CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/06/28

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02740733
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: June 28, 1951

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%me 1 %..1.1� 1.).E.A.../.L11:1 J. Now
28.Iune 1951
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN'
DOCENT NO
NO CHdNGE IN CLASS. xe
DECL ASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT flEVIEW OAE: ZOO
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AUTH_: NIL ....a.70-2
DATEPIIWEVIEWE
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
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Chinese Communist endorsement of Malik's speech does not
guarantee modification of original terms (page 3).
Caution dominates Western European press reaction to Malik
proposal (page 3).
3.3(h)(2)
FAR EAST
4. Prisoners of war report on attittides of Communist military
personnel in Korea (page 4).
5. Possible Soviet anti-aircraft elements reported in Pyongyang (page 5).
NEAR EAST
. British Foreign Secretary believes no negotiations possible with
present Iranian Government (page 6).
India express concern over stoppage of Iranian
EASTERN EUROPE
9. Tito evidences pro-American sentiment (page 8).
WESTERN EUROPE
3.3(h)(2)
(page 7).
3.3(h)(2)
10� British Foreign Secretary explains intention to deliver Polish tankers
(page 9). 3.3(h)(2)
British support for early German rearmament seen (page 9).
. New French Govern ,e 10).
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GENRAL
I. Chinese Communist endorsement of Malik's speech does not guarantee,
modification of pricinal terms: 3.3(h)(2)
An editorial in the official organ of the
Chinese Communist Party, stating that the
Chinese people "fully endorse" Malik's
cease-fire suggestion, goes on to assert that
if the US "is willing to stop the war, she
should therefore fall in at once with the just and reasonable measures
for peaceful settlement repeatedly proposed" by the Peiping regime.
Comment: The editorial does not explicitly
reaffirm Peiping's original terms for any settlement of the Korean con-
flict; namely: withdrawal of all UN forces from Korea, admission of
Communist China to the UN and US abandonment of Taiwan. The refer-
ence to earlier proposals, however, leaves it open to Peiping to1Aing
forward its original terms after a cease-fire is achieved. The Peiping
regime appears prepared to continue its commitment in Korea indefinitely.
2. aution dominates Western European press reaction to_Malik'proposal,:
Leading non-Communistnewspapers 'in,Weat
Germany, France and Italy received with
caution the Malik proposal for a cease-fire
in Korea, generally stressing that the state-
ment should not be disregarded despite-its�
obvious propaganda aspects. 3.3(h)(2)
Although West German press comments
were on the whole pessimistic, raving
from caution and distrust to outright rejec-
tion of the proposal as a propaganda trick,
Berlin newspapers reflected a hesitant
optimism. French newspapers tended to
show a slightly more favorable attitude, emphasizing that it would be
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absurd to reject the Soviet suggestion just because of its origin, as
long as there is a slight chance for a settlement of the Korean fight-
ing. In general, non-Communist Italian press comment stressed that
the move was not solely a propaganda expedient and that the door to
peace should be left open. Several Western European publications
saw in the proposal a Soviet recognition of military failure in Korea
and a victory of the UN Korean policy. Paris newspapers generally
agreed that the UN goal of discouraging aggression would be obtained
by a settlement on the 38th Parallel.
3.3(h)(2)
FAR EAST
Prisoners of war report on attitudes of Communist milita v personnek
Interrogations of recently-captured prison-
ers of war indiciate that the morale of the
Chinese Communist forces prior to the last
offensive was good, and that such surrenders
as did occur were due to the hopelessness of local military situations and
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to the lack of food. The prisoners revealed that during May a major
source of troop discontent was the deterioration. in the quality and
quantity of rations -- a factor indicating a serious strain on Chinese
Communist Army transportation facilities. It was further revealed
that the majority of Chinese Communist troops in Korea are ex-
Chinese Nationalist troops who may now be regarded as thoroughly
Indoctrinated in Communism. The prisoners regarded Sovie,' taid
as coming from an ally and did not consider themselves as Soviet
puppets. The prisoner of war reports agree that some of the best
Chinese Communist armies have been "destroyed," but they believe
that the CCF can and will continue to fight with somewhat lower
quality replacements.
,po sibl e Soviet Vi-aircraft elemqnts reported in Pw_myang!
According to the Far East Air Force,
reports of the presence
of substantial Soviet anti-aircraft artil-
lery units Lia tbe ang area.
So let an '-
raft tr ops and weapons in Pyongyang in May. 3.3(h)(2)
an automatic weapons group of 40 guns was zaanned by
youthful Soviet soldiers wearing uniforms similar terthoAe worn by
Soviet Naval personnel assigned to AAA coastal defense units. More-
over, air photos reveal a slight increase in both heavy and light anti-
'aircraft guns in the Pyongyiang area, where increasingly intense,
accurate and heavy fire has been encountered. 3.3(h)(2)
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/NEAR EAST
British Foreign Secretary believes no negotiations possible with
'Present Iranian Government:
3.3(h)(2)
British Foreign Secretary Morrison has
informed the US Ambassador in London
that there is no prospect for productive
negotiations with the present Iranian Gov-
ernment and that the British have done everything possible to reach a
reasonable settlement. He commented that the Shah-should dismiss
Mossadeq and, with the support of the army, dissolve the Majlis, but
felt that the Shah lacks the courage to take such action. Morrison re-
peatedly stressed the imminent possibility of violence in Iran, in the
face of which he is unwilling to order British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
personnel to remain at their posts. He emphasized the Parliamentary
difficulties with which he is faced, with the Conservatives consistently
pressing the government to use force -- a recourse which the govern-
ment realizes cannot be adopted except to protect British lives.
Comment: The UK evidently anticipates
the early collapse of the Iranian economy, with the resultant political
chaos, and has apparently decided that such a state of affair will offer
the best conditions for the establishment of a new British bargaining
position for regaining control of the oil industry. The cabinet is un-
doubtedly aware of the serious consequences that may flow from poli-
tical confusion in Iran but nevertheless a ',sears willin to ris these
consequences.
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India e �ress concern over sto 1ta:e of Iranian oi
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Meanwhile, the US Embassy in India states
that according to reliable reports the Indian Government will probably
re-introduce gas rationing on 1 july as a result of the Iranian oil situation.
3.3(h)(2)
comment: It is estimated that the loss of
crude oil and refined products now exiyarted from Iran could be made up
in time from other areas by increaSing crude production and by more
fully utilizing available refining capacity. A stoppage in the flow of
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Iranian oil would cause considerable dislocation and hardship for the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's previous 'customers, since severe
transportation and financial problems would have to be solved.
EASTERN EUROPE
Tito evidences pro-American sentiment:
In a farewell conversation with the
Minister to Yugoslavia, Tito reportedly 0 0,, \ \
referred to the US in the warmest terms, �.`-'"`)
stating that the US alone was the champion
of liberty for the world. Contrasting US policy with that of the USSR,
Tito remarked that, while Stalin was absolutely ruthless, he was clever
enough not to let the USSR take an avert aggressive role. Tito felt that
Molotov supports Stalin's views, but that Malenkov heads amaggressive
Soviet faction that favors war before the Western World rearffis.
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US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade comments
that the increasing Yugoslav friendliness to the US has been promoted
by the US policy of rendering prompt and effective assistance to Yugo-
slavia. Allen notes the special importance of continuing this policy of
winning Yugoslav confidences in order that the new Yugoslav pro-US
orientation will overcome the remaining opposition in the middle and
lower ranks of the Yugoslav Government In Allen's opinton, although
Tito will find it necessary to remove additional officials in his govern-
ment, his position in the country as a whole has been strengthened by
the new orientation.
-Ha comment; The current pro-U6 campaign
being carried on iniYugoslav Army and Communist Party is probably
aimed at overcoming some latent resistance to the Tito government's
pro-US orientation in the organizations on which Tito's support rests.
Other reports within recent months have indicated differences of
opion,within the government and party, and extending even into the
litburo regarding Tito's growing pro-Western leanings.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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10. .,British Foreign Secretary explains intention to deliver Polish tankers:
Foreign Secretary Morrison told US 3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador Gifford on 26 June that the
scheduled delivery of two Polish government-
owned tankers must be related to the gen-
eral British dependence upon Eastern
European sources for timber and grain.
Morsrison felt that there was a definite
risk of losing supplies essential to the
British economy if the tankers were requisitioned. He also referred
to resentment in some quarters because of US pressure for further
restriction of trade. Morrison agreed to look into the possibility of
deferring the date of delivery, though he gave no assurances on this
matter. He expressed full awareness of the probable adverse US re-
action. A Foreign Office note delivered the same day explained that
since Polish ownership of the vessels is unquestionable, the UK could
requisition the tankers only as an "emergency" action that would prob-
able provoke damaging Polish retaliation.
Comment: The two vessels in question
were ordered in 1948 by Poland, and are similar in size to those now
used by the USSR to carry petroleum products to the Far East. Cur-
rent Polish petroleum requirements are such that these vessels would
not necessarily be required for regular shipments between the USSR
and Poland,
11. 13ritish support for early German rearmament seen:
The head of the British Foreign Office's
German political department tas observed
that (a) as a result of the brea.kthwn of
the Deputies' talks in Paris, the Western
powers should press for German rearmament, (b) the British Joint
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Chiefs of Staff are of the same view, and (c) Foreign Secretary
Morrison is ''sold" on the need for an early German contribution
to Western defense.
Qom:tient: Previously, responsible
British officials appeared to see no urgent need for German rearma-
ment, despite the government's agreement in September 1950 to a
German contribution to Western defense. The British counseled
caution, especially during the many months when consideration of
the subject at a possible Foreign Ministers' conference seemed
likely. Another retarding factor has been considerable publi.c opposi-
tion to German rearmament, especially in Labor circles; Recently,
however, the failure of Aneurin Bevan's resignation to cause a
serious Labor Party rift on foreign policy and the apathetic public
reaction to the termination of the Deputies meetings may have in-
stilled some new confidence into government leaders.
12. New French Government faces an urgent problem in Indochina:
3.3(h)(2)
The over-all availability of funds for
the conduct of operations in Indochina is
one of the urgent problems facing the new
French Government and National Assembly.
Indochina was not an important issue in the 17 ,Time National Assembly
elections and there is now no basic difference of opinion among non-
Communist parties on this subject, A dezided swing to the right in the
composition of the French Government, however, might result in a
less liberal interpretation of the position of the Associated States
within the French Union,
Comment; Although the strengthened
Right in the new Assembly probably will be inclined to reinforce com-
mitments in Indochina, it is not expected that operations there will
receive a greater-port itIln of the 1952 than the 1951 military budget
(slightly less than 25 percent). France's anticipated defense expendi-
tures for 1952 are estimated at $4 billion., an increase of 50 percent
over the 1951 defense costs; this will increase the ever-all budget
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deficit to more than $3 billion, and. draw strong criticism, especially
from the Communist deputies. In the event that the Gaullists gain
power, a less liberal interpretation of the position a the Associated �
States would dangerously increase the anti French sentiment already
prevalent in Indochina and weaken support for the Bao Dal government.
In MR press conference on 22 June, De Gaulle stated that once France
is put back in order (10 e, after he returns to power), 10 divisions
(possibly doubling the 150, 000 men now on duty) could be supplied to
Indochina, De Gaulle made clear, however, that the defense of the
metropolitan area would be his first consideration.
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