CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1952/01/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02698152
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: May 24, 2019
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2019
• Publication Date: January 29, 1952

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SEC INFORMATION
Noy
29 Tanuary 1952
Copy No. 4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS,
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH, IR 7
DATE. ifini,EvvER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP
SE INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
I. Burmese Commander in Chief proposes withdrawal of Chinese
Nationalists (page 3).
SOUTH ASIA
2. Comment on Kashmiri Prime Minister's departure for Paris (page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Comment on the Egyptian situation (page 4).
4. Franco promises autonomy for Spanish Morocco page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Saar question threatens Schuman Plan and European Army (page 6).
6. Italy seeks Chile's vote for UN membership (page 6).
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FAR EAST
1. Burmese Commander in Chief proposes withdrawal of Chinese Nationalists:
In a recent conversation with the acting US
Army Attache in Rangoon, Burmese Commander
in Chief Ne Win proposed a plan, subject to
cabinet approval, for the evacuation of Chinese
Nationalist troops now in northeastern Burma. He suggested a US request
to Taipei for written orders instructing its troops to leave, and a similar
approach to Thailand for assurance of their safe passage through that
country. Ne Win said that Burma would use its air force to deliver the
order by leaflet and would permit the entry into Burma of six responsible
officers from Formosa to direct the withdrawal.
The Burmese military leader asserted that his
plan offered the only possible solution, and added that removal of the
Nationalists would relieve pressure from Peiping and would free Burmese
troops to "clear up Communist insurgent areas."
Comment: There are no indications that the
Chinese Nationalists would agree to this proposal, even if it were approved
by the Burmese Cabinet and acceptable to all other interested parties.
Only a small number of Burmese troops are
deployed against the Nationalists. The freeing of these forces would not
greatly aid the government's efforts against the Communists.
SOUTH ASIA
2. Comment on Kashmiri Prime Minister's departure for Paris:
Kashmiri Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah's
departure for Paris on 26 January is evidence that the Indian Guv-eLnment
is finding it more and more difficult to control him. His presence there
may complicate the forthcoming UN Security Council debates on Kashmir.
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Sheikh Abdullah, reputedly a persuasive
orator with considerable influence over Indian Prime Minister Nehru,
had planned on earlier occasions to attend UN meetings on Kashmir.
In each case his departure from India was postponed at the last moment.
Available evidence suggests that the Indian Government, knowing his
predilection for Kashmiri autonomy, prevented his attendance for fear
it could not control his statements.
In recent months, however, the Kashmiri
drive for autonomy has become stronger. On 17 January the USSR
openly espoused Kashmir's contention that it should be allowed to decide
its own future without outside interference. The Indian press has given
serious consideration to that suggestion and in some cases has acclaimed
it. The Indian Government may therefore feel that it can no longer keep
Kashmir from having a voice in the settlement of its own affairs.
Sheikh Abdullah publicly stated on 26 January
that he was under no obligation to accept United Nations directives on
the Kashmir issue.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3. Corrtment on the Egyptian situation:
The violent fighting at Ismailia five days
ago and the subsequent rioting in Cairo gave King Farouk the opportunity
he had previously sought of taking direct charge of political developments.
The immediate support given the new in-
dependent Premier, Ali Maher, in both the Senate and the Chamber of
Deputies underscores the sobering effect which the violent disorders of
recent days have had on responsible Egyptians. For the time being,
the new government will accordingly receive substantial backing in its
efforts to maintain public order.
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The present situation offers Egypt and
Britain alike a new opportunity for reaching an understanding. The
independent cabinet, under royal guidance, may be expected to be more
moderate than the preceding government. The British, in turn, have
for several months indicated their belief that Anglo-Egyptian discussions
would be possible only under a new regime in Cairo.
Whether the present calm continues or new
outbreaks become the order of the day depends on how successfully and
how quickly Egypt and Britain compromise their differences. AliiVlaher
can not erase the pledges of preceding governments concerning "evacuation
and unity of the Nile Valley." His present political support, particularly
that from the Wald, may easily turn to opposition.
Recent mob violence in Cairo and in the canal
zone appears to have had centralized direction; accordingly, if no progress
is made toward a settlement, more terrorist disorders? possibly with
Communist participation, may be expected.
. Franco promises autonomy for Spanish Morocco:
General Franco has reportedly promised the
Spanish Moroccan Khalifa, representative in
Tetuan of the Moroccan Sultan, that a formal
announcement of the zone's autonomy will be
ma se w en ranco visits Tetuan in March or April. Spain will also
simultaneously begin the gradual transfer of various administrative
services to the Khalifian government.
Even though no actual commitments have been
received, Spanish Moroccan nationalist leaders are highly optimistic.
Diplomats from Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, have urged
the nationalists to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward Spain, which would
be in the interest of both the Moroccans and the Middle Eastern states.
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Comment: Permission for the Khalifian
government to exercise actual governmental responsibility would be a
drastic departure from Spain's previous policy in its Moroccan protector-
ate.
F
ranco's conciliatory policy toward Morocco is dictated by his desiretoa sume the role of mediator between the Arab countries and the West.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Saar question threatens Schuman Plan and European Army:
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2:
West German officials have urgently requested 3.3(h)(2)
High Commissioner McCloy to make repre-
sentations to France against the creation of
an embassy to the Saar, another step toward
giving the Saar an independent status.
Chancellor Adenauer, described as "gravely
upset," and as dissatisfied with French Foreign Minister Schuman's
explanation, instructed his chief delegate at the European Army discussions
in Paris to make no more agreements there and to file another protest.
Adenauer believes that under the present circumstances it will be impossible
to get the German Upper House to approve the Schuman Plan this week as
scheduled.
As a possible solution to this "most dangerous
threat to the Schuman Plan and the European Defense Community," McCloy
endorses a formula reportedly suggested by Adenauer, that the Saar be
"internationalized" and made the seat of both the Schuman Plan Authority
and the European Defense Community.
6. Italy seeks Chile's vote for UN membership:
The Italian Ambassador in Santiago informed
the Chilean Foreign Office on 22 January that
France, Brazil, the Netherlands, Pakistan,
and Turkey, in addition to the Soviet Union,
will give Security Council support to the Soviet
omnibus resolution on UN membership. He expressed the hope that Chile
would cast the seventh and decisive vote.
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Comment: The Italians clearly do not have
the seven Security Council votes which they have recently been claiming.
In addition to Chile they have also approached the Netherlands, Brazil,
and Turkey, urging each not to cause the defeat of the resolution by
withholding the seventh favorable vote.
France is at present undecided whether to
vote for the resolution or to abstain. In the recent balloting of the
General Assembly's Political and Security Committee, the Netherlands
and Turkey voted against the resolution. Brazil, in line with its policy
of examining each country's application for admission individually,abstained.
There is no evidence that it will alter this policy in either the Assembly
or the Security Council.
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