CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/10/28

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02739300
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 28, 1951
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15603080].pdf504.52 KB
Body: 
Approved for . . SE Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 ****i TY INFORMATION 28 October 1951 Copy No. 47 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. 311111- NO CHANGE IN r-1 DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: IS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: MTH: HR 70.2 Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP S ET SECUR NFORMATION Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 TtiISECItET. SUMMARY USSR 1, British Ambassador considers Soviet Union anxious for cease-fire (page 3). FAR EAST 2. Chinese Communist support of Viet Minh depreciated (page 3). 3. Pope grants audience to De Lathe on Vietnamese problems (page 4). NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 4. Current international situation alarms Afghanistan (page 4). 5. Terrorist campaign predicted against British nationals in Arab states (page 5). 6. British and American Ambassadors warn of serious developments in Egypt (page 6). 7. Cypriot Communists reportedly planning coup (page 6). NORTH AFRICA 8. Spain seeks rapprochement with Moroccan Nationalists (page 7) WESTERN EUROPE 9. Benelux countries may oppose European Defense Forces plan (page 8). -2 T3 SECT Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 ET USSR 3.5(c) British Ambassador considers Soviet Union anxious for cease-fire: US Emb London During an official conversation with Vyshinsky, 25 Oct 51 the British Ambassador to Moscow reports, SE the soviet Foreign Minister raised the subject 0./ of a cease-fire in Korea, stating the USSR was anxious for it and that it would be an important step in easing international tension. Comment: The Communist decision to modify the previously adamant stand on the 38th Parallel may be a reflection of Soviet anxiety for a cease-fire. There are, however, no indications that the Communist negotiators will further discuss their new offer, which is "unacceptable" to the UN representatives. FAR EAST 2. Chinese Communist support of Viet Minh depreciated: US Leg Saigon 3.3(h)(2) 26 Oct 51 no Chinese were identified among Viet Minh personnel killed or taken isoner during recent operations in Tonkin. He also ifirmed a sharp decrease in the activities of Viet Minh training schools in China and said that those trainees still remaining were re- ceiving their military education through service in Chinese units. In considering the uestion of Chinese ist intervention in Indochina, the Chinese and the Viet Min - . ,bu no o ma e le nam a second Korea. " materiel aid by the Chinese would con-3.3(h)(2) tinue but "other �upport- would decrease. 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 TOP SECRET 3.5(c) Comment: No member of the Chinese Com- munist armed forces has ever been identified as serving with the Viet Minh. This fact together with the above report, supports a recent 3 3(h)(2) estimate that only "a few" Chinese Communist ad- visers and technicians are present in Tonkin,. thus discounting another estimate of 10, 000 to 15, 000, 3. Pope grants audience to De Lattre on Vietnamese problems: 3. 3(h)(2) Comment: The Vatican has been cool toward the French puppet government of Vietnamb Bao Dai was received with reserve when he visited Rome, presumably because of strong represen- tations to the Vatican by Vietnamese Catholic leaders. The French are anxious to secure the cooperation of these leaders, whose following of some million and a half Vietnamese Catholics includes many intellectuals and represents a much greater force in the area than numbers would Indicate, NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 4. Current international situation alarms Afghanistan: US Emb Kabul The Afghan Gbvernment, genuinely alarmed at 23 Oct 51 the recent turn of events in the Near East and CONFjD1 South Asia, has assured the US of its coopera- - 4 - Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 1P SECRET tion "in every possible way" and has requested the US to reconsider the withdrawal of its proposal to bring Afghanistan and Pakistan together to settle their current disputes. Comment: The American proposal, first made on 6 November 1950, has achieved no concrete result to date, and the US has recently informed Afghanistan and Pakistan of its with- drawal. As a consequence of this action and of the events in the Near East, the Afghan government may have taken stock of its international position. It is possible, therefore, that an import- ant change in Afghan policy is in the making, which will lead to a more conciliatory attitude toward Pakistan and to a more active participation in world affairs. 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Terrorist campaign predicted against British nationals in Arab states: 3.3(h)(2) "Violent terrorist attacks" upon British nationals will begin within ten days in Syria Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan, The campaign, al- legedly to be directed by the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, will combine the efforts of his Arab Higher Executive with those of 3.3(h)(2) the Moslem Brotherhood. ':3;.em Brotherhood should be "given a free hand and encouraged in extremist members of the Egyptian Government believe that the violence and terrorism" while the government itself should allege that it was doing its best to control the organization. Comment The chief responsibility for a continuation of disturbances in Egypt or for any eruption of violence in the other Arab countries would probably lie with the hypernationalistic Moslem Brotherhood. This group is well-organized in Egypt, where it has semi-legal status, and also in Syria. 5 Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 1-0P ET The Moslem Brothers, supported by the Mufti's henchmen and the Communists, have already evidenced a readi- ness to exploit the current Arab tension despite the restrictions which the Arab governments themselves are likely to impose against terror- ist activities. 6. British and American Ambassadors warn of serious developments in Egypt: US Emb Cairo The US Ambassador in Cairo reports that 25 Oct 51 his British colleague advised London on 25 TOPEetT October that the now British Government would � C 7500n have to make "very grave decisions" in regard to Egypt. If the pr sent situation in the Suez Canal zone is allowed to drift,be said, a revolution in Egypt is in prospect, ending with British reoccupation of the country. Without a minimum of Egyptian cooperation, it is "probable that it will become increasingly difficult to maintain British troops at Suez. " If, on the other hand, British military authori- ties exercise their power to shut off oil, "disaster will probably ensue. " The American Ambassador comments that the United States must also "think this whole business out and not get involved in a dead-end loaded with dynamite." 7. Cypriot Communists reportedly planning coup: US Emb Athens The Cypriot Communists have procured 1, 500 26 Oct 51 rifles and are preparing for an early coup TOP ET according to the Greek Prime Minister. Comment: This report probably represents an effort by Greek Nationalists to promote Greek-Cypriot union, or enosis, by exploiting US concern over recent events in the Near East, The Nation- alists believe that the US, if sufficiently alarmed over the security of Cyprus, might be presuaded to exert pressure upon Britain in favor of enosiso - 6 - ToCD) SEC11' Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 OP $E�RET The Communists,aware of the current pos- sibilities for weakening the British hold on this strategic island, may be planning an incident to focus world attention on Cypriot demands. However, the British security forces in the area are believed capable of coping with any Communist-inspired disturbances. NORTH AFRICA 8. Spain seeks rapprochement with Moroccan Nationalists: US Leg Tangier 24 Oct 5 SEC General Franco allegedly has approved a scheme for including Spanish Moroccan T Nationalists in the administration of the /5) Spanish protectorate of Morocco. The Spanish High 6mmissioer plans to talk with the leader of the Spanish Moroccan Nationalist party, a man who has long been considered a fugitive from Spanish justice. The US Legation in Tangier comments that the High Commissioner apparently is moving rapidly toward a rapproche- ment with the Nationalists despite the opposition of his advisors, who caution that the Nationalists would use Spanish Morocco as a base for anti-French activity. Comment: Spain has long resented the pre- ponderant French influence in Morocco, and desires to strengthen Spanish prestige with the Arab states. 3.5(c) By apparently relaxing their severe repression of nationalism, by promising participation in government now, and by hinting that Spain favors Moroccan independence, Spanish officials hope to discredit France with the Arab League and improve Spain's relations. Spain has no intention, however, of relinquishing its hold on Morocco. 7 TO Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 WESTERN EUROPE 9. Benelux countries may oppose European Defense Forces plan: US Emb The Hague 26 Oct 51 A Socialist member of the Dutch Parliament states confidentially that the Benelux meeting at Brussels on 25 October was convened "to voi organize a united front against the European Defense Force The Dutch Foreign Office strongly opposes the Euro- pean Defense Forces plan, and the Cabinet is divided on the issue with the Socialists and Catholics supporting the plan. Comment: The meeting of Benelux ministers ostensibly was intended to eiii1nihe various questions which might be raised in connection with a common European defense organization. None of the Benelux countries has indicated any enthusiasm for the plan, and the Dutch Foreign Minister is known to be personally opposed. However, alter much Cabinet and high level discussion, the Dutch recently sent an official delegate to the European Defense Forces con- ference in Paris. -8 TOP ET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 TOP S SECUBn3Y11FORMATION 30 October 1951 Copy No. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. 111111( NO CHANGE :N CLASS' DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S NEXT REVIEW DATE: � AUTl. R O- DAT . EVFWEr 4 7 Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOP SECRET SECURI NFORMATION Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 CO2739300 TtPSEcRET SUMMAR Y FAR EAST 1. Communist tactics to gain control of Korean air situation forecast (page 3). 2. Military government for Malaya recommended (page 3). 3. "Revolution" in Thailand predicted (page 4). NEAR EAST 4 . British now seen ready to settle Iranian oil crisis (page 5). 5. Iranian Communists hope to secure representation in Parliament (page 5 WESTERN EUROPE 6. Italy chooses new Ambassador to Great Britain (page 6). 7. French adamant on own terms for US North African commitment (page 6). NOTE: 2 TOP ET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 FAB EAST 1. Communist tactics to gain control of Korean air situation forecast: 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) The Far East Command believes, in view of enemy airfield construction activity, and the con- tinued high level of combat interceptor sorties, that logical steps for the enemy to take in ex- g air capabilities are: (1) Increased air efforts over the Sinanju area to achieve air superiority in northwestern Korea; (2) Utilization of this superiority to cover flights from newly-constructed fields in that area; (3) Basing of jets at these fields to ensure main- tenance of local air superiority; (4) Expansion of the area of Communist air supe- riority further southwards once jet strength on Korean fields has been increased; (5) Movement of conventional fighters and ground attack and light bombers to these secured Korean airfields; (6) A challenge to UN air superiority over the immediate battle area and initiation of air to ground strikes against UN ground forces and installations. 2. Military government for Malaya recommended: 0'7JN z_. 3.3(h)(2) he Chief of Staff of the British Far East Land orces reportedly has endorsed a Staff recommen- ation that "military government" is necessary or successful operations against the Communist� led insurgents in Malaya. 3 Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 11)c)1) S 3.5(c) Comment: Such a policy would presumably mean abandoning the program of gradual development of self-government in Malaya which the British Government has followed despite the great obstacles posed by the "emergency." The murder of High Commissioner Gurney on 6 October and a particularly bloody ambush of British-led security forces during the past week will lend weight to the insistence of military officials who have recommended "taking the gloves off. " It is possible that the Conservative government in London will reinforce British troops in Malaya, but not at the expense of the principle that the battle for Malaya is primarily political in character. 3. "Revolution" in Thailand predicted: 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) A Chinese Nationalist predicts that a bloodless "revolution" will probably take place in Thailand on 31 October. Premier Phibun and General Sarit, ssistant ommander in Chief of the Thai Army, are planning to remove General P.hao, Director General of Police, and General Phin, Commander.in Chief of the Army. The plotters are timing their action to take advantage of Phao's current absence from the country. Comment: A reorganization of the government along lines suggested by this report has some plausibility. General Sarit is known to be antagonistic toward the Phin-Phao clique, and Phibun has been desirous of broadening his administration by includ- ing representatives of opposition political parties -- a move which has been consistently opposed by Phin and Phao. In addition, the ambitious Phao3.3(h)(2) represents the chief threat to Phibunis authority. On the other hand, the alleged plan would be difficult to accomplish, as a radical realignment of military loyalties would be required. 4 S (E) C Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 SECRET NEAR EAST 4. British now seen ready to settle Iranian oil crisis: 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) The US Embassy in London assumes that the Conservatives will be anxious to start off their term in office by settling the Iranian oil question. It believes that the British are now willing to agree to any reasonable settlement, possibly including the acceptance of a completely non-British organization to operate the oil industry. Comment: Although the British have to date re- fused to commit themselves to the replacement of British management of the oil industry, they have gradually come to realize that this is inevitable. 5. Iranian Communists hope to secure representation in Parliament: 3.3(h)(2) The illegal Tudeh Party reportedly intends to present at least thirty "disguised" candidates in the approaching Parliamentary elections in order to obtain the 12 or 15 seats necessary for the effective obstruction of Parliament. 3.3(h)(2) Comment: Tudeh interest in securing repre- sentation in Parliament has been reported previously, Since Tudeh has identified itself with nationalism in the present oil issue, its candidates may well be elected together with bona fide adherents of the National Front. Increasing Tudeh strength and a reported Communist plot against the Shah have stimulated the new Iranian Chief of Police to arrest thirty Tudeh members and to plan a further program of repression, including the arrest of all Tudeh members now in key government positions. -5 Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 ET WESTERN EUROPE 6. Italy chooses new Ambassador to Great Britain: US Emb Moscow 27 Oct 51 RES 730 particularly useful to have London. 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) Manlio Brosio, Italian Ambassador in Moscow, has been chosen to be the new Ambassador to Great Britain. Brosio is said to have displayed unusual acumen in evaluating Soviet policies. Comment: In view of Mr. Churchill's suggestion that a Truman-Churchill-Stalin conference be held, the Italian Government may consider it a man of Brosio's background and abilities in 7. French adamant on own terms for US North African commitment: 3.3(h)(2) French Foreign Minister Schuman� in rejecting a US revision of a proposed exchange of notes between the United States and France on North Africa, emphasized that a satisfactory text could k.av paii. ULU euuu r enc h redraft which he thereupon presented to Ambassador Bruce. The French Government insists that a satisfactory exchange of notes must be concluded before ,it will pet mit a military survey of Tunisia or grant military facilities in North Africa, Comment: The French Government is insisting on written assurances that the US will not interfere in internal North African affairs. In the meantime, a United States military survey mission in the Mediterranean has been refused a Tunisian clearance. Growing discord between the Arab world and the West is increasing French anxiety to obtain US approval of French policy in North Africa. If such approval is not given, France can be expected to attempt to curtail all outside influence in its North African holdings. 6 ToC*SEGREll Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739300 3.5(c)