CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/11/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02739315
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 21, 1951

Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739315
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SECURITY INFORMATION
21 November 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO'.
47
NO CHAME IN CIA"(
DEC4.ASSIRED
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NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTI4- 1414 7rt..1
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
NEAR EAST
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EASTERN EUROPE
4. Yugoslav t terms for a Trieste settlement
WESTERN EUROPE
(page 4).
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5. Dutch see possibility of war in September 1952 (page 5).
6. Dutch believe that European Defense Forces depend on German admission
to NATO (page 5).
7. French Assembly's approval of European Army in the balance (page 6).
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irtip_IfteRET
NEAR EAST
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2. British appear less worried about situation in Egypt:
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the War Office is col the
opin on a e si ua on n gypt will continue quiet and that in a month or
two Egyptian laborers will return to work in the Canal zone.
Comment: The Egyptian authorities succesksfully
forestalled unmanageable demonstrations in Cairo and Alexandria during the
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national holidays and the opening of Parliament,. 13 to 15 November. Clashes
between British and E3 @dans did however occur in Ism : . � 9
November
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EASTERN EUROPE
4. Yugoslav terms for a Trieste settlement
The Yugoslav Government is
ready to settle the Trieste issue
largely on the basis of the status quo. The
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Yugoslays are willing to make certain concessions in Zone B in return for
certain Slovene areas in Zone A, extraterritorial rights in Trieste, and a
connecting corridor from Zone B to the port of Trieste.
Comment: Yugoslav officials have previously
expressed their willingness to return the predominately Italian coastal city
of Capodistria in Zone B to Italy if Yugoslavia is given certain rights and
territory in Zone A. 3.3(h)(2)
WESTERN EUROPE
5. Dutch see possibility of war in September 1952:
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The Netherlands Defense Minister refused
responsibility for fulfillment of the Dutch defense
program if equipment shortages prevent his country
rom fielding a combat-equipped division in time
or e H PE euvers next September. The Dutch still maintain that
these maneuvers coincide with "the moment of greatest danger" and will not
send an incompletely equipped division toward "possible combat."
Comment: The Dutch have previously referred
to September 1952 as "the moment of-greatest danger, " but without giving a
reason.
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6. Dutch believe that European Defense Forces depend on German admission to
NATO:
The Dutch Foreign Minister has stated that his
government continues to favor the idea of a
European Defense Force, but has expressed
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concern over the slow progress at the Paris conference and the consequent
difficulty of obtaining German participation in the plan. He added that the
best solution would be prompt admission of Germany to NATO.
Fearful lest Benelux constitutional limitations
should prevent adoption of the plan if it should "go too far toward political
federation," Foreign Minister Stikker further commented that though the
present plans seem to be militarily sound, he doubts their political feasibility.
Comment: For some time, the Dutch have taken
the attitude that German membership in NATO is an essential element in NATO
control of the European Defense Forces. The lack of Dutch enthusiasm for the
plan stems from fear of domination by France and Germany, and for this
reason the Netherlands has sought to establish a definite link between NATO
and the EDF.
The Dutch have consistently objected to expansion
of the EDF plans into political and economic spheres outside the original con-
cept, and specifically oppose proposals for a common budget and a single
high commissioner.
French Assembly's approval of European Army in the balance:
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The French National Assembly is now in "full
ferment" with respect to thtiEuropean Defense
Force, although the US Embassy believes that the
final vote will be favorable. Since, however, the
1 s may s 1 orce a foreign affairs debate on 21 November before the
government can benefit from its sudden "frantic missionary work" among
"critical deputies, " the government's freedom of action in forthcoming nego-
tiations may be restricted.
Numerous Socialists still argue that a last effort
for German unification and neutralization should be made before a final de-
cision is reached on the European Army. Many Socialist and other deputies
are supporting the Gaullist thesis that France must be permitted to maintain
troops in Europe outside the EDF framework.
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Comment: This is the first indication that the
Pleven government faces an Immediate and serious challenge on a major
foreign policy issue in addition to the challenge on basic economic problems.
The Socialists, who are basically opposed to
German rearmament in any form, initially gave only reluctant approval to
the EDF plan. A year ago in Washington former Defense Minister Moch, a
Socialist, stubbornly held to his party's views by ruling out the creation of
German divisions, and the French Government's recent concesstionsvon.this
point have apparently antagonized the Socialists.
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