Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
April 15, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 22, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 1, 1951
PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15603102].pdf214.71 KB
Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461r- 31 August 1951 Copy No. e,- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S ite NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR TD:2 DATEntat--7� REVIEWER Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 SUMMARY USSR 1. Embassy Moscow speculates on Soviet policy at San Francisco age 3). FAR EAST SOUTH ASIA 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 33(h)(2) NEAR EAST 5. Greek Marshal Papagos confident of electoral victory (page 6). WESTERN EUROPE 6. French seek discussion in Washington of Allied "rights' in Germany (page 6). * * * -2 TOP� SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Ernbass Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 � ItiCi�StU�litt�i USSR 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) The US Embassy in Moscow suggests that at San Francisco the Soviet Union may attempt to minimize substantive differences between the Kremlin's previously expressed views and the text of the US-UK draft. Thus, the Soviet Government would seek to give the impression that it could sign the treaty if Communist China is brought in on the final discussions concerning treaty differences, and if the treaty con- tains no provision for future Japanese security arrangements. The USSRkwould attribute its objection to such a provision to a fear that Japanese sovereignty would be limited. Since this position would parallel that of Ind, the embassy believes that Moscow may consider it as the best hope of dis- suading hesitant countries from signing, while holding out the prospect that the Kremlin is willing to make some sacrifices on the treaty in exchange for an over-all settlement in the Far East Noting the lack of progress at the cease-fire conference in Korea,, the embassy also suggests the possibility that Soviet delegation members, in private discussions with other delegates, may attsempt� to bring pressure by threatening a final rupture of the Kaesong talks. Comment: Embassy Moscow previously ex� pressed the opinion that Soviet participation in the conference was designed to delay the treaty, to capitalize on the reservations of some states with ze- gard to the draft, and to maintain the pretense of a desire for settlement en major issues with the West. In view of the refusal of India and Burma to sign the US-UK draft, the USSR can exploit their absence, as well as thatRof, Communist China, as evidence that Asian nations do not support the Western treaty. The Soviet delegation will presumably employ tactics at San Francisco to encourage further defections among doubtful signers like Indonesia, Pakistan and some Arab states. 3 3.5(c) TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 3.3(h)(2) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 11%01) SEU.K.E1 FAR EAST 3.5(c) SOUTH ASIA 3.3(h)(2 Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 rtudY�SEChitt 3.5(c) 3.3(h)( 2) 3.3(h)(2 TOP SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 .1-01- SEC.:EAT 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) reek M rsh 1 P NEAR EAST 3.3(h)(2) 11) Marshal Papagos, a candidate in the Greek elections of 9 September, has privately in- formed the US Ambassador that when -- not if � he forms the new government, he will become both Prime Minister and Mirdster of National Defense. The latter position would enable him to clear up the "deteriorated military situation. " Papaps expressed the fear that if the King did not relinquish the position of CoMmander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces before the elections, "there would be considerable eilibarrassment for all concerned." � Comment Recent palace and government efforts to weaken Papagos� candidacy by tampering with the army have re- duced its morale and efficiency, and he is convinced that strong measures must be taken if this influence is to be counteracted. WESTERN EUROPE 6. French seek discup_sion in Washinfon of Allied "rights" in Germanv: tractual relations for ments and details *mil 3.3(h)(2) French Foreign Office officials recommend discussion, in the forthcoming Washington Foreign Ministers talks, of only the major issues involved in the substitution of con- Occupation regime in Germany. Minor disagree- be handled by the Allied High Commission. 6 10P SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 3.5(c) � Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 3.5(c) On some of these main issues the French are strongly opposed to making Allied rights subject to the prospective contractual agreements with Germany. These rights include thestigation of scientific and industrial developments, an Allied function which might be placed under the Council of Ambassadors replacing the High Commission, and retention of supreme authority in a few fields, on which the Foreign Office is not yet decided. Furthermore, the French oppose a limitation of the reserved right of intervention to cases tf a "clear and present danger to security, because they fear the Allies would be reluctant to intervene in, any crisis until the situation had deteriorated too far. Comment; Ever since the Brussels talks of December 1950, the French have insisted that the Allies retain some sover- eign powers in Germany beyond the rights enjoyed under the anticipated con- tractual agreements. More recently, the French have become some- what less liberal in their attitude toward restraints on the Germans than they were. This trend is influenced by developments in West Germany, where the press is currently agitating for the complete abolition of all Allied rights in Germany. The Bonn government, moreover, while recog- nizing that the Allies will of necessity retain special rights growing out of the quadripartite arrangements at the end of the war, can be expected strongly to oppose the policing of German scientific and industrial work. TOPS � Approved for Release: 2019/04/02 CO2739461 3.5(c)