CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02887894
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: June 21, 1953

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SECU INFORMATION
TOP S RET
US OFFICIALS ONLY
21 June 1953
Copy No. 6 7
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
0///710103,A
TOP SE ET
SECURITY ORMATION
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
ye Ambassador Bohlen comments on probable Kremlin reaction to
Berlin riots (page 3).
FAR EAST
/ Comment on Communist letter of 20 june on Korean talks (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Chinese Communists pushing new road toward northwestern
Indochina (page 4).
4. Recent developments sharpen Vietnamese fear of French bid to
Viet Minh (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Communists demonstrate impressively in Iran (page 6).
6. Comment on probable postponement of Arab Collective Security
IX" Pact meeting (page 6).
Conflicts reported between top Egyptian leaders (page 7).
WESTERN EUROPE
8. Stand-down of Soviet air activity noted during Berlin disorders
(page 8).
9. Further deployment of Soviet troops in East Germany observed
(page 8).
10. Mayor Reuter to renew official demand for all-Berlin elections
(page 9).
11. West German opposition leader reiterates stand against German
neutralization (page 9).
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CURITY INFORMATION
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SOVIET UNION
1. Ambassador Bohlen comments on probable Kremlin reaction to Berlin
riots:
Ambassador Bohlen believes that the Berlin 3.3(h)(2)
riots will forcibly impress on the Soviet leader-
ship the dangers to a dictatorship inherent in a
program of relaxation and liberalization, but that,
nevertheless, the reforms in East Germany are likely to go forward.
The ambassador considers that the reforms
were motivated primarily by the domestic situation. They stemmed
from the realization by the new Soviet rulers that a continuation of
intensified socialization there would lead either to economic and politi-
cal catastrophe or would require methods of open terror which they were
unwilling to employ.
Pointing to the fact that in its treatment of the
Berlin situation the Orbit press had printed an almost unprecedented
admission that a working class could oppose a Communist regime, and
to the stress put on the need for greater consideration for the masses,
the ambassador suggests that the reforms are likely to continue. Under
Stalin, the reverse would have been almost certain.
Comment: The Kremlin's dilemma in the face
of the East German situation is deepened by the fact that in the other
Satellites no liberalization has been evident. If reform is applied solely
in East Germany and the USSR, Satellite discontent is likely to become
an increasingly acute problem.
FAR EAST
2. Comment on Communist letter of 20 June on Korean talks:
The Communists in effect have now suggested
to the UN Command in Korea two alternative courses of action toward
Syngman Rhee, both of which would prove difficult to carry out. They
clearly believe themselves to be in a strong position to await develop-
ments.
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One course is to conclude a truce which includes
South Korea. In this event,the Communists request assurances that the UN
Command can and will control Rhee. 11 hey further demand the recovery of
the released prisoners, who have disappeared among a friendly Korean
populace. An effort to recover them would be largely unsuccessful and
could lead to bloodshed.
The other alternative is to conclude a truce
which excludes South Korea. In this event, the Communists seek assurances
that the UN Command can and will implement the armistice agreement
despite Rhee's opposition. This course, which the Communists probably
prefer, might involve armed conflict between South Korea and other UN
forces and would in any case make it difficult or impossible for Rhee to
obtain outside support in resisting a later invasion from North Korea.
SOUTHEAST ASIA.
3. Chinese Communists pushing new road toward northwestern Indochina:
The Chinese were energetically pushing con- 3.3(h)(2)
struction of a motor road toward the north-
western corner of Tonkin in early 1953,
3.3(h)(2)
The first 30 miles
from Mengtze, the southern end of the Yunnan railroad, southwestward
to the Red River were finished in February. Work is now in progress on
the next section to Chinho (see map, p. 5).
Comment:
his road construction which would enable the Chinese Com-
munists o supply and support directly any future operation in Laos.
At present the only motor road from Yunnan into Indochina runs from
Mengtze to Lao Kay considerably east of this new road.
3.3(h)(2)
4. Recent developments sharpen VWnamese fear of French bid to Viet Minh:
The long-standing fear among Vietnamese 3.3(h)(2)
leaders that France might attempt to negotiate
with the Viet Minh has been heightened by
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RITY INFORMATION
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Korean developments and the near-investiture as French premier of
Mendes-France who had advocated such a course, according to Governor
Tri of Tonkin. Tri told the American consul in Hanoi that he and his
associates are determined to resist such negotiations at all cost.
Tri inquired what the American position would
be if the French should make a bid to the Viet Minh. He was skeptical
that, in the case of a certain political combination, in France, the United
States could exert enough pressure to force the French to remain in
Indochina.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Communists demonstrate impressively in Iran:
The government-sponsored mass demonstra-
tions in Tehran on 19 June included only about
3,000 progovernment participants, but brought
forth an independent demonstration by 12,000
well disciplined Tudeh sympathizers, carrying numerous anti-American
banners. Prominent Mossadeq supporters were impressed by the
Communist performance and disappointed by their own showing.
Comment: The embassy report contrasts
sharply with local radio and press reports which variously refer to
100,000 progovernment demonstrators and to clashes between Tudeh
and Mossadeq supporters who would not permit the Communists to join
their ranks.
3.3(h)(2)
The Tudeh's disciplined exhibition is more
impressive and more ominous in implication than mob violence. Al-
though the party is outlawed, it has long been rated by embassy observers
as the strongest political group in Iran.
6. Comment on probable postponement of Arab Collective Security Pact
meeting
A postponement of the scheduled 25 June meeting
in Cairo to work out details of the Arab Collective Security Pact would
highlight Arab disunity and inability to organize the defense of the Middle
East.
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Public statements and behind-the-scene
maneuvering reveal Arab preoccupation with local problems and
widespread suspicion of each other's as well as Western, motives.
Syrian and Jordanian officials have made it clear that they have
other commitments on that date. The Iraqi ambassador in Cairo
has predicted postponement. Egypt has urged the meeting, but the
proclamation of the Egyptian Republic may divert attention to other
problems.
Arab officials show awareness of their
inability to erect an effective defense system on the basis of the
Collective Security Pact, but are opposed to a Western-sponsored
Middle East defense organization. They are primarily interested in
an arrangement with the West under which they could obtain con-
siderable amounts of arms and equipment.
7. Conflicts reported between top Egyptian leaders:
A policy clash between General Nagib and
Colonel Nasr precipitated the proclamation
of the republic on 18 June
This action came after t�da.ys of struggle between agin an
Revolutionary Command Council, which was ready to strip him of
his powers.
3.3(h)(2)
General Nagib had sought to end military
interference with the work of the ministries, whereas powerful Colonel
Nasr tried to weaken Nagib and postpone the establishment of the repub-
lic. Nagib is left with the presidency but without any direct control of
the armed forces and the ministries.
Comment: This is the sharpest manifestation
of the long-suspected division in the Revolutionary Command Council,
which personal jealousies threaten to accentuate. This split concen-
trates power in a military clique less inclined than Nagib to moderation
in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.
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WESTERN EUROPE
8. Stand-down of Soviet air activity noted during Berlin disorders:
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
there was virtually a complete
stand-down of the Soviet 24th Air Army
in East Germany, commencing 1300Z on
une, wnicn was smi continuing as of 1500Z on 19 June. During
this period only two fighters and some transport aircraft were air-
borne; at the same time, there was unusually extensive ground-to-
ground tuning on fighter and air warning circuits.
This inactivity is almost certainly related
to the disorders in the Soviet sector of Berlin and other parts of East
Germany.
Comment: These steps probably were part
of general security measures pending determination of the extent of
the uprisings. They may also have been due to Soviet concern over
possible military action by the West.
9. Further deployment of Soviet troops in East Germany observed:
According to observations on 18 June by
members of the British Military Mission
in Potsdam, Soviet troops in battle dress,
together with light artillery, tanks and
armored cars, were stationed around Magdeburg, Halle, Leipzig,
Meissen and other unspecified major cities in East Germany. The
British officers were not allowed to enter these cities, so that it
was not possible to determine whether the Soviet troops had been
sent to quell disturbances or merely to surround the cities to pre-
vent possible uprisings.
Comment: This is the first reliable report
of the deployment of Soviet troops in East Germany outside of East
Berlin in connection with the recent disorders.
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10. Mayor Reuter to renew official demand for all-Berlin elections:
In a meeting with the Allied commandants
of West Berlin, Mayor Reuter stated that
he felt it necessary to renew an official
demand for all-Berlin elections to restore
normal life and free circulation throughout the city.
Comment: Last April, a similar proposal
planned by Reuter and Erich 011enhauer, chairman of the Social
Democratic Party, was blocked by the Allied High Commission on
the grounds that it mi ght stimulate a Soviet counterproposal on the
all-German problem which could be embarrassing to the Allies.
This possibility still exists.
The unification of Berlin would have great
appeal for West Germans in the light of recent events and would
involve far fewer complications than all-German unification. Further-
more, a unified Berlin would presumably remain under four-power
control.
11. West German opposition, leader reiterates stand against German
neutralization:
Erich 011enhauer, chairman of the opposition
Social Democratic Party, has told HICOG
officials that while he hopes the Western
powers will call a four-power conference
athtpoffsTbiedate, his party will oppose a neutralized
Germany and insist on fulfillment of the five points laid down by
the Bundestag on 10 June.
On the other hand, Heinrich von Brentano,
Christian Democratic leader in the Bundestag, told HICOG that he
hoped the Berlin demonstrations would ease the pressure for four-
power talks, at least during the German election campaign. He
nevertheless endorsed the idea of talks between the four high corn-.
missioners to discuss free movement of persons and food supplies
into East Germany.
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Comment: The Bundestag% five points
include: free all-German elections, establishment of an all-German
government, the right of this government to negotiate a peace treaty,
the settlement of all boundary questions, and freedom of alliance.
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