CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/11/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02692640
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: June 6, 2019
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2019
• Publication Date: November 5, 1952

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SEC INFORMATION
5 November 1952
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Copy No.
57
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
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AUTH: H 70-2,ti
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECU INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. Armed strife in Thailand believed imminent (page 3).
2. Burma will abstain from UN vote on Korean POW issue (page 3).
3. Burmese Defense Minister suggests repatriation of Chinese
Nationalists (page 4).
4.
5.
6.
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Mossadeci reportedly clans ultimatum on oil sales (caae 4).
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7. Britain to await Egyptian initiative in Suez negotiations (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Unusual military activity reported in Bulgaria (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
9.
* * * *
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FAR EAST
1. Armed strife in Thailand believed imminent:
An armed clash between supporters of
Police Director General Phao and the
Deputy Commander in Chief of the Army,
npnprni sarit will oreur before the end
of November,
he clash will result in a stalemate that will be resolved
only when independent military commanders who are presently opposed
to both Phao and Sarit commit themselves.
Comment:
relations between Phao and Sarit had in reeent months reached their
most critical point,,
ension had increased, but there was no indication 01
an imminent coup d'etat.
2. Burma will abstain from UN vote on Korean POW issue:
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the American resolution endorsing the UN
Command's stand on repatriation of POW's.
Burma could
support neither the position of the UN Command nor that of the
Communists.
Comment:
Burma's "neutral" foreign policy. In previous UN
sessions Burma has voted with the Communist bloc against labeling
Communist China an aggressor and with the Western powers in
denouncing North Korean aggression.
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3. Burmese Defense Minister suggests repatriation of Chinese Nationalists:
Burmese Defense Minister Ba Swe suggested 3.3(h)(2)
to Under Secretary of Defense Foster, during
his visit to Rangoon, that the problem of
Chinese Nationalist troops in northeastern
Burma might be solved by the "surrender" of 2,000 hard core National-
ists to American or other neutral officers. They could then be repatriated
through Thailand or, if necessary, through Burma.
The American Embassy believes that Ba Swe's
suggestion might offer a solution if it could be assumed that Taipei
would issue the orders and that they would be obeyed.
Comment: Taipei professes to have little
control over the Nationalist force in Burma and on several occasions
has indicated a preference that it remain in a position to harass
Communist China,
Ba Swe has previously suggested repatriation
of the Chinese Nationalists and last summer stated that he would begin
military action against them if they had not been evacuated by fall.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Mossadeq reportedly plans ultimatum on oil sales:
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Prime Minister Mossadeq plans to demand
an early declaration from the Department
of State to the effect that it has no objection
to the purchase of Iranian oil by Americans,
If the United States does 3.3(h)(2)
not comply, Mossadeq will infer that the United States is "unfriendly."
Comment: The proposed demand is in
line with new efforts by various Iranian leaders to blackmail the
United States into assisting Iran in its oil problem. The withdrawal
of the British from Iran has also stimulated extremist pressure on
Mossadeq to cancel American aid programs in Iran.
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7. Britain to await Egyptian initiative in Suez negotiations:
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Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Suez base 3.3(h)(2)
will not be reopened before next January,
unless the Egyptians press for talks, according
to an official of the British Embassy in Cairo.
Britain is not anxious to begin talks until its Chiefs of Staff have
completed their appraisal of the entire military situation in the Middle
East.
The official stated that the staff study, one
result of the recent :knglo-Turkish talks in London, is expected to
take two months, and may result in a lower estimate of the strategic
importance of the Suez base.
Comment: Previous British strategic
studies have concluded that no satisfactory alternative location
for the Middle East defense base. British military planners are now
convinced, however, that the lack of Egyptian cooperation limits the
value of the Suez base, and they are prepared to recommend some
concessions in order to hasten a settlement of the Suez issue.
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Unusual military activity reported in Bulgaria:
an
extensive mobilization of reserves was
in progress between 17, and 20 October
in the Second Army area in central and
south-central Bulgaria. no unusual security
measures or indications of war hysteria, and observed no military
personnel in the border area.
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Comment Other reports indicate that
during mid-October an extensive 5711-up of reserves, requisition of
vehicles, and the use of schools as barracks resulted in considerable
excitement and tension in the First Army District, which includes
Sofia. The conrirrent mobilization in the First and Second Army
areas is in contrast to the phased mobilization test which was con-
ducted in 1951.
There has been no recent evidence of unusual
military activities in the other Satellites. Neither Orbit propaganda
nor other evidence suggests a Soviet intention to launch hostilities in
the Balkans in the near future.
WESTERN EUROPE
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