TERRORISM IN SOUTH AMERICA - 1976/08/09

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02869499
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: August 9, 1976

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M. .MOPANDUM
� r.crEcT?, Terrorism in South America
J.0145,76
No, 0751/76
August 9, 1976
Woproriom flourinhen on the bonen of politics.
:0!; is the delunion of thone who have lont the
capacity to dntinguiah between hope and death.
Trving Howe "The Ultima-te Price
of Random Porro7,,"
AModern terrorism invites repression. The quer-
rilla intent on provoking his enemy�the govern-
ment.--iuto acts of counter-terrorism so widespread
d so brutal that the .general. public becomes ali.en-
ned. from the government and sympathetic ti tnstep- �
',Jire cause. The lmxediate goal, according.to
Carlon Oarighela, the slain Brailian ipostle.o..7 urbam.
guerrilla uarfare, is that "the political stuation. (�):f
the country will become a military situation, and the
� of violence, the mistaken and various calamAties
� fall upon the people will he put down to 'errors'
hv ie government bodyguards."
Ac violence bnclets violence, according to this
Oectrine, the fabric of society is torn apart, demo-
� c institutions give way to anthoritarian decrees,
� a.rmed repression supplants political freedomn
'the aim of terrorism is to make life unbearable for
ordinary people, in the hope that they will eventually
Thin paper wan prepared by the Office of Current
Inteil,igenee, Western Hemisphere Division of the Central
toil onceAgency. Ali commentn and auerien nhould be
addrenned to the author,
CONFIDP
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become embittered and exasperated with their government
and clamor for change. Such a situation, Marighela
argued, could lead to the seizure of power by the guerril-
lo what he described as "a climate of collapse."
Impleved against colonial regimes, such tactics have
p7:077en successful, as in British-mandated Palestine and
C7prus. This hope has not been fulfilled, however,
h
any Latin American nation. Yet, it is precisely in
17:hose countries where political violence has become the
major policy preoccupation�Uruguay and Argentina�that
'nrrorism has been the strongest single catalytic force
in recent military coups .d'etat.
As anpolitical weapon modern terrorism dates from
the French Revolution where it was employed by the in- .
surrectionary government to instill fear and respect
for now authority in the general populace. Then, as
uf.716, terror consisted of symbolic acts designed to in-
� .nence political behavior by extraordinary means, en-
tailing the use or threat of violence. For example, .
in Cnatemala, Uruguay, and Argentina, leftist guerrillas
tlace(fl heavy emphasis on the symbolic nature of their
violent acts�kidnaping and killing military officers
and police chiefs, foreign diplomats, and wealthy husi-
nessmen�both domestic and foreign.�
The concept of terror may be old, but its effects
.are magnified by modern technology. The modern terror-
ist's arsenal includes incendiary devices, sophisticabed
bombn, and hand-held missiles. Modern psychological
r;tilelies have provided new techniques of interrogation
an." intimidation. More important, the conditions of
contemporary living and space-age communications systems
have facilitated the growth and the impact of urban -
political violence. Today terrorists feed on the. frus-
trations generated by crowded living- conditions domio-
naked by and dependent on technology, and thrive on in-
stantaneous dramatic communication of their acts by the
electronic media.
Television and, to a lesser extent, radio have
given new meaning to the 19th Century anarchist view � of
terrorism as propaganda by deed. Now guerrilla groups
can attract national or even world attention to their
cause.. The term "guerrilla theater is an apt descrip-.
tion since terrorism is often drama consisting of:. .
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Carefully staged kidnapings, as in the abduction
of the Born brothers, two wealthy Argentine in-
dustrialists whose seizure by Montonero gnerril-
lan consisted of an elaborate maneuver designed
to divert their automobile from most of their
bodyguards, in which the terrorists masqueraded
as street construction workers and policemen.
Ritual trials and executions, such as the now
famous killing of US AID official Daniel Mitrionn
hy the Trpamaros in Uruguay, or the "capital pun-
" hment" of US honorary consul John Egan.after
Argentine authorities failed to meet terrorist
demands to show several captured guerrillas "alive
and well" on television.
Newspapers have also been exploited by Latin American
guerrillas. One of the conditions for the release of the
Porn brothers was the publication of a Montonnro adver-
tisement in prominent newspapers all over the world.
Po:berto Santucho, the recently slain leader of the Ar-
gentine Peoples Revolutionary Army, invited correspond-
nuts to guerrilla press conferences. One spectacular
operation in 1973 saw guerrillas seize the editor of a
prominent Buenos Aires newspaper, and insist that the
pup or print terrorist advertisements�in direct violation
of a rnenntly enacted ban on news of query:Arm activ:itien.
Tte newspaper complied with the demands to secure the na:"fe
return of j_ts editor, and in retaliation right-wing coun-
ter-terrorists sabotaged the printing pressen. Parther
afleld, the terrorist attack at the Munich Olvmnic Carnes
gained its perpetrators the services of satellie-relayed
n;.-ernatinnal television.
Such events dramatically illustrate the fact that
terrorist tactics are aimed primarily at the people
watching and only incidentally at the victims--who often
arn innocent bystanders. The random quality of the vio-
Jenne heightens the terror and often exaggerates the
actual threat posed by the guerrilla. In renlity,..gunr-
rilla.groups in South America have never posed a.direct��
challenge to any government. Most of the groups have
en too small and weak to engage security forces directly,
and in �the battles that have occurred, as in Argentina,
tne guerrillas have taken most of the blows. An one
soholar has observed, "terror may be the weapon of lonely
-.fanatics or a huddle of conspirators intent upon forcing
.history through their own self-sacrifice and otheinpeo-
plc's blood, but rarely is it the weapon Of mass movements
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engaged in public politics."
The two most prOminent examples of South�American
nations where terrorism currently exists�Colombi.,,I.and
Argentina�support this viewpoint, Terrorism in Colom-
1)1a stll has many of the characteristics of banditrv.
enr leftist groups, most of them based in rural areas,
,2ommit robberies, armed assaults on police outposts and �
smaU army patrols, and kidnapinqs�occasionally of
wo.k7 Colombians or foreigners who are held for ransom
. (mploitation. The guerrilaa hands do not constitute
srr'Lnus subversive threat, but they are a continuing -
source of irritation and concern for security officiaJs.
In Argentina, the Peoples Revolutionary Army (EPP)
has lost its image of invincibility after more than
�ear of harassment by military forces, Hundreds of
guerrillas have been killed�including the leader,
Poheri:o Santucho�and even morn are in prison. The or-
lnzation's treasury, once estimated in millions of
rnHas is said to have dwindled to about f%ioofino0.
addition, the ERP has lost hideouts, weapons, ammu-
ticn, and documents containing valuable operational in-
:erma.tion. It is doubtful that the EPP will ever regain
itsfrmnr prominence,
'ohn other major Argentine group, the Montennros, has
suffered as well, More than seven months have ,'L-Ilased
Hice t*ontonere chieftain Roberto Quieto was calr.7e't bv
rocuritv forces. During that period the querril3i,1 Jinv
made ro imown attempt to free him or to secure his re-
One of the reasons for their failure to respond
may be that Quieto has cooperated with the security
No cannot determine how much the information pro-
vided by Quieto has hurt: the organization, hut lack of
recent violent activity suggests that 'the leftist Peron-
let are on the defensive.
. The serious reverses
the remnants of the group
Monteneros, who have long
tional Liberation Front."
suffered by the ERP may force
to try to-link up with the
advocated a broad-hased "Na-
Efforts to form such an alli-
ance in the past failed. The Montoneros, in fact, new
may he reluctant to affiliate with the survivors because
they fear the EPP has been penetrated by the police'.
AxAother possibility that is being taken nerious7y by
outh American security forces is that several guerrilla
groups are forging operative alliances to engage in trans-
rational or international terrorist activities,
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Official concern has been fueled by recent confirma-�
tion of�..the existence of an organization known as the
P.,evolutionary Coordinating Junta, consisting of guerrilla
roprescIntatives from Bolivia, Uruguay, Chiln, Argentina,
nnd� pessibly Paraguay_ The Coordinating Junta was orig-
inl=lv� organized under the leadership of the Peoples Rev-
olutionary Army, however, and despite reports of repre-
sentatives.. based in several Furopean countries., available
nvi6ence indicates that its headquarters in still in Ar-
gentina and that most of its funds, and probably its mem-
come from the FRP- If it is indeed a creature .nf
;:rcTontine terrorists, it has probably suffered with the
Oecline in their activity and strength. On the other
'S:rA the fact that the Junta has not taken credit for �
any terrorist operations�as is the customary practice
c-) individual guerrilla ..organizations�does not mean that
ithas been inactive. It would appear from captured
gnerrilla documents that the organization takes its co-
ordinating function seriously and exists for that purpose
anc'J to provide logistical support to member groups.
�;.t is the fear that individual guerrilla groups
throughout South America will Unite that has motivated �
�-,t'recent intensification in cooperation among security
�oicials in the Southern Cone. At present intelligence
vicr,.s in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paragnav,
slIji Uruguay share information on terrorist tsrgetis, rch,d� �
there are reports of plans to cooperate more extensively.,
l'enpite the fact that guerrillas seem to be losing
!:1-le battle in Argentina and are only a minor threat
elsewhere in South America, it is unlikely that terrorism
.111 disappear. Few terrorist groups anywhere have a-
ehieved of their long range objectives, hut the use
of terrorist tactics always attracts publicity and fre-
r,;uentiv wins concessions.
In South America, therefore, political, extremists �
will probably continue to establish links, and form al-n�
linacos, if only for the sake of convenience in particular
operations. The development and deployment of sophisti-
cated small arms and precision-guided munitions and their
likely acquisition by terrorists is a serious new threat.
c.T1 the other hand, the fear that terrorists will obtain
and oypiode nuclear weapons seems to he exaggerated. The
.arvival of any guerrilla movement is contingent on some
1-cit public support- Mass murder would be Cbunterpro-
iN7e. Nevertheless, the possibility that guerrillas
viIi threaten to nse nuclear weapons in order to take �
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advantage of a mass hostage situation cannot be ruled
ont.
Until now leftist guerrillas in South America have
not been completely indiscriminate in their use of ter-'
orir,t tactics, but have restricted their targets to
identified political enemies. In contrast, counterter-
roristo and in some cases government forces have threat-
'. (Ined or murdered prominent liberal members of society
not linked in any known way to the guerrillas. This is
of courF:e the response that the guerrillas seek. Yet
�
some repressive measures are officially justified .and
accepted by a frightened population on the grounds that
they redwte the effectiveness and attractiveness of ter-
rorism. Greater government controls over the news media
. with regard to reporting terrorist incidents would di-
minish the publicity that terrorists apparently crave.
A tonc7her official stance on granting political asylum
already evident in Argentina and Uruguay,. and South
2\mn7ixmln countries in general have taken an increasingly
7.olighr stance on yielding to terrorist demands.
'f:errorism poses a continuing threat to human lib-
erties and to human life. . Last year more people died
th Argentina as a result of political violence than have
been killed in Northern: Ireland in the past five years.
.�
In. all strategies of terror, there is an inherent tend-
nnCy t:r1 go beyond the limits previously accepted, formally
er *nformally, by both rulers and ruled. It is just this
, ."nne: stop further" that makes terror momentarily effec-
tive and, to some people, exciting. Except, perhaps, in
the most disciplined kinds of actions against precisely
selected individual targets, the strategy of terror can
1..trmF,:eest only through a steady abandonment of moral re-
rtraints. Regardless of the intentions the terrorists
bring to their act, it tends, out of desperation and
_.trongh�repetition, to become increasingly unselective.
Indeed it is precisely the increasing unselectivity that
mo.kos terrorism so frightening.
There are, however, political limits to the ef-
ectiveness of terrorism. Over forty years ago, one
scholar, J. B. Hardman, defined those limits:
An a complete revolutionary tactic terrorism has
never attained real success. Governments-, whether con-
_ tetvative or revolutionary, are not inclined to retreat �
before acts of terror directed against hey persons The
�� uM to power is not weakened by the exercise of power,
(2.2ac..1.4itnringl.
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and positions made vacant through the explosion of
hcalbs are readily filled., On the other hand, the will
'10 revolution requires a stronger force than the heroism
of isolated individuals or even of small, well-rIrganised
croups� The art of revolution must be sustained by the
interested will of a large proportion of the population
f-Ad by concerted mass operations,"
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