ALLEDGED ASSESSMENT OF VC FAILURE DURING TET OFFENSIVE IN DANANG BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM HANOI AND NEW PLAN FOR ATTACK OF DANANG

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02797882
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RIPPUB
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U
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11
Document Creation Date: 
April 27, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 30, 2019
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Publication Date: 
February 17, 1968
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PDF icon ALLEDGED ASSESSMENT OF VC[15618072].pdf353.53 KB
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Intelligence Information Cable PRIORITY IN 53316 PAGE 1 OF 11 PAGES STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SOC ONE CRS DDI EXO OCR FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. �171trron-mt-ti-56�4----_ THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. 0110UP Excluded from aereeneric downgrading and declossikation 1 7201 9Z CITE DIST 17 FEBRUARY 1968 COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM DOI: MID-FEBRUARY 196S SUBJECT: ALLEDGED ASSESSMENT OF VC FAILURE DURING TET IN DANANG BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM HANOI AND NE FOR ATTACK OF DPNANG CO: SOURCE: SECRET 3.5(c) 3.5(c) L P. N 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.-3(h)(2) � � ,..01 J. .... � %..� ,J I Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 IN 53316 3.5(c) PAGE 2 OF 11 PAGES K t T (classification) FOREIGN DI (dtssem controls) 3.3(h)(2) 1. ALLEGEDLY A DELEGATION FROM HANOI HAS REVIEWED THE VC/N:1VA. FAILURE IN THE TET OFFENSIVE AGAINST DANANG, AND A NEW PLAN OF ATTACK, APPARENTLY TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, HAS BEEN PROPOSED FOR REVIEW OR MODIFICATION BY THE VC DANANG CITY COm1ITTF1T. THREE REGIMENTS WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE ATTACK, WITH TARGETS TO INCLUDE OBJECTIVES INSIDE THE CITY, AS WELL AS MARBLE M'OUNTAIN AIR FACILITY AND DANANG AIR BASE, 3.3(h)(2) 3 THE DELEGATES FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN HANOI PERSONALLY STUDIED THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK AND GENERAL UPRISING PLANS FOR DANANG CITY. THEY CRITICIZED THE WRITTEN REVIEWS OF THE LOCAL SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSITM Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 3(h)(2) ,SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 PAGE 3 OF 11 PAGES dant cation - diamn controls LEADERS ON THIS SUBJECT. THE DELEGATES FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE CONSIDERED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY FORCES ESPECIALLY THE U.S. FORCES, ARE STILL VERY STRONG IN DANANG CITY, THERE ARE MANY WEAKNESSES THAT THEY COULD NOT OVERCOME. AMONG THESE NUMEROUS GENERAL WEAKNESSES APPEARING IN THE WHOLE TERRITORY OF SOUTH VIETNAM IS THE DISIN� TEGRATION OF THE IDEOLOGY OF THE U.S. SOLDIERS. (THE DELEGATES SAID) THAT, BECAUSE WE (MEANING THE VC AND NVN LEADERSHIP GEN� ERALLY) COULD NOT EVALUATE THIS WEAKNESS PROPERLY, THE REGIONAL AND CITY COMMITTEES DID NOT PROPOSE OR DRAW UP A PLAN ON A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE SCALE TO CARRY OUT THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK AND GENERAL UP� RISING IN DANANG. FORCES DEPLOYED FOR USE INSIDE DANANG DID NOT EXCEED ONE REGIMENT. THE ENEMY FORCES WERE SUPERIOR TO OUR OWN. HOW, THEN, COULD WE CARRY OUT THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK AND GENERAL UPRISING? THIS MAY MEAN FORCES ALLOCATED 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) TO PENETRATE INTO DANANG DID NOT EXCEED ONE REGIMENT; NOT THAT ONLY ONE REGIMENT WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE ENTIRE OPERATION). BECAUSE OF THIS (DEFECTIVE) PLAN, THE OPERATIONS AGAINST DANANG CITY SUFFERED FROM THE FOLLOWING WEAKNESSESS: (1) THE MILITARY MAIN FORCES OF ZONE V (MR-5) DID NOT SELR Nu FORt D Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 SECRET � Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 NO FOREIGN DIScPm (classification) (di.; sem *controls) IN 53316 PAGE Li OF 11 PAGES 3.5(c) PROPERLY REINFORCE THE DANANG CITY UNIT (I.E., MILITARY FORCES OF VC DANANG CITY COMMITTEE). IN FACT, THE ZONE DID NOT REINFORCE THE DANANG CITY UNIT AT ALL EXCEPT WITH ARTILLERY UNITS. (TRANS- LATORS COMMENT: THIS APPARENTLY MEANS THAT, AS THE OPERATIONS PLAN WAS INITIALLY DRAWN UP, THERE WAS NO PROVISION FOR PAR- TICIPATION BY TROOPS NOT UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE CITY UNIT, EXCEPT FOR THE ARTILLERY SUPPORT INDICATED.) SOME OF THE SAPPER FORCES OF THE DANANG CITY UNIT HAD TO ENTER THE CITY AND DIS- PERSE INSIDE IT TO ACT AS GUERRILLAS. SOME OF THESE ELEMENTS INFILTRATED TO ATTACK HOA CUONG VILLAGE, SOUTH OF DANANG AIR BASE. THESE SAPPER UNITS DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF CARRYING OUT A LARGER ATTACK. THE MILITARY EVENTS IN DANANG SHOWED THAT THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK WAS UNCOORDINATED FROM THE FIRST MOMENT, WHILE SOME INFILTRATION FORCES ATTACKED I CORPS HEADOUARTERS-, NONE OF THE OTHER FORCES ATTACKED THEIR OBJECTIVES IN SUPPORT; HENCE THE FORCES ATTACKING I CORPS HEADQUARTERS WERE DESTROYED. THE FORCES DEPLOYED TO ATTACK T CORPS HEADQUARTERS COULD NOT SUCCEED BECAUSE THEY WERE DISCOVERED, SO THAT THEY COULD NOT MODIFY THE PLAN IN TIME. THE FIGHTING (FOR I CORPS HEADQUARTERS) WAS SPORADIC, AND COULD NOT BE CALLED SECRET NO FOREICN DISSEM Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882IN 331b ,SECRET NO FOREIGN instm (classification) (dissent controls) PAGE 5 OF 11 PAGES 3.5(c) A GENERAL RAID ATTACK. MEANWHILE, THE FORCES INSIDE THE CITY COULD NOT SEIZE THE INITIATIVE TO EXECUTE THEIR PLAN; ALL WERE COMPLETELY PARALYZED BECAUSE OF THE PROMPT COUNTERMEASURES OF THE ARMY OF THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT AND OF THE U.S. FORCES. IN FACT, FROM THE MILITARY STANDPOINT, WE ACHIEVED NO VICTORY WORTH MENTIONING IN DANANG CITY IN COMPARISON WITH THE VICTORIES IN THE OTHER PROVINCES. THE POOREST RESULTS (OF THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK) WERE IN DANANG. (2) THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE MOVEMENT WAS NOT AGITATED IN- SIDE THE CITY, AND EVEN THE MOVEMENT IN THE RURAL AREAS WHICH SHOULD HAVE SUPPORTED THE MOVEMENT IN THE CITY, WAS NOT LAUNCHED. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE WAS WEAK, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF HIGH-RANKING CADRES HAD INFILTRATED THE CITY. THE MAIN REASON (FOR FAILURE) WAS THAT THE (VC) AGENTS AND THE MASSES WERE SUPPRESSED BY THE ENEMY (AUTHORITIES). THESE HIGH-RANKING CADRES COULD NOT CONTROL AND MOTIVATE THE lissEs AND THE (VC) LEADERSHIP DID NOT EXERT CLOSE AND PROMPT CONTROL. ANOTHER REASON WAS THAT THE MASSACRE OF THE CRUEL ELEMENTS AND THE SEIZURE OF POLITICAL POWER COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT. FOR THESE REASONS, THE MASSES REMAIN UNDER THE CONTROL t T Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 SECR � Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 (classification) (disse:m controls) PAGE 6 OF 11 PAGES 3.5(c) OF THE ENEMY AND ARE OBLIGED TO CARRY OUT ORDERS ISSUED BY THE ENEMY. (3) WE COULD NOT INITIATE THE MOVEMENT TO DISINTEGRATE THE RANKS OF THE ARMY OR OF THE CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF THE GOVERN- MENT INCLUDING THE POLICE. WE COULD NOT LAUNCH THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT AND UPRISING AMONG THE ARMY AND POLICE. ON THE CONTRARY, THE ARMY AND POLICE OF THE PUPPET GOVERNMENT WERE GATHERED RAPIDLY AFTER THE ATTACK WAS LAUNCHED AGAINST DANANG. THAT MEANT THAT THE THREE-PRONGED ATTACK OF MILITARY ACTION, POLITICAL PROSELYTING, AND MILITARY PROSELYTING COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT, AND THE MOVE- MENT (FOR UPRISING) IN DANANG CITY COULD NOT CATCH UP WITH THAT IN OTHER PLACES. TO OVERCOME THE ABOVE MENTIONED DIFFICULTIES, ACCORDING TO THE DIRECTIVE OF THE HANOI CENTRAL COMMITTEE DELEGATION AND OF THE CURRENT AFFAIRS SECTION OF THE ZONE V COMMITTEE, THE DANANG CITY COMMITTEE MUST URGENTLY ^105IFY THE PLAN c MEANWHILE, THE FOLLOWING SECRET 110 FOREIGN DISSEM Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882IN 5351b �S ECRET NO FOREIGN DISSCM 01(int oistroz� PAGE 7 OF 11 PAGES PLANS MUST BE CARR IED OUT IN THE COMING PHASE. THE FOLLOWING APPARENTLY IS THE PLAN UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE VC DANANG CITY COMM ITTEE ) MILITARY: WE SHALL RESOLUTELY CARRY OUT CONTINUOUS ATTACKS, ACCORDING TO T REPORTED TO YOU ON 26 JANUARY 1968 WE SHOULD LAUNCH THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE AREA -- INSIDE OUTSIDE,AND IN THE SUBURBAN AREAS OF DANANG CITY. ZONE V COMMAND HEADQUARTERS ALREADY HAS REIN� FORCED THE DANANG CITY UNIT WITH ONE DIVISION TO CARRY OUT THIS PLAN. THE PLAN IS AS FOLLOWS: ONE REGIMENT WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE SOUTHEAST OF DANANG, I. E. , EA ST OF NATIONAL ROUTE ONE. ONE REGIMENT WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE WEST OF NATIONAL ROUTE ONE I .E THE AREA TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DANANG. ONE REGIMENT WILL BE DEPLOYED TO THE NORTHWEST OF DANANG. THIS DIVISION WILL BE SUPPORTED BY NVA ARTILLERY REGIMENT 368/B TOGETHER WITH THE FOR CES OF THE DANANG CITY UNIT. ACCORDING TO THE PLAN ALL FORCES OF THE DANANG CITY UNIT WILL MAINLY ATTACK THE OBJECT IVES INSIDE THE CITY. MEANTIME ONE REGIMENTAL UNIT WILL ATT ACK THE NHON NUOC (MARBLE MOUNTAIN) NO ruKtiGN DISSEM Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 PAGE 8 OR 11 PAGES 3.5(c) AND HOA CUONG AREAS, TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR AN ADVANCE TO THE DONG GIANG AREA (DANANG EAST) , AND AGAINST MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AT TRINH MINH THE BRIDGE. (TRANSLATOR'S COMMENT: THIS MAY MEAN THE BRIDGE ITSELF, OR INSTALLATIONS NEAR THE DONG GIANG , OR DANANG EAST, END OF THE BRIDGE.) ONE REGIMENTAL UNIT DEPLOYED TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DANANG WILL HIT HOA VANG DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS AND THE AIR BASE, THEN ADVANCE TO HOA RHAT (WEST AND SLIGHTLY SOUTH OF DANANG ACROSS ROUTE NO. I) IN ORDER TO ATTACK THE AREA BEHIND DANANG AIR BASE (SIC). ONE REGIMENTAL UNIT WILL ATTACK HOA KHANH BASE, PHU LOC, HOA MY, AND WILL CROSS HOA MINH VILLAGE TO THANH KHE. IT THEN WILL ADVANCE TO A POSITION FROM WHICH IT CAN ATTACK THE NORTH OF DANAN2 AIRBASE THEN CLEAR THE WAY TO ENTER THE CITY, WHERE IT WILL JOIN THE TROOPS OF THE REGIMENTAL UNIT DEPLOYED TO THE SOUTHWEST OF DANANG. (TRANS- LATOR'S COMMENT: THESE TWO UNITS WILL MEET AND JOIN FORCES INSIDE THE CITY.) (THE TWO REGIMENTAL UNITS) WILL THEN ADVANCE INTO THE CITY AND ATTACK DANANG JAIL, LOCATED NEAR CHO CON MARKET; THE NATIONAL POLICE STATION (I DE., DANANG POLICE HEADQUARTERS ON GIA S t(..K tT Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 tio4 , Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 NO FORtIGN bbtM (olassiftation) (diisetn 'controls) 3.5(c) PAGE 9 OF 11 PAGES LONG STREET); THE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTORATE REGIONAL OFFICE (ON LY THUONG KIET STREET); THE ADMINISTRATIVE HALL (THE MAYOR'S OFFICE ON BACH DANG STREET); THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT (CIVILIAN) REP- RESENTATIVE FOR I CORPS, (A NEW BUILDING ON BACH DANG STREET); THE HEADQUARTERS OF DANANG SPECIAL SECTOR (ON DOC LAP STREET); THE TREASURY BUILDING; AND THE BROADCASTING STATION (AT THE CORNER OF DONG DA AND QUANG TRUONG STREETS). WHILE THESE FORCES ARE AD- VANCING, THE SAPPER FORCES INSIDE THE CITY WILL CARRY OUT THE ATTACK PLAN TO DESTROY U.S. CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICES, AND TO DESTROY ALL THE OFFICES OF THE GOVERNMENT (GVN)'IN EACH QUARTER. THE SAPPER UNIT, WITH THE SUPPORT OF ARTILLERY REGIMENT 368/B WILL DESTROY NHON NUOC AND DANANG AIR BASES, AND THE SON CHA (MONKEY MOUNTAIN AREA) ROCKET BASE. THE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS OF ZONE V HAS ASSIGNED 3.3(h)(2) HIEF OF STAFF OF ZONE V HEADQUARTERS, TO BE IN PERSONAL 3.3(h)(2) COMMAND OF THE ACTION, IN ORDER TO COORDINATE THE DIFFERENT BRANCHES AND THE TROOPS (SIC) TO CONDUCT THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK AGAINST DANANG. WHILE THESE MILITARY FORCES ARE CARRYING OUT THEIR STRONG ATTACK, THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP CADRES SHOULD AGITATE FOR A SECRET NO FOREIGN DI SSW Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 IN Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 'SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSLM (Olaasilleaticn) littitann' control*/ PAGE 10 Of 11 PAGES 3.5(c) GENERAL UPRISING MOVEMENT TO SEIZE POLITICAL POWER, TO ELIMINATE THE CRUEL ELEMENTS, AND DESTROY. ALL � THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM (SIC) IN THE CITY. ACCORDING TO THIS PLAN, THEY (THE VC) HAVE 3.3(h)(2) EMPHASIZED THE LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY OF THE VC PENETRATION AGENTS IN THE I CORPS HEADQUARTERS. AND IN THE POSTS AND OUTPOSTS SURROUNDING DANANG. THESE AGENTS ARE TO RISE UP AND START FIGHTING, IN ORDER TO COORDINATE THE ATTACK FROM OUTSIDE WITH AN ATTACK FROM WITHIN.) THE MAXIMUM REQUEST (FROM HANOI?) IS TO WIN COMPLETE VICTORY IN DANANG, IF, UNFORTUNATELY, THE VC CANNOT OVERRUN THE CITY, THE VC SHOULD OCCUPY THE AREAS HOA CUONG; HOA MINH, HOA PHAT THACH GIAN, THACH THAN, BINH THUAN, AND AN HAI (VILLAGES SURROUNDING DANANG), THESE PLACES WILL BECOME STEPPING STONES FOR CONTINUOUS ATTACK AGAINST THE CITY LATER ON. THIS PLAN IS UNDER DETAILED CONSIDERATION BY THE COMMAND OF 3.3(h)(2; CHIEF OF STAFF OF ZONE V. IN ADDITION, BEFORE THE GENERAL RAID ATTACK IS CARRIED OUT, MANY STRONG ATTACKS WILL BE LAUNCHED TO OCCUPY THE POSTS AND OUT- SECRET NO FOREIGN DP:LEM 4 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 � Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 ,SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM (olaastyloaiton) (dissent eon:trigs) PAGE 11 OF 11 PAGES 3.5(c) POSTS ALONG NATIONAL ROUTE ONE, FROM DANANG TO VINH DIEN AND FROM DANANG TO KIEU DUC. ) � P1 ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO WHITE HOUSE STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS NIC NSA OCT Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO2797882 3.5(c)