CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/09/07

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02745271
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2019
• Publication Date: September 7, 1951

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIt
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENVIAL ,
1. Pacific security pacts discussed at San Francisco reception (page 3).
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3.3(h)(2)
FAR EAST
3. India proposes peace treaty with Iapan (page 4
NEAR EAST
3.3(h)(2)
EASTERN EUROPE
5. Rumania intensifies charges of Yugoslav aggression (page 5
WESTERN EUROPE
6. Adenauer reiterates conditions for Schuman Plan approval (page 6).
3.3(h)(2)
8. Comment on Soviet economic squeeze of West Berlin (page 7).
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. .
GENERAL
1. Pacific security pacts discussed at San Francisco reception:
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At a reception in San Francisco on
3 September, several possible Pacific defense
arrangements were discussed by representatives
of interested foreign delegations. According to
the British favor a joint US-UK-French pact
to cietend Malaya, particularly Singapore, in addition to a similar guarantee
of Indochina. 3.3(h)(2)
The Australian Ambassador to the US
would prefer the joint signing of one pact by all Pacific
allies. Conversation revealed that the Filipinos are quietly and informally
discussing the possibility of such a pact with various delegations. They
would like to bar japan, but would not object to inclusion of japan if it were
to sign a bilateral defense pact with the US.
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The role of the Chinese Nationalists in a Pa-
cific Pact was not mentioned by the Australian or Philippine delegates at
any time during the evening.
Comment: All of the free Pacific countries,
except Indonesia, have at one time or another expressed enthusiasm for more
broadly-based Pacific arrangements.
The Vietnamese and the French are the most
recent advocates of extending security agree nt . Prior to his departure
for San Francisco, the Vietnamese Prem erAemp sizedEerti1ss4A-elarrmg
his interest in raising the questiosduring his visit to the US of a US-UK-
French pact to defend Indochina from aggression.
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FAR EAST
3. ,India Drowses peace treaty with Japarz:
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India has made a direct proposal to the Japanese
Government that the state of war between India
and Japan be terminated by a unilateral decla-
ration of the Indian Government. The declaration
would be issued in agreement with the Japanese
Government on or about the date of signing of the multilateral treaty. The
Japanese Foreign Office advised the Indian representative that it could not,
under present regulations, engage in direct discussions, and su ested that
an approach be made through the diplomatic section of SCAP.
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,Comment: India is well aware of the fact that
Japan, under present Occupation directives, cannot conduct direct diplomatic
relations without approval of SCAR Consequently, this direct approach may
be intended to re-emphasiz5 Indian disapproval of Western controls over
Asiatic peoples and also to reassure Japan of India's intentions despite its
refusal to attend the San Francisco conference.
3.3(h)(2)
NEAR EAST
5,
EASTERN EIMOPE
A Rumanian broadcast of 6 September states that
a note has been presented to the Yugoslav Charge
in Bucharest protesting a premeditated Yugo-
slav provocation on 5 September of "grave pro-
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portions." Rumania alleges that Yugoslav frontier guards penetrated Ru-
manian territory in a "heinous attack" and opened fire on Rumanian frontier
guards. During the ensuing six hours "three companies of Yugoslav troops
were deployed in this sector in an attack formation" and fired on Rumanian
frontier guards. One Rumanian allegedly was killed.
Comment; The incident marks a new high in
calculated Satellite diplomatic harassment of Yugoslavia. Rumania's un-
usual haste in presenting its protest and opening the propaganda barrage is
designed to prove Satellite charges of extensive Yugoslav preparations for
aggression. One Rumanian casualty scarcely supports the Rumanian charge
of a three-company attack.
The increasingly exaggerated and insulting tone
of Satellite protests to Yugoslavia is undoubtedly designed to cover the
growing number and size of Satellite border provocations along the Yugoslav
periphery. The present note also anticipates the protest Yugoslavia will
presumably make against the incursion of 60 Albanian soldiers into Yugo-
slav territory on 2 September.
WESTERN EUROPE
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In recent interviews with High Commissioner
McCloy and Ambassador Harriman, Chancellor
Adenauer discussed several problems now facing
the West Germans. Adenauer emphasized that,
fore the Bonn Parliament would ever ratify the Schuman Plan, a firm
declaration of Allied intentions to dissolve the Ruhr Authority and to lift
the ceiling on German steel production was essential. He felt that if Allied
intentions were clear the parliament would be able to ratify the plan without
waiting for French ratification.
Talking to Harriman, Adenauer stressed that
Germany was still threatened by two dangerous trends, nationalism and neu-
tralism. He regarded neutralism as the greater threat, particularly if rapid
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adion were not taken on German y's new political status and her defense
contribution, so that the Federal Republic would gain the power and prestige
which it requires "to appear attractive to the German public.'"
Comment: Adenauer appears to have been forced,
partly by the critical attitude of his coalition partners, into a stronger po-
sition on removal of certain controls before the Schuman Plan can be
approved. 3.3(h)(2)
8. Comment on Soviet economic saueezp of West Berlin�
East German Communist police have taken tvio
new steps to implement the current Soviet economic squeeze of Berlin.
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Over 60 railroad cars carrying mail from West Berlin to West Germany
were turned back at the zonal border check point with a charge that that the
cars were incorrectly loaded, and five passenger buses were prevented
from proceeding to West Germany, despite the fact that the drivers had paid
the new "road tax" imposed by Soviet and East German authorities on
31 August
As yet, the Western Allies have not agreed on
countermeasures to induce the USSR to abandon its harassment of West
Berlin. Imposition of a tax on Soviet Zone barges using West Berlin canals
has been discussed, but strong reservations against taking vigorous imme-
diate countermeasures have already been expresses by French authorities.
Meanwhile, Soviet and East German authorities are reportedly contemplating
imposing a barge tax themselves.
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