CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/10/14

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02869430
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: October 14, 1953

Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2869430
S7E:OP SINFORMAEL
14 October 1953
Copy Noo 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DociiMeNtNO 29
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
CI DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE. 0 .0
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: dt9,2/7..9 REVIEWER:
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
W/0 770/ 2 P S INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
101.�
Soviet Union attempts to capitalize on Trieste dispute (page 3).
1,ar Popular demonstrations in Yugoslavia believed officially
Vorganized (page 3).
Allied officials in Trieste believe Tito not bluffing (page 4),
Or Italian intelligence chief minimizes Tito's threats (page 4).
FAR EAST
Of. Chou En-lai favors solving Far Eastern questions separately
(page 5).
NEAR EAST AFRICA
6, Britain asks Iran to consider resumption of diplomatic relations
(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
VP' French propose major changes in draft Western note to Moscow
(page 6),
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GENERAL
1. Soviet Union attempts to capitalize on Trieste dispute:
The Soviet Union's demand that the UN
Security Council try again to set up an international administration
for the Free Territory of Trieste, together with the 12 October
Soviet note, represents an attempt to capitalize on the dispute in
the hope of thwarting a Trieste settlement and maintaining the pose
of upholding peace treaties.
The Soviet note did not mention Yugoslavia,
and Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow believes that the Soviet failure to
print a Belgrade TASS dispatch giving Yugoslrav reaction represents
an effort to avoid-a7frearing to support the Yugoslav position. The
Soviet maneuver, simultaneous with the Yugoslav protest, may be
Intended to create suspicions in Allied quarters regarding Soviet-
Yugoslav relations. Yugoslav delegates reportedly had attempted
to dissuade Vyshinsky from making the proposal at this time.
2. Popular demonstrations in Yugoslavia believed officially organized:
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Comment: American officials in Belgrade
have also noted that the extensive demonstrations have been directed
by the authorities and that, at least in one instance, Yugoslav press
reports have doubled the number of those actually present at protest
meetings. while the grea13.3(h)(2)
majority o the people deplore the excesses QI me moo, 90 percent
are strongly nationalistic and detest the Trieste decision.
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3. Allied officials in Trieste believe Tito not bluffing:
Yugoslav fears of Italian irredentism are 3.3(h)(2)
genuine and Allied officials in Trieste do
not underestimate the sincerity of Tito's
threat to send troops to Zone A if Italian
forces enter that area, according to US political adviser Higgs in
Trieste. He believes that Tito might still be willing to negotiate a
final solution of the question and accept Italian administration of
Zone A, but only if the zone is demilitarized.
General Winterton, commander of the
Allied Military Government in Zone A, believes the chief of the
Yugoslav mission in Trieste is seeking to avoid a head-on collision
with the Italians after withdrawal of Allied troops.
Comment: One day before Tito's speech
warning that Yugoslav trooFFWOliff enter Zone A to oppose Italian
troops, Assistant Foreign Secretary Bebler told the Turkish ambas-
sador in Belgrade that Yugoslavia was considering such action. Sub-
sequently, Yugoslav officials in Bonn and Rome have stated to US
officials that Tito's warning was sincere.
Thus, in addition to its public threats,
the Yugoslav government is making a concerted effort through diplo-
matic means to convince the West that it will use military force, if
necessary, to prevent entry of Italian troops into Zone A.
Elements of two rifle divisions and one
tank division may be in the process of moving toward the Trieste
area. There is no confirmation, however, of the entry of reinforce-
ments into Zone B.
4.. Italian intelligence chief minimizes Tito's threats:
General Musco, chief of Italian military3.3(h)(2)
intelligence, told the American army
attache in Rome on 12 October that he
was confident Marshal Tito's threats
were meaningless and that there would
e no Yugoslav re a la on against the entry of Italian troops into
Zone A of Trieste.
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Comment: Musco's opinion contrasts
with the opinions expressed by American officials in Trieste.
Italian Foreign Ministry officials have
suggested that the United States and Britain might wIsh to retain
military facilittes in Trieste, apparently in the belief that the
presence of Allied troops would act as a deterrent to Yugoslav
actions.
FAR EAST
5. Chou En-lai favors solving Far Eastern questions separately:
Chinese Co
En-lat told
in Peiping in mid-September that Com-
munist China wishes first to solve the
Korean problem and then to discuss the
questions of China's admission to the United Nations, Formosa,
Indochina, "et cetera."
pimimist nramipr rhni,
Comment: The armistice agreement
contains an "et cetera" in reference to conference agenda questions
which was inserted after the UN Command had refused to include
these questions explicitly. Chou's statement again suggests an
intention to put forward the questions of China's seat in the UN and
the status of Formosa at the Korean political conference.
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Chou previously stated that Peiping
did not wish to discuss Indochina at the same time as Korean issues.
He is making it possible for this subject to be introdu,.ed later in
the conference or, if the conference atmosphere is unfavorable, to
be considered in a separate meeting.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Britain asks Iran to consider resumption of diplomatic relations:
The British desire that diplomatic rela-
tions with Iran be re-established and that
ambassadors be exchanged was formally
conveyed to the Tehran government on
11 October by the Swiss minister.
The Iranian foreign minister expressed
doubt that public opinion was yet prepared for a resumption of re-
lations and indicated that his government might prefer to wait until
some advance toward an oil settlement made the move seem more
justified.
Comment: Britain has been ready to
resume diplomatic relations ever, since Mossadeq's removal, but has
been awaiting an Iranian initiative.
Prime Minister Zahedi told Ambassador
Henderson on 10 October that a resumption of relations prior to an
oil settlement would be exploited by the opposition as "proof" that
he was controlled by the British and Americans.
WESTERN EUROPE
7. French propose major changes in draft Western note to Moscow:
France has unexpectedly proposed that
the draft Western reply to the Soviet
note of 28 September be amended to de-
emphasize the references to Germany
and Austria and to invite the Soviet Union to discuss other subjects
as well.
The American representative at the
tripartite London meeting feels the French version might be
interpreted as a Western proposal for talks to include the Indo-
china question. He further states that Foreign Minister Bidault
apparently hopes to use the proposed changes to combat pressure
for five-power talks in the French cabinet.
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Comment: While Bidault and Premier
Laniel have denied that any decision has been reached, it is apparent
that there has been increasing support in the French cabinet for Dep-
uty Premier Reynaud's idea of five-power talks to end the Indochina
war.
The French-proposed changes in the
draft Western note would probably meet opposition from Chancellor
Adenauer, who in the past has insisted that initial agenda items for
any four-power talks should be the questions of free German elections
and the formation of an all-German government.
LATIN AMERICA
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