial forces on the battlefield. The slogan of the Zimbabwe People's Army, the main fighting force of the Rho- desian blacks, is We are our own libera- tors." Mr. Kissinger has stressed that during his visits in April, every African head of � state urged .11im to meet. with Prime Soviet Union, Gabon's Boutgo Blast U.S. Role in Easing Afyiean Tension PrOrrrNeWA Dispatches � The SCIViCi� Union yest erday accused U.S. Seere. lacy of Slata I ienry A. Kissinger of using shuttle negotiations between black and white African lead. cia to Prop lip racist governments and protest Amer- ican investments, ostentatious (fisinterestcdnes of the U.S.A. is. nothing else but fear of a chain reaction which was started by the collapse of Portuguese eidonial ism and has flow spread to othe.r natu of the conti- Minister VOrster. But in the 'interim, the riots and killings have occurt ed in South .Africa, and they have made it difficult . for African Presidents to explain how . they can countenance conversations with a man their own newspapers decry as a butcher of black children. - Mr. Kissinger is new to Africa, and some would say he has yet to acquire the necessary feel for the politics and special sensibilities. Days before his arri- val here he caused a flap because press reports said that he had been "invited" .instead of "welcomed"�a distinction promptly corrected by the image-con- scious Tanzanians. Three Conflicts Involved The African preSidents say they fear that the United States Is acting out of self-interest, to contain Soviet influence, rather than out of a sincere commitment to the concept of majority rule. If this is the � case, they say, then America will drift into an alliance with South Africa, which claims to be fighting communism, if the negotiations fail. But there is also a strong. moral tone to c�their position. They say they want someone on their side because it is right, and not because of fear of another super- power. The level of idealism clashes somewhat with Mr. Kissinger's brand of realpolitik. � In the Middle East, the Secretary of State could identify the conflict and the parties involved. In southern Africa, there is not one conflict but three�over Rhode- sia, over South-West Africa and potential- ly over South Africa. In the case of Rhode- sia, tile nationalist factions are so splin- tered,that it would be impossible to know, whom .to invite to the conference table. � While.the nationalist leaders are totally dependent upon the "front African presidents to wage their struggle, the presidents listen to ,their opinions. And each of the presidents�except Joshua Nkomo, the moderate who engaged in talks with. Mr.. Smith six .months ago�is snspicious about Mr. Kissinger. Most suspicious of all is Robert Mugabe, the Rhodesian who is emerging as the most popular politician among the guer- rillas. Significantly, Mr. Mugabe has voiced reservations about a key provision of the Kissinger plan, financial guaran- tees for whites in Rhodesia under a black government. "Who will -pay blacks for all their years of being exploited by the whites?". he said in an interview here last week. nent." Tass, the Soviet news agency, said.' In Paris, President Omar Bongo of Gallon dis missed Kissinger's weekend talks with South Afri- can Prime Minister John Vorster as "nonsense, a waste oflime." "Vorstee will not. change his policy. He is a racist through and through. Since no kind of dialogue can succeed with South Africa, we will take no arms and do as we did. in Angola," Bongo said yesterday when he arrived in the French capital .for a short. private N. 0.1t Bongo said he wilt meet French President Vairry Giscard d"i�:sfaing before flying to Mexico Saturday for an utfiHal visit, 7,0 pproved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 l WASHINGTON POST !OSED 1975 Southern oress By Murrey Marder Washington Post Staff Writer Deep distrust of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's African shuttle diplomacy was expressed 'yesterday by black representatives of the Rhode- sian and Namibian (Southwest Africa) liberation movements. A conference of African specialists, held in the Senate Caucus Room; re- verberated with suspicion that the ul- terior motive of Kissinger and the Ford administration is to protect white interests and American invest- ments in southern Africa. Kissinger's attempt to launch new negotiations for peaceful settlement of the guerrilla warfare in Rhodesia and Namibia was assailed as out-of- date, ill-advised, a serious subversion of African aspirations and even a strategy of racism. Warfare alone, even if protracted warfare, is the only solution now for 'Rhodesia, liberation spokesmen said. The criticisms graphically illustrate the obstacles confronting Kissinger's new round of African diplomacy, which the State Department is ex- pected to confirm officially today. Kissinger is planning a press con- ference Saturday to explain his new venture, scheduled to be launched Monday and starting in black Africa. Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa), a co-spon- sor with Rep. �Charles C. Diggs Jr. (D-- Mich.) of the African panel discussion yesterday, told the group at a luncheon in the Senate Office Building that "I think the chances are one in 25, or �one in 30," that Kissinger's diplomatic mission will succeed. , "But I think it is worth making the effort," Clark said. However, while concentrating on the racial struggle in Rhodesia and Namibia, Clark said, "I hope we never forget that the most repressive regime in southern Africa is the regime in South Africa." The Senate Foreign Relations Sub- committee on Africa, which Clark heads, is conducting intensive hear: lags on South Africa. In South Africa, Clark said, "total U.S. investment is estimated at greater than $1.7 billion," representing "40 per cent of the total U.S. investment in Africa." Several hundred spectators at-- tended the Caucus Room discussion, which was sponsored by the Fund for New Priorities in America and the Women's .Division of the United Meth- odist Church. To the disappointment: of some of the white sperialists on Africa, the lib- eration spokestmni Inc Rhodesia re- LA/trust ossm fused to consider any alternative to expanding guerrilla war. Callistus Ndlovu, representing the relatively more moderate wing of the Zimbabwe (Rhodesian) African Na- tional Council, led by Joshua Nkomo, who tried to negotiate with Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian D. Smith, said: "We do not see how the talks can be Presumed ... We therefore believe that any attempt to resume these talks is bound to fail." Eddison Zvobgo, a representative of the more militant wing of the Rhode- sian liberation movement, led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, said that "every time the U.S. raises the ques- tion of negotiations" it is because a liberation struggle is "about to tri- umph" somewhere in the world. "The conference stage is over," Zvobgo said. "Negotiations are being carried out where they belong�on the battlefield. We should resist any Kis- singer seduction." ,One white panelist, Alex Boraine, from Harvard University's Center for International Affairs, a former mem- ber of the South African Parliament for the Progressive Reform Party, asked the liberation spokesmen if they saw no course "complementary to the armed struggle." He asked , if there is no way to reduce "the length of the struggle" in Rhodesia, and the casualties. Only "by politicizing our people," and "by rallying as many interna- tional forces as possible," replied El- ton Razemba, another member of the Bishop Muzorewa faction of the Afri- can National Council. "Destruction will be there," he said. "What is war about? Zimbabwe will be a better soci- ety" in the end. Zvobgo, his colleague, interjected: "The only way of shortening the [Rhodesian] war or limiting the num- ber of people killed or injured is to get the war over as quickly as possi- ble. It is a kind of 'quick kill' theory, to put it bluntly." The Rhodesian liberation spokes- men insisted that what is going on in Rhodesia in the conflict between about 270,000 whites and about 6 mil- lion blacks is not a racial. war. "We are not ' just fighting to replace a white government with black faces," Ndlovu said. "We are fighting to bring about fundamental change." American-British plans to organize an international guarantee fund of up to $1.5 billion to $2 billion to compen- sate Rhodesia's white settlers for their property and other assets, said Ndlovu, represents "guarantees of 40 em privilege" which the blacks will nere? tolerate. This idea "is predicated on the no- tion that it is impossible for blacks and whites to live together peace- fully," he said, and Zvobgo charged, "This really is racism." However,, Nigeria's, ambassador to the United Nations, Leslie 0. Harri- man, while criticizing much of Kis- singer's strategy, said, "I believe that the option of buying off the whites is realistic." Harriman said afterward, "We have done it in our own country [Nigeria] for independence." But he also said that, *basically, "the military struggle is the only option left" for Rhodesian independence. Kissinger's diplomacy for Namibia equally "is bound to fail," said O.T. Emvula, deputy chief of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) mission to the United Na- tions. He labeled Kissinger's approach to Namibia "a serious subversion" of commitments made by the United Na- tions for the independence of that ter- ritory. Kissinger, Emvula said,'Aleliberate- ly complicates" matters by meeting with Prime Minister John Vorster of South Africa, which rules Namibia under a mandate that the United Na- tions has ruled is illegal. If there "will be a negotiation," said Emvula, expressing a more moderate position than his Rhodesian col- leagues, "only South Africa and SWAPO shall be the parties." However, SWAPO, he said, will not enter any talks with South Africa un- til South Africa withdraws its military forces from Namibia and releases all political prisoners. � Panelist Boraine said, "I think Vor- ster will do a great deal to get Nami- bia ... off his back." Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 201 8/1 0/05 CO2623720 log Angtfc5 ar,i1ttC5 Thurs., Sept. 2, 1976 Co munist Forces Flabby Government Bureaucracy Fails to Contain Insurgents 13Y GEORGE Ild'eARTITUR Times Stall Writer � : I3ANCKOK�Por eight years the government of Thailand has entrust- ed its campaign against Communist insurgents to a semi-clandestine, rank-heavy bureaucracy known as � ISOC�the Internal Security Opera- tions Command. � And while ISOC grew progressive- Ay flabbier, the insurgency grew from a serious nuisance into a hard jungle army of about 9,000 guerrillas In the estimate of an American ex- pert, the Communist organization be- came "a .quality product, well- trained, well-armed and largely self- sufficient." It has, the expert said, perhaps 85,000 active workers within the country's political woodwork. Given the intrigues of the Thai mih itary structure�where some 6067 generals and admirals vie for power and its rewards�it would be unfair . to blame Communist growth entirely � ; on ISOC's failure. � � The government's regular � armed , forces -are made up of more than � 200,000 men, plus a paramilitary de- . � fense� corps of. 49,000 and a border police force of � 14,000. Their effe6- tiveness is a matter of debate. ' � Gen. Saiyud Kerdphol, the ISOC � commander, warned i� recntly: "My - estimate �is: that we have about three years to put our house. ift order. If. � not, the eambinatioWof internal and , external pressures will nialce�the fu- ;ture� of this country ..'very uncertain sindeed.". : �. An; Anierican. military adviser feels s'the test will come sooner: . expects 'that Within. the. next two dry seasons4�a span of about IS months�the insurgency will grow to . niobile warfare and . battalion-sized attacks against the ill-organized Thai military and government structure. � "They have the troops to do it now," he said. "They could overrun any military or police , post in the � countryside if they wanted to." The old-school politicians and gen- erals who run things in Bangkok are . 'debating what to do. There are belat- ed plans to reorganize the army, buy-, more planes and enlarge "pacifica- tion" programs in the countryside. But sources with first-hand knowl- edge of the Thai counterguerrilla . program say .that despite decades of . -experience, the government fre- quently lacks the most basic knowl- � edge of Communist activity. . "Intelligence -in the past has not- been too accurate," admitted Air Marshal Siddhi Savetsila, secretary general of the National Security Council. "We have good hindsight on what has happened, but we know nothing about what is about to ham' pen or what the insurgents are going to do the next day. But the Commu- ..riists know our movements." For years of military rule, and dur- ing the fragile period of democracy since 1973, the rulers in Bangkok in- directly have supported the domino theory by contending that the Com- munist Party of Thailand was almost totally dependent on outside help.. Aging Prime Minister Seni Pramol, ill-suited to control the traditional turbulence of Thai politics, has tried to play it both ways. Until June he contended that foreign aid was mak- ing the insurgency more serious than ever. Last month he admitted before the parliament that he had little proof of direct aid from Peking, Han- oi or Moscow for Thailand's Commu- nists. Then he basked in the "diplomatic victory" when Foreign Minister Pi- chai Rattakul returned from Hanoi, where the two countries agreed to exchange ambassadors, and reported a pledge froni North Vietnamese Pre- mier Pham Van Dong not to inter- fere in Thailand's domestic affairs. (The Chinese had. made a similar . pledge earlier). . � But Seni knows better. The flow of aid from Hanoi and Peking is a fact of life along the border. More important is the dismal fact that� during the decade of heavy American involvement in Vietnam, while the Thais largely wasted $1.7 . billion in aid, the Cofnmunists were building a force heeding little outside help. A diplomatic source cited the government's record recently in the _ distant southern provinces, which the least important of three major in- surgency areas. In little-noted clashes, insurgents there have cap- ' tured more than 300 weapons in. six, months. The government is planning a $600 million military budget this year. A Western expert figured abstractly that the Insurgents could fight for roughly 130 years on that. amount. It lakes only 75 cents a day to feed and clothe a Communist soldier and keep him in the field. In time, the insur- gents doubtlessly will need more am- munition and guns, but they need lit- tle right now. "This is not tho classic domino__ theory. This is the Communist Party of Thailand at work," a Western clip.' lomat said. Still,. the outside help is available now. There are three fairly well de- fined supply routes through Laos from Vietnam, organized and manned by North Vietnamese. The Chinese send supplies on an all- weather road extended through Laos to Pak I3eng, just across the northern , Thai borfier. The level of this aid is indicated by the light traffic on the Chinese road. In one recent month, an official ado 'milled, only two Chinese trucks came down with material for the in- � surgents: The Thai army has done little to � seriously disturb the Communists in their growing "liberated zones." While the generals make pro- nouncements and schedule "suppres- sion" drives, the actual strategy has : been one of "containment." The Corn, Inimist bases are largely centered � around tribal peoples in-jungles- and mountains, but there are relatively few government soldiers in a position to bar the insurgents from moving into more populated�and. ethnic Thai�districts. . � Government offensives are rare. The only major battle of the year came about by accident. It started June 11 when the jet pilot son of a Maj. Gen. Yuthasorn ICarsornstik � crashed his F-5 in the rugged moun- tains of Petchabun province, about 300 miles north of Bangkok and mid- way between the insurgent areas in i the north and the northeast. An immediate operation was launched to find the plane. A pare- troop unit was put in, got into a hea- � vy battle, sand called for reinforce- ments. For the next two weeks major fighting raged in the district, com- plete with .jet strikes. At least 200 Communist troops, and probably more, were killed. Although government 'casualties also were heavy, the few "activist" generals . in Bangkok were elated. ifver the battle. A lot of intelligence' 'kvas picked up and there were signs. he insurgent forces were being bad-. ly disrupted. In addition, this was a� Vital area where the shadowy Cen- ;ATM Committee of the Communist Tarty of Thailand had been meeting 4.ccently. in the end, the missing plane was. )ncver found and the operation was r, ailed off despite the claim of...the' _ Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 commanding general that "we will never stop fighting." "They never would have started in the first place if a general's son had not been lost," said one disgusted headquarters official in Bangkok. . This attitude gradually has permit- ted the, insurgents to enlarge, their areas. Gen. Pralong Veerapriya only this month stirred a public storm by say- ing that perhaps 10% of the popula- tion was under the sympathetic sway 'of, the Communists. Western experts consider this .a high estimate, but ev- eryone admits that the Communists now control large base areas with plenty of manpower for recruitment. They long since. have matured from. an organization dominated at the top by Chinese or Sino-Thai leaders, with the foot soldiers recruited from tribal "buffalo boys." . Since 1952�when the first batch of 20 trainees was sent to southern China�about .2,500 military and po-. Mica' cadre have been sent to China; North Vietnam � and camps in Laos (often supervised by Chinese), ac- cording to intelligence sources. An efficient command structure � has been built, now based around 15 - "provincial" areas where the local � commander corresponds roughly to a regimental or .divisional commander, with attached political officers. : Unlike the Vietnamese Communists who had a proclivity toward putting things in writing (and having them captured)/the Thai CommuniSts com- municate less and enjoy wide local autonomy. Although they have cap- tured plenty of radios, they seldom . use 'them except to monitor govern- ment posts. , it is a force, Westerii experts say, already capable of considerable ex- pansion and growing at a relatively slow but very steady pace. The leaderShip�always myster: bus�is the party's Central Commit- tee, which stayed for years in the safety of southern China. Lately, it: has been coming back to Thailand,. according to some evidence. At any rate, the three major members of the . Central Committee also are the three Main regional commanders in Thai4 land. t, � Two of the regional commander.... � Song Nopakun in the north an Udom Sisuwan in the northeast�are old Bolshevik Sine-Thais who attend- ed the Party's congress three decade' ago. The third, in the south, is Prasit. Thiansiri, an ethnic Thai believed to; be much younger. The Central Com- mittee is now believed to number about a dozen men, several of whom:. are ethnic Thais, and the first.: among-equals is said to be CharoerY Wanngam, also an ethnic Thai, who, is in his .50s and was trained in Hanoi and possibly China. ' THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, 1 - Tuesday, Sept. 14, 1976 New,Sig By RoaritT L. BARTLEY PEKING�The doors to the Great Hall �of the People stood open, and after 15 min- ' utes waiting in the pleasant autumn sun, the force of the air conditioning struck the face like a cold breeze. It was a fitting sen- sation as one came into the presence of the remains of Mao .Tse-tung, one of the most , historic figures of our century. James Schlesinger, formerly U.S. Sec- retary of Defense and now in Peking as a guest of the Chinese government, led the party of 12 Americans into the antecham- ber where they signed official registers, and into the receiving line of nine of the fop officials of the People's Republic of China �headed by Premier Hua Kuo-feng, and Politburo standing committee mem- bers Wang Hung-wen and Chang Ch'un- .ch'ia.o. Slowly walking 80 steps beyond the re- ceiving line, the party spread into a re- spectful line before the glass coffin holding the remains. Motion pictures were taken under shining light, and the party passed alongside the bier, three feet from the late chairman. Mao's face was somehow more square, more gray, and more . wrinkled than one would expect from photographs. But eyes closed /111(1 expression peaceful, it radiated a sense of serenity and power. The procession passed behind one row oi wreaths as the next group of foreign vis- itors canie through the receiving line, then down the steps past a separate line of blue and green clad Chinese workers, and fi- nally hack to Its proceselon of autos/rwen- ty-tive minutes after the party had left its hotel, the solemn :Mil dignified ceremony Wert over. The former American Defense gocrotary had paid his last respects to the -Vhatever the makeup of the corn4 mittee� analysts say it is totally Maoist. The Party radio station oper- ating from Kunming in south China never varies from Peking's lil, al- though it steers clear of comment on international Communist squabbles. The domination of the Thai party's _ideology by Maoists may have come , as a slight shock to Hanoi in the eu- phoria that followed the fall of Sal- gon in April, 1975. Some analysts feel that Hanoi's leaders attempted at that time to enlarge their influence in the party. "The old party hands in Thailand are not going to let the Vietnamese run their 'revolution' for them," said a European diplomat whose Asian experience dates back many years. "Vietnam gave them a tremendous lift but the CPT has been building to- ward the same goal for.years. They are following good Maoist principles in preparing to encircle the cities from the countryside, and that con- tinues to be their strategy." Another Western expert feels that the Thai party will alter the strategy somewhat to take advantage of the political weaknesses in Bangkok. "What they are after here is a col- lapse from within," he said. 'Those guerrillas are not going to come marching into Bangkok like the North Vietnamese marched into Sai- gon. The way they figure it, they won't have to." *ficance to .a China _ leader and saint of the People's Republic and the Chinese Communist Party, Mr. Schlesinger, and for that matter the other 11 Americans present, had certainly not come to China with the idea of passing by Mao's .bier, but for a spectacular 5,000- mile tour of the nation's most remote and fabled regions. Upon the chairman's death the trip was cancelled. The wreath-laying was something of a symbolic substitute, for clearly the. invitation was intended as a great honor for Mr. Schlesinger. Now the rest of the trip has suddenly been rein- stated as well, an intriguing commentary on the post-Mao regime and Chinese priori- ties in foreign policy. An 'Exceptional Regard' Obviously the Chinese government has what one of its spokesmen calls "excep- tional regard" for Mr. Schlesinger., who since his dismissal as Defense Secretary by President Ford has been at the Johns Hopkins University Washington Center of Foreign Policy Pesearch. During the mourning period, when, Peking's Museums were officially closed, he and his party were escorted to the Great Wall, the Ming tombs am! the fantastie Summer Palace, Members of his party were told that the original invitation for the visit came at the personal direction of Mat), and that the dying chairman knew Mr. Schlesinger was In Peking. The trip's itinerary was from the first the Moat. SpeetttcUlar ever accorded a for- eign visitor. Mr. iiehlesinger and those of party who have iniastsi the Chinese health exams for a 12,a00-foot idtitude will visit th'e Dahl! 1.,:t11)1CS ottl capital of 1,11icla In TibtA, lifter pending the balance of the mourning Willa quietly in China's scenic 4.2 rip Jewel of Kueilin. They will also visit the Central Asian region of Sinkiang, another fabled land which also has a sensitive bor- der with the Soviet Union, and the almost as remote Inner Mongolia. Any one of these stops might be the highlight of a nor- mal China tour. Why should the People's Republic of China pay such attention to a former offi- Mr.' Schlesinger had cer- tainly not come to China with the idea .of passing 4 Mao's bier. Now the rest of his trip ,has Suddenly been reinstated, an 14 itriguing commentary on the post- Mao regime and Chinese pr- orities in foreign policy. � dal who is now an academic? It is true that China did entertain former President Nixon and former Walsh Prinne Minister Edward He with' high lienors after they left office. But when pressed for a reason for the "exceptional regard" for Mr. Schlesinger, an official says, "His views� it is no secret.'' hi other words, in being solicitous to Mr. Schlesinger, the Chinese are aupport- Mg the It policies Is,, ittiVOcilled as Defense decretary,. and ltt,phIclLty 1rit1OZ- ing the policies oi the administration that diaanissed Calls tor t-h0 U.S, to be Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 more' stalwart in opposing the RUssians � have been a' standard theme of Chinese di- plomacy for some time now. Their propa- ,. geode. refers to new Munichs," particu- " !arty applied to the Helsinki agreement. , One China-watcher back in the United States viewed the thete:inmending Schlesin- ger trip as an attempt to "inject anti-de- tente, anti-Soviet themes into the American political campaign." The trip had in fact been originally scheduled for June, but Mr.: ' Schlesinger postponed it until after the Re- publican Convention to minimize the impli- cations for domestic politics. The same . China-watcher remarks that since 1974 the Chinese have been trying to build up Mr. Schlesinger at the expense of Secretary of State. Henry Kissinger, and in.: the last* e three or four months have started to erne- . � cize Secretary Kissinger by name in their press outlets in Hong Kong. - The trip will do little to dampen that particular tendency. Those who listened to' the toasts at the going-away party for non- journalists held at the Chinese liaison of- fice in Washington report that Chief of Of- flee Huang Chen stressed that the invita- tion for Mr. Schlesinger to visit China had been first extended two years ago, while he was still Defense Secretary. Mr. Schlesin- ger is reported to have replied that he never received the invitation, apparently because there were "filters within the U.S. government." The Chinese Dilemma . Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 The Chinese expectations' of an ariti-Scie viet posture from Mr. Schlesinger were not disappointed, for he expressed the theme in such events as the public toast at a ban-' quet with Foreign Minister Chian Kuan- hua, with whem he held five hours of pri- vate conversations prior to Mao's death. But at other points, the ex,:11;tiges caught the dilemma of Chinese relations with the U.S. In particular, there was an exchange with Chen Shien-ta, political commissioner of the Chinese army's Third Garrison Divi- sion. visited bv, the group. Mr. Olen gave a long history of the division that included the elimination of 10,000 "enemy troops" while fighting "American imperialism" in Korea. Mr. Schlesinger replied that the ref- erence to Korea "strained the historical record and the rules of hospitality." Other American representatives visiting Chinese military units have suffered simi- lar and even harsher lectures about Korea without responding. The problem for the Chinese is that an American who takes a tough line with the Russians is not likely to take a soft line with China's own claims. In choosing which Americans to encourage, the People's Republic has to sort out its priorities. And one thing the Schlesinget visit suggests is that it has sorted'them out pretty well. . . By now the visit, and particuhu.;y its reinstatement after Mao's death, may have taken on. a new .significance. Even before WASHINGTON POST 8 SEP 1G:3 Rowland. Evans and Robert Novak the chairman's death, the.nation WEIS buf- feted by the passing of Premier Chou En- lid. It has also suffered major earthquakes in three regions, and a huge meteor fell in a fourth �regarded in Chinese superstition as marking the loss of "the mandate of heaven" and the passing of a dynasty. There have been indications, including a heavy emphasis on law and order in the Chinese press, of a decline in social disci- pline. In these circumstances, the elaborate' trip for Mr. Schlesinger can be seen as a sign ,of continuity. It suggests business as usual. The decision to reinstate Mr. Schles- inger's trip, at a time when foreign digni- taries are explicitly not invited to China, would seem rather nicely to demonstrate that someone in the hierarchy of the People's Republic has the power and will - to make decisions that are, if not exactly bold, at least unconventional. And of course, if the trip's reinstate- ment suggests there will be a continuity of the regime after Mao, it also suggests con- tinuity in its implicit foreign policy priori� - ties. So it is perhaps well to remember that Mr. Schlesinger was invited to China to make the point that what Peking wants most from the U.S. is a military balance against the Soviet Union. Me. Bartley is editor of .thc Journal's editorial page. e Korean incident: An Orchestrated Contrary to hints from the State De- partment that Moscow and Peking se- cretly helped avert a new Korean war, non-political government experts be- lieve the recent crisis was a ploy or- chestrated by North Korea with limited . political goals in mind. There is no hard intelligence of any Intervention by either the Soviet Union Or Communist China that prompted the North Korean expressions of regrets for the murder, of two U.S. army offi- cers. Rather, there is a strong feeling among Pyongyang-watchets here that North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung never wanted the provocation of Aug. 18 to escalate into warfare but intended it for political effects, both in Korea and the U.S. � Thus, instead of triumphantly dem- onstrating the value of detente, the events in Korea were part of continued Communist pressure on one of the world's most dangerous flashpoints. The reaction on Capitol Hill, conthined with the overall political climate here, should encourage North Korea to keep up that pressure. The most obvious goal of the Aug. 18 Incident was to draw attention to Korea at the recently completed non-aligned nations confercuee in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and the forthcoming United Na- tions General Assembly session. For the longer range, however, K iat's targets were political opinion, at home and among his enemies. Troubled by grave economic prob- lems in North Km-ca, Kiln is believed by experts to have fomented a criais to firm up national morale. At age 04, the Korean despot is in questionable health, troubled by a vlst- ble growth on his neck which is getting alarmingly large. The designation of his eldest son, 36-year-old Chong Il Sung, as heir apparent has not proved popular with the party apparatus; the succession is now in doubt. According- ly, the time-tested device for diverting . attention from domestic discord is to generate a unifying foreign threat. In the hermit state of North Korea, there is no quick way to determine whether Kim's bloody ploy fulfilled its domestic goals. It is clear, however, that it largely achieved its foreign pur- pose: to raise new doubts among Ameri- cans about their seemingly endless Ko- rean commitment. Beneath public expressions of out- rage over Pyongyang's latest atrocity were private complaints on Capitol Hill that American blood was too precious to spill for Park Chung Bee's authori- tarian South Korean regime. Indeed, events following the Aug. 18 incident Indicate development of an anti-South Korea congressional bloc on the model of the old anti-South Vietnam )loc. Just as the House international af- fairs committee was about to -adopt a resolution condemning North Korean actions, Rep. Don Fraser of Minnesota proposed an additional paragraph con- demning South Korea's sentencing of political prisoners. Amazingly, the com- mittee adopted it. Fraser, who has be- come the scourge of Seoul, on Sept. 1 won committee approval to subpoena South Korean diplomats and their doc- uments. That same day this question was raised by Rep. Robert Drinan of Massa- chusetts in a House floor statement at. the sentencing: "Should the United States that gives massive eco- nomic and military assistance to South Ploy? Korea confess that it has no sanction for this type of indefensible cot duct?" While the Erasers and Drinans propose ending all aid as a sanction, Jimmy Carter talks of a staged withdrawal of all US. ground forces from Korea (though lately he has promised to first consult Japan). Enjoying this favorable political cli- mate, Pyongyang-watchers believe Kim .never had any intention of escalating the murder of the Americans into a war for the entire peninsula. Besides, his notions of attempting a lightning seizure of Seoul last year following the fall of Saigon were vetoed by both Cornmunist superpowers. � Nevertheless, some close students of the Korean scene deduce that Kim, au- thor of so much bloody mischief in East Asia for a generation, would never is- sue his first apology for anything with- out pressure from the Russians or Chinese. That deduction, however, is not backed up by facts. Officials at the highest level say there is simply no in- telligence of any such intervention. In his declining. years, Kim Il Sung may have moved from sheer brute force to a mixture of brute force and political maneuver. Experts here be- lieve his immediate goal; will be to en- courage sentiment, ieside the U.S. ao ye- eating a Korean pullout while seeking bilateral U.S.-North fantasia neetala- tions, leaviog out the South Kok That may prove more difficult for U.S. politicians to refast than a naked mili- tary threat. 43 cilF nlFntenpria:athc, Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 THE ECONOMIST AUGUST 28, r978 Left right right right... .Bad days for Latin American radicals. .Every to CO 20 years the continent's left wing attempts to find a new way of �bridging the extremities of wealth and poverty that bedevil most Latin American countries.. In the 194os and 19505 democratically elected dema- gogues had their day in. several of the larger states: , most of . them disappeared .. Juicier the. treads of right-wing tanks. .In the 196os insur- � rectionary guerrilla armies attempted to imitate Mr Fidel Castro's Victory in Cuba; but efforts to export Cuba's .-revolution came to nothing and the guerrillas, or many of them, were .hunted down by the military governments they had helped to pro- voke into seizing power. Next came left-wing military governments; but , these too are sputtering out. The left is ..fading�and so, too, is democracy. In Peru, General Velasco Alvarado, who followed the radical-soldier tradi- tion of Ataturk and Nasser, was dropped last year, and his left-wing prime minister, General Jorge Fer- nandez Maldonado, was sacked last *month. The more timidly reformist president of Ecuador, General Rod- riguez Lara, lost his job in January. The only avowed soldier-radicals still around are the flamboyant' ruler of Panama, General Omar Torrijos, and a clique of quarrelling colonels in Hon- duras led by Colonel Melgar Castro. Never upset a landowner But General Tnrrijos's left-wing bark has always been fiercer than his bite. Panama's liberal banking laws, for example, have made it a haven for 'foreign capital. And land reform, touted . by the general as his main achievement, has been moving along , on a tiny annual budget of kim. The. Honduran government took office last � year in the wake of charges that the previous president had been bribed by an American banana company. It is �already cutting back on its land re- form programme for fear of upsetting � the nearly independent power of the country's big landowners. The left- wing head of the country's agrarian reform institute was fired in October, 'and the it seems to have lost control of large areas where scores of people have beer) killed in 'clashes between peasants and landowners. � Neither in Peru nor in Ecuador was the reform experiment a complete failure. About 20M acres of land in Peru were expropriated, and a start was made towards a crude distribution of wealth through profit-sharing schemes. The Peruvians also nationalised their fisheries, banks, mining and oil indus- .tries, although some of these are now being given back to private industry. They were careful not to frighten away foreign investment, which stayed at a high level until the economy began to get into trouble last year. :But the expectations aroused by the reforms in Peru -were largely disap- pointed. Government � overspending pushed inflation � up to an annual rate of ao%, provoking riots 'and strikes. The agencies supervising the -reform programmes were all too often corrupt and inefficient. And only about a third of Peru's people were actually affected by the changes. Three quarters of the government's budget this year con- tinues to flow into metropolitan Lima, which contains only a fifth of the cbuntry's population. More than tm peasants�most of them the mountain Indians whose plight had fired General Velasco's revolutionary ardour when he did a tour of duty away from Lima as a young man�remain landless. Ecuador's 'more timid reforms hardly got off the ground. They were largely financed by the country's oil revenues, which are not very big. Nearly half the country's population is still unem; ployed or underemployed; half the land is still owned by 2%; of the people. Peru's and Ecuador's new rulers seem to have accepted the blunt fact that it is hard to have a social revolu- tion without making money first. They are also beginning to talk about hand- ing power back to the civilians. Ecuador's leader, Admiral Poveda, has promised to hold elections by t 977. President Morales Bermudez of Peru has taken civilians into his cabinet, and was starting to ease restrictions on the press until he was checked by a bout of rioting in July. In Honduras, the ,government says it will hand over power by 1979. The South American map would Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 be enlivened by some patches of demo- cratic colour. Buried in the political graveyard are long-established Latin American democracies such as Chile and Uruguay, as well as the countries that have ricocheted between demo- cratic and authoritarian rule, such as Argentina and Bolivia. The drive by left-wing guerrillas helped to impel South America's lurch towards .right-wing army rulers. Few democratic governments could enforce the authori- tarianism needed tostampout guerrillas. Economic instability, however, was the prime cause of Latin America's drift to dictatorship. Radical govern- ments followed each other to the scaffold, as programmes multiplying workers' wages, nationalising indus- tries and expandinpublic spending generated massive -rates of inflation. Brazil started the ball rolling after the short and disastrous presidency of Joao Goulart in the earlyi196os. His efforts sent inflation up to t00% and brought in the generals in 1964. In Bolivia the radical military government of General' .Torres sank into economic Chaos and. was overthrown by 'the ,right-wing General Banzer in 1971... In Uruguay, government corruption and overspend- ing brought in the army in 1973. Sal- vador Allende's Marxist government in Chile hit the inflation jackpot. When the rate reached about i000% in 1973, General- Pinochet launched his military coup. Chile's inflation records were reached, and possibly beaten, this year in Argentina when the soldiers stepped in to save the country from near-anarchy. � . � In the past', a lurch towards auth- oritarian government in South America Just one big barracks The switch to army rule since 1964 DOMINICAN errveuc 4 lioNamAs "S:71 CC.)STA iticA V.g. ,c:.... %VENEZUELA jL�V Itsv. COL0f..111tiA r S., . co. leo .;d1. t - ECUADOpiptipiltillilkl 1 1 11 13,11111AI illik i!il i'''17 .::%11 1111: ' I I ll 11!'Vr11171, (.1 C.2.c.,?. Nr. �,.. c �' yll' .'l 11IVIIJ1 1 Countries that: I.', AAC11 i'l'in Pill :trillg il IIIill 1111111 have been under pi lilli ! pa,, v; jAy army rule since �IL 64 I �I . rilli I 1964 CHILE ran have been taken lif� I uc UAY over by the army ii UR since 1964 It � it L____I have alternated Ili ,l since 1964 between democratic it and army government rt! it. ARGENTINA PP 2E] aro under or party rule 17e3 are democratic rt. was followed by a swing back to demo- cracy as soldiers found that they were no better able to cope with social and economic problems than the civilians were. Not this time. In Brazil and Chile, both countries where the army had previously intervened only to restore order and then bowed out, the generals have stayed put. Professionals have their use Western-style democracy is out of fashion. Instead the military rulers, of Brazil in particular, have been taking their cue from Mexico, Latin America's most successful one-party state. The Mexican Institutional Revolutionary party has used professionals to run its economy�the most recent of whom, the finance minister, Mr Lopez Portillo, takes over as president in December. � The soldiers running Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay handed the job of economic manage- ment to civilians, all of whom were largely foreign-educated and all of whom pursue broadly similar policies. Most of Brazil's successive economic managers spent long periods in the United States. Jos�artinez de Hoz, Argentina's finance minister, went to Eton and Harvard. Bolivia's finance minister, Carlos Calvo, was educated in Britain. Uruguay's finance minister, Vegh Villega, went to Harvard. The old school tie has not done badly. It helps, naturally, to have soldiers in the background to shoot anyone who strikes against wages policies or price rises. The most recent .example of tough confrontation was in Bolivia where the regime spent the past two months cracking the demands of strikers sitting it out in the tin mines. At least four miners and several sol- diers were killed and the government cut off electricity and water supplies to some of the men underground. But the economists have not lived by the gun alone. The Brazilians pion- eered an imaginative mix of. economic policies, including the encouragement of large-scale foreign investment, in- dexation of prices, wages and savings in line with inflation, big state invest- ments, and a crawling-peg exchange rate. Bolivia's orthodox monetarist policies�and its self-sufficiency in oil �have brought inflation down to about 15% this year. Monetarist policies have taken longer to work in Chile, but in- flation has fallen fast over the past six months. Uruguay's inflation rate has fallen slowly to about 50% a year. The most dramatic turnabOut was in Argentina. In June, three months after the military coup, monthly infla- tion had dropped from 38% to 2M%. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 Wages have been firmly clamped down. At the same time the government has mobilised Argentina's enormous agri- cultural resources by raising food prices from the unrealistic levels at which they were pegged under the Peronist governments: a 40% increase in the prices paid to producers for grain led to an extra 5m acres of wheat being planted in July. This kind of economic management marks the newer military governments out from die older, more static and impoverished dictatorships. General Stroessner has ruled Paraguay as a personal fiefdom for 22 almost growth- free years; the Somoza dynasty has run Nicaragua, on and off, for 40 years. In other respects the soldiers, old or new, use many of the same methods. The map, a necessarily sketchy guess at political prisoners, gives one very rough idea of the levels of repression exercised by the different militan; governments. And political prisoners are only part of the picture of dis- appearances, torture and killings in many Latin American countries. Nothing succeeds like success Many of the economic ministers and officials claim that economic viability will pave the way for a return of the soldiers to the barracks. On the con- trary. Their very success seems to strengthen the army's resolve to stay on in office. Even the most moderate of Argentina's present soldier-rulers say that the army will have to Stay in office indefinitely. The half-hearted promises of Brazil's successive presidents over the past 14 years to restore democracy have never been kept. In Chile, General Pinochet's sole concession to the scattered forces of the democracy that was once the pride of Latin America has been to consider allowing local elections. The army's grip on Uruguay seems, after the dismissal of its civilian front man in June, to be tightening. Bolivia's military govern- ment has set a paper deadline for a return to civilian rule by ig80. Nobody believes it. . Nor is there much evidence that the generals and the economists working for them are trying to resolve the social problems that lie at the heart of Latin American political. instability. Under. President Geisel, thazil has in- creased its social budget, but up to 40% of Brazilians remain outside the. moneyed economy. Economic recovery in Uruwitay, Bolivia and Chile has been largely achieved by depressing real wages and balancing budgets; low rates of taxation leave little room for social spending, Mr Carlos Calvo says that MEXICO / � GUATEMALA\ *VENEZUELA EL SALVADOR NICARAGUA 1 in 5000 PANAMA Who locks up how many Political prisoners as proportion \S :CUBA of population .04,41:li.n 1800 _ DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HONDURAS (numbers unknown) COSTA RICA* / COLOMBIA ECUADOR PERU. CHILE.477.7 tin 200W One in: , mg less than 1000 population Ea 1000-2000 F71 2000-10,000 1--1 10,000- 100,000 LJ 100,000 -500,000 � ,/' URUGUAY I in 600 %ARGENTINA ; in 1200 A * No known political prisoners Main source: Amnesty International now that Bolivia's economic house is in order, " we will place a high pri- ority on social spending ". But manana seldom comes. Political soldiers tend atter a period in government to become politicians. In Brazil the political arguments that stopped when the generals came in have simply surfaced again in the army. So too have other civilian habits, including corruption. Argentina's mod- erate president, General Videla, is fighting for control against his more extreme colleagues who encourage a policy of indiscriminate repression. Neither military discipline nor econ- omic recovery is helped by the fact that several Argentine industries are owned by the armed forces. Divisions within the Chilean junta led to the dismissal in January of the relatively moderate chief of staff, General Lopez Arellano. Bolivia has been plagued by the attempted palace coups of left-wing army factions. Most Latin American countries would be better off if their armies could be put back behind a glass win- dow, only to be broken in case of. fire. Too often democratic experiments have been stunted because they grew in the shadow of armies who Ated as alter- native governments instead of the final guarantors of order and democracy. The three exceptions that disprove the rule that Latin Americans are inher- ently incapable of democracy are Vene- zuela, Colombia and Costa Rica. And perhaps it is tiny Costa Rica that has the safest formula for a centre course to democratic survival. It disbanded its army in 1948. MONITOR Thursday, September 9, 1976 Chu Th uch rch state ties fry T Latin Amer ca By James Nelson Goodsell Latin America correspondent of The Christian Scitlice Monitor The Boman Catholic Church is increasingly at (kids with a number of pivcroment:.; in Latin America. The signs are many: 45 0 When three Chilean Catholic bishops, re. ..SC,IraiSA7iii�gaTi.,. Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 tin ning from a church conference in Ecuador last month, were hostilely greeted by crowds � at Santiago's Pudahuel Airport, that country's Catholic hierarchy accused the government of authoring the violent demonstration. It also ex- communicated four government officials. * Earlier in August at the session in the Ecuadorian city of Riobamba, 37 churchmen from around Latin America were arrested, de- tained overnight; and then expelled from the country for taking part in what the government termed "a subversive plot." Ecuador's church hierarchy promptly accused the government of illegally interfering in church nctivities. o Argentina in recent months has been ar- resting churchmen and young seminarians, in- cluding one United States priest, on charges of subversion and of possessing Marxist-Leninist literature. The U.S. clergyman was released, but the fate of 11 others is unknown and the Argentine hierarchy has issued a series of pro- :tests. o Meanwhile, Brazil's Dom Helder Camara, a longtime opponent of the Brazilian Govern- ment and bishop of Recife and Olinda, issued a new criticism of governments in Latin Amer- ica, saying they "no longer serve the people." Behind these and other developments is a sharp ideological dispute that has led to the most serious deterioration in churchlstate rela- tions in years. Not since Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Cas- tro tangled with that country's Roman Catholic hierarchy has there ,been such a Church-state clash. In that struggle, which eventually resulted in a standoff, the church took a basically conser- vative approach, Dr. Castro a much more lib- eral or radical one. .31-0g Migits' arms Thurs., Sept. 2,.1976- a lb n t1 ec Teens Middle-Class Youths Prime Candidates for Guerrilla Subversion �� BY. DAVID P. BELNAP Times Staff Writer BUENOS AIRES�One of the most striking aspects of the war against subversion in Argentina is the kind of people in the terrorist ranks. It has become clear that the shock troops of subversion are not the har- dened guerrillas of the Latin Ameri- can stereotype, but young people of the middle class. They are youths in 'their 20s recruited by terrorist orga- nizations while in their teens. They come from some of the most respected families. Among recent ex- amples: -----Th ron of a former army com- mander in chief who was killed while fighting with a band of rural guerril- las. Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 002623720 The current church-state cleavage in at least six nations reverses the positions of church- men and governments. It is not lost on observ- ers also that the governments in question are all rightist military regimes. The Catholic Church in Argentina, _Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay is on the liberal side, the state on the conservative, even reactionary side � although the dispute is not being stated in such terms. Part of the confrontation involves a new militancy on the part of the churchmen who believe they have the right, even the duty, to speak out on national issues, particularly those relating to human rights and political liberties. This certainly is the case in Chile where the Roman Catholic hierarchy is increasingly op- posed to the hard-line, conservative tactics of Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte's military domi- nated government. Chile's influential Raill Cardinal Silva Henrfiquez, the Archbishop of Santiago and Chile's leading churchman, has frequently tan- gled with General Pinochet. While he has tried to keep the dispute out of _public view, their disagreements are becoming common knowl, edge. Excommunication of four� Chileans, one of them a government official, for the airport ha- rassment of three returning bishops was a clear sign of Cardinal -Silva Henrfiquez's atti- tude. A statement, accompanying the ex- communication order and issued with the Car- dinal's approval, warned against he danger of abuses under the military regime and of "om- "nipotent police state" governments across Latin America. That also seems the preoccupation of Dom Helder, the Brazilian bishop Who has long chafed under the restraints placed on him by The nephew of a .closely guard- ed, high-ranking navy officer who furnished access to his uncle for young terrorist friends. They kid- naped the officer and later killed him. �The son of a wealthy provincial governor, doing his compulsory miii- tai'y service at an air force staff headquarters, who led a terrorist , band that ambushed and severely wounded the air force chief of per- sonnel and his chauffeur. There has been a great deal of parental � anguish, and teen-agers have become the subject of a spate of I magazine articles, -newspaper series, television documentaries and public seminars. All seek to learn what drives young people to get involved with an extremist organization of the far Left. Neither terrorism nor its appeal � to privileged youth is an exclusively Argentine phenomenon. But there ; are few places where the movement 46 fellow churchmen who did not want to rock the boat of church-state relations in Brazil. But more and more bishops and archbishops in Brazil are protesting repressive measures by their country's military-dominated govern- ment. \ This repression, often aimed at leftists, has meant large-scale abridegements of civil rights in the countries with military governments. Churchmen, meeting in Ecuador at the pas- toral conference in Riobamba, were in fact dis- cussing this issue � hence, the Ecuadorian Government charge that the conferees were engaged in subversive activities. An Ecuadorian Government source, explain- ing the arrests and deportations of the foreign bishaps, said that "the clergy must abide by the laws of the nation and to question govern- ment actions is a crime." This goes along with an Interior Ministry statement in Argentina, following the arrests in Ecuador: "When priests have been detained, it has been for fully justified reasons." . But churchmen, while not disagreeing with the philosophy that they are subject to arrest, argue that repressive military governments do not have legitimate cause for many of their ac- tivities. This increasing social and political ori- entation of the Roman Catholic :clergymen is what arouses the ire of governments, particu- larly military regimes, and the outlook for the future is for increasing tension in church-state relations. . The reason is obvious. As archbishop Vicente Faustino Zazpe, of Santa Fe in Ar- gentina said recently: "we [churchmen] have no intention of letting up on our social in- volvement. !3-1,as been marked by such violence. Two groups have been operating in Arrntina since 1970, the People's � Revolutionary Army (called the ERP after its initials in Spanish) and the Montoneros, named for the bands of "patriotic irregulars" that roamed Ar- gentina's pampa In the mid-19th-cen- tory. The ERP is Marxist-Leninist, for-: .3tally allied with the United Secreta- riat of the Fourth international in I Paris. The Montoneros are Peronist renegades with Marxist inclinations. The ERP, smaller, better organized and originally more effective _than the Montoneros, suffered a crippling setback recently with the death of its ,top leaders, killed in confrontations with the authorities. - In fewer than eight months this year, the death toll of political vi- olence has topped 850. In the search for motives, investi- gators haVe traced the steps involved in recruiting middle-class teen-agers. The process generally follows a pattern like this: �Recruiters, including some teachers and student acti- vists at high schools and universities; attempt to set potential .recruits against their parents, their society and the system through ideological argument. --Recruiters then try to separate the potential recruits from then. background, to get them somehow away from home. This is not easy in Argentina, where traditionally sons and daughters live at boom until marriage, even well into adulthood. But it can be done. Guerrilla bands are well sul)plisd with loot from kidnapings and robberies and can pi O\ idc housing and expense money for remits. Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 002623720 Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720 �Recruits are started along the road to commitment = through assignments to perform such tasks as handing out leaflets on street corners and in other public places. This is followed by hanging posters and painting slogans. �Promising recruits are then involved in some illegal acts�shoplifting, for example, graduating to burglary. �Assignment to an armed assault group is the final step. Once a recruit has taken part in a shooting incident, he or she is considered to have passed the point of no re- turn. Coercion can be a factor, too. A 16-year-old high school boy told a reporter: "My dad switched me to a private school last year be- cause there was Montonero indoctrination and training ping on (after classes at the public school). If you didn't 'stay for indoctrination, you got beat up." Why the recruiters are able to subvert youngsters is another matter. The magazine Gente recently sponsored a seminar on the subject, with a broad cross section of mid- dle-class parents taking part. The number, of theories put forth was almost equal to the nuMber of participants, but blame was placed gener- ally on. two factors: some aspect. of home life and too .much leisure time and money for teen-agers. There was no agreement on just what might be wrong in the home: Some thought youngsters should be more tightly controlled; others thought controls should be loos- ened; some thought parents did not make enough effort to understand their children; others thought parents were trying too hard to be their childrens' "friends." Moreover, it became clear that *while everyone was deeply concerned and groping for answers, no single an- swer was likely to satisfy everyone. Some typical re- sponses: Maria Antonieta Ingster, manager of a motion picture distribution firm�"I think the phenomenon is caused by 'It's essential that parents know what their children are doing.' middle-class teen-agers having absolutely everything they , .want., causing them to be bored and wanting to draw at- tention to themselves." Enrique Wilkinson, a retired air force captain and fath- er of four teen-agers�"I attribute the problem exclusive- ly to the moral formation within the home, complemented . AO. some degree, within the schools. The economic factor � ' THE WASHINGTON POST/PARADE 5 September 1976 rimuffm El In :the "Past . dirjama six. months a: wave c of.avsio- e. z struck. Jamaica, the va- -CittioraO. randin-, the ',car ib ..bean. fore:thousand:3r of am . Americans. At-least'. 100 -oeople , including 17 po-�-� � .licemen, have been mur� dered. And in 'one ghastly incident; a gang ..of youths set fire to a tenethent. 'block in Kingston. As the . tenants � fled. they were gunned down. Whon . the , firemen and tolice ar� � rived,- they, ,too, were � fired upon. At least � I ls� 'people were killed,' while the .police' - -killed one member . � � contributes, but it's not the most important." � Beatrice Lacoste de Vercesi, a social worker�"It's es- sential that parents know what their children are doing, that thcy speak with them and above all listen to them. Speaking, to them is easy; but listening to them often is much harder." Fernando Sabsay, an attorney and professor of law�"I believe the fundamental psychological failure in the home ! is pretending to be excessively 'a friend' to the children. Some fathers even accompany their sons on amorous ad- ventures, and some psychologists say this is beneficial. I believe it creates a great vacuum for the son; for whom no one is occupying the place of father." � � � I A 19-year-old woman told an interviewer that she agrees with the point of view expressed by Sabsay. "My father would like to be my friend," she said, "but, being my father, he can't be a friend: He must be my father." - � 1 Regardless of how young Argentines are recruited into ',.the guerrilla gangs, and regardless of the reasons, there is iid question about what they do once committed. The case / of Ricardo Omar Snag could be typical. Six years ago Felipe Sapag, the wealthy governor of Neuquen. province in the Andean lakes region, told a magazine interviewer that one of his sons, Ricardo, then 17, "is the family hippie who smiles only when he comes to me for money." Five years later Ricardo was serving as a conscript in a secretarial office at air force headquarters in Buenos Aires' having elected to do his year of compulsory service after college. Dec. 10, 1975, Maj. Gen. Aly L. I. Corbat, chief of air force personnel, and his 14-year-old son entered the gen- eral's car in front of their suburban home. The son was going to school, the general to his office. ' Before the car could get under way it was attacked by terrorists, approaching in a station wagon and firing sub- machine coins. � The chauffeur jumped from the general's car to try to defend his charges and was struck by the station wagon, suffering a shattered leg as well as multiple bullet wounds. Corbat was seriously wounded. The general's son was not injured although, according to an air force com- munique, "the attackers threw a grenade against the gen- eral's car in an effort to eliminate his son." The communique identifiedRicardo Omar Sapag as "the finger man and leader of the assault." He remains at large. Coy. Sapag offered his resignation, which the provincial legislature refused to accept. of the gang, a 1.3-Year-old boy. What's going on Jamaica? Michael Manley, who has been running the government for the past four* years, is leader of-- the Peoples National Party. .He is a democratic socialist. His- opponents, who represent the Jamaican, Labour Party, want him out. So, too,- does the commercial element in Jamaica, which has always had strong ties to Ameri� can business and financial' interests. Manley.. supports Castro of Cuba, which' makes him suspect in the eyes of our CIA. � a. � It is highly doubtful that the U.S. is going to � permit another socialist regime to be established in our Caribbean sphere of influence. � Jamaica the -word is . widespread that-the- CIA - is -supplying. money -for the, purchase of armaments that go to ManleY" s po- litical opponents. Man- ley' s policy is based on redisbribution of land and wealth, government control of the economy, and a restricted role for private .enterprise. � CasEro started. out with the same political tenets.. Approved for Release: 2018/10/05 CO2623720