THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT RACE: THE EUROPEAN SIDE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02871869
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: March 16, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2016
• Case Number: F-2016-00985
• Publication Date: March 17, 1967

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No Fore Disseri
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
The Supersonic Transport Race: The European Side
Secret
N2 38
17 March 1967
No. 0281/67A
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THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT RACE: THE EUROPEAN SIDE
The Anglo-French developers of supersonic
transport aircraft (SST) are in a close race with
the USSR to be the first to fly a prototype. At
this point it appears the Soviets could be the
first to attain that goal, possibly even by the
end of this year--although they apparently will
not be a major competitor in the world aircraft
market.
The British and French have settled some of
their technical and economic differences about the
joint Concorde project which had caused delays and
at one time threatened to end British participa-
tion. They are now well on the way toward meet-
ing their February 1968 target date for the ini-
tial flight of a Concorde prototype.
After the first test flights technical con-
siderations will determine how soon the SSTs will
be ready for commercial use. Both the Soviets and
the British and French plan to have their respec-
tive aircraft in limited service by 1971. In the
case of the Concorde, technical problems are likely
to delay full service use perhaps by as much as
two years or more beyond 1971.
The full scope of the technical problems
likely to be encountered by a commercial airliner
flying at twice the speed of sound will not be
known until the SSTs are test flown. There are
preliminary indications, however, that trouble-
some problems will be found in the operation and
maintenance of the engine and the fuel system.
There are also problems attendant on supersonic
flight over populated areas, such as the effects
of sonic boom, that have yet to be solved.
The Anglo-French Concorde
Political, as well as eco-
nomic and technical, considera-
tions have weighed heavily in
decisions about the Concorde
project. At the time of the
program's initiation in Novem-
ber 1962, Britain was seeking
entry into the European Economic
Community, and sought to demon-
strate its interest by estab-
lishing other ties with the con-
tinental Europeans. The project
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The SUPERSONIC TRANSPORTS.....
The ANGLO-FRENCH CONCORDE
The SOVIET TU-144
RET
NO FORE1G � ISSEM
CONCORDE
TU-144
BOEING 2701
PROGRAM COST
51.4 billion
PLANE COST
521 m
�OmiMonillion
PROTOTYPE
early 1968
late '67 eark'68
late 19704
IN SERVICE
1971
late 1970-71
1974d
TOTAL No. ORDERS
72 (26 US)
10-20 derdflot
115 (57 US)
No. of PASSENGERS
138
121 (80)4
280
LENGTH
191 It.
189 ft.
306
ICIi0.ibs.
286,000 -
GROSS WEIGHT
357,000 lbs.
315,000 bs
6160,06
Mach 1.2
Mach 2.2
CRUISE SPEED
1450 mph
54,000-
Machu2.5
p 10
6M1011020.-7
CRUISE ALTITUDE
63,000 ti.
65,000 t.
68,000 ft.
RANGE
3506 n.m.
3500(25004.in.
aluminu is
4000 n.m.
METAL
aluminum
(some titanium)
titanium
a. Including 55 million for spare parts
b. Soviet claims
c. Western estimates for the 144 prototype
d. FaA est male -- no official US commitment
BOEING'S VARIABLE-SWEEP WING SST
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No Foreig
was also expected to help upgrade
the UK's slumping, state-supported
aircraft industry. In late 1964
the newly installed Labor govern-
ment in Britain had serious res-
ervations about the costs of the
project and seriously considered
withdrawing. London still harbors
doubts about the Concorde's eco-
nomic viability but seems com-
mitted to seeing it through.
The French, unlike the Brit-
ish, have never shown any doubts.
President de Gaulle views the Con-
corde as an important step in
demonstrating the technical com-
petence required of a major
power. He sees the project as
a means to enhance French pres-
tige by proving that a European
aircraft industry strong enough
to survive US competition can be
created.
Points of Difference
The British and French still
differ considerably on important
technical and economic aspects
of the Concorde project. Paris
advocates an all-out effort to
sell as many Concordes as pos-
sible before US competition comes
to bear. London on the other
hand, continues to believe that
development of an expanded ver-
sion of the present Concorde will
be necessary to compete effec-
tively with the larger Boeing
2707 SST.
The French believe the Con-
corde must be in service two
and a half or three years before
the US plane if it is to capture
a reasonable share of the market.
At French insistence, the first
sssem
prototypes will be a 126-pas-
senger version and the prepro-
duction aircraft a lengthened 138-
passenger version. The French
have flatly rejected any further
increases in size or capacity,
even though this seating capac-
ity will be only half that of
the Boeing 2707.
UK thinking follows a much
different pattern. The British
do not believe the planned pro-
duction aircraft has the optimum
economic potential. They want a
vehicle with greater passerger
capacity and more powerful en-
gines, and believe that these
technical adjustments should
be made during the development
and testing of the first proto-
types. The French refusal to
consider such design changes un-
til after the smaller version
is in service has heightened
British reservations about the
economic viability of the whole
program.
The rising costs of tYe Con-
corde have also impaired coopera-
tion between the two countries
on the project. When the pro-
gram was launched in 1962, its
projected cost was $450 million
to be shared equally between the
two governments. By late 1964
when Prime Minister Wilson took
office the project's anticipated
costs had risen to almost $800
million. At that time London
somewhat hastily informed the
French it wanted to reappraise
the program because of the rising
costs and Britain's balance-of-
payments problems, and implied
it might withdraw. After a more
considered review, the Labcr
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government decided to continue
to participate, mainly for politi-
cal reasons. Britain is now once
again trying to get into the EEC,
and if it withdrew from the Con-
corde Project while EEC negotia-
tions were in progress, De Gaulle
would certainly cite it as proof
that the UK was not sufficiently
European-minded. The estimated cost
is now up to $1.4 billion, how-
ever, and it is clear that in any
event London will continue to
have doubts about the project on
economic grounds.
In late 1966, the UK Treas-
ury and the Ministry of Aviation
for the second time in two years
refused an inquiry into the cost-
sharing arrangement between Paris
and London, despite pressure from
Parliament. Those who are push-
ing for inquiry, however, appear
concerned not so much about the
magnitude of the projected costs
as about ensuring that the
cost-sharing arrangement isequita-
ble and fairly administered.
If the French are concerned
about soaring costs, they have
not shown it. De Gaulle's po-
litical motives probably override
any qualms about diverting addi-
tional funds to the program. There
has been virtually no public de-
bate in France about pouring
money into the Concorde, even
though the French Government, like
the British will probably recover
only a fraction of its expendi-
tures for research and develop-
ment.
The difference over costs
and design, however, have made
ssem
the partners nervous about each
other's intentions. The French
are not wholly convinced that the
UK will not back out, and for
that reason are trying to hurry
the project along. The rapid
pace of the program has in turn
raised British fears that they
are being dragged along in a
dubious venture in which they
really have very little say.
The Orders Game
The developers of the Con-
corde are, of course, very in-
terested in the potential market
for their plane. To amortize
the tooling costs along, for ex-
ample, will require sales of
more than 130 aircraft. As for
research and development costs,
a portion of these is expected
to be realized from a special
levy on each plane sold. It is
not known how much this levy
will be, or how many planes would
have to be sold before all costs
could be written off.
As of 10 March 1967, six-
teen major airlines had taken
options for 72 Concordes (there
are at least 115 options for the
Boeing 2707). The options do not
commit purchasers to buy the air-
craft, even after it is certified
for commercial service. The most
recent options, for three Con-
cordes, were taken on 9 March by
the German airline, Lufthansa.
Its decision was based partly on
the "unexpectedly long period" of
waiting for the American SST, but
Lufthansa has options for three
of these too. There may be other
orders for the Concorde shortly.
SE
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The sales manager for the
British half of the project es-
timates that 100 Concordes will
have been optioned by the end
of this year, 200 by 1975, and
possibly 400 by 1980. He indi-
cates that this market assess-
ment was made on the "pessi-
mistic" assumptions that sonic
boom restrictions will prohibit
flight over land, that tickets
will have a 25 percent surcharge
for supersonic flight, and that
the US will have a highly com-
petitive plane within three years
after the Concorde enters service.
These estimates of poten-
tial sales appear overly opti-
mistic, particularly that for
1980, especially if SST flights
are restricted to over-water
routes. The operation of the
SSTs could be very profitable
for the airlines, but this
will depend on a high level
of aircraft performance, and the
Concorde has technical deficien-
cies which will have to be cor-
rected. Many airlines have taken
options on both the Anglo-French
and the American SSTs, so that the
comparative quality of the per-
formance of the two planes will
have a decisive impact on future
sales. The Concorde project will
almost certainly have to adjust
its timetable if the plane is to
be brought up to its optimum tech-
nical efficiency before it is
turned over to the airlines.
Production Progress
Cooperation between the
British and the French at the
production level has gone well.
The British Aircraft Corporation
ET
issem
and France's government-controlled
Sud Aviation have formed a company
to produce and market the Concorde.
Britain's Bristol Siddeley, and
Societe Nationale d'Etudes et Con-
struction de Moteurs d' Aviation
(SNECMA) will produce the engine.
The first prototype is being
constructed in France with en-
gines made in Britain. The first
exchange of major components
for the airframe was made in mid-
1966 on schedule. Equally good
progress is being made with the
Olympus 593 engine, about a dozen
of which were built last year.
The French-built prototype is
scheduled to be test flown in
February 1968 and to be certi-
fied for commercial service by
mid-1971. At present the de-
velopers are slightly ahead of
schedule. Work on the second
prototype, which is being built
in Britain, is about six months
behind that of its French Joun-
terpart.
The projected cost of 31.4
billion is understood to cover
the construction of the two
prototypes, two preproduction air-
craft, and two airframes for sta-
tic tests, the tooling costs for
these six planes, test flights
up to the receipt of a certificate
of air worthiness in 1971, and
the construction of 80 Olympus
engines. This figure also in-
cludes a contingency fund of
$225 million to finance two years
of further development after
certification to bring the air-
craft up to its full planned
performance and another of $140
million to cover higher wages
and other likely expenses.
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A, CONCORDE PROTOTYPE UNDER CONSTRUCTION
at Toulouse, France, 17 February 1967
=FRENCH
ReW BRITISH
BAC Weybridge BAC Ron
Hessler
BRISTOL SIDDELEY
SNECMA
SUD Bouguenais SUD Merignane HISPANO SUIZA
SUD Toulouse
BAC Filton
BA( Weybridge
.BAC Preston
SUD SI Nazaire
RO R
GAM DASSAULT
The DIVISION of CONSTRUCTION WORK on the COMPONENTS for CONCORDE
S ET
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'CRET
No Forel.
Technical Problems
Technical deficiencies in the
Concorde could delay completion of
the project two years or more.
All of the anticipated problems
can probably be solved through
normal engineering approaches,
but the British and French have
only lately begun serious study
of some of these problems. If
some of the deficiencies are not
adequately corrected in the rush
to get the plane into service,
the Concorde could be an aircraft
of very marginal performance re-
quiring extensive ground main-
tenance time.
The initial service design
is expected to contain short-
comings in range performance,
in the operation of equipment,
and in maintenance. The most
serious of these problems are
likely to involve the engine.
The design changes made to date
have required significantly more
engine development than originally
planned. The changes made to in-
crease the thrust of the engines
may mean that either the load
(138 passengers) or the range
3,500 nautical miles of the ve-
hicle will have to be reduced.
Moreover, the development of new
engines with even greater thrust
must be started soon, if growth
versions of the presently pro-
jected aircraft are to be ready
in time to meet the demand.
There is also concern that
the time between overhauls of the
engine will be too short. Neither
France nor the UK has a lubricant
that is satisfactory for more than
100 hours of operations. The Con-
corde is programed initially
Page 7
Dissem
for a minimum of 500 hours be-
tween overhauls.
Another potential hazard
relates to the fuel system. The
French plan to use a sealant in
the fuel system which US experi-
ence shows is not satisfactory
in an SST. If this sealant is
used, frequent draining, cleaning,
and resealing of the fuel tanks
would be required to prevent
serious corrosion. This type of
maintenance involves difficult
procedures which necessitate a
great deal of ground time. This
would be unacceptable to the air-
lines, because of high rate of
utilization is necessary to make
operation of the Concorde profit-
able.
The airframe of the Concorde
will be constructed of an alumi-
num alloy. The French have de-
veloped a new spot welding tech-
nique that will be used along
with conventional riveted and
bolted construction. The aim
is to develop a structure with a
flying life of 45,000 hours. The
partners appear to have exercised
very thorough quality control in
the development of the airframe.
Aluminum has basic limitations, how-
ever, and in order to fly faster
than the Concorde's planned speed
of 1,450 miles per hour, the air-
frame, or at least the mos vul-
nerable parts of it, must be con-
structed of a stronger metal,
like titanium.
There are other potential
troubles for the Concorde, as
well as for the US and Soviet
SSTs, the seriousness of which
will not be fully determine& un-
til the prototypes are test-
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flown. For example, there are
uncertainties about the effect
of drag--the resistance to
movement brought to bear on a
plane by the air through which
it passes. The turbulence at
the altitude the SSTs are to fly
will be severe. One US Air Force
test pilot compared supersonic
flight at 70,000 feet with travel
in a Greyhound bus going over a
washboard road at 200 miles per
hour. Certain American aeronau-
tical engineers have doubts that
the Concorde builders have yet
taken these problems seriously
enough into account.
Two further problems not di-
rectly related to technical per-
formance are sonic boom and the
limitations imposed by today's
airport facilities. The sonic
boom caused by an SST can shat-
ter windows and do other physi-
cal damage that go beyond mere
annoyance for people on the
ground. Neither Concorde partner
apparently gave this problem much
consideration. Each simply took
eventual public acceptance for
granted, until tests conducted by
the US Government demonstrated
the seriousness of the problems
of supersonic flight over popu-
lated areas. The British are now
studying the problem, but what
recommendations, if any, they
have come up with are not known.
The British say they would be
satisfied to concentrate on put-
ting the Concorde into use ex-
clusively on over-water routes,
but the French expect the plane
to be used on routes over con-
tinental Europe.
Most airports do not have
all the facilities necessary to
handle SSTs. The necessary land-
ing strips, maintenance facili-
ties, guidance systems and the
like will be installed in time,
but for at least a decade or so
the lack of proper facilities
will probably limit use of the
SSTs. Airport noise will be an-
other problem. The noise level
of a supersonic plane flying at
subsonic speeds is somewhat higher
than that of today's largest sub-
sonic jet airliners. The Con-
corde's developers believe the
difference is not great enough,
however, to preclude eventual
public acceptance of the nui-
sance.
The Soviet TU-144
The Soviet Union may be the
first nation to fly an SST, but
apparently will not be a major
competitor in the world aircraft
market. The Soviets have not
seriously competed for options on
their TU-144. The Soviet state-
ment that only 10 or 20 SSTs will
be needed by Aeroflot, the So-
viet civil airline, also suggests
that the USSR does not plan to
manufacture the TU-144 on a large
scale.
The TU-144 prototypes will
probably be unable to achieve
the flight performance presently
being advertised by the Soviet
Union. Although the Soviets
have announced that the TU-144
would have a range of 3,500 miles
and a passenger capacity of
121, Western estimates indicate
that the aircraft will not attain
that capability. Its range may
be as low as only 2,500 miles
with 80 passengers, or 1,800
miles with a full load of 121 pas-
sengers.
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No Forel.g.
The USSR first displayed a
model of the TU-144 in June 1965
at an international air show in
Paris. This showing was followed
by a propaganda campaign indica-
ting that the USSR intends to be
the first country to fly an SST.
To achieve this end the Soviet
aircraft industry is believed
to be working to complete a pro-
totype late this year, perhaps
on the occasion of the 50th an-
niversary of the Bolshevik Revo-
lution, or early in 1968. Even
if the test flight is delayed
until early 1968, Soviet SSTs
could enter limited Aeroflot
service by late 1970 or early
1971 provided the Soviets over-
come the same problems that
threaten to delay the Concorde's
timetable. Like the developers
of the Concorde, the Soviets will
not be aware of the full extent
of some of these problems until
their SST is test-flown.
Future Developments
The developers of both
the Concorde and the TU-144 will
Dissem
continue to work toward geIting
a prototype into the air wLthin
a year. Their progress beyond
that point will depend a great
deal on the seriousness of the
technical problems they encoun-
ter in test flights, on the ex-
tent to which corrective measures
have been tentatively deve_oped,
and on the level of perfornance
each developer will deem sdtis-
factory for his aircraft.
The technical deficiencies
will almost certainly prove
formidable enough to delay cer-
tification of the Concorde be-
yond the target date of mi.-
1971. Whether Whether the developnent
of the TU-144 is also held up
probably hinges on how wel:
the Soviets have anticipated the
expected technical deficiercies
and developed possible remedies
for them, a question about which
very little information is avail-
able. (SECRET NO FOREIGN EIS-
SEM)
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