CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/11/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02739320
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: November 29, 1951

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SECURITY INFORMATION
29 November 1951
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
I�JO CHANCE IN CLASS.
DI-TCLASSIFIED
C1.A!33. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: O.
DATE.
re/ FIEVIEWIM
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECURITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
USSR
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FAR EAST
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3. Soviet training program for Chinese forces in Manchuria assessed
(page 4).
4. De Lattre may be ready to relinquish his Indochina post (page 5).
5. Australian position on New Guinea moderated (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
7. British seen willing to resume oil negotiations (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
3.3(h)(2)
8. Constitutional obstacle to German defense contribution is explored
(page 7).
9. Canadians requested to give economic aid to Europe (page 8).
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3.
Soviet training program for Chinese forces in Manchuria assessed:
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Up to 50 Chinese Communist divisions may be
involved in the current Soviet-supervised re-
equipping and training program centered in
Manchuria, according to preliminary US Far
East Command analysis. Training in the combat arms is believed to con-
stitute the major part of this program.
Confirmed reports of the departure of Chinese
Communist troops from South and East China towards Manchuria since late
1950, and the failure of these troops to appear in the Korean war, form the
basis for FECOM's analysis.
Far East Command further believes that the
supplying of Soviet equipment to troops presently in Korea is a measure to
enable China to remain in the Korean war until the 50 divisions in Manchuria,
modernly equipped and trained, are ready for combat.
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Comment: A Soviet program for training and
reequipping Chinese Communist ground forces in Manchuria has been
frequently reported, but nothing is reliably known of the scope of such a
program.
4. De Lattre may be ready to relinquish his Indochina post: 3.3(h)(2)
General de Lattre himself is probably the
source of the rumors predicting his resignation
as High Commissioner in Indochina, according
to a well-placed French official. It is quite
likely that the general wants to leave Indochina while he is still at the
height of his success, particularly since the fulfillment of French desires
in that area is increasingly uncertain. It is also possible that he has
political ambitions which could lead him into the Gaullist camp or into
accepting an important diplomatic post.
Comment: The persistence of these rumors
recently led the French Minister for the Associated States to deny that
De Lattre's replacement is under consideration.
General de Lathe's health has been adversely
affected by his service in Indochina and he might resign on this account.
His departure would probably disrupt the military effort and thus increase
parliamentary opposition to France's continued burden in Indochina.
5. Australian position on New Guinea moderated:
The US Embassy in Canberra comments that
Australia, although not advocating Indonesian
control of West New Guinea, has adopted a
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less rigid attitude than it held a year and a half ago. Australia feels that
the Indonesian Government is not yet stable, however, and fears that
unrest in West New Guinea might have repercussions in adjacent Australian
territory.
Austrialia prefers that the issue remain dormant
until Indonesia achieves political stability, after which a reasonable solution
could be more easily reached. Should a crisis develop over New Guinea in
the near future, however, Australia may still feel forced to support con-
tinued Dutch sovereignty.
Comment: Approximately a year and a half ago,
when the Netherlands and Indonesia were preparing to discuss the disposition
of West New Guinea, Australia made vigorous representations for continued
Dutch sovereignty over the area. Australia argued that its interest in the
question was equal to that of the Netherlands and Indonesia and that it should
in effect be given a veto power over any proposed change of status.
3.3(h)(2)
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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7. British seen willing to resume oil negotiations: 3.3(h)(2)
In view of the US Embassy in London, Foreign
Secretary Eden's statement on 19 November
that he would be willing to negotiate with Iran
at any time, although offering no particular
encouragement, means that the British have abandoned the policy of re-
fusing to negotiate with Mossadeq.. The Embassy believes that the new
British Government has allowed itself wide latitude in possible future nego-
tiations on management of the oil industry but will press for employment of
some British personnel within the organization.
Comment: The intensity of British opposition
to Mossade9. has wavered at times, but they had before Eden's speech
maintained consistently that he must be replaced if any solution to the oil
problem is to be found. The British have felt that failure of Mossadeq to
obtain economic aid would force him to resume negotiations.
Since his return to Iran, Mossadeq has increased
his attacks on the British, placing on them the onus for the failure of the
oil discussions in Washington. This attitude, from which he is unlikely to
swerve, will prevent the resumption of negotiations.
WESTERN EUROPE 3.3(h)(2)
8. Constitutional obstacle to German defense contribution is explored:
United States officials in Bonn doubt that West
Germany can provide any defense contribution in
the foreseeable future if the Parliament. must
amend the constitution in order to sanction it.
krance fears that the contribution requires such an amendment, calling for
two-thirds approval, rather than a motion calling for only a majority vote.
Many West German leaders, according to American observers, maintain
that no amendment is required. Opposition Social Democrats are vehemently
demanding that approval take the form of an amendment.
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Comment: The constitution is extremely vague
in matters regarding rearmament, and contains several articles which might
be invoked by opponents of a German defense contribution. The Social
Democrats, with the help of only a few votes from other parties, could mus-
ter more than one-third of the votes necessary to block any constitutional
amendment on rearmament.
If Adenauer should attempt instead to have the
defense contribution approved by a parliamentary motion, the Social Demo-
crats are likely to send the matter to the newly established Constitutional
Court. This action might result in further delays or uncertainty in the
whole matter of rearmament.
9. Canadians requested to give economic aid to Europe:
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The special NATO committee examining politico-
economic capabilities of its members has
proposed that Canada in 1952 extend 200 million
dollars in economic aid to European member
"nations. In its view, adding Canada to the US as a source of economic aid
would have an important psychological effect in Europe and would greatly
facilitate passage of the 1952-53 Mutual Security Agency appropriations by
the US Congress.
The Canadian Finance Minister objected that
the defense proposals for 1952-53 represent the maximum portion of its
gross natiOnal product that Canada can contribute. The Minister of Commerce
and Defense Production indicated, however, that these problems did not seem
too serious.
Comment: Canada is a strong supporter of NATO
and is somewhat self-conscious about the smallness of its military commit-
ments. Therefore, it may well meet this request.
The Canadian decision will be influenced by the
rate of US defense purchases in Canada. In the first six months of 1951
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Canada ran a 3.44.million dollar trade deficit with the US, the second
largest in history. This deficit is partly attkibutable to defense purchases
resulting from the decision to standardize Canadian military equipment
with the United States.
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