CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/09/29

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02869418
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: September 29, 1953

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29 September 1953
Copy No, 37
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. J.5
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE. 200 9
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE; /.9A2/Z.: REVIEWER
Office of Current Intelligence
3.5(c)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
'USSR proposes two conferences of foreign ministers (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
\el/Viet Minh activty in Tonkin delta increasingly serious (page 4).
3. Large-scale desertions from Vietnam army training camp
reported (page 4).
4. Thai resent lack of American support in UN election (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
5. India refuses to accept Battle Act provisions as binding age 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Iranian army cautions Qashqai tribe against aggressive action
(page 6).
Comment on the status of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
/Arrest of Polish cardinal reliably reported (page 7).
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GENERAL
1. USSR proposes two conferences of foreign ministers:
The Soviet note of 28 September, as sum-
marized by the US embassy in Moscow,
answers the Western suggestion for a
four-power conference on German elec-
tions and an Austrian treaty with a proposal for two conferences
of foreign ministers.
One would be alive-power conference in-
cluding Communist China to consider means of lessening international
tension. The other, a four-power conference on the German problem,
would consider "all proposals raised in the course of preparation of
the conference." The note states in conclusion that no answer has
been received to the 28 August Soviet note on Austrian and says that
the USSR is willing to consider the question "in usual diplomatic
channels."
Comment: By proposing two conferences,
the Soviet Union has clarified its note of 4 August which created the
impression that it would talk- about the German problem only at a
five-power conference, and that such a conference must first dis-
cuss the lessening of international tensions. The USSR is attempting
to leave the agenda of the German meeting as well as that of the
five-power conference wide open and at the same time avoid the Wes-
tern precondition that free elections be discussed first.
The note suggests continued stalling tactics
on the Austrian question, probably in an attempt to gain Western
acceptance of Soviet terms through diplomatic channels before com-
mitting the USSR to discuss the issue at a conference. The Western
powers considered that their note of 2 September;, to which the
USSR is now replying, was an answer to the Soviet note of 28 August.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Viet Minh activity in Tonkin delta increasingly serious:
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the French have suffered heavy losses of both
men and materiel in the Tonkin delta and the
situation there is increasingly serious.
the Viet Minh has 30,000 organized local troops
within the defense perimeter, in addition to two regular regiments,
an attempt will be made to move the whole
320th'DiviSioh into the delta.
the first phase of the enemy fall offensive will consist of
greatly intensified attacks within the delta.
Comment: the
mop-up operation launched last week by the French with 16 battalions
to remedy the serious deterioration in their position achieved very
limited success.
By intensified guerrilla action inside the delta
and attacks in force against key objectives, the Viet Minh would be able
to upset any early offensive that Navarre may be planning.
3. Large-scale desertions from Vietnam army training camp reported:
During the first half of September, 483 Wet- 3.3(h)(2)
namese draftees deserted from the Quang
Yen camp in Tonkin,
Vietnam army officials at-
tribute the desertions to mismanagement of the camp rather than to
Viet Minh propaganda and doubt that many of the deserters have joined
the Viet Minh. I however, that the Viet
Minh is greatly increasing propaganda aimed at Vietnam army recruits.
Comment: This is the largest single number
of desertions yet reported.
The Quang Yen camp is one of three used in
training troops for the Vietnam army's new light battalions. It has
facilities for approximately 3,000 trainees.
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Generally low morale, which is the result
not only of mismanagement but of Vietnamese distrust of French
intentions, has been a continuing factor in retarding the development
of the Vietnam army, which has been considered a prerequisite to
the success of the Navarre plan.
4. Thai resent lack of American support in UN election:
A member of the That delegation to the United 3.3(h)(2)
Nations indicated on 25 September that because
of American failure to support Prince Wan for
the presidency of the General Assembly, Thai-
land's support on colonial issues could no
longer be counted on. He said that from now
on the Thai intend to work more closely with
the Arab-Asian bloc.
Meanwhile, a Thai cabinet minister informed
an officer of the American embassy in Bangkok that his government
considered the US attitude to be "a slap in the face," and stated that
the king was bitterly disappointed.
Comment: That resentment over this issue
Is concentrated among thg-MiTTOT officials who completely dominate
the formulation of Thailand's policies, and who are quite capable of
attempting to make their displeasure felt. It is not likely, however,
that this attitude foreshadows any drastic revision of Thailand's pro-
Western orientation.
SOUTH ASIA
5. India refuses to accept Battle Act provisions as binding:
The Indian government, though prepared not
to ship any IA items under the Battle Act,
has no controls on certain IB items and is
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actually exporting some of them, according to the secretary general
of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The secretary general
believed Prime Minister Nehru could not agree to the United States'
request for prior notification of any change in the situation. He
urged that since senior Indian officials are now thoroughly aware of
the implications of the Battle Act, the United States let the, matter
rest for a few months.
Comment: This statement, following Nehru's
earlier refusal to promise advance notice of the shipment of strategic
materials, indicates that no formal guarantee of any kind can be ex-
pected from India. It is possible that shipments of IB Items to Com-
munist China and the Orbit will increase as a result of the Korean
armistice.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Iranian army cautions Qashqai tribe against aggressive action:
The commanding officer of the Sixth Divi-
sion at Shiraz has been attempting to
impress the Qashqai: tribes with Iranian
military strength and has informed them
that if they cause trouble, flit army units
will act.
Comment: In spite of numerous reports
that the Qashqai are restless and with Iranian political
developments, the military authorities appear to be capable of
preventing widespread revolt.
7. Comment on the status of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations:
Cairo's public airing of the details of the
Informal negotiations over the Suez base may be a device to test
popular reaction before the regime finally commits itself. In
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inviting public reaction, the government points up the existing differences,
thus indicating that last-minute concessions may have to be made. Should
public sentiment strongly oppose any part, of the agreement, the Nagib
regime could still hold out for better terms.
The premature release by the Egyptians, on
the other hand, tended to put the British government on the spot, forcing
it to make a similar announcement. Failure or undue delay in solving
the dispute can still be blamed on London.
EASTERN EUROPE
8. Arrest of Polish ,pardinal reliably reported:
report 3.3(h)(2)
the arrest on 25 September -Of Cardinal
Wyszynski and Bishop Choromanski, sec-
retary of the Polish episcopate. In the
official Polish ommunist daily newspaper of the same date, polit-
buro member Ochab attacked the cardinal for violating the church-
state agreement of 1950 and "sabotaging" the understanding with
the government.
Comment: These arrests will evoke a
strong reaction among the people. Despite relentless attacks by
the regime over a long period of time, the Roman Catholic Church
in Poland, with the adherence of over 90 percent of the poeple, has
retained its organizational strength.
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