IMPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS OUTCOMES OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

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• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02772619
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• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2016
• Case Number: F-2015-02516
• Publication Date: October 20, 1980

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
NOFORN- ONTRACT
f
t-
kitAi1/4.)
Implications of Various
Outcomes of the Iran-Iraq War
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Se
SN1E 34136.2-8
20 October 1980
Copy 443
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SNIE 34/36.2-80
IMPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS
OUTCOMES OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
Information available as of 20 October 1980 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State,
the Department of Energy, and the National Security Agency.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
DISCUSSION
I. STALEMATE
Impact on Iraq
Impact on Iran
Consequences for Oil
Impact on the Region
Israel's Security
Potential Soviet Actions
Impact on the United States
II. IRAQI VICTORY
Impact on Iraq
Impact on Iran
Restoration of Oil
Impact on Arab Politics
Capabilities Against Israel
Soviet Perspective
US Interests
III. IRANIAN VICTORY
Impact on Iraq
Impact on Iran
Restoration of Oil
Impact on the Other Arabs
The Arab-Israeli Balance
Soviet Reaction
Impact on the United States
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Estimate discusses the consequences of three general scenarios
for the current Iraq-Iran conflict: stalemate, an Iraqi victory, and an
Iranian victory. It does not judge which of the three is most likely to
come to pass. In general, the Estimate looks forward six to nine months,
although in some instances trends are identified that extend beyond this
period. The disposition and safety of the US hostages held in Iran have
not been discussed in this assessment because this subject would include
considerations beyond the scope of this Estimate.
The goals of the combatants have remained relatively constant
throughout the conflict. Iraq has sought to overturn its 1975 agreement
with Iran by a military fait accompli, to gain control of the Shatt al-
Arab, to reestablish eventual Arab sovereignty over the islands of the
Tunbs and Abu Musa, and to bring about the overthrow of the
Khomeini regime. Iran has sought to blunt the Iraqi offensive, to extract
a stiff price from Baghdad for the seizure of Iranian territory and the
destruction of Iranian petroleum facilities, and to discredit Iraqi Presi-
dent Saddam Hussein at home and in the international arena.
If neither side is able to achieve its goals and the conflict evolves into
a stalemate, the situation over the next several months is likely to lead
to:
� Serious damage to the political standing of Saddam Hussein and
the intensification of antiregime activity by Iraq's restive Kurd-
ish minority and Shia majority.
� Serious economic hardship in Iran contributing to an intensifica-
tion of the power struggle in Tehran, with the military probably
gaining in political status.
� Continued curtailment of oil exports from Iran and Iraq, greater
damage to their oil facilities, and a heightened risk that other
Gulf oil producers will be drawn directly into the conflict.
Protracted tensions between the combatants would present the Soviet
Union with certain opportunities in pursuing its most critical regional
objectives: winning a principal role in controlling the access to oil from
the Gulf and preventing the establishment of an enhanced US political-
military posture in the region. These opportunities might include:
� Reviving the -Portugalov Plan,- which provides for a Soviet
role in guaranteeing the security of access to Persian Gulf oil.
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� Supplying arms to both sides while also seeking to mediate the
dispute, thereby gaining greatly enhanced influence in the
region.
Avoiding taking sides�as long as the outcome remains uncer-
tain and there is no significant political realignment of either
combatant�and exploiting any openings to propagandize
against the United States.
Stalemate is probably the outcome containing the greatest possibilities
for both gain and risk for US interests. On the positive side, a stalemate
would:
� Preoccupy both Iran and Iraq and wear down their military
capabilities.
� Facilitate US attempts to enter into new security arrangements
with selected area states.
� Relieve pressure on Arab moderates to move toward more
hardline, anti-US positions, particularly on the Arab-Israeli
dispute.
On the _negative side, the greatest danger from the US perspective is
that a stalemate might lead to:
� A widening of the war and thus an interruption of the flow of
oil from all Gulf producers.
� A sharp increase in oil prices, because of protracted
nonavailability of Iranian and Iraqi oil.
� Greater challenge to the domestic security of the Arab Gulf
states.
� Risk of expanded opportunities of Soviet influence in the region.
If the conflict resulted in an Iraqi victory, it would solidify Saddam's
position at home and strengthen Iraq's influence among the Gulf states
and in the Arab world. This would create renewed difficulties for the
United States and its regional allies on a variety of political and security
issues, particularly the Arab-Israel struggle. Because an Iraqi victory
might include major reduction of Iran's ability to refine crude oil and
the consolidation of Iraq's military control over western Khuzestan,
Baghdad could exert great pressure on the Iranian economy. This,
added to the humiliation of defeat, would severely tarnish Khomeini's
image of invincibility and could in time lead to the collapse of the
regime. A defeated Iran would also be vulnerable to territorial frag-
mentation, as dissident minorities sought to consolidate their autonomy.
This would increase the chances that the Soviets could ultimately estab-
lish a more influential position in Iran. In view of the difficulties and
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time that would probably be required for a successful Iraqi campaign,
damage to oil facilities of both combatants probably would be serious.
A victory by Iran would immensely strengthen the Khomeini regime,
as it would again appear to have prevailed over great odds and, in the
eyes of Khomeini, over the United States. This probably would make it
more difficult for the United States to maintain international adherence
to sanctions against Iran. Emboldened by victory, Iran almost certainly
would intensify efforts to export its revolution to the Arab Gulf states,
probably prompting them in turn to pursue the dual strategy of seeking
accommodation with Iran and security assurances from the United
States.
If Iraq were defeated, there would be a good chance that Saddam
would be toppled and a serious danger would arise of widespread revolt
by Iraq's Shia majority against continued political control by the domi-
nant Sunni minority. Iraq's more vigorous efforts in recent years to
supplant Egypt as the most influential Arab state probably would be
derailed, and Baghdad's influence in the Gulf would be substantially
reduced.
An Iranian victory would provide few clear-cut advantages to the
Soviets, although Iran's efforts to destabilize Arab governments in the
Gulf might provide the Soviets with some new opportunities. The USSR
might also stand to gain from Iran's defiance of the United States,
through offers to assist in rebuilding the country. The speed with which
prewar oil flows could be restored would depend on the extent of dam-
age to oil facilities, which has worsened during the past several weeks.
Moreover, if a defeated Iraq were plunged into political chaos, restora-
tion of its facilities would be seriously complicated.
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DISCUSSION
I. STALEMATE
1. The war between Iran and Iraq, which began on
22 September 1980, may proceed over the next six to
nine months with neither side able to win a decisive or
acknowledged victory. Iraq might continue its occupa-
tion of a significant portion of Khuzestan with Iran
continuing to resist. Under such a scenario Iraq
presumably would remain interested in a cease-fire
and negotiations, but it would be unable to secure its
position in occupied Khuzestan or totally disrupt dis-
tribution of petroleum in Iran and would remain
vulnerable to Iranian counterattacks and guerrilla ac-
tions. Iran would remain unable to drive Iraqi forces
out of the occupied areas of Iran but would refuse to
accept a formal cease-fire, negotiations, or a com-
promise settlement. The conventional war might
gradually wind down without a political settlement.
The fighting, conventional or guerrilla, could also con-
tinue at a fairly high level or sporadically for an ex-
tended period.
Impact on Iraq
2. A stalemate would damage the political standing
of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Stalemate would
lead to domestic recriminations, an erosion of
Saddam's prestige and authority, and probably
antiregime plotting, purges, and increased terrorism
by Iraq's Shia Muslim population backed by Iran.
Saddam would be blamed for miscalculating Iran's
political and military reaction and for embroiling Iraq
in a protracted war that it could not win. He would
blame his advisers, especially in the military. Much
jockeying would ensue, but over time it would be
likely that factions in the Baath Party would join with
disgruntled elements of the military in efforts to oust
Saddam. Some segments of the military could turn
against the party, but the latter is sufficiently large,
institutionalized, and established in the military ser-
vices that this is less likely. It could take an extended
time to settle the issue, as Saddam's abilities in seizing
and holding power are formidable.
3. During this period Saddam would curtail his ten-
tative prewar moves to expand his political base by
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broadening political participation in favor of more re-
pressive rule. At the same time, Iraq's Kurdish minor-
ity would seek to exploit the military and political
demoralization and the government's preoccupation
with Iran to advance its autonomy goals. Saddam's
own thinking would turn more toward suspicion of
those around him, preoccupation with vengeance
against Iran, and a search for victory elsewhere to re-
store his lost prestige.
4. Failure to resolve the conflict would result in
economic dislocations in Iraq, but Iraq is in a much
better economic position than Iran to weather a pro-
tracted conflict. Iraq entered the war with a healthy
inventory of essential commodities, had a good grain
crop this year, has several months' stocks of imported
foodstuffs, and greater financial reserves. Ports that
normally handle 80 percent of Iraq's 8-10 million tons
of annual imports are closed, but alternate overland
routes have the capacity to maintain supplies of most
basic needs.
Impact on Iran
5. A stalemate would intensify the power struggle
in Iran. The regime had been gradually losing support
and turning toward authoritarianism before the war,
although this trend was interrupted by the surge of
nationalistic pride that buoyed the regime following
the Iraqi attack. The blunting of Iraq's offensive could
be viewed as a symbolic victory even though some
Iranian territory remains in Baghdad's hands. How-
ever, once the initial enthusiasm for the war passes and
the full impact of Iranian losses is felt, factional in-
fighting between the secularists and clerics probably
would increase, perhaps with military leaders playing
a role for the first time. The war has increased the
military's prestige and given it greater credibility�
improving the chances for a successful coup d'etat.
6. If Iranian forces remain tied up in the southwest
or depleted to the extent that key positions in the prov-
inces cannot be controlled, minority groups will prob-
ably make new attempts to consolidate the already
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significant self-rule that they enjoy in some areas. Left-
ist opposition groups�Mujahedin and Fedayeen�
would also be able to operate more openly and could
further expand their influence. The public stance of the
Tudeh and other groups with ties to the USSR would
depend on whether the USSR continues to support
Khomeini. Covertly, these groups can be expected to
continue efforts to subvert the regime.
7. If the conflict were not resolved, Iran would face
internal economic problems more serious than those of
Iraq. Loss of access to oil facilities in Abadan has al-
ready eliminated half of Iran's petroleum refining and
product storage capacity. Iran's remaining refineries
could produce no more than 50 to 70 percent of winter
kerosene requirements, and the outlook for importing
oil products is bleak. If Iran's remaining oil refineries
were shut down, the country's economy would be in a
precarious position, creating severe economic depriva-
tion. In any event, Iran's already troubled food situa-
tion would also worsen.
Consequences for Oil
8. As long as military activity continues even on a
small scale, oil exports through the Persian Gulf from
Iran and Iraq are likely to remain seriously curtailed,
and Iraqi oil shipments to Mediterranean ports will
probably remain cut off. The longer the fighting
continues, moreover, the greater the risk will be of
more serious damage to oil facilities that would hinder
the resumption of exports once hostilities end.
9. World oil inventories theoretically could cover
the loss of Iraqi and Iranian exports for at least the
remainder of 1980, but there would be a marked
reluctance to draw down stocks when a prolonged loss
of exports was believed likely by the world oil market.
This reluctance in turn would generate ever-increasing
price pressures on crude. Part of the loss of Iranian and
Iraqi oil is expected to be offset by increased supplies
from other OPEC countries, but political and tech-
nical constraints would probably limit the increase
over a period of months, to about half the loss of
nearly 4 million barrels per day (b/d).
10. If, under the pressure of growing economic and
military problems, Iran should attack other Persian
Gulf oil producers or attempt to close the Strait of
Hormuz, the impact on the oil market would be im-
mediate and large. Even if oil exports were not com-
pletely shut down as a result of Iranian action, the
psychological impact of the widening of the conflict to
an area that currently supplies an additional 13-14
million b/d of exports would be devastating. There
would be a scramble to secure the limited non-Persian
Gulf supplies and an immediate increase in spot and
official prices.
Impact on the Region
11. If the conflict between the two Gulf states is
protracted, the risks will grow of regional instability
and of increased involvement in the war by outside
powers. Jordan's commitment to Iraq could lead to its
direct involvement, to greater use of Aqaba port and
Jordanian airfields by the Soviets and others to re-
supply Iraq, and to heightened anxiety, warnings, and
perhaps military intimidation by the Israelis to counter
this resupply and any Iraqi presence in Jordan. If the
Arab Gulf states were to become more involved or
Iran were to feel a heightened sense of desperation,
Iran could attack the Arab Gulf states or attempt to
close the Strait of Hormuz. As long as the Arab Gulf
states are not attacked, Syria and Libya probably
would become more vocal and generous in their sup-
port for Iran as the stalemate continued.
12. As time passes without a clear Iraqi victory, the
recent growth in Baghdad's influence over other Arabs
and the nonaligned states is likely to slow or even be
reversed�and with it the inclination of the smaller
Arab states to go along with Iraq's hardline policies.
This, added to the general Arab preoccupation with
the war, could lead to at least a temporary reduction
in the intensity of the Arabs' campaign against Egypt.
This altered Arab outlook is not likely, however, to
include fundamental changes in the positions of any of
the Arab states on the basic issues of the Arab-Israeli
dispute.
Israel's Security
13. Prolonged conflict between Iran and Iraq would
enhance Israeli military superiority over the Arab
states. Iraq's Army and Air Force, the principal poten-
tial contributors of expeditionary forces to the Golan
Heights-Jordan Valley front against Israel, are tied
down in and facing Iran, and extended conflict would
increase Iraqi losses and delay force improvement pro-
grams. Continuation of the war in the Gulf might lead
to the establishment of more effective forms of mili-
tary cooperation between Iraq and Jordan that over
the longer term would work to Israel's disadvantage.
In most other respects, however, continued fighting
would only cause a further deterioration in the already
poor relations among several Arab states, most notably
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Iraq and Syria, that have long been a major stumbling
block to effective coordination of military forces
against Israel. The Israelis, who hold a pessimistic view
of the longer term trends in the region, might view this
period of military imbalance as a propitious time to
preempt such perceived threats as the Palestinians'
military capability in southern Lebanon or the Iraqi
nuclear facility at Tuwaitha.
Potential Soviet Actions
14. A period of protracted tension between Iran
and Iraq would present the Soviets with certain op-
portunities. Moscow will maintain its criticism of the
United States, hoping to prevent or at least limit any
coordinated Western action in the Gulf. In this
connection the Soviets might revive their proposal for
multilateral discussions aimed at guaranteeing the se-
curity of access to Gulf oil�the so-called Portugalov
Plan. These steps would be in keeping with two of the
Soviets' most critical objectives in the area: winning for
themselves a principal role in controlling access to oil
from the Gulf; and preventing the establishment of an
enhanced US politico-military posture in the region. In
any event, Moscow will continue to maintain a
substantial naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the
Arabian Sea.
15. The Soviets may be prepared to covertly supply
arms to both sides while at the same time offering to
mediate a settlement. However the war evolves, Mos-
cow would probably volunteer to help rebuild combat-
damaged facilities in the hope of ultimately garnering
increased and preferential access to energy, particu-
larly for its East European clients. The Soviets will
strive to avoid openly taking sides so long as the out-
come remains uncertain and there is no significant
political realignment of either combatant.
Impact on the United States
16. Paradoxically, stalemate is probably the out-
come of the conflict that from the point of view of US
interests contains both the greatest possibility for gains
and the highest risk of severe setbacks. On the positive
side, a stalemate would preoccupy both Iran and Iraq
and wear down their military capability. By eroding
Iraq's influence with the other Arabs and providing a
continuing alternative focus for Arab concern, a stale-
mate would' to some extent relieve pressure on the
Arab moderates to move toward more hardline, anti-
US positions, win the United States some respite from
Arab pressure to solve the Palestinian problem, and
facilitate US efforts to enter into new security arrange-
ments with selected area states. A stalemate would also
be the outcome preferred by the chief US supporters
in the area�Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The ero-
sion of Iraqi and Iranian influence in the Gulf would
also raise the possibility that Saudi Arabia might be
able to establish itself as a more realistic leader of the
Arab states in the region, at least on the diplomatic
front.
17. On the negative side, stalemate could lead not
only to a continuation but also to an expansion of the
conflict�and to a consequent direct challenge to the
United States and the West. If Iran perceives itself in
an increasingly desperate military and economic situa-
tion, it could strike at the oil production facilities of
the Arab Gulf states or attempt to close or disrupt traf-
fic through the Strait of Hormuz, knowing that these
actions would force outside involvement, including US
involvement, to keep the oil flowing. Such a widening
of the war�although it might be of short duration�
would carry the highest risk of interrupting the flow of
oil from all Gulf producers, triggering sharp price in-
creases, undermining the domestic security of the
Arab Gulf states, and prompting the direct involve-
ment of third parties in the conflict. All parties con-
cerned would expect the United States to intervene
militarily, and would fear that other Arab states, Is-
rael, and the USSR might also be drawn in. This situa-
tion would put the Western alliance to a severe test,
with the European allies convinced of their vulnerabil-
ity but uncertain of the extent to which they should
become involved militarily. Any US moves perceived
as pro-Iranian, especially a relaxing of the embargo on
military supplies, would be seen in the Arab world as
anti-Arab�in the same way Arabs view US support of
Israel.
II. IRAQI VICTORY
18. A credible Iraqi victory must have both a mili-
tary and a political component. Militarily, Iraqi forces
must solidify their hold on the Shatt al-Arab and those
parts of Khuzestan critical to Iran's oil economy. On
the political side, if the Iraqis were to succeed in
prompting the overthrow of Ayatollah Khomeini, they
would have won a victory virtually regardless of
whether they had achieved their territorial goals. Short
of that, the Iraqi regime must achieve a truce favor-
able to Baghdad or otherwise demonstrate that it has
bested the Iranians. Iraqi leaders will not be credited
by the other Arabs or by their own people with having
achieved a victory as long as Iraqi forces in Iran are
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continually vulnerable to major Iranian counterattacks
and are sustaining unacceptably high casualties, or as
long as Iran is able to sustain its economy and armed
forces with petroleum from Khuzestan. Baghdad need
not achieve restoration to the Arabs of the Iranian-
controlled islands in the lower Gulf to be seen as hav-
ing emerged the victor.
Impact on Iraq
19. Military victory over Iran would to an extraor-
dinary degree solidify the status of Saddam Hussein as
leader of Iraq and strengthen a sense of Iraqi national-
ism. Iraq's rulers and populace would believe them-
selves truly the preeminent power in the Gulf and pos-
sibly in the Arab world. A more confident Saddam
Hussein would resume efforts to broaden his political
base, extend the concept of nationhood, and give
Iraqis a sense of greater participation in the system.
There would, however, be no meaningful devolution
of power, and opposition groups like the Kurds prob-
ably would be more intimidated than they are now.
Iraqi leaders would be even more reluctant to advance
views contrary to those of Saddam Hussein. One of the
most significant consequences of victory might be that
it would reinforce in Baghdad the notion that Iraq's
military power was a usable tool of foreign policy.
Impact on Iran
20. An Iraqi victory that included the consolidation
of Iraq's military control over western Khuzestan and
the shutting down of Iran's principal refineries would
enable Baghdad to exert great pressure on the Iranian
economy. As in the case of continuing fighting that
resulted in shutting down of a substantial part of Iran's
refining capacity, fuel shortages would soon develop
that would curtail internal distribution of critical
commodities. Even the import of vital goods would
prove very difficult, as the lack of fuel would soon
restrict Iran's ability to move goods overland. It would
also disrupt Iran's ability to produce domestic food
supplies in the spring. Electric power generation
would be heavily cut, and heating and cooking fuel
would become extremely scarce during the winter
months.
21. Politically, an Iraqi victory that involved the
loss of a significant amount of Iranian territory and oil
resources would undermine Khomeini's image of
invincibility and could in time lead to the collapse of
the regime. Several months of economic deprivation in
Iran would add severe pressure on the collection of
factions that make up the Iranian regime. They would
be likely to quarrel among themselves as the winter
goes on. Some would make common cause with ele-
ments in the military or the Revolutionary Guards.
Efforts to change the government would be made. But
Khomeini's stubbornness would cause him to resist all
efforts at compromise, and his position as the man who
saved Iran from the Shah might protect his position at
least as a figurehead whatever the outcome of the
political struggle. Dissident minorities might be able to
consolidate their autonomy in the provinces. Their
ability to deny to the central government the resources
and communications links in their homelands would
further weaken the regime in Tehran. Some minority
groups, probably helped by Iraq, would join with
other moderate forces seeking to topple the
government.
22. Winning foreign assistance for regaining Iran's
lost territory would be a priority for any regime fol-
lowing a defeat. In view of Iran's suspicions about US
antagonism and backing for Iraq, such a government
probably would continue to be anti-American. Despite
its Islamic rhetoric, it might be more willing to reach a
rapprochement with the USSR. Or, a new regime
might demand as a precondition for ties with the
United States that Washington initiate pressure on
Iraq to make significant withdrawals.
Restoration of Oil
23. The Iraqis have built substantial redundancies
into their oil transport system, and probably would be
able to restore some exports if they won. There is,
however, increasing evidence of damage to critical
Iraqi oil facilities that could prevent the restoration of
production and exports to prewar levels. The longer it
takes to obtain victory, the greater the chance of even
more serious damage to critical facilities. If the
Iranians retained control of their offshore and south-
eastern Khuzestan oil facilities, which are outside the
current primary area of conflict, Tehran could prob-
ably restore crude oil exports to prewar levels (600,000
b/d) with only minimal delay. Production from off-
shore fields could probably produce 350,000-400,000
b/d by themselves.
Impact on Arab Politics
24. An Iraqi victory would have a far-reaching im-
pact on the political balance in the region and on the
views of area states on security issues, especially if the
Iraqis held on to Khuzestan or established a puppet
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regime there. Iraq's prestige and influence in the Arab
world would be enhanced significantly. Conversely,
the respect or fear the Arabs have for the Iranian
revolution and for Ayatollah Khomeini would dimin-
ish, and with it probably much of Iran's ability in the
near term to intimidate the smaller Gulf states�limit-
ing its ability to foment political dissidence among
their Shia populations.
25. An Iraqi victory (like an Iranian victory) would
also ensure renewed instability and conflict over the
longer term. The mutual Persian-Arab antipathy and
hatred that has existed since the seventh century has
been given an enormous boost by the current conflict,
which has been wider than any between Persian and
Arab for at least a century and a half. It will not be
forgotten, and people on both sides of the cultural di-
vide will seek revenge. Neither Iraq nor Iran would
acquiesce permanently in fundamental and disad-
vantageous alterations of the border.
26. A victorious Iraq almost certainly would emerge
as the most assertive, influential, and effective state
seeking to lead Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller
Gulf states to an Arab consensus that was independent
of the United States, the USSR, Egypt, and the -Stead-
fastness Front--Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen,
and the PLO. This probably would stimulate renewed
efforts by the Gulf states, especially Kuwait, to seek
political accommodation with Iraq and further limit
Saudi Arabia's role as leader of the Gulf Arabs. Syria,
more than the other Arab states, would be defensive
and fearful of an expanded Iraqi role in the region.
Syria's relations with Jordan could be expected to
deteriorate further, and Damascus might continue to
draw closer to Libya and the Soviet Union.
Capabilities Against Israel
27. An Iraqi victory would not increase Baghdad's
ability to confront Israel militarily for the next three to
five years. Following the current conflict, Baghdad
would probably:
� Accelerate the ongoing modernization and
expansion of its military and economy, with em-
phasis on replacement of items lost in the war
and correcting deficiencies in air defense and air
force performance that were uncovered during
the war.
� Use its enhanced strategic position to encourage
other Arab oil producers to spend more of their
wealth and influence to promote military and
diplomatic action against Israel.
RACT
� Attempt to extend wartime cooperation with Jor-
dan into closer military and political ties between
the two countries.
28. The aftermath of the war, however, will con-
tinue to limit the amount of troops and weaponry that
Iraq could send against Israel, as Baghdad would need
to maintain a large portion of its Army facing Iran to
deter revanchism, especially if militant Shias remain
in power in Tehran. Iraq would also need time to re-
place wartime losses in personnel, weapons, and logis-
tic stores.
Soviet Perspective
29. The Soviets would move quickly to strengthen
their own ties to Iraq if it were to defeat Iran, rec-
ognizing that Soviet interests would be best served by
being on good terms with a more powerful Iraq. The
Soviets would almost certainly become more coopera-
tive in their discussions about arms deliveries to Iraq.
We believe that the Soviets would be inclined to move
in this direction because of their concern that a
strengthened Iraq might be even more eager than be-
fore to promote its own independent role and to dis-
tance itself from Moscow. A preeminent Iraq that is
not dependent on Soviet weapons systems might well
hinder the USSR's efforts to promote its own interests
in the Gulf, particularly access to oil. Moreover, from
the Soviet point of view, a preeminent Iraq might cre-
ate new impetus for other Gulf states to look to the
West for assistance.
30. Assuming that Iran would remain at least mini-
mally stable over the short term following its defeat,
the Soviets could offer major economic and military
support�hoping to build relations with Tehran,
thereby preventing any Iranian turnabout toward the
West and enhancing the ability of the USSR to expand
its position in Iran over the longer term. Tehran might
be receptive to such an offer in the belief, which the
Soviets might encourage, that Moscow was both able
and willing effectively to press Baghdad on Iran's
behalf.
31. Anticipating increased instability in Iran, Mos-
cow would continue to develop its own assets there
and might strengthen Soviet military capabilities in
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the region. If Iran began a process of fragmentation,
Moscow might seek to take advantage of the situation
through instigation of a pro-Soviet coup in Tehran,
supporting separatist groups in the provinces or even
occupation of adjacent border areas.
US Interests
32. An Iraqi military victory over Iran would raise
a significant new challenge to the policy aims of the
United States and its friends in the area�Israel,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Although a victorious Iraq
would be preoccupied militarily with the Iran prob-
lem for an extended period, its increased influence
among the other Arab states, especially Jordan and the
Gulf states, would strengthen Baghdad's effectiveness
in marshaling Arab support for its generally hardline,
anti-US policies on regional issues. This would ensure
that there would be no slippage in the Arab opposition
to the Camp David Accords, reinforce the reluctance
of the Arabs to endorse any future agreements result-
ing from the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations on Palestin-
ian autonomy, and probably increase the reservations
of the Gulf Arabs about negotiating or implementing
fully any security arrangements with the United
States. If Iraq continued to hold Iranian oilfields, it
might also have an enhanced ability to influence the
deliberations of OPEC.
33. An Iraqi victory would stimulate intensified Is-
raeli requests for US assistance, as Israel would see it-
self threatened militarily by a more influential Iraq,
especially in view of the recent close cooperation be-
tween Iraq and Jordan. This would be true even
though Iraq's military capability vis-a-vis Israel would
not be enhanced. Israel would also be anxious about
the possibility that the Iraqis over time would try to
use their oil weapon and their greater political clout to
undermine European and other international backing
for Israel, elicit cooperation of foreign suppliers with
Iraq's nuclear program, expel Israel from the UN Gen-
eral Assembly, or seat the Palestine Liberation Orga-
nization in more international organizations. Success-
ful or not, any such efforts on Iraq's part would be
likely to entangle Washington as well, isolating the
United States as the principal international supporter
of Israel.
CT
III. IRANIAN VICTORY
34. For Iran to win a military victory it must
emerge from the conflict with Iraqi forces- substan-
tially withdrawn from Khuzestan and with secure ac-
cess to its petroleum resources in the province. Politi-
cally, the Iranians could win a victory if Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein were to be toppled or
discredited in the Arab world after having become
bogged down in Iran or following a serious military
debacle, whatever the situation regarding the occupied
territory.
Impact on Iraq
35. The major distinctions between stalemate and
defeat for Iraq are in the pace and severity of con-
sequences. Like stalemate, defeat would produce
antiregime plotting, purges, and emboldened Kurdish
and Shia violence. A defeat, however, would hasten
the process and aggravate the results, seriously chal-
lenging any regime's ability to maintain Iraq's social
fabric, which is torn by deep ethnic and religious dif-
ferences. The chances of Saddam Hussein retaining
power in the face of defeat would be greatly dimin-
ished. A successor regime would certainly involve the
military, but no one in Iraq�with the possible excep-
tion of ailing ex-President Bakr�has Saddam's stature.
A defeat would discredit both the military and the
party, adding to a successor regime's burden of estab-
lishing its authority. Defeat would probably produce
an Iraq similar to that of the late 1960s and early
1970s�insecure, massively repressive internally, and
regarded as unstable and hostile abroad. Outside pow-
ers�Syria and Iran among them�would likely in-
crease their support to various dissident elements as a
way to keep the regime weak.
36. The degree of damage sustained by the Iraqi
economic infrastructure, especially to its oil facilities,
could well determine the rapidity of Iraq's recovery
from a defeat in the war. If it emerged relatively un-
scathed, Baghdad's continuing economic strength
would help restore more quickly governmental self-
confidence and provide the population with an incen-
tive for a stable government. An Iranian victory prob-
ably would not have a serious impact on the Iraqi
economy unless Iraqi use of the Shatt al-Arab water-
way was disrupted or alternate overland trade routes
closed. The interdiction of Iraq's transport routes
would eventually be translated into shortages of food,
intermediate products, and consumer goods.
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Impact on Iran
37. Victory over Iraq would immensely strengthen
the Khomeini regime. Khomeini would again appear
to have prevailed in the face of overwhelming odds
and the opposition of the United States and the Arabs.
The prestige of the Iranian military and President
Bani-Sadr would be boosted, but the Islamic fun-
damentalists would probably move quickly to try to
undercut them. The minorities and leftist opposition
would have no immediate weaknesses to exploit and
would continue to strengthen themselves in the hope
of winning future concessions from Tehran.
Restoration of Oil
38. The speed with which prewar oil flows could be
restored would depend on the extent of damage to
vital facilities. Such damage has worsened during the
past several weeks. If Iran were to win a victory over
Iraq with little additional damage to either country's
oil facilities, limited oil flows from both could resume
quickly provided that Iraq retained use of its two off-
shore Persian Gulf terminals. If use of these terminals
were lost, Iraq theoretically could export almost 2 mil-
lion b/d via the Mediterranean Sea. However, 1.2 mil-
lion b/d of this capacity goes through Syria, which has
backed Iran in the war and might therefore interdict
the flow.
Impact on the Other Arabs
39. A military victory over Iraq in a war launched
by the Iraqis would enhance Iran's potential to influ-
ence or intimidate the other Arab states in the Gulf
region. Tehran would almost certainly possess a
greater capacity to stimulate antiregime political
activity among the sizable Arab or Persian Shia popu-
lations of Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia in
particular. The small Gulf states could be expected to
explore the possibilities for political accommodation
with Iran, but at the same time they probably would
seek continued or more explicit security guarantees or
assistance from the United States. Iraq in the near
term would have much less influence with the Gulf
states, but any regime in Baghdad could be expected
within a relatively short time to attempt to redress
such an anomalous imbalance.
40. Iraq's attempt to supplant Egypt as the most
influential Arab state, pursued vigorously since the
signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978, probably
would be derailed by a military defeat. In terms of
inter-Ara � politics, Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Saudi
Arabia would be disadvantaged by their support for
Iraq and would be unlikely to take vigorous or effec-
tive steps to lead an Arab consensus if Iraq had turned
inward to deal with its domestic' problems. Conversely,
the radical Arab backers of Iran, Syria and Libya,
would be strengthened by an Iranian victory and, al-
though they would win no new converts to their
hardline policies, would be left somewhat less defen-
sive, isolated, and insecure. Egypt's position within the
Arab world probably would not change appreciably,
although the moderate Arabs in their insecurity and
without Iraq's pressing probably would make less an
issue of the isolation of Egypt. The net impact of an
Iranian victory probably would be heightened frag-
mentation among the Arabs and a new period of
scrambling for leadership among them.
The Arab-Israeli Balance
41. Iranian victory would ensure enhanced Israeli
military superiority over the Arabs for at least the next
five years. Iran would not have the capability follow-
ing the war to send more than token forces to the
Golan Heights or southern Lebanon, and Iraq's forces
would need substantial rebuilding. If the present gov-
ernment survived in Baghdad, it would see Tehran as
the main threat and probably would not be eager to
challenge the Israelis until the score with Iran was set-
tled. A severe setback for Iraq would drain its military
strength and would increase Shia unrest in Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, and the Gulf states, thus focusing attention on
internal problems and away from the dispute with Is-
rael, despite a likely increase in militant Arab rhet-
oric. Although Tel Aviv would view unrest around the
Gulf with alarm, fearing an expanded Soviet role in
the region and declining Western influence, it would
see fewer emerging military threats directed specifi-
cally against its interests and might find less need to
take preemptive military action.
Soviet Reaction
� 42. The Soviets might anticipate that an Iranian
victory would generate further impetus for pro-
Khomeini Shia forces to foment revolution in neigh-
boring Gulf states. They would hope that the instabil-
ity thus created would lead ultimately to the fall of
some of these governments, particularly Saudi Arabia,
and thus produce a major strategic setback for the
United States and the West. The Soviets would ac-
tively support these Iranian goals, even at some risk to
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their position in Iraq, by providing military aid and by
continuing to play upon Iran's hatred of the United
States. On the other hand, the Soviets recognize that
Islamic radicals in the area are anti-Soviet as well as
anti-West; they are concerned about the spreading of
Islamic radicalism to their own Islamic minority; and
they do not want to see a rationale provided for a
forceful US involvement in the region. In the event of
an Iranian victory, the Soviets would be very forth-
coming in their offers to assist Iran, seeking to develop
their ties to the Iranian regime and lay the ground-
work for better relations.
Impact on the United States
43. The chief effect on US interests in the Middle
East of an Iranian victory would be to relieve the
United States and its regional supporters of the prob-
lem of dealing with a more powerful and influential
Iraq. A defeat would foment political instability in
Baghdad, but, whether or not it led to the replacement
of the current regime, it probably would foreshadow a
period of preoccupation with domestic affairs and a
disinclination to pursue an activist policy in the Gulf
or in the Arab world. This would remove some of the
intensity from the Arabs' anti-US and anti-Egypt cam-
paigns, and�coupled with a likely increase in Iranian
efforts to export Iran's revolution�probably leave the
Gulf Arabs more willing to cooperate with the United
States on mutual security matters. A more withdrawn
Iraq could also open the way for Egypt over time to
establish itself as leader of the Arab world, and in the
near term relieve some of Israel's anxieties.
44. A victorious Iran would possess a greater poten-
tial to foment revolution in the Arab states of the Gulf,
however, and would be reinforced in its tendency to
take a very hard line in negotiations on bilateral issues
with the United States. Additionally, the United States
would probably find it more difficult to maintain
international adherence to the boycott of Iran if the
regime were buoyed and seemingly made permanent
by a successful war with Iraq. With Iran's revolution
strengthened, however, the likelihood presumably
would grow that the country would remain relatively
stable, thereby reducing somewhat the chances that
the United States might be required to deal with an
expansion of Soviet influence in Iran.
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