CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/03/16

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02682866
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
March 18, 2019
Document Release Date: 
March 28, 2019
Publication Date: 
March 16, 1951
File: 
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15587342].pdf135.64 KB
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´╗┐Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2682866  TOP ET  16 March 1951  Copy No. I -  CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN  RIP  DOCUMENT NO.    NO CHANGE IN CLASS.X ´┐Ż  DECLASSIFIED  CLASS. CHAI TO: TS S Spa  NEXT REVIEW nisi E:  AUTIA 7 ' 2  DATE/  Office of Current Intelligence  CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2682866  r   Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2682866  Tkto  3.5(c)  SUMMARY  GENERAL  I. Indiaii Prime Minister takes personal interest in Moroccan  situation (page 3).  FAR EAST  3. French obstructing ECA program in Indochina (page 4).  WESTERN EUROPE  4. Communist strength in Austrian police force revealed (page 5).  CRET  3.3(h)(2)  3.5(c)  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2682866  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2682866  Irktr szyw,ri..e,1.    3.5(c)  GENERAL  1. Indian Prime Minister takes personal interest in Moroccan situation:  On 12 March, an official of the Indian Min- istry of External Affairs read to US Ambas- sador Henderson portions of a private  message from Prime Minister Nehru to the  French Government in which Nehru expressed the hope that France  would take appropriate steps to ensure the eventual independence of  Morocco. The official stated that the Syrian Minister and the Indian  Charge in Baghdad had suggested the move and that the governments  of the Arab countries had been confidentially informed of Nehru's  action. According to Ambassador Henderson, Nehru wrote in most  friendly terms, although he displayed sympathy for the Moroccans  and other North African nationals. The Ambassador believes that  Nehru's new interest in North Africa has been stimulated by a de- sire to strengthen his influence in Arab countries of the Middle East.  Comment: It is doubtful that Nehru's mes- sage will have much effect on the French in view of French sensitivity  to external interference and the antagonism raised by Nehru's earlier  outspoken criticisms of colonialism in Indochina. On the other hand,  the message may improve India's position in the eyes of those Arab  nations which opposed Indian recognition of the state of Israel last  September.  FAR EAST  3.3(h)(2)  3.3(h)(2)  3  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2682866  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2682866  l...11.2.1  3.5(c)  3,  obstruct ECA ram in Inc  After more than a month's study, French Economic 3.3(h)(2)  Counselor Penavaire, an old-line "colonialist" in  General de Lattre's High Commissariat who re- portedly holds a narrow concept of Vietnamese in- dependence and is suspicious of US aims in Indochina, is delaying the  conclusion of bilateral aid agreements between the US and the three  Associated States of Indochina. Acting under authority based on the  Franco-Vietnamese agreements of 8 March 1949, Penavaire has pro- posed amendments to the text worked out by US and Vietnamese repre- sentatives that are in almost every case identical with those previously  either deleted or rejected by US negotiators. In reporting this French  action, Indochina ECA Chief Blum observes that such French intran- sigence can only reinforce the Asian belief that the Associated States  are far from being independent of France.  3.3(h)(2)  Comment: The fact that General de Lattre himself  has recently expressed suspicions of ECA activities in Indochina sug- gests that Penavaire's attitude reflects more than the private view of  one isolated French official.  -4  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2682866  Dtsiookpproved for Release: 219/03/14 CO2682866  3.5(c)  el  ea  WESTERN EUROPE  4. Commtinst strength in Austrian police force revealed:  An investigation of Communist strength in  the Austrian police force,  as revealed that the Interior Minister's policy  o gra ua y wee mg out Communists (appointed in large numbers  under Austria's provisional government in 1945) has been much less  effective than responsible police officials have suggested.  Comment: This investigation will afford,  for the first time, a comprehensive picture of the composition of the  police. According to an unofficial press report, 50% of the adminis- trative police, 33% of the secret police and 20% of the regular police  voted the Communist ticket in the police union elections. Discontent  with economic conditions and with the government can only in small  part explain this unexpectedly large pro-Communist vote. Although  the investigation may result in forcing Austrian officials to make  greater efforts to remove or counteract Communist influence in the  police, civil service laws and the fear of Soviet retaliation will con- tinue to hamper these efforts.  5  TOP CRET  3.3(h)(2-)  3.3(h)(2)  3.5(c)  Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2682866