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March 27, 1961
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Approvedfor ,v�rWr-4AIVKLI� 3.3(h)(2) e,s �)lir 3.5(c) 27 March 1961 Copy No. C CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN' A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 -T0-110-S-EeRET- --T.Gia-sEener Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Fl Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 %no SECRET No� 27 March 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Laos. (Situation as of 0400 EST) (Page 2. Congo: Foreign Minister Bomboko invites UN to send technicians to Matadi. (Page ti) 3. New uprisings reported planned in southern Angola and Cabinda. (Page it) 4. Fighting breaks out between Pakistani military units and Pushtoon tribes. (Page itt) 5, USSR: Comment on earth satellite launching of 25 March. (Page tit) \\\& SECRCT Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Asik Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 *mg CHINA 1\I A /\/1 T H A � Muong Sal I LUANG PRA ANG -.....s. Luang Prabang ---''.-,-----*Ii. \'/N..\1.i SAYABOURY r--." XIENG KHOUANG N, muond soui N, _ ,,, .Ban Ban - -...,,i'L ,.. ''--- -2" 1' 1.irriNecTO. --, Pliou Khoun .) /1 J d f f es 'NI X 1 eng Khauang-,, � -tot Muong Kass ....tir ...... 1 i Ban Ta Viang i / ajl ".. e i� � Tha Thorm Wang Vieng ./ (." .1-.../- \ ---.... VIENTIANE C ' Pak Sane j NORTHERN LAOS 401. GOVERNMENT Forces in KONG LE - PATHET LAO Contact AO KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS X SITE OF C-47 SHOOTDOWN --ROAD -TRAIL 0 50 I I STATUTE MILES 17 ROUTE NUMBER one AND Sam i Neua AM NEUA � Kam Keut � KHAMMOUANE Sbvannakhe 27 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 VI //- � ii 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 JIOP SECRET NisS CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 27 March 1961 DAILY BRIEF *Laos: Moscow's first comment on President Kennedy's press conference and the present situation in Laos appears ) designed to retain flexibility of action while pressing for /?) its basic demands. By emphasizing the "urgent" need for an international conference, but taking no stand on the question of a prior cease-fire and ICC meeting, Moscow has left itself free to accept these Western proposals if its proposals on thea-a composition, timing, and agenda for the international meet- �2,* 4 ing, which are expected to be presented by Gromyko, are ac-,Zz-ec} cepted by the West. V Ai 6 Although the Chinese Communists have not yet made any ir 7 comment of their own on the press conference, Peiping has broadcast a North Vietnamese editorial of 25 March expres--�t4- sing Hanoi's opposition to a cease-fire before an internationa,Ve,,e, Conference. The editorial declares that "only a Geneva-typeee conference or an enlarged conference will be competent to n settle questions of a cease-fire and reactivation of the Inter-'-` national Commission in Laos." The bloc has not yet reported the shooting down of an American C-47 aircraft over the Plaine des Jarres on 23 Ma reh the plane burned completely following the crash. The lone survivor, presumably an assistant army attach�n Vientiane, is reportedly in a hospital near Xieng Khouang town with a broken shoulder3 (Backup, Page 1) (Map) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Vi 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 -Nowl VA Congo: Foreign Minister Bomboko has sent a letter to the UN's acting representative in the Congo, Makki Abbas, ips inviting the UN to send technicians to Matadi to cooperate with the port authority in clearing up the backlog of UN sup- plies there. Bomboko's letter added that the government could not authorize the return of UN troops to Matadi because of the feelings of the population. Uimbassador Timberlake reports that the pile-up of supplies at the port was due to the failure of the UN to issue shipping instructions. The UN is reported to have rejected an offer by a local shipping firm and the port authority to assume joint responsibility for for- warding UN merchandise to Leopoldville. Timberlake be- lieves the return of civilians to Matadi would involve a min- imum risk of incidents. He also believes the climate of relations between the UN and the Congolese has "changed radically" since the arrival of Abbas in mid-March but that Abbas has not yet been able to capitalize on it because of the expected return of Daya (Bac up, Page 3) Angola: angolan dissident leaders, encouraged by the respTiFirea the African population to their terrorist cam- paign in northern Angola, believe they can continue their ac- ,?s tivities indefinitely, although on a reduced scale, have been set for these operations:3 southern and 1::)r the Cabindai exnlave hut nn riatAs /? 7/2( they are planning new uprisi Lisbon, aware of the threat of an outbreak in southern Angola, is seek- ing the cooperation of the South African authorities to control itators using South-West Africa as a haven, 3 outbreaks would probably be accompanied by addi- tional demonstrations against Americans in Angola; rumors 27 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF ii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 'OP SECRET linking local Americans with the terrorism are still being given wide circulation there. (Backup, Page 5) Afghanistan-Pakistan-USSR: Foreign Minister Naim told Ambassador Byroade on 26 March that "major fighting" has broken out between Pakistani military units and several dissident Pushtoon tribes on the Pakistani side of the Afghan- Pakistani frontier. The action reportedly is taking place in the same semiautonomous tribal area where clashes occurred last fall. Pakistani authorities recently have been trying to suppress localized tribal resistance there�in part Afghan inspired�and to extend their control over the border areas. A widespread tribal uprising within Pakistan probably would draw active support from related tribal groups on the Afghan side. (Backup, Page 7) (Map) *USSR: The experience gained by the USSR with its large satellite payload recoveries has probably given the Russians a scientific and technological base and confidence level suf- ficient for them to attempt a manned recovery from orbit in their next launching. It is believed such an attempt will b e made prior to the middle of April, when the Sibir Pacific ships will need to return to port Preliminary analysis in Washington has not yet provided a firm answer as to the identity of the biological payload. an undetermined ob- ject apparently encased in a transparent dome-shaped con- tainer. While it has not been possible to confirm or deny the Soviet statement that a dog was a passen- ger, on balance it is believed the statement is valid. The Sputnik IX and X operations were similar in many as- pects. The Sputnik X operation was supported by three Sibirs 27 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF iii Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 'Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 voSTOP SECRET In the Pacific and probably by three other ships in the Atlantic. The use of the Sibirs in this ESV recovery program probably Indicates that Sputnik X was the dress rehearsal for a manned experiment. 27 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 NmeSECRETNoe' Situation in Laos -(Situation as of 0400 EST) Moscow has consistently avoided committing itself on whether an international conference would have to net be- fore a cease-fire could become operative. It has at various times called for reactivation of the International Control Commission for Laos, but has always specified that this body could not resume its activities in Laos without new directives from a conference. On 22 March, however, Moscow broad- cast without comment Souvannah Phouma's suggestion that a cease-fire could be arranged by the ICC pending the convo- cation of an international conference. The Pravda article maintains this careful avoidance of the question of timing, while heavily emphasizing the dangers of international conflict through the "intervention" of SEATO and the United States and the consequent urgency of an inter- national conference. By driving home the point that it has long favored a conference, Moscow has put itself in position to claim that the convocation of a conference and a cessation of hostilities is a consequence of its initiatives and another example of the ability of the "Socialist camp" to prevent "ag- gression" by the imperialists. Accompanying its charges that SEATO members are pre- paring for direct military action in Laos, Pravda warns that "peace-loving countries will not remain indifferent" to direct intervention by SEATO which could lead to "far reaching con- sequences," A more explicit threat has been made in the presence of US Ambassador Ravndal in Prague by the Czech Deputy Foreign Minister. Responding to a remark from the Indian Ambassador, the Czech stated: "If the United States Invades Laos, members of the Warsaw Pact have decided to enter Laos in return." Peiping has not yet commented on President Kennedy's press conference on Laos, although, the Chinese Communists have broadcast a substantial account of his remarks. Peiping's last comment suggesting its disapproval of a cease-fire be- fore an international conference is convened was contained in a People's Daily article of 23 March. Since then there have be-erimilThliig-that its attitude remains the same. The first 27 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Noe SECRET negative reaction to such a cease-fire appeared in an edi- torial on 25 March in the North Vietnamese newspaper, Nhan Dan. The paper accuses the US of putting the "cart before the horse" in order to gain time to strengthen "rebel" forces. Peiping has reported this editorial without adding comments of its own. [The King and General Phoumi have reacted favorably to latest Western moves toward a peaceful settlement of the Laotian crisis. Both, however, expressed concern that Laos' problems would be subordinated to other world issues in a 14-nation conference. Phoumi had reservations about a re- turn of the International Control Commission to Laos on the grounds that this would effectively prevent Western aid to the Laotian Army, while bloc supply of the Pathet Lao would go uncheckeg Rumors in Vientiane that the city is in imminent danger of attack were probably circulated by Communists. The de- parture of the King, prime minister, and Phoumi to attend a long-scheduled national ceremony in Savannakhgt may have strengthened the rumors. The royal party will remain there until 28 March. The credibility attributed to these rumors by the populace is indicative of the low morale in Vientiane. Since 1 March about 200 troops have deserted in the areji. The military situation north and south of the Phou Khoun junction of Routes 7 and 13 is relatively unchanged. The enemy maintains his hold on the southern approach to the Plaine des Jarres and is exerting pressure on government troops at Tha Thom. attacic on lila mom scneauiea ior zo iviarcn was be- ing successfully resisted, aive companies of Laotian Army troops under the com- mand of Colonel Kham Ouane Boupha are reportedly en route from Phong Saly to join army forces at the outpost of Muong Sal in Luang Prabang Province. Since the Kong Le coup, this com- mander has maintained a precarious "neutrality" between all factions in the crisis and has entered into at least informal working relations with Pathet Lao troops who control most of/ SECRET 27 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 N.., SECRET &hong Saly. Preliminary reports indicate that Kham Ouane's move was precipitated by fears the Pathet Lao were about to arrest hirn-.) Soviet transports continue flights into Laos. On 23 March eight IL-14s and at least two but possibly five LI-2s flew from Hanoi to Xieng Khouang. Additional flights were scheduled for 26 March, The North Vietnamese are apparently trainine Pathet Lao communications personnel in Hanoi. "they were scheduled for training at Hanoi but might have stopped at Khang Khay for preliminary training." SECRET 27 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2A Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 P SECRET The Situation in the Congo In Stanleyville, Gizenga told a press correspondent that his regime was based on positive neutralism and would ac- cept unconditional aid from any source. He said, however, that practically nothing had been forthcoming and that of the 20 countries which had recognized his government, only ten had done so in writing. He added that his government would respect present and future foreign investments, and claimed his troops would be willing to surrender their arms to the UN if this would lead to "republican legality." He disclaimed being a Marxist, saying that he had never studied Marxism and that although he had visited Moscow as recently as 1960, he had spent more time in Western capitals and had twice been to the United States. UAR military representatives in Stanleyville, complained to Cairo of difficul- ties in working with Gizengat forces. The representatives said that in addition to linguistic problems encountered"because we did not know French," they almost became embroiled in a fight with Gizenga's troops when the weapons arrived in Aketi "because they imagined we were spies, in spite of the fact that it was they themselves who got the weapons. They wanted to hold Major Samir as a hostage until they were sure." More- over, the mission was unable to effect an adequate training program for Gizenga's troops. It could not find officer material to train in the use of UAR-supplied weapons and also encountered delays in recruiting noncommissioned officer trainees and in dis- tributing weapons. The mission also complained of the lack of discipline on the part of the Congolese during a trip to recon- noiter the air-drop zone--a trip that should have taken two days but took five--and of a lack of appreciation for its efforts by "anyone but Gizenga and some of the ministers." In contrast, "because her broadcasts are heard here;' there was a growing appreciation for Ghana. Finally, the representatives complained of inadequate food and medical facilities and the harshness of conditions generally. The Malayan UN commander in Kindu has been able to es- tablish contact with the "Leopard men" in southwestern Kivu TOP SECRET 27 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 '!...'FOP SECRETNape Province. This secret group, founded six months ago by Lumumba, is supposedly anti-Christian and anti-white but now is "running out of steam," and its members are willing to return to their homelands in northern Katanga. TOP SECRET 27 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 ..JOP SECRET The Situation in Angola The recent outbreaks in northern Angola were instigated p-y six Angolans trained by the Tunisian UN contingent in the ongo, The six en- tered Angola clandestinely just before the outbreaks and each directed a campaign of terror in a specific regionj 5:.he Tunisian Government, is backing the Angolan People's Union (UPA), led by Holden Roberto, an organization which opposes the more extreme ro-Communist Angolan dissident group based in Guinea, unisian representatives are said to have told UPA leaders hat Tunisia and the other Afro-Asian countries would find it difficult to support their objectives in the United Nations unless the UPA took action to make Angola an issue for world atten- tio,E) alresident Bourguiba is reported to have congratulated Roberto, who stopped in Tunis after a recent visit to UN head- quarters, on the success of the uprising. He advised Roberto to form a "committee of national liberation," rather than a government-in-exile, because few countries would be ready to recognize an exile government. Tunisian Foreign Secretary Mokaddem is reported to have promised Roberto that Tunisia would provide rifles, machine guns, ammunition, and medical supplies, and Bourguiba's Neo-Destour party has assigned an expert to act as an adviser on guerrilla warfare tactics and po- litical organization. The Tunisians have also offered to assist the formation of an Angolan trade unio19 The Lisbon Foreign Ministry, described the Por- tuguese in southern Angola as "somewhat tense because there have been numerous purchases of crude weapons (chains, etc.)." the governor of Angola had received threatening letters from "Portuguese negro" refugees in the frontier area of South-West Africa. The South African Govern- ment had previously arrested similar agitators. Luanda warned Lisbon that the local security forces were inadequate to 27 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 FOP SECRET Nisor cope with demonstrations like that against the American Con- sulate. The clinic of the local Evan- gelical Mission, which has an American as titular director, although most of its personnel are foreign, was sacked by a mob on 24 March. Portugal itself, the government-controlled press is reported to have called for a demonstration in downtown Lisbon today to protest recent international criticism of Portugal. Right wing elements led by the National Front re- portedly plan to turn the demonstration into a march on the US Embassy, and, according to press reports, thousands of handbills calling for such action have already been distributed in the cityj opinion in some regime circles is beginning to turn against the government, however, as a result of the Angolan situation and many persons are criticizing the government for not having taken measures some time ago that would have avoided the present difficulties. A report is said to be circulating among regime supporters that two unidentified army generals have told Premier Salazar that Portuguese policy toward Africa must be radically changed. On 23 March the undersecretary of the Overseas Ministry told the American Embassy in Lisbon that for the past six months, the government had been actively studying far-reaching reforms in all sectors of the overseas provincesl TOP SECRET 27 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 " Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 grem4 USSR Stalinaba Mazar Shard Ts maz Pull Khumn Salang Pass halal Fort Sande CHINA JAMMU //KASHMIR (Status in dispute) RAW PINDI ob Lahore , PAkISTA CONFIDENTIAL Rush ha Zahedan Herat Sad Pal Maimana AFGHANISTAN - PAKISTAN (PUSHTOON TRIBAL AREA) PUSHTOON TRIBES 11111 AREA OF GREATEST FRICTION Roads �4�I�I- Railroads STATUTE MILES 300 INDIA CHINA ,olisofgdu.s, 31638 27 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 -fts ---SEefter- =Nov Fighting Breaks Out in Pakistan Near Afghan Border Guerrilla fighters from three of the major Bajauri tribes-- the Salarzai, Utman Khel, and Mamund�reportedly have been engaged against Pakistani troops since 24 March. If this resist- ance continues, the powerful Mohmand tribe may join its neigh- bors. Other Pushtoon tribes, such as the Wazirs, might also lend their support and further extend the area of fighting. All the tribes, whose area extends on both sides of the border, want to remain relatively free of government control and resent Pakistani Government moves since last September to strengthen control over Bajaur. If the present fighting should become wide- spread, it would so deepen the antagonism between these tribes and Pakistan that the latter would be forced to suspend its ef- forts to bring the Pushtoon tribes all along the frontier under its administrative control. The fighting in Bajaur follows recent moves by Afghanistan to strengthen its regular forces at the border opposite the area. In discussing this build-up with the American Army attach�n Karachi, the director of Pakistan's joint military intelligence said that the Pakistani Army would actually welcome the chance to defeat Afghan intruders again--whether tribal irregulars or Afghan Army units�and reiterated his government's determina- tion to use whatever force is necessary to maintain its position in Bajaur. Kabul, fearful of strong Pakistani counteraction, probably does not plan to send readily identifiable Afghan forces across the border. While it may be giving covert assistance in the form of arms and tribal "volunteers," the Afghan Government wants the fighting to appear to involve only the "oppressed" Pushtoon tribesmen on the Pakistani side of the line and the Pakistani Government. Afghanistan would like to bring the matter before the United Nations to generate international pressure on Pakistan to nego- tiate the status of the Pushtoon tribes living in Pakistan. Kabul, however, probably calculates that open Afghan intervention would merely strengthen the Pakistani case in the eyes of the UN Gen- eral Assembly. The USSR probably would not be happy to see the Pushtoonistan issue come to a head again at this time. Moscow has made a 27 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 SECRET small but impressive beginning toward achieving .a more favor- able position in Pakistan. Support for Afghanistan, however, would result in a decline in this position. Khrushchev is on record in support of the Afghan position on Pushtoonistan, and in the event of a military clash between the Afghans and Pakistanis, it is probable that the USSR would feel that it had to give increasing propaganda support to Afghan- istan. 27 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 �C�ENWIDENTIAL Noe THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary Of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 CO2731969 r /4-