CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1953/03/01
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
02900527
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
July 15, 2019
Document Release Date:
July 22, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 1, 1953
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULL[15671669].pdf | 194.17 KB |
Body:
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SEC INFORMATION
1 March 1953
Copy No. 5]
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REVIEWER:
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. Brazil may introduce resolution on Korea (page 3).
FAR EAST
2. Set fighters probably transferring from Manchuria to Shanghai (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Burma will place Chinese Nationalist issue before UN (page 4).
4. Rebellion of Shans in eastern Burma reportedly planned (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5.
6. Comment on the Iranian situation (page 6).
7,
8.
WESTERN EUROPE
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GENERAL
L Brazil may introduce resolution on Korea:
The Brazilian delegate to the United Nations
has drafted a resolution on Korea which he
believes would counteract any Soviet cease-
fire proposal. This is a reversal of his
earlier stand against any new resolution.
The draft notes the Communist rejection of
the Indian resolution, calls on member states for full support of the
UN effort, and proclaims UN willingness to convene special sessions as
required by the Korea situation.
Comment: At a 19 February meeting of UN
members supplying troops for Korea, it was agreed that the United
States would draft a resolution reaffirming the General assembly stand
on the Indian proposal. It was further decided to hold this resolution in
reserve, awaiting Soviet action.
This Brazilian tactic is likely to attract
�
considerable support from other Latin American delegations.
FAR EAST
2. Jet fighters probably transferring from Manchuria to Shanghai:
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Twenty-six MIG-15's of the Chinese Communist
18th Air Division flew from Peiping to Muting
on the Shantung Peninsula on 26 February.
These aircraft, previously noted flying from
their home base in Manchuria to Peiping, are
believed en route to a new base at Shanghai.
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Comment: The first indication that the 18th
Air Division might be transferring to the Shanghai area was a 3.3(h)(2)
"test flight" by one of its transport aircraft to a point at least as far
south as Shanghai.
The arrival of this combat-trained unit in
Shanghai would represent the first known re-disposition of military forces
from Manchuria to the East China coast since the deneutralization of Formosa.
Other reports, though unconfirmed, of naval activity at Swatow, of mine laying
at the mouth of the Yangtze, and of a rocket launcher battalion in the Shanghai
area, also suggest that the Chinese Communists are bolstering their East
China coastal defenses.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3. Burma will place Chinese Nationalist issue before UN:
The Burmese Foreign Minister has informed
the American Ambassador in Rangoon that
his government has decided to place the Chinese
Nationalist issue before the United Nations. A
statement to this effect, a copy of which is being given to the Chinese Com-
munist Ambassador, will be made to parliament by the Prime Minister on
2 March.
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Previous plans to submit the case to the UN
were not carried through because of lack of sufficient evidence as to the
sources of Nationalist supplies, reluctance to admit Burma's inability to
suppress the Chinese intruders, and fear that relations with friendly
countries would be adversely affected.
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4. Rebellion of Shans in eastern Burma reportedly planned:
5.
A rebellion of the Shan tribal group in eastern
Burma is being planne4
reportedly envis-
ages cooperation from the Chinese Nationalists
in that area. The plotters allegedly have been
promised arms from Thailand.
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Comment: The Shans, a normally peaceful
people who number slightly over 1,060,000, live in the areas where the
Chinese Nationalists have been most active. They have long been dis-
satisfied with their status as a minority group in the Burmese Union.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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6. Comment on the Iranian situation:
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The crisis brought about by the Shah's decision on
28 February to remain in Iran has resulted in a struggle between Prime Min-
ister Mossadeq and an anti-Mossadeq coalition of army, Court and religious
leaders, headed by the fanatical religious mullah and Majlis President
Ayatollah Kashani.
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the army strongly sup-
ports the Shah, who made his decision after secular and religious leaders
urged him to stay and after crowds demonstrated outside the palace. Although
order has been restored for the time being, supporters of Kashani and of re-
tired General Zahedi, often mentioned as a possible successor to Mossadeq,
are active.
Nevertheless, the Prime Minister has in the past
retained control of the government through superior initiative. Despite his
failure to sway the Majlis on the evening of 28 February, he has reportedly
announced that he would ask for a vote of confidence and has asserted that
if his position is not clarified within 48 hours he will appeal directly to the
people. The Majlis is currently considering a bill introduced by his sup-
porters proclaiming its loyalty to the Shah but its support for the Prime Min-
ister. On 1 March the Tudeh reportedly came out in support of Mossadeq.
The Prime Minister's position is more precarious
than at any time since he came to power in 1951, but the Shah's vacillating
nature and conflicting interests of the opposition favor Mossadeq.
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