CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/08/02

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02872250
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: August 2, 1953

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SECURI NFORMATION
2 August 1953
Copy Na. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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DATikl,,Qi!..17 REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Noe SECUItITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
/USSR may not seek place in Korean political conference (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Viet Minh expands sabotage program in Tonkin (page 3).
Or Indonesian Communists outline national front policy (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Iranian Communists reportedly concentrate on agitation among the
peasants (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
5. New Communist moves expected to counter Berlin food relief
program (page 5).
6. France plans to send additional metropolitan battalions to Indochina
(page 6).
7.
3.3(h)(2)
(page 7).
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GENERAL
1. USSR may not seek place in Korean political conference:
Soviet UN delegate Tsarapkin, in separate 3.3(h)(2)
conversations on 31 July with a UN Secretariat
member and a US delegate, pointed out that the
Korean armistice agreement calls for a political
conference "of both sides." He indicated his
inability to understand the belief among UN delegates that the General
Assembly had the specific responsibility for naming participants in the
conference.
Comment: These statements suggest that the
USSR may wish to avoid playiTh'�Viii overt role in the political conference
called for by the Korean armistice. Tsarapkin's remarks,after discussing
alternative possibilities a few days earlier, probably reflect Moscow's
instructions to express a preference for a limited conference.
The Kremlin may consider that overt parti-
cipation would have disadvantages overbalancing the propaganda
opportunities of the forum. Its alliance with Peiping would require it to
support fully China's demands concerning the UN and Formosa, and thus
jeopardize its attempts to improve relations with the Western powers.
The USSR may also calculate that it can better exploit differences among
the non-Communist powers over Far Eastern questions from a flexible,
behind-the-scenes position.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
2. Viet Minh expands sabotage program in Tonkin:
The chief of staff of the French air force in
Tonkin, commenting on the sabotage of a
military DC-3 at Gialam airfield near Hanoi
by a time-bomb, states that Tonkin airfields
can operate safely only by excluding all Indochinese personnel. The
American consul notes that the pattern of sabotage has now been ex-
tended to include all forms of communication in Tonkin.
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Comment: The Viet Minh during the past few
months has stepped up, its program of sabotage within the delta and has
demonstrated improved techniques against rail and rbad communications
and supply installations. The apparent ease with which such activities
are conducted illustrates the fundamental insecurity of this heavily in-
filtrated area.
3. Indonesian Communists outline national front policy:
In outlining the program for such a government he included security
measures against armed Moslem groups, imprisonment of pro-Western
army elements who led the abortive coup of 17 October, increased
governmental responsibility at a local level, nationalization of foreign
enterprises, abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, and the
accession of Netherlands New Guinea.
Comment: The draft program of the new
Indonesian cabinet closely parallels the national front program outlined
by the Communist central committee,providing another example of
Communist influence in the present government.
At the same time the Communists reportedly
are increasing their capabilities fo*" paramilitary activity. An "elite,"
armed ;Communist group of undisclosed strength is believed to have
been organized recently in Java, and other reports indicate extensive
Communist infiltration of other dissident groups.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4. Iranian Communists reportedly concentrate on agitation among the
peasants:
Comment: Tudeh agitation was largely res-
ponsible for the bloody clashes between landlords and peasants in the
strategic Azerbaijan province last spring,
a resurgent Tudeh is 'paying more
attention to the organization of peasants.
Widespread activity in the rural areas could
create a serious problem for Iranian security forces, particularly
since Prime Minister Mossadeq is now apparently accepting Tudeh
support and may therefore not order necessary countermeasures. The
rural areas are the strongholds of Mossadeq's conservative opposition.
WESTERN EUROPE
5. New Communist moves expected to counter Berlin food relief program:
3.3(h)(2)
American officials in Germany believe that
the East German government may approach
High Commissioner Conant, directly or
through.,. Soviet officials, to demand the
release of blocked East German funds in the
United States for the purchase of food.
Premier Grotewohl recently demanded
release of the funds and said his government
is willing to buy American food at world market prices.
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US officials in Germany fear that any increased
attempt to,publicize the American role in the Berlin food relief plan
might be used as an excuse,not only for further Soviet intimidation of
persons bringing food parcels across the border but also for the closing
of the East-West Berlin border and for new interference with food
shipments from West Germany into Berlin.
Comment: Communist retaliation has so
far been limited to isolated seizures of food and identity cards, pre-
sumably because harsher measures would seriously 'Upset current Soviet
conciliatory policies. Official ,r6quests to:I:much-ate food:from-the,
blocked account might bolster the weak Communist propaganda response
to the food program, even though the account totals only about $1,400,000.
6. France plans to send additional metropolitan battalions to Indochina:
French commissioner general Dejean told 3.3(h)(2)
Ambassador Heath in Saigon on 29 July that
Paris has agreed to initiate the "Navarre
plan," but cannot carry it out completely until
funds are available. According to the reported decision, nine battalions
will be sent from France on 1 October and the battalion now in Korea
will be added if the UN Command consents. Additional cadres, non-
commissioned officers, specialists and cargo planes will also be sent.
Dejean pointed out, however, that these
reinforcements and the formation of new Vietnamese battalions would
not enable Navarre to undertake an all-out offensive in the next few
months, but only a stepping up of limited offensive moves.
Comment: Navarre is reported to have
requested 15 battalions from France. The reinfok�cements now
promised are not scheduled to leave France until the time autumn
hostilities usually begin in Indochina.
This policy of reinforcing Indochina, apparently
a triumph for Foreign Minister Bidault, cannot be expected to survive
over the long term unless the military situation undergoes marked
improvement in the coming months,
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