CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/06/25

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02887897
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: July 15, 2019
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2019
• Publication Date: June 25, 1953

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SECUPJ1 INFORMATION
25 June 1953
Copy No. 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECU I RMATI
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SECURITY INFORMATION
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Relaxation of China trade sanctions after Korean armistice
foreseen (page 4).
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on 1953 Soviet state loan (page 4).
FAR EAST
"South Korea reportedly able to return majority of escaped
prisoners (page 5).
tolor Peiping approaches India for information on Korean prisoners
. iron nen c\
Vet
6. British minister to South Korea sees drastic UN retaliation
necessary (page 6).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
7. French high commissioner fears Cambodian unrest and favors
grant of independence (page 7).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
8. Resignation of Iranian oil sales director caused by failure of
government's oil policy (page 7).
9. India and Pakistan unable to promote reopening of Suez talks
(page 8).
10. Colonel Nazi.% drive for power rouses Egyptian army discontent
h,(page 8).
a )
L(pibgyean9 king and prime minister reportedly reach agreement
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EASTERN EUROPE
12. Comment on cancellation of Albanian agricultural debts (page 10).
13. No disturbances observed in Poland following East German
outbreaks (page 10).
WESTERN EUROPE
kille Churchill's motives
vt( (Page 11).
in anticipated British policy statement assessed
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GENERAL
1. Relaxation of China trade sanctions after Korean armistice foreseen:
A British Foreign Office official predicts
early relaxation by smaller UN nations of
restrictions on trade with Communist China
following a Korean armistice. The Foreign
ice ctoubtS that l3rttam will be able to hold the line in controlling
trade with China if other nations relax.
Comment: Various of the smaller nations'
delegates on the China CorriiTteT,m particularly the Danish, have re-
peatedly questioned whether the committee's work on determining
embargo criteria for China will continue after a truce in Korea.
SOVIET UNION
2. Comment on 1953 Soviet state loan:
The Soviet announcement of a 1953 state
loan only half as large as the 1951 and 1952 loans suggests that
the Malenkov regime has gone even further than previously indi-
cated in shifting resources from heavy industry production to con-
sumer goods. The loan is as much a means of limiting consumer
purchasing power as it is of obtaining funds for "development" of
the national economy.
In the past two years, the state loan has
provided about seven percent of budgetary revenues. The bonds
will theoretically be redeemable in 1973, but in the past such loans
have in effect been repudiated before the redemption date, as in
the case of Czechoslovakia's recent currency reform. These "vol-
untary" loans are always oversubscribed because they are collected
automatically by payroll deductions.
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FAR EAST
3. South Korea reportedly able to return majority of escaped prisoners:
Ambassador Briggs reports that information
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cates that the South Korean government is
probably capable of returning a majority of
the escaped POW's to UN Command custody. The prisoners, whom
the Rhee government apparently intends to conscript for labor and
military service, are believed to be in hiding near the camps from
which they escaped while awaiting identification cards and further
orders from government officials. Many local residents reportedly
are reluctant to assist prisoners because of the expenses involved
and fear of UN reprisals.
85
percent of the escapees in the Masan area refused to serve in the
South Korean army and are being threatened with forcible return to
the POW camps by South Korean authorities.
4. Peiping approaches India for information on Korean prisoners:
Communist officials, according to Prime 3.3(h)(2)
Minister Nehru, have indicated to the Indian
embassy in Peiping their "great concern"
as to whether all Korean prisoners unwilling
to be repatriated have been released, and
whether those released are being impressed into the South Korean
armed forces.
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The Chinese professed to need assurances
on these points as bearing on the good faith and ability of the UN
Command to fulfill the draft armistice terms.
Comment: Approximately 8,000 prisoners
who are unwilling to be repati---7�ated remain under UN Command con-
trol, according to a press report of 23 June.
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5.
6. British minister to South Korea sees drastic UN retaliation necessary:
The view of the British minister to South
Korea is that UN "retaliation" must be
drastic if it is to be effective, the US
embassy in London reports. This view
is based on the minister's belief that South Korean opinion is
strongly behind Rhee and that "pinpricks" would serve only to
increase Rhee's following and to strengthen his determination to
go his own way.
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Comment: While the Korean people are
behind Rhee on the POW release, Ambassador Briggs has reported
that the Korean people are apathetic and would probably accept a
UN-sponsored truce despite their bitterness over Korea's continued
division.
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
7. French high commissioner fears Cambodian unrest and favors grant
of independence:
The French high commissioner in Phnom
Penh told the American charge on 22 June
that he fears the king may have so excited
the Cambodian people that it will be difficult
to keep control until a French government can act. He believes that
once France has a government, differences with Cambodia can be
settled and he is prepared to go to Paris to argue the need for Cam-
bodian independence.
The charge noted that the king's actions
were apparently producing results, since the high commissioner had
not previously spoken so resignedly regarding Cambodian demands.
Comment: While there is no evidence of
an imminent revolt in Cambodia, the king's increasing association
with anti-French elements and a sense of frustration might impel
him to initiate an uprising unless very substantial concessions are
soon granted.
A French government could scarcely con-
sider granting independence to Cambodia until it is ready to grant
It to Vietnam and Laos also.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
8. Resignation of Iranian oil sales director caused by failure of govern-
ment's oil policy:
Abbas Parkhideh, sales director of the
National Iranian Oil Company, told an
American embassy official that he re-
signed on 17 June in order to escape being
made the scapegoat for the failure of his
government's oil policy.
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Parkhideh said prospects for oil sales were
very dim in the absence of a settlement with the British because Japan
will not allot more foreign exchange to buy Iranian oil and Italy refuses
to issue import licenses for the oil.
Comment: The resignation of Parkhideh,
who has been the key figure in Iranian attempts to sell oil, is strong
evidence of the bankruptcy of Mossadeq's oil policy and may foreshadow
greater financial difficulties for Iran.
9. India and Pakistan unable to promote reopening of Suez talks:
Pakistan's prime minister and its minister
of foreign affairs have not offered Egypt a
formula for solving the Anglo-Egyptian con-
troversy, and India is not expected to present
one either, according to the Egyptian foreign minister.
Conversations in Cairo among the Pakistanis,
British and Egyptians were encouraging, but elicited no promises from
either Egypt or Britain, according to the Pakistani foreign minister.
Comment: Both Egypt and Britain have
hoped that Indian and Pakistani intervention would at least lead to
reopening the Suez negotiations, which were suspended on 6 May.
There are indications that Egypt will keep
its internal situation under control until after the Bermuda conference,
where it hopes the Suez issue will be discussed.
10. Colonel Nases drive for power rouses Egyptian army discontent:
Colonel Nasr, who assumed the posts of
vice premier and minister of interior on
18 June, allegedly also wants the office
of vice president, which would formally
esigna e him as agib's successor.
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Comment:
Nasr intends to assume the premiership within two months and
relegate Nagib to the ineffectual role of president.
On several occasions in past months there
has been discontent and plotting within army officer ranks. While
the present dissatisfaction may influence Nasr to move more
cautiously, all previous attempts at revolt against the Revolutionary
Command Council have been quickly suppressed.
11. Libyan king and prime minister reportedly reach agreement:
Prime Minister Muntasser of Libya has
indicated to American minister Villard
in Tripoli that he has reached an under-
standing with King Idriss and does not
intend to resign at present.
Muntasser stated that he expected to
conclude negotiations with Britain regarding a base agreement
in approximately 10 days and would then be prepared to open
similar talks with the United States.
Comment: While Muntasser's position
at the head of the government seems assured for the time being,
there is no indication that he and the king have resolved their basic
differences and that the monarch will discontinue his interference
in the country's affairs. This fact and Muntasser's overoptimism
make it premature to consider that Libya will soon reach an agree-
ment with Britain and the United States on the base negotiations.
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EASTERN EUROPE
12. Comment on cancellation of Albanian agricultural debts:
The cancellation of accumulated debts of
the Albanian peasantry for the years 1949 through 1952, decreed
by the Albanian Council of Ministers on 22 June, is the first relaxa-
tion of the socialization program in any of the Satellites except East
Germany since Stalin's death. This announcement marks a reversal
of agricultural policy in Albania, where as recently as 19 May the
Council of Ministers decreed that unfulfilled collection quotas for
1952 were to be met by the peasants in addition to those for 1953.
According to the new decree, unfulfilled
payments of cereals, vegetables, fodder crops, and dairy products
are to be cancelled. The announcement also called for the immediate
revamping of crop collection legislation, "in connection with other
favorable measures to the peasantry."
13. No disturbances observed in Poland following East German outbreaks:
No unusual security precautions were observe3_3(h)(2)
in Poland by an officer of the American embassy
in Warsaw who traveled from Berlin to Warsaw
on 22 June. This contrasts with the Russian
soldiers stationed at strategic points along the rail line in East Germany.
Other officers of the embassy who just completed
three-day automobile trips through southern and western Poland reported
that they had observed no indications of disturbances.
Comment: It is in this area of Poland, as
well as in Warsaw, that a tightening of security would be expected to
occur first if the regime were fearful of spontaneous outbreaks. No
popular demonstrations or increased security measures have been
reported in any of the Satellite countries following the East German
demonstrations, although the news spread quickly throughout the
Communist bloc.
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WESTERN EUROPE
14. Churchill's motives in anticipated British policy statement assessed:
15.
Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler states
that Prime Minister Churchill will almost
certainly make a foreign policy declaration
before leaving for Bermuda in which he will
again express an "independent" British attitude. Butler observes
that Churchill's statement will be aimed at convincing public opinion
that Britain is cooperating with the United States as an independent,
if not equal partner. Such statements will in no way affect the British
government's "complete devotion" to Anglo-American cooperation as
fundamental to its foreign policy.
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Ambassador Aldrich comments that Churchill
Is impelled to assert his "independence" by domestic political considera-
tions, his concept of his own historical role, and strong Commonwealth
support. He feels confident that the prime minister greatly desires the
Bermuda conference to reaffirm the identity of British and American
objectives.
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