CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/07/28

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
02872247
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
July 15, 2019
Document Release Date: 
July 22, 2019
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 28, 1953
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PDF icon CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15677520].pdf233.59 KB
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' A.* F Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872247, og,/ TOP S ET INFORMATION SEC r /4, 28 July 1953 Copy No. 67 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN DOCUMENT NO. - 3 ) NC CHANGE IN CLASS I CIEC.:i ,r,C3IFI7.:) 3.5(c) (LAS:;. CH:V�K;I"J3 TG: (70"1 T3 ADA fitIte(*.CLREVIEWER: HiViAgs /14 NEXT i'111,!!EW E� 3.5(c) Office of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TOPS RET SECU INFORMATION A Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872247 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872247 lir- I SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) SUMMARY GENERAL 3.3(h)(2) SOVIET UNION 2. Moscow reaffirms post-Stalin policies (page 3). 3. Comment on return of Melnikov to official status (page 4). SOUTHEAST ASIA 4. French promise Cambodia independence (page 4). NEAR EAST - AFRICA 5. Mossadeq reportedly unable to decide on future action (page 5). 6. Comment on Lebanese elections (page 5). EASTERN EUROPE 7. Imminent high-level personnel changes rumored in Prague (page 6), 8. Rumania reported suspending work on Danube-Black Sea Canal (page 6). WESTERN EUROPE 9. Comment on changes in East German politburo (page 7). * * * * -2 TIO) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872247 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872247 Nitre Uf CJU1 CURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) 1. GENERAL 3.3( SOVIET UNION 2. Moscow reaffirms post-Stalin policies In a lengthy TASS release of 25 July, the 50th anniversary of Bolshevism, the Kremlin strongly reaffirmed the concil- iatory foreign policy and internal "liberalization" program which have developed since Stalin's death. Lenin was quoted on the possibility of "lasting coexistence" and also on the need of the West for trade with the Soviet bloc. Minimizing Stalin's role in party history, the editorial em- phasized the recent theme of collective leadership and warned that "the cult of the individual.., has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist concepts." - 3 - TOIET h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872247 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872247 SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) 3. Comment on return of Melnikov to official status: The appointment of L. G. Melnikov as Soviet ambassador to Rumania suggests that his earlier disgrace was engi- neered by Berta in the power struggle which resulted in the latter's arrest. Melnikov, an alternate member of the top party presidium at the time, had been ousted on 12 June from his position of leadership in the Ukraine on charges of harsh Russification of that republic's western oblasts. His re-emergence supports previous indications that the now scrapped anti-Russification propaganda campaign had been a Beria crea- tion, 4. French promise SOUTHEAST ASIA Cambodia independence: its latest note to Cambodia, the French government reaffirms its intention to allow the Kingdom,of Cambodia to attain complete independence and sovereignty. It offers to discuss any outstanding problems. Ambassador Heath in Saigon believes that this meets Cambodian demands but fears that the king may be influ- enced by his advisers to continue in his present wary attitude toward the French. Comment: The French note is unprecedented in promising full independence. The essence of the Cambodian demand, however, is that France acknowledge that Cambodia is actually, not merely potentially, independent. The Cambodian prime minister, after a visit to the king's headquarters, announced that France and Cambodia had reached agreement "in principle." -4 11-)P-StET 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872247 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872247 Num: tcr, SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) NEAR EAST - AFRICA 5. Mossadeq reportedly unable to decide on future action: The recent letter of President Eisenhower and 3.3(h)(2) the continued absence of Ambassador Henderson have made Prime Minister Mossadeq unsure concerning his future course of action, the American embassy reported on 25 July. In addition, the Tudeh's impressive display of strength during the 21 July demonstrations and the failure of the prime minister's negotiations with the Soviet Union to arouse alarm in the United States have added to Mossadeq's uncertainties. As a result mainly of the president's letter, some of Mossadeq's more moderate backers appear to be reconsidering whether to support him. Comment: Mossadeq has long attempted to stimulate American fear of a Communist take-over in Iran, in order to get financial and economic aid from the United States. The evidence of a lack of American support and the significant increase in Tudeh capa- bilities may be causing him to re-examine his tactics. 6. Comment on Lebanese elections: The first free elections in Lebanon returned a 44-man unicameral legislature of generally middle-class political Individualists interested in an independent, Western-oriented state. These elections break the power of the feudal sheikhs largely responsible for the corruption of the government and legalize the forced removal of the Khoury regime last fall. They also mark a definite trend away from the leftism popularly embodied in the demagogic chieftain, Kamal Jumblatt, who is the sole representative of his socialist party in the new parliament. S ince this election returned legislators as Individuals rather than party members, the resulting parliament is likely to be disunited and unstable at least for a time. - 5 - 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872247 Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2872247 I SECURITY INFORMATION 3.5(c) EASTERN EUROPE 7. Imminent high-level personnel changes rumored in Prague: Rumors of imminent changes in the Czech Communist Party and government hierarchy persist in Prague despite the reappearance after prolonged absences of most of the Czech leaders. The most recent rumors center about the replacement of Pre- mier Siroky. He and President Zapotocky are rumored to have returned recently from high-level consultations in Moscow. The American embassy believes that the Czech government will probably announce policy changes 'on the Hungarian mod- el as "paper concessions" to the disgruntled populace. It does not fore- see, however, any major purges resulting from the Berta affair. 3.3(h)(2) _ Comment: If the Czech regime softens its in- ternal policy, one or more leaders will probably be replaced. Abolition of the presidency has long been expected in line with general Orbit policy, in which case Zapotocky would probably be eliminated from the govern- ment but retain his leading role in the party. 8. Rumania reported suspending work on Danube-Black Sea Canal: The American lezation in Bucharest reports that work was suspended on the Danube -Black Sea Canal on 20 July and that all "free" labor was shifted to harvesting in the East Danube grain belt. The legation believes that this move may be designed to ensure the harvesting pro- gram, remove prison labor from the canal before visits of members of International Youth Festival, or possibly to cut', baek the long-range investment program. Comment: The Danube-Black Sea Canal, originally planned for completion by 1955, is still in an early stage of construction; work might be suspended on it in order to shift re- sources to other parts of the economy where more immediate re- sults would be obtained. - 6 - T9ISEC