CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/05/20

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02733129
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: May 20, 1951

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ZO, May 1951
Copy
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO:
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NFXT REVIEW DATE:
A U R
DATEU _
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
USSR
FAR EAST
2. Communist air strength for Korean operations now estimated
at 900 (page 3).
3. Japan desires inclusion of Chinese Nationalists in peace treatyv
(page 4).
NEAR EAST
4. Soviet-Iranian monetary and boundary negotiations continuing
without progress (page 5).
5. Israelis openly oppose UN Security Council resolution on the 1" E
Syrian-Israeli border dispute (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Neo-Nazi party attempts to improve its political position (page 7).
7. UK Government reported likely to deliver two tankers to Poland
(page 7).
LATIN AMERICA
8. Bolivian revolutionary party reportedly plans revolt (page 8).
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FAR EAST-
2. Communist air stren th for Korean o erations now estimated at 90(k
The US Far Eastern Command estimates that
the enemy now has a total of 900 operational
aircraft and that this strength will possibly 3.3(h)(2)
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reach 1,000 by mid-year. FECOM notes that a large percentage of
this expan�ion has been in fighter aircraft, "in keeping with the enemy's
long continued defensive tactics.. " FECOM points out, however, that
"the enemy could momentarily effect a complete change in tactics and
sustain offensive operations,," 3.3(h)(2)
Comment:
(a) the Communist air force is being well supplied
with aircraft, particularly fighters, (b) the Communists are making
efforts to protect their airfields by installing anti-aircraft equipment
and by assigning anti-aircraft battalions to some of the larger airfields
and (c) the Communist air force is suffering a serious shortage of
aviation gasoline. The latter consideration will probably deter the
Communists from launching a large scale air offensive in the immedi-
ate future.
3. Japan desires inclusion of Chinese Nationalists in peace treaty:
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Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Iguchi, repre-
senting Premier Yoshida, advised the US 3.3(h)(2)
Political Advisor in Tokyo on 19 May that his
government: (a) under no circumstances de-
sires the signature of the Chinese Communist regime on a Japanese
peace treaty, and (b) wishes to make peace with the Nationalist govern-
ment, which it considers deserving of Japan's support Iguchi also
� expressed the thought that failure to give the Chinese Nationalists an
opportunity to become a party to the treaty might unduly delay its rati-
fication by the US Senate.
� Comment: In view of the obvious economic
advantages to Japan of free trade with Communist China, Iguchi's state-
ment appears to be an unusually pro-Western commitment and is to be
contrasted with a statement to the Diet by a responsible Foreign Office
official 16 May that the problem of Chinese representation was an
"insolvable issue," Iguchl's strong pro-Nationalist stand is probably
to be explained by the overwhelming Japanese desire for an early peace
treaty.
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NEAR EAST
Soviet-Iranian monetary_ a_._11cLboundaruegotiations continuing without
2ro:ress:
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The Iranian press reports that conversations
between Soviet and Iranian representatives 3.3(h)(2)
concerning Iranian gold and foreign exchange
are continuing. The chairman of the Iranian
group is said to have privately expressed disgust with the lack of pro-
gress and extreme doubt whether any agreement can be reached. The
press also reports that the Soviet-Iranian border commission is re-
suming on-the-spot studies of disputed sections of the frontier. This
work had been interrupted near Astara during the winter Al)!,cause of
heavy snows, and has been slow to resume. No progress has been
made and there are reports that the dispute may be taken up through
diplomatic channels or that the matter may be arbitrated. According
to the Iranian press, there have been two recent border incidents in-
volving Soviet frontier guards.
.cmeakm The continuation of these Soviet-
Iranian negotiations indicates that the USSR is continuing its policy
of ostensible friendship toward Iran.
in Some weeks,
These border incidents are the first reported
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5. Israeijs open)lyose UN SecuipsijiLcts_211Lan on the Sy.rian-
Israeli border. dis 3.3(h)(2)
According to US Ambassador Davis in Tel Aviv,
top Israeli governmeqt officials have stated
that Israel is "extremely upset" over the terms
of the UN Security Council resolution on the
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Syria. -Israeli border dispute. The Israelis
are particularly opp sed to the parts of the
reSoluti n which request (a) Israel-2s suspen- 3.3(h)(2)
sion of its drainage scheme in the Lake Hule -
demilitarized area, and (b) permission for the
return to the demilitarized zone of those -Pales-
tinian Arabs who were removedby the Israelis-
several weeks ago. Davis anticipates that the
Israelis will try to prevent the impl.ementatiiin of the Security Council .
resolution, and he expresses the fear that a wave of Israeli Cynicism
will develop against the UN. Meanwhile, US Minister Cannon in Damas-
cus takes issue with the two chief Israeli complaints. Concerning the .
Lake Hule drainage scheme, Cannon states that the basic question is not
over the project itself, but over Israel's right to take unilateral action
in the demilitarized area, the sovereignty of which is still in dispute..
In regard to the Israeli allegation that the recently displaced Arabs are
"happy," Cannon points out that the Arabs bitterly fought to remain on
their lands and that UN observers were unable to see those Arabs who
were removed because the Arabs were allegedly "quarantined. "
ftoommailt: The bitterness between Syria and
Israel over the initial dispute regarding the Israeli drainage project
and over the subsequent border incidents Made it certain that, if the
Security Council adopted any positive measures at all, the Ul�Isug-gested
.course of action would be opposed by at least one: of the two parties .
concerned. Israeli's opposition to the 18 May Security Council resolu-
tion, which was passed by a 10 - 0 vote (the USSR abstaining), has
been further emphasized by a government statement from Tel Aviv to.
the effect that the Israelis will continue their drainage scheme deSpite
the provisions of the UN measure. Syria and the Other Arab States,
on the other hand, have reacted favorably to the Security Council
resolution, for Arab government officials repOrtedly consider the
measure as indicating that the UN is seeking a just solution to the
Syrian-Israeli controversy and that the UN opposesany unilateral
action being taken in the border area by either side.
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WESTERN EUROPE
6. Neo-Nazi party attcinsts to ims.rove itsdlitica1 ositiom
the neo-Nazi
Socialist RetchtParty (SRP)s which recently
attained prominence through its success
in the Lower Saxony -state elections- is improv-
ing its position in the West German Federal
Parliament through political maneuverin& The two SRP delegates in
the Parliament now vote with the Economic Reconstruction Party (WAY) .
in order to give the WAV- the minimum representation of 15 delegates 3.3(h)(2)
required to give it all the official privileges of a voting group. The
,SRP has exploited its new alignment to influence the WAY leadership
to support the SRP line on occasion. The SRP is alsi currently at-
tempting to increase the size of its own represent lion in Parliament
by proselyting tw9 delegates, from another extremist party.
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Comment Allied officials have expressed
alarm at the -success of the SRP in the Lower Szxony elections and at
the possibility that the p rty might spread its influence to the rest of �
Western Germany, The SRP has already announced that it will open
a propaganda campaign in early June in Hesse. Because of the Federal
Governments recently announced plans to have the:SRP banned, party
leaders have .adopted more moderate tactics for the presents and have
toned down4heir previously extreme anti-democratic and natiOnalistic
utterances.-
7. UK Government .!steted like_12122teliver two tankers to Poland:
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According to an export control official at the
US Embassy in London s the UK Government
will probably decide not to interfere with the
delivery of two British-builit tankers to Poland,
since the government recently
discovered that the two vessels are already the property of a Polish
state corporation, the UK fears that the Poles would retaliate against
British shipping if the Mmiralty requisitions the tankers, as had been
requested in April by the Foreign Office. US Embassy London believes
it highly desirable that the US deliver a note asking the UK Government
to prevent delivery of these vessels.
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Comment: In light of the UK's reluctance to
curtail trade with Poland, and in the absence of any question of owner-
ship, the British would normally deliver the ships. The two vessels
in question were ordered in 1948 by Poland and are similar in size to
those currently in use by the USSR to carry petroleum products to the
Far East, Current Polish petroleum requirements are such that these
vessels are not required for regular shipments between the USSR and
Poland.
LATIN AMERICA
8. Bolivian revolutiOnary party re ortedl lans revolt:
far
Embassy*. La Paz reports that outbreaks planned
by the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR)
at various points in La Paz on 18 May failed to
materialize. In only one district, where MNR
followers tried to seize a police station, was 3.3(h)(2)
there any violence, and this was quelled by
police. MNR members say that their ranks have
been well infiltrated by police agents who thus 3.3(h)(2)
have been able to stalemate MNR plans.
Comment: Thus far the police and armed forces
-- including the air force -- have remained loyal to the junta government.
Some pro-MNR sentiment among minor army officers has been reported
during the past few months; there have been no reports concerning MNR
sentiment in the air force. The air force is of prime importance in the
rapid transportation of troops to suppress possible disturbances in re-
mote parts of Bolivia.
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