VIETNAMESE ANALYSIS OF VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02799333
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 CO2799333
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS
DDI EV) OER FBIS DCS IRS AID USIA
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.
Secs. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
UKIIGIN DISStii
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
071858Z CITE
DIST 7 FEEigue5Y, 1968
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 6 FEBRUARY 196g
SUBJECT VIETNAMESE ANALYSIS OF VIET CONG TET OFFENSIVE
ACQ
SOURCE
3.5(c)
VIETNAM9 SAIGON (6 FEBRUARY 196)
3.5(c)
1. THERE HAS BEEN NEAR UNANIMOUS PRAISE BY SOUT;--I
VIETNAMESE LEADERS FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE GENERAL VO NG'uYEN GIAP" S
PLAN OF ATTACK, WHICH WAS BRILLIANTLY CONCEIVED AND AUDACIOUSLY
EXECUTED. HOWEVER IN RETROSPECT THERE 1,A7R..E. ALSO SERIOUS ERRORS
IN THE PLAN. THE LACK OF ARTILLERY IN THE ATTACK ON SAIGON IS
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SOMEWHAT SURPRISING. A NUMBER OF THEORIES ARE ADVANCED, ONE
BEING THE DISCOVERY OF A LARGE ARTILLERY CACHE BY THE AMERICANS.
ANOTHER ATTRIBUTES THE ABSENCE OF ARTILLERY TO THE ELIMINATION
OF A NUMBER OF KEY ENEMY LEADERS IN THE EARLY STAGES
OF THE ATTACK, CAUSING A BREADOWN IN COMMAND DECISIONS.
IN OTHER WORDS, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, THE VIET CONG (VC)/
NORTH VIETNAMESE (DRA) LEADERS WANTED TO HOLD OFF ON THE USE OF
ARTILLERY IN ORDER NOT TO JEOPARDIZE THE HOPE THAT THE POPULAGE
WOULD RISE AND SUPPORT THEM. POSSIBLY, IT IS CONJECTURED, IF THIS
PAST OF THE PLAN FAILED, A COMMAND DECISION COULD BE MADE TO BRING
UP SUPPORTING FIREPOWER, HOWEVER, BY THE TIME THE LACK OF A POPULAR
UPRISING BECAME APPARENT, KEY ENEMY LEADERS HAD EITHER BEEN KILLED
Op PUT TO FLIGHT OR WERE WITHOUT COMMUNICATIONS WITH THEIR TROOPS,
2. MANY GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) OFFICIALS FEEL THAT
THE BREAKDOWN OF WHAT HAD TO BE A VERY INTRICATE ANDHNELICATE.,
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK MAY HAVE BEEN A SERIOUS FLAW IN THE VC
MASTER PLAN. COVERT AND COORDINATED, NOT To relION COMPARTMENTED,
MOVEMENT OF SUCH LARGE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL INTO SAIGON AND THE
OTHER POPULATED AREAS ATTACKED, MUST HAVE PLACED A SEVERE STRAIN
ON AN ALREADY DIFFICULT COMMUNICATION PROBLEM. IN THE EARLY
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ORGANIZATION PHASE THE ENEMY WAS ABLE TO BENEFIT GREATLY FROM
THE RELAXED ATMOSPHERE OF TET, A PERIOD WHEN THERE IS MUCH
MOVEMENT IN THE CITY. BUT THESE FRAGILE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS
MUST HAVE BROKEN DOWN FAIRLY RAPIDLY TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE
ATTACKING FORCE.
3. THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT AREA KNOWLEDGE BY THOSE MEMBERS
OF THE ATTACK FORCE NOT INDIGENOUS TO SAIGON WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
CONSIDERED. AFTER INDIGENOUS LEADERS WERE KILLED, OTHERS TN THE
ATTACK FORCE MADE SERIOUS ERRORS nuE TO A LACK OF PROPER AREA
KNOWLEDGE, LEADING TO THEIR CAPTURE OR DESTRUCTION.
4. THE MAJOR FLAW IN GIAP, S PLAN WAS LACK OF TRUE APPRECIATION
FOR THE FEELINGS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. PROBABLy vC CADRES
FROM SAIGON AND ELSEWHERE HAD CONVINCED THE DRV THAT THE VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE WERE SO DISCONTENTED WITH THE THIEU/KY GOVERNMENT THAT
THEY WOULD RISE UP AND WELCOME THE INVADERS As COMRADES :k ARMS,
ESPECIALLY IF THE INVADERS COULD MAKE AN IMPRESSIVE SHOw OF FORCE,
THE TOTAL LACK OF SUPPORT MAY CAUSE THE DRV TO REEVALUATE ITS
PRESENT POSITION IN THE SOUTH.
5, A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF INFLUENTIAL VIETNAMESE THINK
THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A LAST GASP EFFORT BY THE VC AND THEIR DRV
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3.5(c)
ALLIES THEY POINT OUT THAT MOST BRILLIANT LAST GASP EFFORTS
SUCH AS THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN AND MA-NY OF THE MOVES OF FIELD
MARSHAL ROMMEL WERE STAGED "BECAUSE IT WAS THE ONLY COURSE
CF ACTION OPEN TO THEM AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME IN HISTORY". IN
BRIEF9 IT IS ALTOGETHER POSSIBLE THAT GIAP ORDERED THE ATTACK NOT
BECAUSE HE FELT THAT HE WAS OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH,
BUT BECAUSE HE WAS OPERATING FROM A POSITION OF DESPERATION. .
REPORT CLAS- RET/NO FOR
S ,RET
GROUP 1
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