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March 18, 2019
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March 28, 2019
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Publication Date: 
May 2, 1951
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15587370].pdf365.77 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 %to, -1UJ'IL.ttJa 1 sui 2 May 1951 Copy No, CI CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. LI DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CFIANGfE.D TO:IS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE DATE72.0..A if./REviEwER: Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1fel Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/0E/14 CO2733122 ET SUMMARY USSR 1. USSR munitions production increased (page 3). FAR EAST 3. Enemy armor contacted in Chinese Communist sector (page 4). 5, Communist China's railroad to Indochina reported completed (page 5). 6. Petroleum being shipped to Communist China from Indonesia (page 5). NEAR EAST 8. UN Secretary-General Lie cautions Israel on its international polities (page 7). EASTERN EUROPE 9. Anti-Communist resistance in Poland (page 7). WESTERN EUROPE 11. Spanish Monarchists seek control of strike movement (page 9). TO Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.30-1(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 TLP-SCRET USSR L USSR munitions production increased: v55 3.5(c) Comment: This wood-working trust in Irkutsk 3.3(h)(2) supplies packing for the major armaments plants between Lake Baikal and the Urals. The increase in production of special packing for muni- tions in the first quarter of 151 is approximately 50 percent over pro- duction for the first quarter of 1950. Further increases are evidently planned, for an additional mill of this trust was preparing in late March to manufacture special packing for munitions. 3 Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 If 11 4 CAI idA 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 FAR EAST 3. Enemy armor contacted in Chinese Communist sector: CINCFE Telecom A CINCFE telecon of 1 May reported that 1 May 51 five enemy tanks attacked six miles northeast SECRET of Seoul and that UN aircraft observed seven- teen more in enemy rear areas. Comment: Although there have been almost continuous air sightings of' enemy armor since January, scarcely any ground contacts have been reported during this period. This tank con- tact is reported in the sector occupied by the Chinese Communist 3rd Army Group, previously reported as having received armored support in Manchuria. Two major .North Korean armored units are also known to be located in western North Korea. 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) tfbrE An 11 April Far East Command analysis of enemy tank sightings revealed 82 sightings in western Korea south of Pyongyang for the period from 16 March, to 10 April. In the light of previous experience indicating that air sightings fail to account for more than 50 percent of actual armored strength, this same analysis estimated that the enemy may have at least 150 to 175 tanks for future employment along the more favorable west coast road net. 4. Manchurian arsenals produce aerial bombs: in late March Manchurian arsenals were ordered to increase the production of aerial bombs of 50, 120, 250, 500 and1,000 pounds. - 4 - Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 FsECRET Comment: The Mukden Arsenal, and probably a few others in Manchuria, are believed to be capable of producing bombs up to 1, 000 pounds. This evidence of increased bomb production ties in with recent reports of increased numbers and training activity of Chinese Communist Air Force light bombers. 3.5(c) 5. Communist China's railroad to Indochina retorted comtleted: Fl )AM 1)126 US Cons Gen Hong Kong An untested source has informed the US Consul 30 Apr 51 General in Hong Kong that the railroad from CONFIDENTIAL .Laipin (in Kwangsi province) to the Indochina border at Chermankuan has been completed by using rails taken from a section of another line in Kweichow province. The source alleges that the line from' Nanning to the Indochina border is the same narrow gauge that is used in Indochina railroads. Comment: This line was scheduled for completion b the end of April. /I A reviousl re orted 3.3(h)(2) the Communists had to tear up another line to complete this new one to the Indochina border. This is the only report, however, which indicates that a sec- tion of the line is narrow gauge. If true, this would necessitate trans- shipping at Nanning. 6. Petroleum being shi 6 01141A 41 ed to Communist China from Indonesia: ,;, k US Cons Gen Hong Kong The US Consul General in Hong Kong reports 5 Apr 51 that the tightening of Singapore's export regu- CONFIDENTIAL lationsjyJed to an organized movement of goods from Singapore to Indonesia for trans- shipment to Hong Kong, Macao, or directly to Communist China. The Consul General states that, although the trade is not large as yet, opera- tions may become larger in scale. He mentions in particular the move- ment of petroleum products via this route, and says that mounting evi- dence indicates that considerable finance As available to make bossible a steady flow of petroleum to Macao from Indonesia. 5 'Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 Comment: US officials in Singapore and Hong Kong have been reporting information (which they evaluate as probably true) concerning the planned delivery of a large quantity of motor gaso- line or crude oil to Macao, possibly from Indo esia. NEAR EAST 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) TC:�%ETP CRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 11\wil>SECRET 3.5(c) 8. UN Secretarv-peneral Lie cautions Israel on its international policies: US Emb Tel Aviv According to the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv, 30 Apr 51 UN Secretary-General Lie has discussed with SECRET Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett the present unsatisfactory situation in the Middle East Referring to the dangers arising from Israel's hatred of the Arab States and to the lack of progress in improving that situation, Lie advised the Israeli Foreign Minister (1) to follow a milder policy in international relations, (2) to abide by the UN decisions, and (3) while retaining a necessary independence, to avoid any course that would lessen Israel's friendship with the US. Lie stressed the importance to Israel of Ameri- can goodwill, citing the Buie- controversy -- particularly the retaliatory bombing -- as an example of unwise policies which might jeopardize US goodwill. 3414 v6, Comment: Domestic considerations within Israel -- such as the strong Israeli nationalism, the influence upon Prime Minister Ben-Gurion of General Yaclin, Army Chief of Staff, and the problems involved in a general election this summer -- have made it difficult for the government to pursue a moderate foreign policy, par- ticularly in regard to Israel's relations with:the Arab States. Lie's advice, however, may have some effect in improving Israel's attitude toward the UN Truce Supervision Organization and the various Mixed Armistice Commissions, EASTERN EUROPE 9. Anti-Communist resistance in Poland: TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Vow Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 rBastICRET 3.5(c) The Polish resistance groups are small, num- bering from four to 200 members. They engage in dissemination of anti-Communist propaganda, acts of local sabotage, aid to farmers fighting collectivization, liquidation of Communist activitists and e- curity Police agents, harassment of Polish and Soviet transporta. ion, raids on political prisons, and attacks on small outlying Security Police offices. .Q 3.3(h)(2) WI ree nm Independence), was founded in the first half o 1� A 5 is composed of rem- 3.3(h)(2) nants of World War II undergrounds, and is open to all loyal Poles what- ever their political complexion. It is presently estimated to number ap- proximately 10, 000 members on an active or semi-active basis. WIN'S current activities are limited, since it holds that attempts at active resistance or an armed uprising would be futile under present circumstances. However, some WIN personnel are believed to be engaged in active resistance despite the organization's policy of pa.ssivity. Presently WIN is the only known nationwide resistance organization capable of supporting an armed internal insur- rection in the event of war, provided outside aid were supplied. More- over, WIN is probably in the best position to organize and give cohesion to the spontaneous resistance groups now scattered throughout Poland. On the other hand, seven groups of top WIN leaders have been eliminated by the Security Police since 19460 The Security Police have, in addition, prepared elaborate lists of individu- als who are deemed politically unreliable, and who would form the bulk of a wartime underground. These lists would provide the information for mass deportations to the USSR or for imprisonment in work camps, thus seriously weakening the formation of an effective wartime resistance organization. 8 TOP ET Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 11\*S3 ECRET WESTERN EUROPE, 10. West German leaders concerned over prospects of neo-Nazi party in Lower Saxony election: The West German Government and political leaders are increasingly alarmed over the electioneering activities and prospects of the extreme rightist Socialist Reich Party (SRP) in the Landtag election scheduled for 6 May in Lower Saxony. Local US observers now pre- diet it will emerge as the third strongest party in Lower Saxony with approximately ten per- cent of the vote. The party, led by Dr. Fritz Doris and ex-General Otto Ramer, is "essentially a revival of the Nazi Party and proud of that fact," The. SRP has been suspected of camouflaged dealings with the East. The Communists have ceased their attacks on the SRP, and in at least one case have given it indirect assistance. Although the Fed- eral Government has considered repressive measures against the party, no definite action banning the SRP has yet been taken. The Social Democratic government of Lower Saxony reportedly is unwilling to take action against the SRP until after the election, hoping that the party will help split and weaken rightist political opponents. 3.5(c) Comment: Numerous reports have been re- ceived on the extremely active electioneering of the SRP, which has held large and frequent meetings in Lower Saxony/ where it has its largest following. The SRP does not yet represent a nation-wide threat, although it receives much publicity from the demogogic utterances in the West German Bundestag of its leader)Dr. Doris. The party could, however, by securing a large Landtag representation in Lower Saxony, attract considerable publicity and possible strength in Western Germany. �or, 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 11. Spanish Monarchists seek control of strike movement: US Emb Madrid The US Embassy in Madrid reports that, despite 29 Apr 51 previous denials, the secretary of the non-Corn- SECRET munist opposition Comite Interior de Coordina- don (CIC) now admits that his organization was - 9 - Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 TP SECRET 3.5(c) behind the Barcelona and Bilbao strikes. The CIC is planning a further series of non-violent strikes culminating in a general sit-down strike in Madrid during the month of May synchronized with the issuance of a Monarchist manifesto calling on Franco to turn over the government to the Pretender Don Juan. Comment: In the light of available evidence, the CIC, a coalition of clandestine Monarchist, Socialist and Anarchist organizations within Spain, does not appear justified in claiming credit for instigating or directing the Barcelona and Bilbao strikes. Monarch- ists within the CIC, who sense the latent possibilities of the strike move- ment, apparently are anxious to use it as a lever for the immediate ouster of Franco and the restoration of the monarchy under Don Juan. On the other hand, the non-Monarchist elements of the CIC, who have a more intimate grasp of the aspirations of Spanish workers, counsel caution, since they feel that any undue haste might well jeopardize their cause by affording Franco a pretext for a new series of repressive measures that could break the back of the non-violent strike movement before it gains momentum. � - 10 - Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 CO2733122 3.5(c)